Response Actions to AAD Emergencies in Asian-Pacific

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Questions for discussion

- What is the role/mandate of your institution and relevant structure in place for dealing with aquatic mass mortality events (MME)
- Example of an MME that you have been involved. Describe the specific MME scenario (the central issue/problem investigated/examined)
- Describe the response actions taken and the outcomes / findings / conclusions / any follow-up work
- □ Describe the implications of (3) in terms of effectiveness, cost
- □ Describe lessons learned and improvements
- In your opinion, what are the 5 minimum emergency preparedness response requirements that need to be in place?

Roles of NACA dealing with aquatic MME

- Maintain close relationship on AAH with
 - FAO and OIE
 - NACA Member governments
- Establish regional AAH forces
 - Advisory Group for AAH was established to include about 10 experts with public-private participation and FAO/OIE cooperation
 - Annual AGMs have been organized on a self-founding basis for 18 years
- Build regional AAH capacity
 - Australia/NACA regional proficiency testing programs
 - Regional training courses for AAH
 - Regional Reference Laboratories (RRL), Regional Resource Centres (RRC), and Regional Resource Experts (RRE) were designated
- Networking regional AAH resources
 - It's considered to develop regional sub-networks for specific subjects.
 Resources for response to AAD emergencies is a important subject
- Early warn for AAD Emergency
 - IMNV was early warned through NACA website and newsletter

- Maintain a regional AAD reporting system
 - A regional AAD list: annual updated
 - Establish and maintain QAAD Report
- Publish regional technological guidance
 - Disease Card for emerging AADs
 - Regional FAO/NACA diagnostic manual for AADs
- Share information for emerging AADs
 - NACA website sharing of diagnostic and preventing information: AHPND, EHP, etc.
- Coordinate cooperation projects for Aquatic MME
 - FAO/NACA/Indonesia Project on emergency response for KHV (TCP/INS/2905) (2002)
 - ASEAN/SEAFDEC/DOF/NACA/ANAAHC/JAIF: Aquatic Emergency Preparedness and Response Systems for Effective Management of Transboundary Disease Outbreaks in Southeast Asia
- Organize regional consultation workshops
 - Austrilia/NACA regional consultation workshop for AHPND (2013)
 - NACA/China regional consultation workshop and training courses for TiLV

Examples of response action to MMEs involved: WSD in China

- ☐ First outbreak of WSD in Shandong in 1993
 - The central issue investigated
 - ✓ Unknown MMEs were reported to local government
 - ✓ AHG of experts was convened to visit farms with MMEs
 - ✓ Farm practices, disease process, & gross signs were surveyed
 - ✓ Sample were token in DAFA and TEM fixative and frost
 - Response actions, outcomes, and follow-up
 - Gross signs defined: white spots, no hemolymph clotting
 - ✓ Histo- and cyto- pathology, bioassay were done in laboratory
 - ✓ Infection with a new virus (HHNBV, ie WSSV) were identified
 - ✓ Diagnostic methods were developed: histopathology, on-site observation of wet-mount with T-E staining, ELISA with MAb
 - ✓ A national emerging consultation workshop were organized and Finding of the new virus were announced in the workshop
 - Implications in terms of effectiveness
 - Competent scientist was identified among many voices
 - ✓ Identification of emerging pathogen
 - Establishment of basic diagnostic methods

- Outbreak of WSD in Zhejiang in 1994
 - The central issue investigated
 - ✓ Unknown MME was reported to central government
 - ✓ The National Advisory Group for Shrimp Farming was convened
 - Competent scientist was invited in the group
 - Routine surveys were launched
 - ✓ Farmed shrimp in diseased ponds and row feed of net-captured wild crustaceans were collected as samples
 - Response actions, outcomes, and follow-up
 - ✓ Samples were analyzed on site with T-E staining and MAb-ELISA
 - ✓ Gross signs, clinical pathology with T-E staining, and MAb-ELISA were identical with that of the infection with new virus
 - ✓ The pathogen were detected in the row feed by MAb-ELISA.
 - MOA issued an official announcement based the on-site results to ban using of wild crustaceans as row feed
 - ✓ A national emergency project for control measures were funded
 - Implications in terms of effectiveness
 - An important transmission route was found
 - One of important control measures were recommended with scientific basis
 - ✓ Total loss caused by WSD began reducing since the next year

Examples of response action to MMEs involved: AHPND in Asia

- ☐ First occurrence in China in 2010
 - The central issue investigated

 ✓ MMEs were reported in China in June 2010.
 ✓ Samples were collected from diseased farms (Zhang et al., 2012)

More investigations were conducted by Chinese

scientists

Response actions, outcomes, and follow-up

✓ A high virulent *V. parahaemolyticus* was identified and reported (Zhang et al., 2012). There were other groups informally declared *V. p.* as the pathogen
 ✓ Some scientists argue that the disease was caused by multiple opportunistic bacteria

Implications in terms of effectiveness

✓ AHPND was not officially recognized in China due to argument among scientists

✓ AHPND has not been involved in national target

surveillance program for AAD

✓ AHPND is managed indiscriminately with other opportunistic diseases in China

First occurrence in Vietnam in 2010

The central issue investigated

✓ MMEs was found in 2010 and posted in June 2011
✓ Disease spread to Malaysia (2011), Thailand (2012) and the Philippines (2014)

✓ Samples were collected in Vietnam in Dec 2012, Bacterial isolates were analyzed in USA (Tran et al., 2013)

Response actions, outcomes, and follow-up

Emergency Regional Consultation was held in Bangkok organized by Australia/NACA in Aug 2012. Definition and gross signs were identified

✓ V. p. was identified as the causative agent (Tran et al.,


- ✓ FAO/MARD Consultations (TCP/VIE/3304) was held in Hanoi in June 2013. The causative agent was confirmed, control measures were recommended
- Implications in terms of effectiveness

✓ AHPND definition and causative agent were confirmed. AHPND was reported by countries
 ✓ Vietnam has briefly recovered from AHPND and exportation of farmed shrimp increased

Examples of response action to MMEs involved: infection with Decapod iridescent virus 1 (DIV1)


□ iDIV1 in Asia

- The central issue investigated
 - ✓ CQIV was found in market crayfish in 2014 (Xu et al., 2016)
 - ✓ SHIV was found in *P. v.* with unknown mortality in 2014 (Qiú et al., 2017)
 - ✓ MME in the end of 2016 were reported.
 - ✓ AHG visited diseased farms for sampling and investigation
- Response actions, outcomes, and follow-up
 - ✓ DÍV1 was detected in diseased samples
 - ✓ Genome sequences of CQIV and SHIV showed >99% identical
 - ✓ National Target Surveillance Program has covered the disease since 2017
 - ✓ DIV1 were detected in farmed and wild shrimp in other countries but not reported officially
- Implications in terms of effectiveness
 - ✓ NACA has listed CQIV as a regional disease for QAAD.
 - China transparently launched national response action to iDIV1
 - ✓ ICTV has accepted the new virus and new genus, named as DIV1
 - ✓ OIE and NACA prepared Disease Card, OIE is assessing for listing
 - Farms in other countries with iDIV1 may be under unknown risks due to luck of transparency



Lessons learned and improvements

- □ A rapid response approach to MMEs in AAHS should be established
 - An AAHS coordinator (Disease Control Centre for Aquatic Animals) can enhance the linkage among competent authority – experts – Licensed Veterinarian – farmers in response to MMEs
- □ Encouragements and supports should be given to key contributors, who can
 - Immediately report MME
 - Rapidly response to the report of MME
 - Early identify the causative agent for the MME
 - Effectively recommend response measures to the MME
- ☐ The decision maker should respect the expertise which can identify the causative agent on sufficient scientific basis and provide support for practical actions
 - A hidden truth is often revealed by the discerning few
 - Identification of causative agent cannot base on votes but only scientific evidences
- Decisions for response actions can be improved
 - Actions should be considered to reduce or eliminate risks of disease spread
 - Scenarios of preparedness for response actions can be presumed under different biosecurity levels
 - Farmer's right and benefit need to be taken into account in the action
 - Recyclable and eco-friendly treatment of diseased aquatic animals can be improved



Five minimum emergency preparedness response requirements

- ☐ A responsible and ascendable decision-maker
- □ A rapid response approach in AAHS with a central coordinator (Disease Control Centre for Aquatic Animals)
- □ A competent expertise resource or a network which can provide the resource
- ☐ An encouraging policy for the key contributor responding to MME
- □ A set of preparedness of emergency response for scenarios under different biosecurity risks

Thanks for attention!

NACA welcomes your cooperation

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