

Multi-stakeholder partnerships

*to finance and improve food security and nutrition
in the framework of the 2030 Agenda*

A report by

The High Level Panel of Experts

on Food Security and Nutrition

June 2018

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FOREWORD

The High Level Panel of Experts for Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) is the science-policy interface of the United Nations' Committee on World Food Security (CFS), which is, at the global level, the foremost inclusive and evidence-based international and intergovernmental platform for food security and nutrition (FSN).

The HLPE reports serve as a common, evidence-based starting point for the multi-stakeholder process of policy convergence in CFS. The HLPE strives to provide in its reports a comprehensive overview of the topic selected by CFS, based on the best available scientific evidence and considering different forms of knowledge. It strives to clarify contradictory information and knowledge, to elicit the backgrounds and rationales of controversies and to identify emerging issues. The HLPE reports are the result of an inclusive and continuous dialogue between the HLPE experts (Steering Committee, Project Team, external peer reviewers) and a wide range of knowledge-holders across the world, building bridges across regions and countries, across scientific disciplines and professional experiences.

After years of decline, hunger is on the rise again and 815 million people are still undernourished worldwide. As illustrated in the latest HLPE report on *Nutrition and food systems* (2017a) malnutrition, in its different forms (undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity), now affects all countries, whether low-, middle- or high-income. One person in three is malnourished and, if current trends continue, one person in two could be malnourished by 2030, in stark contrast with the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG2) to end hunger and all forms of malnutrition by 2030.

As illustrated by the diversity of the topics selected by CFS and as shown by the HLPE notes on *Critical and emerging issues*, FSN depends on numerous factors, environmental, economic and social, as well as on their governance. In many of its previous publications, the HLPE has also illustrated, from different perspectives, the critical importance of FSN, as both a necessary condition and a cross-cutting challenge to achieve not only SDG2 but also the whole 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development.

Previous HLPE reports call for radical transformations and suggest possible pathways to progress towards more sustainable food systems, at different scales, in order to address the multiple burdens of malnutrition. There is already enough evidence to act: the short-term costs of action may seem high, but the cost of inaction is likely to be much higher for future generations.

In 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda promoted multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) as a way to complement the efforts of national governments and international organizations and to “mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries and in particular developing countries”.

Nevertheless, the emerging importance of MSPs, as part of a new approach to governance for FSN and sustainable development, does not take place without controversy. Besides a debate on the exact definition of concepts, scientists and other actors question the potential benefits and limitations, the performance and even the relevance of MSPs as a suitable institutional mechanism to finance and improve FSN. They also question the conditions for MSPs to contribute effectively to the realization of the right to adequate food. Thus, as illustrated in this report, MSPs should be considered as a means rather than as a goal. They do not provide a “silver-bullet” solution to any problem, in any context.

The HLPE faced specific challenges for this report. Previous HLPE reports covered FSN-related issues for which significant literature and a great deal of evidence were already available. On the contrary, as illustrated in this report, MSPs have emerged quite recently as a focus of interest in the FSN-oriented scientific literature beyond social sciences. Available evidence and data on MSPs are still fragmented, limited in time and scope, and quickly evolving. They rely mainly on self-reported data or on partial reviews based on a limited set of partnerships.

In that context, this report does not provide a complete analysis of all the issues at stake, but rather contributes to clarify the concepts and raise the main questions. It does not provide detailed, comprehensive and comparative assessments of all existing MSPs, but suggests relevant criteria to enable governments and non-state actors to perform their own assessments of MSPs. This report also explores possible pathways to improve MSPs’ contribution to FSN in a sustainable way, with the view to progress towards the realization of the right to adequate food.

Here, more than for any previous HLPE study, the inclusive – and multi-stakeholder – process of elaboration of the HLPE reports, which includes two open consultations allowing all stakeholders to contribute, and applies principles and methodologies suggested in this report, is as important as its result. The raw material (including all the contributions and case studies) received during these consultations, as well as all the preliminary documents generated throughout the process of elaboration of this report, are available on the HLPE website and must be considered, along with the final report, as an important result of this HLPE study.

Increased transparency and accountability have been identified in this report as key conditions for MSPs to better contribute to financing and improving FSN. In that perspective, this HLPE report, as well as the annexed questionnaire, aim at providing useful tools for governments and non-state actors to collect and share information on MSPs following a common methodology.

I am confident that this report, requested by the CFS to inform its debates during its 45th Plenary Session in October 2018, will provide useful elements for further discussions in CFS, as well as at regional and national levels, and will open new avenues for future research on MSPs in order to enhance their contribution to financing and improving FSN.

On behalf of all my colleagues of the HLPE Steering Committee, I would like to acknowledge the involvement, on a *pro-bono* basis, of all the experts who worked for the elaboration of this report. I want to thank first the HLPE Project Team Leader Moraka Nakedi Makhura (Team Leader, South Africa), and Project Team Members: Matheus Alves Zanella (Brazil), Eltighani Elamin (Sudan), Madhura Swaminathan (India) and Anke Weisheit (Germany).

This report benefited greatly from the suggestions of external peer reviewers, and of a large number of experts and institutions that contributed to the report in many ways, in particular through the open electronic consultations organized both on the scope and on the preliminary draft of the report. I would like also to commend the HLPE Secretariat for its precious support to the HLPE work.

Finally, I would like to show my gratitude to all the resource partners who supported the work of the HLPE in an independent way, and who enabled the HLPE to release this publication. With my colleagues of the HLPE Steering Committee and Project Team, we stand ready, with the support of the HLPE Secretariat, to help CFS members and participants to disseminate this report, with the view to increasing the impact of CFS work outside Rome, at different scales.

Patrick Caron

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Caron', is written over a large, stylized blue scribble that forms a large, irregular shape.

