Banana Split
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AbstractBanana prices within the European Union are almost double world levels. These prices are maintained by restrictive import quotas and tariffs. These policies generate rents that accrue to distributors and producers. The European Union is obliged to remove its quantitative restrictions and replace them with differential tariffs that are likely to give preference to existing quota holders on exports from ACP countries. The removal of binding quotas will remove the quota rents. The impact on export country producers depends on the rents they currently receive. Indications are that a relatively small proportion, perhaps €60/tonne, of the rents are currently accruing to ACP producers. Quantitative analysis suggests that the loss in rent received
by producers from an EU
free market in bananas would be more than offset by the expansion of
EU imports by 37 per
cent. Under these circumstances ACP exports to the EU are estimated to
expand 8 per cent
and non-ACP exports by 45 per cent. EU consumers and suppliers to the
US market would
also gain, while distributors would experience a loss in quota rents.
A preferential tariff of €75/tonne on imports from non-ACP suppliers
would revise these impacts on ACP and non- |