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FAO SYMPOSIUM
ON
AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND FOOD SECURITY:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN THE FORTHCOMING WTO NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Geneva, 23-24 September 1999
Session I: Major trends over the past two decades in global agricultural markets and the medium-term outlook |
Paper No. 1
Salient trends in world agricultural production, demand, trade
and food security
Commodity Policy and Projections Service
Commodities and Trade Division
I. Global trends in production and demand
II. Trends in agricultural trade
This paper reviews the major trends in world agricultural production, demand, trade and food security in the last two decades, highlighting shifts in production, demand and trade as well as food security indicators at the global and regional levels.
1. At the global level, agricultural production has been increasing steadily, outstripping world population growth by a widening margin since the 1960s. However, world agricultural growth (for all products) has actually been slowing down: from 3 percent per annum (p.a.) in the 1960s to 2 percent p.a. in the mid-1990s (see Figure 1). But the deceleration in world population growth over the same period was even greater, falling from the peak of 2.07 percent p.a. to its current level of 1.34 percent p.a. in 1995-2000. There have been significant inter-regional disparities in production growth and demographic profiles which underlie the spatial distribution of global demand.
2. World production of and demand for the main agricultural products have shown a declining growth trend since the 1970s (see Tables 1 and 2). While production grew on average at 2.28 percent per annum during the 1970s and consumption by 2.3 percent, their rates of expansion slowed during the 1980s to stand, in the last eight years, at 1.97 percent and 1.91 percent, respectively. The picture is mixed across products. Aggregate production growth rates increased significantly for vegetables, fats and oils, tropical fruit, roots crops and eggs, and since the 1980s for millet and sorghum; fell notably for most basic foodstuff (i.e. cereals, meats and dairy products) and declined sharply for other agricultural products during the 1980s, but have since rebounded (not always to pre-1980s rates) in 1990-97.
3. In the developing countries (taken as a group), production and consumption of the main agricultural products have been growing at much higher (and increasing) rates than in either the developed countries or economies in transition. In fact, in the case of the economies in transition, there were sharp contractions in both production and consumption in the last eight years compared with the previous decades, reflecting the economic dislocations associated with systemic changes in these countries. As a whole, developing countries' demand accelerated from around 3 percent per year in 1970-79 to about 4.1 percent in 1990-97.1 Production growth lagged somewhat behind, but rose nevertheless from 2.8 percent in the 1970s to about 3.9 percent for 1990-97. By contrast, the developed countries' production growth rate decelerated to 0.68 percent from 1.8 percent in the 1970s and recovered somewhat in the 1990s. Their consumption of the main agricultural products expanded at decreasing rates, falling from 1.5 percent in the 1970s to around 0.5 percent in the 1990s.
4. The developing countries accounted for much of the growth in overall commodity demand since the 1970s because of their higher population growth rates, their comparatively buoyant per caput GDP expansion and the greater responsiveness of their demand to income growth. By contrast, a slower growth in demand occurred for the developed countries, because already high current per caput consumption and slow growth of population had a dampening effect on the demand growth rate for many commodities. As a result of these relative growth rates, developing countries have steadily increased their share in world production and consumption of nearly all the main agricultural commodities. Nevertheless, in per capita terms, their production and particularly consumption (in kilograms per person) remain far below those of both the developed countries and the economies in transition.
5. Among the developing countries, East and South Asia have made the most impressive gains in production since 1970, more than doubling their cereals production and increasing their share of global cereals output from 31 percent to 38 percent. The region increased output of vegetables oils more than 5-fold and raised their share of global production from 25 percent to 44 percent. East and South Asia's production of livestock products more than trebled and their share of global production increased from 25 percent to 45 percent. However, their production still lags behind consumption, so that East and South Asia have not increased their presence in world export markets, with the exception of vegetable oils. They have tended rather to increase imports as well as production to supply rapidly growing domestic markets. In contrast with the other commodities, vegetable oil exports from East and South Asia have increased from 19 percent to 44 percent of the world market.
6. The developing countries of Latin America and the Caribbean also increased production faster than the world average, raising their shares of global production, consumption and trade for a number of commodities. Their share of global vegetable oils production increased from 9 percent to 13 percent and exports from 11 percent to 15 percent. Although the share of Latin American and Caribbean countries in global production of fruit and vegetables was unchanged during the period, their exports of these products increased from 20 percent of the global total to 32 percent. However, Latin American and Caribbean countries raised their domestic consumption faster than the world average, increasing their share of global consumption for all commodity categories except fruit and vegetables.
7. The countries of North Africa and the Near East have made few gains in production (or exports) of agricultural products, relative to world totals. However, some expansion of production and much higher imports have raised domestic consumption, between 1970 and 1997, by several folds in cereals, vegetable oils, livestock products and fruit and vegetables.
8. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa have had little success in increasing their share in world agricultural production, consumption, imports or exports. In some cases their small share of world consumption has declined further. Between 1970 and 1997, production of cereals and livestock products grew slightly faster in the Sub-Saharan African countries than the global average, increasing their share of global production by less than one percentage point. Their share of global cereals and livestock product consumption also grew by less than one percentage point. Production of vegetable oils and fruit and vegetables grew considerably slower, shrinking the region's share of global production from 9 percent to 5 percent for vegetable oils and from 7 percent to 5 percent for fruit and vegetables. The region's consumption of these products grew at a slower pace than the world average and thus shrank as a share of global consumption.
9. The main trends in food and agricultural trade during the past few decades relate to: its continuing importance for both developed and developing countries; its uneven growth over the period, with rapid expansion in the 1970s followed by virtual stagnation in the mid-1980s and a slow recovery since then; the collapse of commodity prices during this latter decade; the changing directions and commodity composition of agricultural trade; and the expected changes on world markets resulting from policy reforms relating to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.
10. Since the early 1970s, the volume of agricultural trade, including temperate zone and tropical products, and fishery and forestry products, has grown by about 75 percent and its value from US$148 billion to some US$580 billion in 1997 (in nominal terms). Because trade in manufactures grew more rapidly, the share of agricultural products in merchandise trade fell from around 20 percent in the early 1970s to about 10 percent in 1997. This average figure, however, conceals the much greater dependence on agricultural trade of many individual countries, both as exporters and as importers. In around a quarter of the developing countries the share of agricultural exports exceeded two-thirds of total exports in the mid-1990s, while in a further 20 percent the agricultural export share exceeded one-third. Low-income countries remain most heavily dependent on agricultural trade, often still relying on one or a few agricultural exports for the bulk of their foreign exchange revenue. Agricultural trade is less important for high-income countries but remains a substantial source of export earnings for some of them, such as Australia, France, New Zealand and the United States.
11. Around one-third of international agricultural trade takes place among the countries of western Europe. If trade among these countries is excluded, then North America, Western Europe and Asia have roughly equal world export market shares, while Asia is by far the most important import market. Several notable trends can be observed over time. These include a decline in the once-large import market in western Europe and its shift to a net export position for a number of commodities (e.g. cereals, sugar, meat) due largely to the success of the Common Agricultural Policy; growth in import markets in Pacific rim countries due to high income growth (based on manufacturing) sustained over the period; a related but more general shift in import-market emphasis from high-income to middle-income developing countries; increasing market surpluses in some agricultural export countries; and proliferation in the use of export subsidies by major industrialised countries. Among developing-country regions, Latin America and the Caribbean is a significant net exporter of agricultural commodities, while Asia, the Near East, Africa and the transitional economies are now net importers.
12. Two dimensions of the commodity composition of agricultural trade are noteworthy - the horizontal diversification by product; and the vertical diversification by level of processing. As agricultural trade has grown, there has also been a structural shift in the commodity composition of this trade from bulk commodities to value-added products, as a result of rising incomes. High-value trade in products such as cut flowers and tropical fruits has been a source of agricultural export growth for a number of developing countries.