HLPE Steering Committee Chairperson, 14 June 2018

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

There is a growing recognition that complex and multi-dimensional issues such as food security and nutrition (FSN) require cross-sectoral and holistic approaches, pooling together the resources, knowledge and expertise of different stakeholders.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development not only comprises the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but also includes the means to achieve them. SDG17, in particular, encourages “the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by the use of multi-stakeholder partnerships” (MSPs) as a means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda. It also invites states and other stakeholders to “encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships” that “mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries”.

In this context, in October 2016, the United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS) requested its High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) on Food Security and Nutrition (FSN) to produce a report on “*Multi-stakeholder Partnerships to Finance and Improve Food Security and Nutrition in the Framework of the 2030 Agenda*” to inform its debates at the 45th CFS Plenary Session of October 2018.

The growing importance of MSPs in the landscape of food governance at different scales does not take place without controversy. Besides a conceptual debate on the exact definition of concepts such as stakeholders and partnerships, scientists and other actors question the potential benefits and limitations, the performance and even the relevance of MSPs as a suitable institutional mechanism to finance and improve FSN. They also question the conditions for MSPs to contribute effectively to the realization of the right to adequate food. Thus, as illustrated in this report, MSPs should be considered as a means rather than a goal. They do not provide a “silver-bullet” solution to any problem, in any context. This is why the last chapter of this report focuses on the internal conditions and external environment that could help to improve MSPs’ contribution to FSN in a sustainable way.

Most previous HLPE reports covered issues on which there were already data and significant scientific literature. On the contrary, as illustrated in this report, MSPs have emerged quite recently as a topic mobilizing scientific communities beyond social sciences. Such communities are still small. Evidence and data are limited in time and scope and quickly evolving. It is difficult to find detailed and publicly available information on existing MSPs, particularly when it comes to budget, finance and impact. A great part of the available data is self-reported by the MSPs with no guarantee of independent verification. Further research and efforts are needed to generate more comprehensive information on MSPs and their outcomes.

Therefore, this report cannot provide a complete analysis of all the issues at stake, but rather clarifies the concepts and identifies the main challenges based on the best available evidence, data and observation. For the same reasons, this report cannot provide a detailed and comprehensive assessment of all existing MSPs, but rather suggests relevant criteria to enable governments and non-state actors to perform their own assessments following a common methodology and to identify pathways for improvement.

This report and its recommendations aim to help states and non-state actors to improve MSPs’ contribution to the realization of the right to adequate food, in particular by strengthening transparency and accountability, and by improving the learning process through knowledge generation and sharing.

MSPs: context and definitions

1. Malnutrition in all its forms (undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity) now affects all countries, whether low-, middle- or high- income. As illustrated in previous HLPE reports, transformative actions are needed across food systems to enhance the four pillars of FSN (availability, access, utilization and stability) and realize the right to adequate food for all.
2. Many decision-makers and donors point at the disengagement of states at national level and at the lack of public funding for development at the international level. In this context, they call for an increasing role of the private sector in financing FSN and the whole 2030 Agenda. They

consider MSPs as a possible way to leverage additional funds, in particular private or philanthropic funds, to complement governments' efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Nevertheless, states remain ultimately responsible for adopting effective strategies to eradicate hunger and all forms of malnutrition, and to ensure that the efforts of all stakeholders concur to public interest and to the realization of the right to adequate food. This calls for a renewed commitment of states and a strengthened public investment for FSN and sustainable development. The challenge is then to coordinate the efforts of all stakeholders, whether states or non-states, through appropriate governance mechanisms to better deliver a public good such as FSN.

3. Financing needs for sustainable development can be grouped into three categories, namely investments: (i) to address *basic needs* (eradicating poverty and hunger, improving health and education, providing access to affordable energy and promoting gender equality) and (ii) to address *national sustainable development needs* (including infrastructure and rural development), as well as (iii) to address *global challenges* (including climate change and the protection of the global environment) and deliver global public goods.
4. In its World Investment Report, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2014) estimates the annual investment gap for achieving the SDGs in developing countries at around USD 2.5 trillion. Compared with the current level of investment (around USD 1.4 trillion), this gap seems huge. However, it should be noted that: (i) all the SDGs are deeply interconnected and integrated approaches can foster synergies across sectors and reduce the financing needs; (ii) the cost of inaction is likely to be much higher than the cost of corrective measures; (iii) even a small change in the allocation of existing resources¹ could have a considerable impact for FSN and sustainable development. In other words, the challenge is not only to mobilize additional resources but also to improve the coordination and targeting of existing resources to finance and improve FSN, and to support the achievement of the 2030 Agenda.
5. Filling this investment gap is likely to require the involvement and coordination of all stakeholders and the appropriate use of all available sources of funds, whether domestic or international, public or private, concessional or commercial. In this context, MSPs have rapidly emerged, over the past two decades, as a part of a new approach to governance for sustainable development at different scales, even though the idea of multi-stakeholder engagement in decision-making processes is older than the term of MSP itself and refers to a wide variety of situations.
6. The term "stakeholder" is generally used to designate any person or group who has a "stake", i.e. an interest, whether financial or not, in an issue. It refers to any person or group who is affected by or can affect the situation or issue at stake, as well as the achievement of an organization's objectives. However, considering that this concept of "stakeholder" hides important differences existing in terms of rights, roles, responsibilities, interests, motivations, power and legitimacy, some authors call for using instead the term "actors". They argue that, from a human-rights perspective, a fundamental distinction is to be made between citizens as "right-holders" and "duty-bearers" (mainly states and intergovernmental organizations – IGOs) that have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate food.
7. The scientific literature commonly defines three broad spheres of stakeholders according to their legal status, namely: the *public sector*, the *private sector* and *civil society*. This categorization may seem overly simplified, considering the wide variety of stakeholders grouped within each category, and the diverse way stakeholders could be analytically classified, but it offers a broad picture, useful for political discussions.
8. MSPs can create a working and sometimes long-term relationship, initiate a dialogue and build trust among different stakeholders that, by sharing resources, responsibilities, risks and benefits, become partners for the realization of common objectives. For this reason, MSPs should clearly be distinguished from one-time transaction arrangements and classical contracts, where the collaboration ends with the realization of the transaction, which brings economic benefits for the different parties. MSPs should also be clearly distinguished from broader multi-

¹ According to the UN Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF), the existing stock of global financial assets amounts to USD 225 trillion, and global savings reach USD 22 trillion per year (UN, 2014).

actor policy processes and platforms: (i) where participation is open or defined by the law, meaning that partners are not co-opted as can be the case in some MSPs; (ii) where decision-making rests unequivocally and entirely in the hand of governments. These characteristics have important implications in terms of legitimacy and accountability.

9. Considering all these elements, MSPs are defined here as “any collaborative arrangement between stakeholders from two or more different spheres of society (public sector, private sector and/or civil society), pooling their resources together, sharing risks and responsibilities in order to solve a common issue, to handle a conflict, to elaborate a shared vision, to realize a common objective, to manage a common resource and/or to ensure the protection, production or delivery of an outcome of collective, and/or, public interest”.² This report focuses on the contributions that MSPs acting around food systems can make, directly or indirectly, to finance and improve FSN.
10. Considering that MSPs have been privileged as a means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda, some actors focus their attention on how to improve their performance in financing and improving FSN. On the contrary, other actors still question MSPs’ relevance and desirability and rather highlight the need to reconsider the allocation of public funds.
11. Stakeholders have different perceptions on the potential benefits and limitation of MSPs. Facing financial constraints, some states might consider them as a useful tool to mobilize additional funding, including private funding, to achieve public priorities. Some private actors might consider them as a way to influence public decision-making and policy or to improve their own reputation. Some civil society organizations might acknowledge the role of inclusive partnerships in empowering marginalized and vulnerable groups, while raising concerns about the power given, in some MSPs, to the private sector in decision-making processes. In this context, this report reviews the potential benefits, limitations and contributions of MSPs, as part of a new approach to governance for FSN and sustainable development.

Mapping MSPs and their diversity

12. MSPs emerged quite recently as a focus of interest in the FSN-oriented scientific literature. Evidence and data on MSPs are still limited, especially on finance, budgets and impact, and significantly relying on self-assessments and self-reported data that have not been verified independently. In this situation, and in order to progress towards a categorization of MSPs, the HLPE has suggested, during the open consultation organized on the V0 draft of the report, a questionnaire that could help different stakeholders to conduct their own assessment of MSPs following a common methodology.
13. This questionnaire uses a set of criteria to describe a given MSP, including its: (i) *thematic domain of action*; (ii) *scale* (from local, national, regional to global) and *geographical scope* (i.e. the country or region covered where appropriate); (iii) *structure and organization* (more precisely: composition, legal status, governance structure, representativeness); (iv) *financing structure*; and (v) *main domains of intervention*.
14. The HLPE identified five main domains of intervention for MSPs: (i) *knowledge co-generation and capacity building*; (ii) *advocacy*; (iii) *standard setting*; (iv) *action*; and (v) *fundraising and resource mobilization*. These domains are not mutually exclusive and can be further developed: MSPs might intervene in several domains and have multiple outcomes. These domains can help practitioners and decision-makers define broad categories of MSPs that might face similar challenges or opportunities for enhancing FSN. Each domain is illustrated in the report by concrete examples of existing MSPs.
15. MSPs can play a key role in *knowledge co-generation and capacity building* for enhanced FSN, in particular through the collection and sharing of information and experiences. Such MSPs have long existed, involving different stakeholders, beyond the academic community, in participative research and development (R&D) efforts. These MSPs can involve public and private R&D institutions, as well as organizations of farmers, food producers or consumers. By confronting diverse perspectives as well as different forms of knowledge, expertise, skills and

² In this definition, a “collective” interest shall be understood as the common interest of the stakeholders involved or represented in the MSP; while a “public” interest designates the general interest of the whole society, in all its spheres, whether represented or not in the MSP. The tension between these two sets of interests – i.e. “collective” vs “public” interest – may represent a major challenge for MSPs and question their legitimacy.

experience, MSPs can be instrumental in the co-production of new forms of knowledge, including through transdisciplinary and participatory R&D methods.

16. MSPs can be involved in *advocacy* at the global, regional or national levels, raising awareness on major issues related to FSN and suggesting possible pathways towards more sustainable food systems, building on the complementary resources and expertise of the partners involved. There are examples of such MSPs initiated and led by governments or by the private sector.
17. *Standard setting* is a distinct area in which MSPs have been active for several decades. New initiatives emerged where private or civil society stakeholders, sometimes in collaboration with governments and intergovernmental bodies, established voluntary and market-based approaches to the sustainability of practices across agriculture and food systems.
18. *Action-oriented* MSPs are involved in activities ranging from natural resource management (including water management or community management of forest resources or protected areas) and agricultural development, to food processing and distribution. Certainly, many of their activities could also be linked to advocacy or standard setting, knowledge co-generation and capacity building, but they primarily focus on the implementation of policies, programmes and projects at different scales, from global to local. These MSPs can contribute to FSN and sustainable development in emergency situations or with a longer-term perspective.
19. *Fundraising and resource mobilization* for FSN and sustainable development is another domain of intervention, where MSPs can play an important role. They can foster synergies and avoid fragmentation of efforts, contributing to better mobilization, coordination and targeting of public and private funds for FSN. This may be performed through innovative mechanisms such as blended finance facilities, provided that their efforts are aligned with national priorities and the overall framework of the 2030 Agenda.

MSPs: potential benefits and limitations

20. The report discusses potential benefits and limitations of MSPs, as well as a set of criteria for assessing the performance of existing MSPs for FSN, examining the trade-offs between these criteria, with the view to better understand and improve the contribution of MSPs to financing and improving FSN. It proposes common tools and a common methodology for different stakeholders to perform and share their own assessments of existing MSPs.
21. The primary benefit of MSPs is the mobilization and coordinated use of complementary resources (including human, material and financial resources) from different stakeholders to solve a common issue that no stakeholder would have been able to tackle alone. *Pooling together complementary resources* in a MSP can foster synergies and help the partners to better share risks and responsibilities, to attract new resources or to use existing resources more effectively to achieve the MSP's FSN goals and targets.
22. By providing a space for policy dialogue to different stakeholders, with diverse views and diverging interests, MSPs can *improve mutual understanding* among partners, facilitate policy convergence and consensus building. If the rights, interests and needs of different stakeholders are appropriately considered, the strategies, decisions and action plans elaborated by a MSP might be more widely accepted and more easily implemented by all, and may lead to better outcomes in terms of FSN and sustainable development.
23. MSPs also face major challenges and limitations in the realization of their potential. *Tensions* can appear among partners in a MSP because of mistrust or diverging views on: the shared values; the diagnosis of the situation; the short- and long-term common objectives; the priorities for action; and the resources needed to implement the plan of actions. These divergences are grounded on the different interests and motivations, roles and responsibilities of partners in a MSP. Tensions can also be generated by *conflicts of interest* in the MSP.
24. There is a risk for MSPs to reproduce existing *power asymmetries* and to strengthen the position of more powerful actors. One of the challenges for MSPs in the field of FSN is to acknowledge and address these power asymmetries. Inclusiveness, transparency and accountability are keys to address this challenge. Full and effective participation of the most marginalized and vulnerable groups, directly affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, will be ensured if weaker partners have the right and capacity to speak, to be heard and influence the

- decisions. This requires time and resources to participate in discussion, including in physical meetings, as well as information, expertise and communication skills.
25. Decision-making in MSPs can be more time, energy and resource consuming than processes where stakeholders act separately, entailing inherent direct and indirect transaction costs. To be operational and successful, MSPs demand time and commitment from partners.
 26. The process of bringing stakeholders together determines the performance and the results of the MSPs and is often a result in itself. As such, any assessment of a given MSP must not only cover its tangible results, but also the decision-making process itself. In that perspective, the HLPE suggests eight qualities, whether result- or process-related, that shape MSPs' performance.
 27. The HLPE considers three result-related qualities: effectiveness, impact and capacity to mobilize resources. While effectiveness denotes the extent to which a MSP delivers its expected outputs and immediate outcomes, impact refers to longer-term and broader outcomes, and to the ultimate goals of the MSP, including enhanced livelihood and FSN. Although capacity to mobilize resources could be considered as part of the effectiveness of a MSP, it deserves specific attention when assessing the contribution of MSPs to financing FSN.
 28. The HLPE identifies five process-related qualities: inclusiveness, accountability, transparency, reflexivity and efficiency. These process-related qualities reflect the extent to which MSPs efficiently facilitate the discussions between stakeholders, enabling them to work together for a shared objective. They strongly affect the legitimacy of a given MSP, of its processes, actions and decisions. Inclusiveness is ensured when "the voices of all relevant stakeholders – particularly those most affected by food insecurity – are heard" (CFS, 2009). Accountability, whether internal or external, is usually understood as the responsibility that a representative or a group acquires with the action of speaking or deciding on behalf of someone else. Transparency implies that all relevant stakeholders have open or easy access to the best available information on MSPs' governance, rules, processes, costs, activities and decisions. Reflexivity denotes the capacity to learn from mistakes, to assess long-term trends and to react accordingly. Efficiency is generally understood as the relationship between the benefits (output) produced by, and the resources (input) engaged in, a given MSP.
 29. The logical links, synergies and trade-offs between these eight qualities have to be carefully considered when assessing MSPs' performance. For instance, although greater inclusiveness, transparency and accountability might increase immediate transaction costs in MSPs, they are instrumental in ensuring the full and effective participation of the more marginalized and vulnerable partners, with the view to contribute more effectively, in the long run, to the progressive realization of their right to adequate food.

Pathways to improve MSPs' contribution to FSN

30. Although MSPs, as one of the possible institutional mechanisms in the landscape of food governance, might not be the most appropriate approach in any situation, it is important to explore the internal conditions and the external environment that could help optimize MSPs' contributions to FSN and sustainable development.
31. Internal conditions refer to what can be done or changed within the MSP, by the partners themselves, or by the MSP as a group, to improve its performance for FSN. The HLPE identified six important steps to follow for establishing a MSP: (i) identify the relevant stakeholders to be involved and agree on the problem statement; (ii) elaborate a shared vision; (iii) clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the different partners; (iv) create the governance structure; (v) design and implement a common strategy; and (vi) regularly monitor and evaluate the results and the process. This six-step method can contribute concretely to address the limitations and challenges identified above by building trust and fostering synergies among partners, addressing power asymmetries and reducing long-term transaction costs.
32. At the initial stages of the MSP, enhanced trust and synergies among partners will depend on the strength of the agreement on the problem statement and on the composition of the partnership, as well as on the capacity of the partners to clarify their common values and elaborate a shared vision. Before the establishment of any partnership, the diverse expectations, interests and motivations of the different partners must be clearly spelled out.

33. This trust can be preserved through continuous stakeholder engagement, and only if MSPs are able to acknowledge and address power asymmetries, through: (i) a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of each partner and the identification of potential conflicts of interest; (ii) inclusive governance structures for MSPs that ensure the full and effective participation of the weaker partners and give priority to those actors most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition; and (iii) strong and transparent conflict resolution mechanisms.
34. As highlighted above, multi-stakeholder processes entail inherent transaction costs. However, these transaction costs could be considered as long-term investments to strengthen inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. When they build trust and reduce tensions between partners, address power asymmetries, manage conflicts and ensure full and effective participation of the weaker partners, MSPs are likely to contribute more effectively in the long run to FSN and sustainable development than isolated actions undertaken separately by stakeholders.
35. The external environment refers to the environment in which MSPs operate, framed by states and IGOs, but also shaped by non-state actors. The report reviews possible options to strengthen transparency and accountability, repeatedly pointed out in the 2030 Agenda and in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda as key factors for a successful contribution of MSPs to FSN and sustainable development. Among these options, it highlights in particular the importance of strong reporting and monitoring mechanisms that facilitate data collection, lesson sharing, learning processes and capacity building within and between MSPs.
36. Knowledge sharing can be promoted internally and supported by external organizations working with MSPs. For example, MSPs can promote internal knowledge sharing by widely communicating experiences in the partnership to their own organizations, thus creating an internal learning culture that is informed by benefits and limitations of MSPs. Several tools can be applied in knowledge sharing. Capacity building can be promoted by engaging different staff from their organizations in partnership meetings. Learning events, evaluations and initiatives specially dedicated to knowledge sharing can also be used.
37. States and IGOs have the primary responsibility, highlighted in the 2030 Agenda (SDG16), to promote the rule of law at national and international levels, and to develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. Through international guidelines, and national regulations, states and IGOs can support policy convergence and provide the institutional framework needed for MSPs to effectively strive for enhanced FSN and the progressive realization of the right to adequate food.
38. The report explores the potential of innovative mechanisms, such as corporate social responsibility or blended finance facilities, to attract additional resources or to better align existing resources with global and national priorities for FSN and sustainable development, as well as the conditions under which such mechanisms can effectively contribute to public priorities.

Recommendations

Multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) should be an integral part of strategies, plans and programmes across sectors to achieve food security and nutrition (FSN) goals and targets. They offer innovative mechanisms that can contribute to finance and improve FSN. However, MSPs do not replace the need for continued public investment in FSN. There are a number of constraints or limitations that need to be addressed to ensure that MSPs are transparent and accountable and that their efforts are aligned with global, regional and national priorities and contribute to the progressive realization of the right to adequate food. In this context, the HLPE suggests the following recommendations to enhance the contribution of MSPs to financing and improving FSN.

1. ESTABLISH A POLICY FRAMEWORK TO ENSURE THAT MSPs EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD

States should:

- a) consider the role of MSPs when developing strategies, plans and programmes for achieving national FSN goals and targets;
- b) ensure that legal and regulatory frameworks promote transparency and accountability and facilitate the management of conflicts of interest in MSPs;
- c) ensure that MSP efforts are contributing to the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security (VGRtF), and are guided by CFS major products;³
- d) encourage the development of charters for MSPs to better contribute to finance and improve FSN, based on the principles developed in this report.

2. IMPROVE MOBILIZATION, COORDINATION AND TARGETING OF FINANCING FOR FSN THROUGH MSPs

States, in collaboration with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) including multilateral development institutions, should:

- a) promote innovative ways to mobilize domestic and international public financing of MSPs through the use of various mechanisms, such as progressive taxation policies and corporate social responsibility spending;
- b) create public-supported special funds for grants and loans to marginalized and vulnerable actors, including small food producers' groups, small and medium enterprises, and associations of indigenous peoples;
- c) encourage increased and coordinated public and private funding of MSPs for FSN, including through the development of blended finance facilities;
- d) establish and enforce corporate social responsibility legislation to allocate corporate funds for FSN in line with social responsibility and sustainable development goals;
- e) encourage MSPs to facilitate mobilization and targeting of financing for FSN by strengthening the links between community-based initiatives, including women's self-help groups and formal financial institutions.

³ Including: CFS Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition; CFS Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT); CFS Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises, and CFS Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI), especially in the context of large-scale agricultural investments.

3. STRENGTHEN TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN MSPs THROUGH EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

Partners in MSPs should:

- a) identify and acknowledge, at early stages of MSPs, possible tensions among partners, power asymmetries and conflicts of interest;
- b) develop appropriate codes of conduct in line with national legislation, rules and charters, as well as with CFS major products;
- c) define clear roles and responsibilities for the different partners, in terms of representation, participation, decision-making and financial contribution within MSPs operations;
- d) encourage inclusive decision-making processes, ensuring an effective and meaningful participation of all stakeholders, particularly women, youth, indigenous peoples, small food producers and other marginalized or vulnerable actors;
- e) develop transparent and appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms;
- f) establish mechanisms to strengthen capacity building of the more vulnerable partners, guaranteeing them appropriate financial and technical assistance.

4. INCREASE THE IMPACT OF MSPs THROUGH EFFECTIVE MONITORING, EVALUATION AND EXPERIENCE SHARING

Partners in MSPs should:

- a) define appropriate indicators and metrics as well as data collection and management plans related to the achievement of their FSN goals and targets;
- b) establish appropriate and transparent MSP monitoring and evaluation systems, based on the criteria developed in this report: effectiveness, impact, capacity to mobilize resources, inclusiveness, accountability, transparency, reflexivity, efficiency;
- c) share monitoring and evaluation feedback with policy-makers and society for achieving impact at scale.

States and IGOs, in collaboration with other stakeholders should:

- d) establish mechanisms to improve data collection and information sharing on MSPs at global, regional and national levels.

5. INTEGRATE DIFFERENT FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPLORE FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH ON MSPs TO FINANCE AND IMPROVE FSN

States and the academic community, in collaboration with civil society organizations and other knowledge-holders should:

- a) promote participative research programmes and projects, taking into consideration local and traditional knowledge;
- b) encourage, as appropriate, MSPs as a tool to acknowledge and integrate different forms of knowledge and to share experiences;
- c) support the development of effective extension systems, including through MSPs;
- d) finance and conduct further research on MSPs, exploring:
 - (i) innovative short- and long-term impact assessment methodologies, based on the criteria suggested in this report;
 - (ii) MSPs governance, including decision-making rules and processes, considering the complementary roles and responsibilities of the public sector, the private sector and civil society;
 - (iii) adequate ways to address power asymmetries and conflicts of interest in MSPs;
 - (iv) the immediate and long-term implications of the transaction costs associated with MSPs setting-up and operations;

- (v) successes and failures in existing MSPs in financing and improving FSN, paying specific attention to the rights and needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups;
- (vi) innovative financing arrangements for MSPs to enhance FSN.

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing recognition that complex, multi-dimensional and cross-sectoral issues – such as food security and nutrition (FSN) – require cross-sectoral and holistic approaches, pooling together the resources, knowledge and expertise of different stakeholders (whether public, private or from civil society). This has contributed to position multi-actor policy processes, as well as multi-stakeholder initiatives and partnerships at the centre of FSN and sustainable development debates.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015), and in particular the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) focusing on “means of implementation” (SDG 17), invites states and other stakeholders to “enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries” (SDG 17.16). States and other stakeholders should also “encourage and promote effective public, public–private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships” (SDG 17.17).

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA, 2015) stressed the importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) to complement the efforts of national governments in ending hunger and poverty and achieving sustainable development in its three dimensions (promoting inclusive economic growth, protecting the environment and promoting social inclusion).

In this context, in October 2016, the United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS) requested its High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) to produce a report on “*Multi-stakeholder Partnerships to Finance and Improve Food Security and Nutrition in the Framework of the 2030 Agenda*” to inform its debates at the 45th CFS Plenary Session of October 2018.

The emerging importance of MSPs as part of a new governance approach to finance and improve FSN does not take place without controversy. Besides a conceptual debate on the exact definition of concepts such as stakeholders and partnerships, some scientists, and other actors, question the potential benefits and limitations, the performance, and even the relevance of MSPs as a suitable institutional mechanism to finance and improve FSN. They also question the conditions for MSPs to contribute effectively to the realization of the right to adequate food. This report does not take MSPs for granted, nor dismisses them *a priori*. It reviews the potential benefits and limitations of MSPs. It explores possible pathways to improve their performance for FSN and sustainable development with the view to suggesting concrete recommendations.

Most previous HLPE reports covered issues on which there were already data and significant scientific literature. On the contrary, as illustrated in this report, MSPs have emerged quite recently as a topic mobilizing scientific communities beyond social sciences. Such communities working specifically on that topic are still small. Evidence and data are limited in time and scope and quickly evolving, and further research and efforts are needed to generate more comprehensive information on MSPs. It is difficult to find detailed and publicly available information on existing MSPs, particularly when it comes to budget, finance and impact. A great part of the available data is self-reported by the MSPs with no guarantee of independent verification.

Here, more than for any previous HLPE study, the inclusive – and multi-stakeholder – process of elaboration of the HLPE reports (described in **Appendix 3**), which includes two open consultations allowing all stakeholders to contribute, and applies principles and methodologies suggested in this report, is as important as its result. The raw material (including all the contributions and case studies) received during these consultations has to be considered, along with the final report, as an important result of this HLPE study. This raw material, as well as all the documents generated throughout the process of elaboration of this report, are available on the HLPE website.⁴

The report is organized as follows. Chapter 1 briefly discusses the context of emergence and consolidation of MSPs as part of a new approach to governance and discusses the definitions of stakeholders, partnerships and MSPs. Chapter 2, illustrated by concrete examples, suggests a set of criteria to describe MSPs as well as their wide diversity. It identifies five main domains of intervention through which MSPs can contribute to finance and improve FSN. Chapter 3 analyses the potential benefits and limitations of MSPs and discusses criteria to assess their performance. Solution-oriented,

⁴ See: <http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/reports/report-13-elaboration-process/en/>

the last chapter discusses the internal conditions and external environment needed to improve MSPs' contribution to FSN. It concludes by discussing innovative financing mechanisms for development in which MSPs could play a key role.

1 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS: CONTEXT AND DEFINITIONS

MSPs are often presented as valuable institutional mechanisms for FSN (Hemmati, 2002; Dentoni *et al.*, 2012) and sustainable development (Bäckstrand, 2006; Biermann *et al.*, 2007; Glasbergen *et al.*, 2007). As highlighted in introduction, MSPs are now recognized by the international community as one of the means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015; AAAA, 2015).

In order to better understand why MSPs have become so prominent in FSN and sustainable development debates, this chapter starts by presenting the scope of this report. It then describes the overall context of financing for development and the investment gap to be filled in order to achieve the 2030 Agenda. It depicts the emergence of MSPs as part of a new approach to governance for FSN and sustainable development. It presents conceptual debates around the concept of MSPs with the view to suggesting a comprehensive definition. It introduces the discussion, further developed in the report, on the potential benefits and limitations of MSPs, and on their capacity to contribute effectively to financing and improving FSN and to the realization of the right to adequate food.

1.1 Scope: MSPs to finance and improve FSN

Malnutrition in all its forms (undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity) now affects all countries, whether low-, middle- or high- income. After years of decline, hunger is on the rise again and 815 million people are still undernourished worldwide (FAO/IFAD/UNICEF/WFP/WHO, 2017). One person in three is malnourished and, if current trends continue, one person in two could be malnourished by 2030 (IFPRI, 2015; GloPan, 2016), in stark contrast with the objective of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015), to end hunger and all forms of malnutrition by 2030 (SDG2).

The human right to adequate food is defined as the right of every individual “*alone or in community with others, to have physical and economic access at all times to sufficient, adequate and culturally acceptable food, that is produced and consumed sustainably, preserving access to food for future generations*” (UNGA, 2014). This right was inferred in 1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and explicitly recognized in 1966 in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, Article 11)⁵ as a legally binding right for all states parties. The legal obligations of states parties to *respect, protect* and *fulfil* this right were further refined in the General Comment No. 12 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR, GC12).⁶

The World Food Summit (1996) considered that “food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. The World Summit on Food Security (WSFS, 2009) stated that “the nutritional dimension is integral to the concept of food security”, and identified four main pillars of FSN, already described in previous HLPE reports (2016, 2017b):

- ***Food availability***: availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.
- ***Food access***: access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. This dimension includes physical access to food (proximity) and economical access (affordability) (HLPE, 2017a).
- ***Utilization***: utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met.
- ***Stability***: to be food secure, a population, household or individual must have access to adequate food at all times.

⁵ See: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx>

⁶ See: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx>

As illustrated in previous HLPE reports (2016, 2017a), transformative actions are needed across agriculture and food systems⁷ to enhance these four pillars of FSN and realize the right to adequate food for all. This report will consider the role that MSPs can play in this needed transformation towards more sustainable food systems⁸ for enhanced FSN.

The HLPE, through many of its previous publications,⁹ has illustrated, from different perspectives, the fundamental importance of improving FSN for all, now and in the future, as both a necessary condition and a cross-cutting challenge, not only to end hunger and all forms of malnutrition by 2030 (SDG2), but also to achieve the whole 2030 Agenda. Therefore this report will not only consider MSPs directly focused on FSN and agricultural development (SDG2) but also MSPs that, striving for other SDGs, contribute indirectly to FSN, including:

- MSPs acting to improve *food availability*, through enhanced resource efficiency, or reduced food losses and waste at different stages of the food supply chain (SDG12);
- MSPs acting on the food environment to improve *physical access to food*, including through appropriate infrastructures (SDG9), and sustainable cities (SDG11);
- MSPs engaged to improve *economic access to food* through social protection programmes and, more broadly, poverty reduction (SDG1); those working for sustainable economic growth (SDG8), for income and employment generation;
- MSPs fighting against economic and social inequalities, including gender inequalities (SDGs 5, 10), giving priority to marginalized and vulnerable groups most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition;
- MSPs acting on consumer behaviour to promote sustainable consumption patterns (SDG12) and to improve *food utilization* through, for instance, education (SDG4) on nutrition, innovation (SDGs 8, 9), information and knowledge management and sharing;
- MSPs striving for improved health (SDG3) and nutrition outcomes of food systems;
- MSPs working for peace and social justice (SDG16), including those engaged in humanitarian emergencies, to improve food stability in contexts of conflicts, protracted crises and natural disasters;
- MSPs engaged: in climate change adaptation and mitigation (SDG13); in the sustainable management of natural resources (e.g. biodiversity, soil, water and energy); or in the preservation of natural ecosystems (e.g. forests, rangelands, wetlands and other terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems) that form the ecological basis of food stability and that are essential for food availability in the future (SDGs 6, 7, 14, 15).

In this context, the different categories of stakeholders described below in section 1.4.2 could also be categorized with a food system perspective based on the three core elements of food systems identified in the latest HLPE report (2017a), distinguishing: consumers; stakeholders acting in food environments;¹⁰ stakeholders directly involved in different stages of the food supply chain (production, storage and distribution, processing and packaging, retail and markets); and stakeholders indirectly shaping the food systems, their drivers and their outcomes. Even if private actors play a major role in food systems, it is important to remind here that access to adequate food is a human right that states have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil through appropriate policies and regulations.

⁷ “A *food system* gathers all the elements (environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, etc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the outputs of these activities, including socio-economic and environmental outcomes” (HLPE, 2014).

⁸ “A *sustainable food system* (SFS) is a food system that ensures food security and nutrition for all in such a way that the economic, social and environmental bases to generate food security and nutrition of future generations are not compromised” (HLPE, 2014).

⁹ See: <http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/reports/en/>

¹⁰ “*Food environment* refers to the physical, economic, political and socio-cultural context in which consumers engage with the food system to make their decisions about acquiring, preparing and consuming food” (HLPE, 2017a).

Box 1 Public vs private goods: general definitions

Samuelson (1954) identified four main types of goods and services, based on two properties:¹¹

- “public” goods: non-excludable and non-rivalrous;
- “common-pool” resources: non-excludable and rivalrous;
- “club” goods: excludable and non-rivalrous;
- “private” goods: excludable and rivalrous.

Initially introduced by Hardin (1968), the “tragedy of the commons” is an allegory generally used to point out difficulties in setting up appropriate governance tools that can sustainably manage shared, “non-excludable” resources (whether public goods or common-pool resources). An extensive literature (e.g. Ostrom, 1990, 2014) confront the “tragedy” by presenting examples where local communities have designed institutions able to achieve sustainable management of these types of resources.

Malkin and Widavsky (1991) have challenged the traditional distinction between public and private goods, arguing that the boundary between public and private goods is socially constructed; what is considered as a public good in one community might be viewed as a private good in another. In that spirit, Ostrom (2010), for example, calls for polycentric governance, a system of decision-making where different kinds of actors coordinate their actions towards collective interests. The HLPE report on forestry (2017b) applied this discussion to the context of forest and tree governance and highlighted the importance of stakeholder involvement for sustainable forest management.

Considering the general definitions presented in **Box 1**, food products can be considered as a private good (excludable and rivalrous). However, for certain authors, food carries the characteristics of public goods (Vivero Pol, 2013; Patel, 2009). Dorward (2013) refers to stable food prices as a public good. Fish stocks could be considered either as common-pool resources or private goods, depending on the rules and instruments (such as capture quotas or marine protected areas) in place to protect and sustainably manage those stocks (HLPE, 2014).

Transport infrastructures, indispensable to ensure access to food, particularly in remote rural areas, can be considered as either a public good or a club good. Biodiversity, essential for food production and FSN, now and in the future, is a clear example of public good (HLPE, 2017b). Water scarcity is an increasing threat to FSN.¹² While bottled water is a private good, quality and availability of water resources can have the characteristics of a public good or of a common-pool resource (HLPE, 2015).

At first sight, health, including human, animal and ecosystem health, can also be considered as a critical public good for FSN that deserves a holistic approach popularized with the concept of *One Health* (FAO/OIE/WHO/UN System Influenza Coordination/UNICEF/World Bank, 2008; HLPE, 2016). Nutrition education is a public good that can orient consumer behaviour towards improved food utilization for healthier and more sustainable diets (HLPE, 2017a).

When conflicts and protracted crises leave millions of people hungry (FAO, 2017a; FAO/IFAD/UNICEF/WFP/WHO, 2017; HLPE, 2017a), peace, which can be considered as a “public good”, is a critical condition for FSN. Appropriate global governance mechanisms to address global food security have also been considered as public goods (Page, 2013).

Finally, FSN in itself, as a prerequisite for the realization of the human right to adequate food for every citizen now and in the future, and as a fundamental part of human dignity and of socio-cultural identity, can be considered as a global public good (Vivero Pol, 2014, 2017).

The challenge is then to align the efforts of all stakeholders through appropriate governance mechanisms to better deliver the set of public and private goods and services needed at different scales for achieving FSN, considering the possible contribution of MSPs.

¹¹ “*Non-rivalry*”: each individual’s consumption of the good or service leads to no subtraction of any other individual’s consumption. “*Non-excludability*”: no individual can be excluded from consuming the good or service.

¹² See: <http://www.unwater.org/water-facts/scarcity/>

1.2 Financing for development: the investment gap

As mentioned in the previous section, FSN is a critical condition for sustainable development. Strategies to finance FSN, at national, regional or international levels, have thus to be considered in the broader framework of the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) and of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA, 2015) on Financing for Development (FFD).

This section presents an overview of the FFD needs, gives rough estimates of the investment gap at the global level and for developing countries, and presents the different sources of funding to be used to fill this gap.

1.2.1 Financing needs for sustainable development

In 2014, several reports (e.g. UN, 2014; ODI, 2014; UNCTAD, 2014), written in the perspective of the 2030 Agenda negotiations and of the Addis Ababa conference, estimated the financing needs for sustainable development at the global level. These rough estimates are only indicative orders of magnitude, rather than precise figures. Of course, financing needs vary hugely across regions, borders and socio-economic situations (UN, 2014). The needs are often greatest in countries where the capacity to raise resources is weakest, in particular in least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states (SIDS), landlocked developing countries and countries facing or emerging from a conflict or a natural disaster.

The UN Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF) identified three categories of financing needs (UN, 2014):

- i. investments to address basic needs (eradicating poverty and hunger, improving health and education, providing access to affordable energy and promoting gender equality);
- ii. investments to address national sustainable development needs (including infrastructures and rural development); and
- iii. investments to address global challenges (including climate change and the protection of the global environment) and deliver global public goods.

Investments to address basic needs

FAO (2017b) highlighted the strong links existing between poverty and food insecurity and malnutrition, with around 75 percent of the world's poorest living in rural areas and depending on agriculture for their subsistence. In 2013, 767 million people still lived in poverty worldwide, with less than USD 1.90 per person and per day (World Bank Group, 2016).

FAO/IFAD/UNICEF/WFP/WHO (2017) found that, after a long decline, hunger is on the rise again with 815 million people undernourished. In 2017, four countries suffered from famine (South Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen) due to the combined effects of conflicts, displacements, weak infrastructures, droughts and water scarcity, putting 1.4 million children at imminent risk of death from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and over 40 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (HLPE, 2017a; UNICEF, 2018). The crisis is not limited to these four countries: conflicts and droughts also impact other countries, particularly in the Middle East and in the Horn of Africa.

In 2011, 31 countries were spending less than USD 200 (purchasing power parity) per person and per year in health, education and other public services (ODI, 2014).

According to the ICESDF (UN, 2014), addressing those basic needs would cost annually: USD 66 billion to eradicate extreme poverty;¹³ USD 50 billion to eliminate hunger by 2025;¹⁴ USD 42 billion to achieve universal primary education and increase access to lower secondary education; USD 37 billion to set up universal health care. According to Shekar *et al.* (2017), USD 70 billion would be needed over ten years in nutrition-specific interventions to achieve the global nutrition targets, reducing stunting, wasting and anaemia in women, and promoting breastfeeding.

¹³ Amount needed to increase the income of the poorest to the international poverty line (i.e. in 2014: USD 1.25 per day).

¹⁴ More recently, Fan *et al.* (2018) found that the estimated cost of eradicating hunger varies widely, from USD 7 to USD 265 billion per year, depending on the model used, on its assumptions and targeted objectives, as well as on the different investment strategies considered across sectors.

Investments to address national sustainable development needs

Beyond addressing basic needs and emergencies, sustainable development needs to embrace a longer-term perspective and to develop appropriate infrastructures at national level in different sectors vital for FSN and sustainable development, such as water, agriculture, forestry, telecommunications, energy, transport, industry and construction. The ICESDF (UN, 2014) estimated that, at the global level, USD 5 to 7 trillion would be needed annually to finance these investments in infrastructure.

Investments needed to address global challenges

Investments are finally needed to address global challenges related to FSN and sustainable development, including peace keeping, climate change mitigation, or biodiversity protection or restoration (ODI, 2014 ; UNCTAD, 2014) .

With regard to climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) estimated that USD 343 to 385 billion were invested each year to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and/or to enhance resilience to climate change and climate variability. