by
Patrick McConney and Robin Mahon122
Summary
This paper focuses on issues affecting the management of fisheries when fisheries authorities are small, as is typical in most Small Island Developing States (SIDS), but also the case in many developing countries regardless of their size. SIDS are often stewards of large ocean spaces relative to land area, population and size of economy. Consequently, even if proportional in size to their populations, fisheries departments of SIDS are small relative to the ocean space they must manage and to the importance of fisheries in the society and economy. This is especially so in the contexts of food security, social structure, culture and environment. The fisheries management issues for SIDS have become increasingly urgent as they struggle to cope with their commitments, binding or otherwise, to international fisheries agreements and international programmes of action (IPOA). Following the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), which highlighted the need for action in fisheries and set time targets for stock rebuilding, ecosystem-based management and implementation of IPOAs, the urgency is even greater. Much of the problem in the structure of small fisheries authorities is that they are modelled on large fisheries management agencies in large and/or developed countries, often with large commercial fisheries. Sustainable fisheries will be difficult to achieve unless there is a better fit between the scales of management and management capacities in SIDS. There is a need to research appropriate structures and functions for small fisheries authorities. Ideas are shared on some of the issues and possible answers that will require further dialogue and development at sub-regional, regional and international levels to ensure that real progress is made.
1. INTRODUCTION
The 1994 Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in Barbados focused world attention on this group of territories whose limited size has several consequences for natural resource management. Based on a global analysis of several fishery-related characteristics, Mahon (1996) found that SIDS differ more from mainland countries than among themselves. SIDS are typically the stewards of large ocean spaces relative to land area, population and size of economy. Consequently, even if proportional in size to their populations and comparable to other governmental agencies with terrestrial jurisdictions, the fisheries departments of SIDS are often small relative to the ocean space that they are expected to manage and small relative to the importance of fisheries to the society and economy.
In addition to this issue of scale there is the associated matter of inadequate management capacity in relation to responsibility. Fisheries management issues have become more challenging for SIDS as they struggle to cope with their commitments to international fisheries agreements and international programmes of action (IPOA) (FAO 1995 and 2001, UN 1995). The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) highlighted the need for action in fisheries and set time targets for stock rebuilding, ecosystem-based management and implementation of IPOAs. Capacity constraints have been highlighted in the first and second workshops as factors that contribute to the unsustainability of fisheries. Insufficient and inappropriate capacity both need to be taken into account. This paper addresses mainly the latter.
A significant problem with small fisheries authorities is that they are modelled on large fisheries management agencies. In large countries and developed countries there are usually large commercial fisheries. While this may also be true of some SIDS, it is more common to find a larger number of smaller scale fisheries, not all of which are commercial. Scaling down a fisheries authority based on the template of that found in larger and developed countries is not what is required in many cases. Sustainable fisheries require a better fit between the scales of management and management capacities in SIDS. There is a need to research appropriate structures and functions for small fisheries authorities. Ideas are shared here on some of the issues and possible answers associated with this dilemma. Further dialogue and development is required at sub-regional, regional and international levels to ensure that real progress is made in ensuring that the fisheries of SIDS can be sustainable.
2. SIDS AND UNSUSTAINABILITY
Forty small island developing states are members of FAO. According to the FAO (2004), “effective fisheries management, implementation of national and international legal instruments, capacity building and institutional strengthening, statistical systems and good governance are the key issues for [sustainable] fisheries development in SIDS”. We do not dispute this assessment, but would argue that perspectives on these issues, and hence proposed solutions, may determine whether interventions lead towards real sustainability or tend to perpetuate unsustainable conditions, although perhaps with some more favourable characteristics. For example, more and better trained staff will almost certainly be an asset, but capacity added to an inappropriate discipline or programme will not facilitate real progress.
The FAO FishCode SIDS project notes that “the nature of problems faced by SIDS with respect to the effective conservation and management of fisheries resources are not vitally different from those of other states. However, SIDS are considerably disadvantaged in that they do not have the same range of solutions to these problems that larger States have at their disposal”. These statements point to the need for special emphasis to be paid to scale and capacity even within the realm of conventional solutions to fisheries problems. This also holds true for emerging alternative directions in fisheries management, especially for small-scale fisheries (Berkes et al. 2001).
Scale and capacity are recurrent themes in the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (also called the Barbados or SIDS POA). Extracts are in Box 1.
| IV. COASTAL AND MARINE RESOURCES |
| Develop and/or strengthen national capabilities for the sustainable harvesting and processing of fishery resources and provide training and awareness programmes for the managers (Government and local communities) of coastal and marine resources. |
| X. NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY |
| Improve access to financial and technical assistance in order to strengthen national institutions and administrative and operational capacity. |
Box 1. Extracts from the SIDS POA concerning scale and capacity
Source: Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States
These themes also feature in the more recent 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (Box 2).
| 58. Small island developing States are a special case both for environment and development. Although they continue to take the lead in the path towards sustainable development in their countries, they are increasingly constrained by the interplay of adverse factors clearly underlined in Agenda 21, the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the decisions adopted at the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly. This would include actions at all levels to: |
| (a) Accelerate national and regional implementation of the Programme of Action, with adequate financial resources, including through Global Environment Facility focal areas, transfer of environmentally sound technologies and assistance for capacity-building from the international community; |
| (b) Implement further sustainable fisheries management and improve financial returns from fisheries by supporting and strengthening relevant regional fisheries management organizations, as appropriate, such as the recently established Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism and such agreements as the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean; |
| (c) Assist small island developing States, including through the elaboration of specific initiatives, in delimiting and managing in a sustainable manner their coastal areas and exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf, including, where appropriate, the continental shelf areas beyond 200 miles from coastal baselines, as well as relevant regional management initiatives within the context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the regional seas programmes of the United Nations Environment Programme; |
Box 2. Sustainable development of small island developing States
Source: Chapter VII of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation
The challenge is to match the scale of management and capacity to the features of SIDS fisheries in order to address factors of unsustainability. The obstacles identified at the Bangkok Workshop were:
In summary, the Mauritius Workshop found that important components of sustainability included:
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Fisheries managers and scientists are acutely aware of scale issues even outside of the context of SIDS. Making matches among the scales of fish stocks, fishing fleets, marine jurisdictions, labour force, enforcement capability, management agreements, benefits from fisheries, operational budgets and the like are at the heart of fisheries management in any country. However, taking note of the FishCode observation quoted above, fisheries managers in SIDS are often faced with fewer solutions, especially if they rely upon the conventional interventions developed by and for larger countries with different characteristics.
The perspective of scaling management used in this paper concerns matching the capacity that a fisheries authority has at its command, either in-house or out-sourced, to the types of management that are most appropriate for the situation. In the same way that “conflict resolution” evolved into “conflict management” as resolution proved elusive, there are growing tendency references to “capacity enhancement” rather than “capacity building”. The distinction is that just as conflicts may never be resolved, but they can be managed, it may never be feasible to build capacity to an optimal level, but one can enhance it to become more effective. In many cases, although the development language of capacity building is still being used, SIDS fisheries authorities realise that only enhancement is within their immediate reach. Few fisheries units can claim to have built capacity at a rate faster than the increases in their responsibilities and demands upon staff. The ideal management capacity may not be attainable on any reasonable time scale in relation to the growing threats to the sustainability of fisheries discussed in the previous workshops on unsustainability. Capacity has many definitions and is a multi-dimensional concept (Box 3).
As an example, the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI) has developed a framework for capacity building that contains seven main elements organisations should focus on, illustrating the breadth of capacity building beyond training:
|
Box 3. Dimensions of capacity
Source: Krishnarayan et al. (2002)
The remainder of this paper uses the conceptual framework of capacity in Box 3 as a perspective on the factors of unsustainability. The points raised are intended to stimulate discussion and encourage learning y doing through exploration of new options.
4. SCALING MANAGEMENT AND CAPACITY
4.1 World view and culture
The model of large fisheries departments in large countries or developed countries is one with a variety of professional capability in the form of different persons to cover a range of responsibilities including: biology and stock assessment, economics, sociology, fishing technology, post-harvest technology, marketing and distribution, international relations and community development. This model is based on the conventional approach to fisheries management with heavy dependence on stock assessment and economic modelling, requiring intensive data collection, technical analysis and top down enforcement (Mahon 1997). The inclusion of social sciences is slowly increasing. In some countries private or parastatal agencies may be contracted to provide skills, but this is an exception. Reasons for this model being inherited by or transplanted to SIDS as part of their world view and organisational culture include the following.
Within this model, assuming that the SIDS department has gone beyond administering primarily capital projects for mainly economic fisheries development (e.g. wharves, processing plants, vessels), fisheries management is often perceived as a biological matter. Hence, personnel with training in biological and environmental sciences may predominate in this next phase of small fisheries department evolution. Where coastal management authority is shared by the fisheries agency there may be coastal ecologists, physical planners and engineers or technicians. Natural and physical sciences prevail. The Appendix contains, for illustration purposes only, a few examples of structures found in SIDS and developing countries. There is no blueprint solution for the ideal fisheries authority scale and capacity, but from the many different existing arrangements it should be possible to develop criteria on what works and what does not. Lessons learned should be shared and used to guide public administration choices, decisions and the direction of public sector reform.
It may not be useful to apply purely technical and mechanistic solutions to scale and capacity problems. One needs to examine entire organisational climates and cultures. Organisations quickly develop distinctive climates and cultures that shape the perspectives of those who work within them. This can be the result of customary practices that come to dominate the nature of the organisation. For example, the Fisheries Division in Barbados changed in character from a highly technical and innovative unit in the early 1960s to a more administrative unit by the late 1960s (Research and Productivity Council 1981). This reflected the more service-oriented and socialist immediate post-independence period. To reorient the unit towards scientific and developmental programmes in the 1980s required as much attention be paid to the organisational climate as to any technical matter.
One of the consequences of SIDS fisheries authorities recognising that they lack capacity is for them to accept, and perhaps even embrace, the position of underdog. This often occurs when fisheries units placed within large agriculture ministries are neglected, and are forced to struggle in the context of public administration. The world view of an underdog is narrow and constrained. It can become defeatist when the ideal, big country fisheries agency model, is unrealistic and unachievable. This perspective must change to one of being a champion that regularly faces and overcomes challenges if the SIDS units are to re-define their approaches to fisheries management. Organisational behaviour and management are not typically taught in fisheries courses. Therefore, an external catalyst or change agent may be required to instigate the process of transformation by the introduction of new ideas based on lessons learned elsewhere that can be adapted and applied to a particular SIDS situation.
If the SIDS unit has a vision for what it should be in the future, then the change process is more likely to occur smoothly. Without a clear vision, integrated within a planning process, the advice of an external catalyst or change agent may be implemented without reference to the organisational culture. This may become an obstacle to effecting change. In cases where fishing industry associations and cooperatives are part of the management structure the government fisheries authority may be the external change agent. One of the fundamental difficulties in bringing fishing industry organisations into management to increase the effective capacity of the fisheries authority is that these groups may have organisational cultures that are very different from the fisheries authority. These differences have to be recognised, respected and accommodated. The vision, management plans and objectives should be developed in consultation or collaboration with stakeholders using a participatory planning process. Such a process was used with the Barbados sea urchin (‘sea egg’) fishery (Mahon et al. 2003). In this process stakeholders come to appreciate the trade-offs among competing and conflicting management goals, and that it may only be possible or feasible to agree upon broad reference directions rather than more precise reference targets and limits (Berkes et al. 2001).
4.2 Structure and adaptive strategies
Determining how small fisheries departments in SIDS should best be structured to achieve sustainable fisheries is a complex challenge. It depends on a number of contextual factors. These are primarily the scale, value and diversity of the fisheries to be managed. If there is a large, valuable resource (such as tuna) then a small island may be more able to afford a large, conventional fisheries department. Most often this is not the case. SIDS often have a large number of small-scale fisheries each of relatively low value (Mahon 1997). Their aggregate value may be high, and each small fishery requires some management, but few warrant a full conventional management approach. In this situation, a small fisheries department may have sufficient resources to address only one or two fisheries properly. The other fisheries may be left unmanaged. However, it is not uncommon for a department's scarce resources to be spread across attempts to conventionally manage all of the fisheries so that no fishery is well managed. This challenge, at national and regional scales of management, has drawn attention in the Caribbean (Chakalall et al. 1998, Haughton et al. 2004).
Small fisheries departments with few staff (between one and ten persons having specialist fisheries technical or scientific training) are vulnerable to perturbations such that they may routinely do little more than “fire-fighting”. Despite having fisheries management and strategic plans with scheduled work plans to guide implementation, a SIDS fisheries authority may be overwhelmed by matters that small size and limited capacity tend to magnify. Small crises, that may occur frequently, can bring the more demanding, planned, operations of a small department to a halt. SIDS fisheries units need to realistically determine their performance limits and limitations. This is where adaptive strategies that allow an organisation to change according to real demand without becoming diverted from the vision are important (Berkes et al. 2001).
Regarding institutional sustainability, each staff member possesses a significant proportion of the small fisheries department's institutional memory and learning. If a few high level individuals leave in a short space of time this can result in loss of continuity in the activities and strategic directions being pursued under approved management plans. This loss of human capital may occur due to staff taking up training opportunities overseas (and often not returning), low opportunity for advancement within the small organization prompting resignation, a lack of options for career advancement in the wider public service due to perceived niche training, or even early retirement due to the several frustrations of such working conditions. This situation is exacerbated by the difficulty in establishing operational and informational systems for institutional memory in small fisheries departments due to inadequate resources. Thus filing systems, computerised records and data processing routines may not persist. More attention needs to be paid to internal governance and systems to enhance organisational resilience.
The structure envisaged for small fisheries departments puts operational emphasis more on technical coordination than on actual technical activities. This includes managing projects and facilitating multi-stakeholder and iterative planning/implementation/review processes. Being much more people-centred than the conventional approach, this operational mode requires greater emphasis on planning and process, including an appreciation of social and economic systems to balance the concentration on ecosystems. Social-ecological systems thinking is gaining recognition in the context of resilience (Berkes and Folke 1998; Olsson et al. 2004).
Planning and process can stabilize small departments at several levels. Government ministers and senior bureaucrats frequently move from one ministry to another due to political elections and public service re-shuffles. The existence of plans and established processes can provide stability, particularly when these plans have wide stakeholder support. Within small departments, stability can be enhanced by plans reducing the influence of strong personalities. Without planning, strong personalities may lead departments astray or concentrate decision-making and leadership in one person. When this person leaves, the department may be left in a dysfunctional state. This reinforces the need for institutional analyses and capacity assessment to address personnel dynamics at all levels, and to tackle the area of political will in relation to capacity where policy-makers pay insufficient attention to capacity issues.
4.3 Skills and material resources
We suggest considering management approaches that are much less technically-based or intensive (lower demand for data and analysis). It is becoming clear that much can be achieved in managing fisheries through effective planning, coordination and consensus building by integrating basic technical and scientific information on catches and fleets with stakeholder knowledge of the situation (Mahon 1997, Johannes 1998). We advocate utilising traditional ecological knowledge and other forms of local knowledge. This approach requires a differently structured and staffed fisheries department (Berkes et al. 2001, Allison and McBride 2003). The key new skills include strategic planning, project development and management, social science, negotiation and facilitation. These are seldom taught in the natural science or technical training programmes to which most fisheries managers are subjected during typical career paths. This illustrates the need for reviewing and revising fisheries curricula at tertiary education institutions and training centres worldwide.
There are several additional implications to the alternative structure and operational mode proposed above. There may be greater dependence on skills that are currently external to the fisheries unit. Technical inputs could be contracted on a project basis or as opportunities arise. These options require linkages with sources of the technical skills. These skills are available on the international market, but there are advantages to developing local and regional capacity. The latter is favoured by most SIDS occurring in geographic clusters reinforced by political and economic alliances. SIDS consultants, NGOs and academic institutions can become a part of this capacity building strategy (Chakalall et al. 1998).
There are also small, but not trivial, examples of areas in which administrative change can be more strategic. Travel to workshops and training courses, with associated per diems, may increase the annual salaries of fisheries officers substantially. For example a two week trip to a workshop with US$ 100 per day surplus per diem (after hotel and food costs) would leave participants with US$1 400 in pocket. For a fisheries officer with an annual salary of US$ 14 000 the trip can provide a ten percent supplement to annual salary. Consequently, in the absence of transparent planning, activities that include well-paid travel may get priority. In a small fisheries department, several such absences per year can wreak havoc. It is clear that travel is necessary, and may need to be increased in some cases to allow adequate representation of SIDS in certain forums, but travel should be part of a fisheries strategy wherever possible. Making this clear and explicit can be advantageous where reduction in travel to technical meetings is one of the most sacrificial areas of budgets controlled by political decision-makers.
4.4 Linkages and feedback
The approaches suggested also lead to increased emphasis on regional coordinating organizations that can provide expertise to several SIDS or assist with the linkages to expertise. Networking among regional stakeholders is essential for them all to be informed and coordinated in their actions on the international stage. The balance, and perhaps trade-offs, between building and using national and regional capacity needs to be carefully planned and incorporated into national policy. Models of national/regional arrangements that take advantage of limited resources are only now beginning to emerge in some locations (Sydnes 2001, 2002). Centres of excellence for fisheries can be developed. Regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) can serve this purpose (Haughton et al. 2004). This further complicates the matter of national investment in management, because regional institutions must be supported from national funds, usually at the expense of the national institutions. Thus it can be expected that, in addition to collaboration between the two levels, there will be tension and perhaps conflict that should be managed by persons with appropriate training.
There is also a tendency for small fisheries departments to be highly influenced by one or a few high level individuals, either positively or negatively. Where the fisheries sector or authority has little political or economic appeal (perhaps few linkages to political reality) the senior officials in a small fisheries department may operate unmonitored by the parent ministry in most of its operations. Where fisheries is seen as an obscure technical specialisation, the persons leading management can often have a freer hand in carrying out activities with less ministerial scrutiny than counterparts in agriculture or tourism, for example. The consequences may be good (progressive) or bad (regressive) depending on whether such leaders seize the opportunity to introduce new unconventional approaches appropriate to SIDS, or to maintain approaches that are conventional but not appropriate to SIDS.
The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries urges the integration of fisheries into coastal management. Planning and process are valuable in governance, and essential when dealing with a wide range of stakeholders such as the integrated coastal management that is critical for highly vulnerable SIDS (Clark 1992, Manson and Die 2001). Participatory planning has numerous benefits, including facilitating accountability and transparency, and opening communication channels between authorities and other stakeholders (McConney et al 2003). Under these conditions fisheries unit staff cannot easily deviate from what is planned without explaining their reasons to stakeholders. Such communication is also part of participatory monitoring and evaluation (Abbot and Guijt 1999). Planning also includes prioritization which reduces the opportunities for ad hoc activities. Small fisheries departments are particularly susceptible to diversion of staff time into ad hoc activities. Often these may be high priority to particular individuals while being of low priority in the overall scheme. Some cases of this are foreign travel and the pursuit of special interests through opportunistic projects that are inconsistent with the plan. For example, a fisheries officer with strong interest in reef conservation may shift the departmental focus in this direction while providing limited attention to offshore fisheries. Formal planning can provide the balance and prioritisation to overcome these problems, assuming that there is effective oversight or monitoring of planned performance.
Planning that includes stakeholders increases the chances that they will buy into the plan (create or strengthen ownership) (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001, Mahon et al 2003). It requires information exchange and the capacity for stakeholders to participate effectively in planning. Political will is stimulated by participatory planning as it becomes easier to 'sell' the plan to the political directorate if they believe that it reflects popular opinion or has widespread support among the electorate. This has assisted in the easy approval of successive Barbados fisheries management plans.
Planning and building consensus can shift the distribution of power through knowledge among stakeholders and strengthen upward and downward linkages from decision-makers through fisheries officials to industry and community stakeholders. This also facilitates lateral communication with non-fishery stakeholders in the public and private sectors such as those concerned with tourism and shipping. It is especially important that fisheries managers in SIDS not ignore the inter-sectoral and inter-agency linkages that often receive less attention in larger countries where redundant capacity is affordable.
4.5 Resistance to the changes proposed
Not surprisingly, there is typically some resistance to participatory planning as it may reduce existing freedom, particularly of those in power. In a small fisheries department, with everyone in daily communication, planning may also be perceived as time wasting and redundant. Particularly for those without a management background, participatory planning may also be seen as difficult, and not a comfortable mode of operation for persons with a natural science background. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that there is very little guidance in fisheries literature on how to approach the planning process for fisheries management and even less for how best to structure and organise fisheries departments. A systemic/structural impediment to planning is that most post-colonial administrations remain formally rigid, slow to adapt and unwieldy. In these cases change is often informal and unplanned. It will be necessary to actively promote and experiment with planned change. This requires adaptive strategies that incorporate institutional learning.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Issues relating to the appropriate scale and capacity of small fisheries departments in SIDS are complex. There are questions about the benefits of top-down versus bottom-up management, what are appropriate capacity and capacity building or enhancement, and the consequences of wider public sector reform. These issues are also relevant to larger fisheries departments in developed countries and public sector administration in general. A small fisheries department cannot simply be a miniature of a large one. When this is attempted, the functions become compressed into a few individuals who cannot possibly have the capacity required to carry them out effectively. Critical mass is lacking. Since fisheries in SIDS are no less complex than those in larger and/or more developed countries it is unreasonable to expect that they can be managed with less capacity if conventional approaches are used. Key capacities for SIDS include fisheries assessment, participatory management planning, integrated decision-making, appropriate innovation, management of change and the institutional learning.
The issues identified relating to small size of fisheries departments make it difficult for SIDS to achieve WSSD targets. The appropriate scale and capacity of a developing country fishery department being based on levels of financial support that are related to the value of resources to be managed is a topic that has not been systematically addressed. Similarly, although the need for improved planning processes is frequently identified, there is little to guide managers in these areas. Systematic research to address these fisheries issues has been minimal in the area of public administration. Practical recommendations for improvement do not appear to be reaching SIDS fishery managers. Institutional strengthening and capacity building continues as if the models to follow are self-evident except in cases where specific agencies have learnt from their own experiences. Few of these lessons are shared internationally compared to other, more technical, aspects of fisheries management.
If these issues are to be addressed, they must be brought into active discussion with programmes developed to focus on solving them. There is the need to conduct research on the appropriate scale and capacity of small fisheries departments worldwide. Some of the proposed approaches are being implemented in SIDS. A synthesis of what works and what does not work in SIDs around the world would useful. Alternative structures and mechanisms to ensure the stability and resilience of small fisheries departments must be explored. There is an urgent need to develop literature that can provide guidance on the optimal planning and operation of these departments. While this paper did not address these topics comprehensively, it raised key issues which can serve to stimulate further discussion on the topic and reduce factors of unsustainability in fisheries.
APPENDIX
Figure 1. Grenada Fisheries Division
Source: McConney 2003
Figure 2. Belize Fisheries Department
Source: McConney, Mahon and Pomeroy 2003
Figure 3. Barbados Fisheries Division
Source: McConney, Mahon and Oxenford 2003
Figure 4. Suriname Fisheries Department
Source: Charles, McConney and Mills 2001
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