13. The expansion of agricultural trade has not occurred at an even pace in the past two decades, but has reflected the influence of a number of global shocks: the commodity price booms during the 1970s; the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979; and the sharp increases in interest rates in the early 1980s which inaugurated the international debt crisis and the subsequent slow growth and recession in developed countries and in most developing-country regions. Two indicators highlight the difficult agriculture-trade environment in the mid-1980s. First, this was the only period in which trade in agricultural products failed to expand faster than agricultural output. Second, commodity prices, which had tended to move downwards in the previous two decades, fell sharply in the 1980s (Figure 2). In real terms, e.g. deflated by developed country export prices of manufactures, the decline was even more pronounced.
14. The sharp fall in world food prices during the 1980s was partly a symptom of the state of disarray of world markets due largely to policies in developed countries, in which national levels of production and consumption, and hence trade, were heavily influenced by government policies, and many countries insulated their domestic markets from changes in world market conditions. In the 1990s, agricultural prices remained relatively low in the early years (1990-93) rose sharply in the middle of the decade (1994-97) before declining in 1998.2
15. Trade in food commodities has exhibited the same trends since the early 1970s as agricultural trade as a whole. The value of food trade, some US$458 billion in 1997, was over five times greater than it had been 20 years earlier. Developing countries accounted for some 37 percent of total food imports in 1997, up from 28 percent in 1974. However, their share of food exports in 1997 had risen to about 34 percent from 30 percent. As a result, the trade balance in food commodities, which was marginally positive 20 years ago, has turned negative.3 In 1997, developing countries imported about US$168 billion worth of food commodities, compared with US$155 billion worth of food exports. These trends highlight the growing importance of trade in meeting food consumption needs, especially for the developing countries. In terms of cereals, imports accounted for some 14 percent of the domestic consumption of developing countries in 1997, up from less than 10 percent 20 years earlier.
16. Agricultural trade made a substantial contribution to the improvements in global and household food security that occurred during the 1980s. Ample food supplies were available on world markets at decreasing real prices. The volatility of world prices decreased. World cereal stocks rarely fell below the 17 to 18 percent of world cereal consumption estimated by FAO as the minimum necessary to ensure world food security (recent exceptions were 1995 and 1996). Food aid flows, particularly for emergencies, increased. To some extent the situation in the 1990s (1990-97) has been different, with stocks lower, prices higher and food aid flows by 1995 at their lowest since the mid-1970s.
17. Over the past three decades significant progress has been made at the global level in food consumption and nutritional standards.4 As a world average, food availability for direct human consumption (on a per-person basis) grew 19 percent to 2720 Kcal/day between 1960 and 1994/96. The gains for developing countries (i.e. all countries excluding OECD countries plus Eastern Europe and former USSR) was 32 percent, and excluding China, 22 percent. Progress has however been very uneven across regions of the world. Thus, sub-Saharan Africa still has food availability of only 2150 Kcal/day, compared with 2050 Kcal 30 years earlier. The comparable figures for South Asia are 2350 Kcal and 2000 Kcal, respectively. The per-person food availabilities of the other developing regions (Latin America/Caribbean, east and south-east Asia, Near East and North Africa) are in the range 2700-3000 Kcal, while those of Western Europe and North America are 3370 Kcal and 3570 Kcal, respectively.
18. The very low levels of food availability still prevailing in several developing countries imply that undernutrition is widespread. FAO estimated that there were roughly 830 persons undernourished in the developing countries in 1994-96 (see Table 5), with high concentrations in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 3)5. Progress in reducing these numbers has been painfully slow, with reductions in East Asia being offset to a large extent by increases in sub-Saharan Africa.
19. The bulk of the increases in the consumption of the developing countries (notably China and India) were met by increases in their own production. In the case of cereals, their production grew at 3 percent p.a. in the three decades to the mid-1990s and provided 87 percent of the increase in their consumption. However, in a considerable number of countries, increased food availability was mainly explained by rising food imports, particularly during the 1970s, following the growth of incomes due to increased foreign exchange earnings in the case of oil exporters, and access to cheap foreign borrowing and debt accumulation in the case of many others. In North Africa, for example, per person import of cereals nearly quadrupled. Food aid made possible by structural surpluses in developed countries also played a role in raising food imports.
20. In the 1990s, there has been a slowdown in the growth of world agricultural production. World cereal output stagnated and fluctuated widely in the first half of the decade. In per-person terms, it fell from the peak of 342 kg achieved in the mid-1980s to a low 311 kg in the 3-year average 1993/95, before recovering to 323 kg in the latest 3-year average 1996/98.
21. However, in the ten years to the mid-1990s which witnessed the declines in the world averages, there has been no decline, but rather an increase, in the per-person production and consumption of cereals in the developing countries, while that of all other food products (roots and tubers, pulses, bananas and plantains, livestock, sugar, oilseeds, fruit and vegetables, etc.) grew even faster than in the preceding ten years. The growth in production influences not only total supplies but also the income earning opportunities, hence the demand for food, of the majority of the population who depend on agriculture for a living. In sub-Saharan Africa for example, imports account for a minor, though crucial for nutrition, part of total cereal supplies (about 10 percent). But the prospects for increasing the latter will depend on the growth of domestic production. Nevertheless, given their low income and nutritional levels, the problem for the developing countries remains one of too low production and consumption per person.
22. The declines in world cereals output per person have been due, in the first place and up to quite recently, to policy reforms and supply controls coinciding with weather shocks in the main industrial exporting countries. The longer term deceleration in the growth rate of cereals production in these (i.e. developed) countries is largely explained by the inadequate growth of demand for their produce and the associated decline in real prices. The latter in turn reflects both the slowing down of global population growth and the lack of purchasing power in many countries and population groups that have no way of expressing their need to increase consumption.
23. In more recent years, the decline reflected also the collapse of production (as well as of consumption and net imports) in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR following the drastic systemic reforms in their economies. The impact of policy reforms may lead to the cessation of the quasi-permanent structural surpluses and the holding of large stocks in the major exporting countries by the public sector, which in the past were readily available for interventions in case of abrupt shortfalls in supplies.
24. Trends in food security for two groups of developing countries - the least-developed countries (LDCs) and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs) - facing structural food deficits are illustrative.
25. The percentage of undernourished population has barely changed since the early 1970s - at about 40 percent for the LDCs and 20 percent for the NFIDCs. Given, therefore, the serious extent of undernourishment, even small variations in year to year supply can have considerable implications for the nutritional situation in these countries. Recent trends have not been encouraging. In the case of cereals, which account for 52 percent of total dietary energy supplies in LDCs and 45 percent in NIFDCs, per caput production followed a declining trend in the period 1980-1996 - it fell for 29 of the 42 cereal producing LDCs and in 13 of the 18 NFIDCs. Moreover, the coefficient of variation of cereal production exceeded 10 percent in 26 of the LDCs and in 11 NFIDCs. Thus, many of these countries are vulnerable to changes in world food markets, particularly cereal markets.
26. Total food imports (including non-cereal food) for LDCs increased from US$3.9 billion in 1980 to some US$6 billion in 1995, an increase of over 50 percent. For the NFIDCs the corresponding import bills were US$8.5 billion rising to US$12 billion, an increase of over 40 percent. Cereals are the biggest item in food import bills of these countries, accounting for over 40 percent; vegetable oils and oilseeds account for another 20 percent. From 1993/94 to 1995/96, both groups of countries experienced a substantial increase in their cereal import bills, amounting to 83 percent for the LDCs and 61 percent for the NFIDCs due to the substantial rise in the world cereal prices in 1995/96. However, despite the decline in the cereal prices since the 1995/96 spike6, the cereal import bill still persisted at a relatively high level for both groups of countries in 1996/97 and 1997/98. The explanation is to be found not in the nominal price of cereals only, but also in the volume of imports and two other components of the cereal import bill which were relatively important in the past, namely food aid and export subsidies.
27. The ratios of food aid to the total (commercial and aid) volume of import show the extent to which food aid has contributed to alleviate the burden of food imports. During 1997/98, food aid in cereals accounted for 23 percent of the LDCs cereal imports compared to 36 percent in 1993/94 and 64 percent in the mid-1980s. The decline in the relative contribution of food aid to cereal imports of the NFIDCs is even sharper, from 22 percent in the mid-1980s to 7.6 percent in 1993/94, down to 2 percent in 1997/98. Therefore a much greater volume of cereals has been imported under commercial terms in the period to 1997/98. The countries' capacity to import food commercially is likely to remain limited due to the modest overall outlook for their income growth and to heavy debt burden.
28. In summary, and more generally, the overall world-wide cereal balance shows a precarious trend (see Tables 6, 7 and 8).7 The balance for all net importers was negative 37 million tons in 1964-66 (negative 17 million tons for developing countries). By 1994-96, the negative balance increased four times (six times for developing countries) to reach 146 million tons. This trend is unlikely to change markedly for several years to come because of rising demand in the developing countries due to population and income growth. As regards trends in household food security, measured by the percentage of undernourished population, what seems clear, from the historical data reviewed in this document, is that for those countries where the bulk of farm or national incomes is derived from domestic agricultural production, household food security has been closely linked to domestic production.
29. The medium term outlook to 2005 for production of and demand for the main agricultural commodities is for an increase in growth rates compared with the previous decade. But the expansion is expected to be slow, with per caput output and consumption showing only a modest (0.7 percent a year) rise after its stagnation in the previous decade8. Factors influencing the projected increase of world demand include the relatively strong economic growth still expected in the developing countries and the recovery in the demand projected for some of the economies in transition. In the developing countries, per caput production and consumption of the main agricultural commodities are projected to grow at 1.4 percent a year, slightly slower than in the previous decade (1.6 and 1.7 percent per year respectively).
30. Despite the beneficial effects of policy reforms, the previously identified slowdown in world trade in agricultural commodities is expected to continue, but the picture is quite complex, with an increase in growth rates for cereals, dairy, tea and coffee and some raw materials. The slowdown in trade is based on the sharp falls in growth foreseen for fats, oils, oilmeals, meat, fruit and cotton. The slowdown in the markets for the major agricultural products could, however, be offset by growth in some other sectors, particularly in the processed food products. The net agricultural trade position of the developing countries is expected on the basis of these projections to deteriorate, so that they are likely as a whole to be net importers of agricultural products in the future. For the same reasons, the imports of the economies in transition are also expected to grow significantly over the projected period. As a result, the growth rates of exports of the developed countries are expected to increase sharply over the projection period relative to the previous decade.
31. Factors affecting trade include domestic policy adjustments that would be undertaken to comply with the Uruguay Round Agreement and the tendency for some commodities, including agricultural raw materials, toward increased consumption and processing in the producing countries.
32. For the longer term, beyond 20059, developing countries are expected to become increasingly net importers of foodstuffs for the following reasons: i) almost the entire increment in world population (currently at about its all time peak of 80 million persons annually) occurs in the developing countries, the majority of which have low or very low levels of per caput food consumption, hence a significant scope for further increases in such consumption; ii) such potential will increasingly materialise as actual growth in effective demand for food as more and more developing countries embark upon a path of sustained economic growth; iii) many of these countries, particularly the most populous ones in Asia (China, India), have limited potential for increasing domestic production, especially of those foodstuffs that are likely to experience rapid growth in demand, e.g. wheat for direct food consumption and coarse grains for feed. Consequently, meeting their growing demand for food will involve hefty increases in their food imports from the rest of the world.
33. The analysis of the longer-term food outlook as summarized above begs the following questions. Can the rest of the world produce the required export surpluses? And how will the new policy environment governing global agricultural production and trade affect those prospects? At the same time, would the export earnings of the developing countries keep pace with their increasing food import dependency?
Table 5: Number and Percentage of Population Undernourished in the Developing Countries
Note: Numbers do not add up to the total because of the Oceania region.
Source: The State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA), 1998, FAO, Rome.
Table 6 World Cereal Production and Population 1/
Production (mmt) |
Growth Rates, % p.a. |
Population (million) |
Growth Rates % p.a. | |||||
Aver. 1994-96 |
1961-96 |
1986-96 |
1960 |
1995 |
60-95 |
95-2000 | ||
NET IMPORTERS (in 94-6) |
||||||||
East & S.E. Asia |
486 |
3.4 |
2.3 |
1019 |
1911 |
1.81 |
1.05 | |
South Asia |
221 |
2.9 |
2.7 |
564 |
1225 |
2.24 |
1.76 | |
All Asia |
707 |
3.2 |
2.4 |
1583 |
3136 |
1.97 |
1.33 | |
Near East-North Africa |
86 |
2.5 |
2.6 |
142 |
367 |
2.75 |
2.44 | |
Lat. America/Caribb.,excl Argentina |
90 |
3.1 |
1.8 |
197 |
442 |
2.34 |
1.57 | |
sub-Saharan Africa |
82 |
2.3 |
2.3 |
228 |
591 |
2.76 |
2.78 | |
sub-total (all importers) |
965 |
3.1 |
2.4 |
2150 |
4536 |
2.16 |
1.64 | |
NET EXPORTERS (in 94-6) |
71.0 |
79.8 |
||||||
Western Europe |
190 |
2.0 |
0.3 |
325 |
384 |
0.47 |
0.21 | |
North America |
373 |
1.9 |
1.6 |
204 |
297 |
1.07 |
0.80 | |
Oceania |
27 |
2.6 |
2.3 |
13 |
21 |
1.52 |
1.07 | |
Argentina |
26 |
1.4 |
2.0 |
21 |
35 |
1.50 |
1.27 | |
sub-total (all exporters) |
616 |
2.0 |
1.2 |
563 |
736 |
0.77 |
0.52 | |
former USSR & E. EUROPE |
212 |
1.0 |
-3.3 |
314 |
415 |
0.80 |
0.04 | |
WORLD |
1793 |
2.3 |
1.1 |
3027 |
5687 |
1.82 |
1.38 |
Source: FAOStat.
1/ Cereals include wheat, rice in milled form and coarse grain.
Table 7. Cereal Consumption (all uses)
Kg per Caput |
Growth Rates of Demand (% p.a.) | |||||||
Per Caput |
Total | |||||||
1963-65 |
1973-75 |
1983-85 |
1993-95 |
65-95 |
85-95 |
65-95 |
85-95 | |
NET IMPORTERS (in 94-6) |
||||||||
East & S.E. Asia |
179 |
213 |
266 |
279 |
1.6 |
0.7 |
3.3 |
2.1 |
South Asia |
163 |
164 |
173 |
184 |
0.5 |
0.8 |
2.8 |
2.9 |
All Asia |
173 |
195 |
231 |
242 |
1.2 |
0.7 |
3.2 |
2.3 |
Near East-North A frica |
282 |
299 |
359 |
355 |
1.0 |
-0.5 |
3.8 |
2.1 |
Lat. America/Caribb.,excl Argentina |
188 |
217 |
255 |
272 |
1.3 |
0.5 |
3.6 |
2.4 |
sub-Saharan Africa |
153 |
153 |
148 |
158 |
0.1 |
0.2 |
2.9 |
3.1 |
sub-total (all importers) |
180 |
200 |
233 |
243 |
1.1 |
0.5 |
3.3 |
2.4 |
NET EXPORTERS (in 94-6) |
||||||||
Western Europe |
401 |
464 |
474 |
421 |
0 |
-1.3 |
0.3 |
-1.0 |
North America |
729 |
744 |
825 |
868 |
0.4 |
0.1 |
1.4 |
1.1 |
Oceania |
334 |
351 |
421 |
411 |
0.6 |
0.4 |
1.9 |
1.7 |
Argentina |
372 |
469 |
403 |
385 |
-0.8 |
-0.5 |
0.7 |
0.9 |
sub-total (all exporters) |
519 |
567 |
605 |
598 |
0.3 |
-0.4 |
1.0 |
0.3 |
former USSR & E. EUROPE |
533 |
708 |
754 |
607 |
0.4 |
-2.9 |
1.2 |
-2.5 |
WORLD |
277 |
305 |
330 |
316 |
0.4 |
-0.6 |
2.2 |
1.0 |
Memo Item |
||||||||
World excl.W. Europe, f.USSR & E.Europe |
228 |
243 |
275 |
283 |
0.8 |
0.3 |
2.8 |
2.1 |
Source: FAOStat. Cereals include wheat, rice in milled form and coarse grain.
Table 8. World Cereal Balances ( million metric tons)
1964-6 |
1974-6 |
1984-6 |
1989-91 |
1994-6 | |
NET IMPORTERS (in 94-6) |
|||||
East & S.E. Asia |
-15.4 |
-29.4 |
-38.4 |
-53.2 |
-64.5 |
South Asia |
-10.4 |
-10.2 |
-3.1 |
-3.1 |
0.3 |
All Asia |
-25.8 |
-39.6 |
-41.5 |
-56.4 |
-64.2 |
Near East-North Africa |
-5.4 |
-15.2 |
-40.9 |
-41.7 |
-41.7 |
Lat. America/Caribb.,excl. Argentina |
-4.7 |
-11.4 |
-19.8 |
-20.4 |
-30.5 |
sub-Saharan Africa |
-1.6 |
-0.4 |
-9.9 |
-6.5 |
-9.4 |
sub-total (all importers) |
-37 |
-67 |
-112 |
-125 |
-146 |
NET EXPORTERS (in 94-6) |
|||||
Western Europe |
-27.5 |
-25.4 |
10.7 |
24.7 |
16.3 |
North America |
59.7 |
87.2 |
103.6 |
115.6 |
108.8 |
Oceania |
7.2 |
9.8 |
20.4 |
14.2 |
15.6 |
Argentina |
10.0 |
9.8 |
17.1 |
9.6 |
11.9 |
sub-total (all exporters) |
49.4 |
81.4 |
151.9 |
164.2 |
152.5 |
former USSR & E. EUROPE |
-9.3 |
-15.8 |
-38.0 |
-36.8 |
-4.4 |
WORLD |
2.6 |
-0.9 |
1.8 |
2.4 |
2.3 |
Memo Item |
|||||
Developing Countries |
-17.0 |
-38.5 |
-65.9 |
-88.1 |
-103.8 |
Source: FAOStat.
1 China's role is prominent in explaining the acceleration of demand growth in the developing countries.
2 See document 2 for more details on developments on agricultural markets during the 1995-98 period.
3 Valuing imports c.i.f. and exports f.o.b.
4 The yardstick is the per-person availability of food products for direct human consumption as a national average in each country, expressed in Kcal/day. Note that this is based on the apparent food consumption of individual countries which takes into account food imports and exports.
5 See FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture, 1998, Rome.
6 There is some evidence that the bill could fall in 1998/99 if current expectations (e.g. import demand, world prices) materialize.
7 For further discussion, see: Alexandratos, N. and J. Bruinsma (1999), "Europe's Cereals Sector and World Trade requirements to 2030" in Agriculture and World Trade Liberalisation: Socio-environmental perspectives on the Common Agricultural Policy, Redclift, M., J. Lekakis and G. Zanias (eds.), CAB International, Wallingford, U.K.
8 For further details, see: FAO (1999) Medium-term prospects for agricultural commodities. Projections to the year 2005, forthcoming, Rome.
9 For further discussion, see: N. Alexandratos (ed.) World Agriculture: Toward 2010 - An FAO Study, John Wiley & Sons, 1995.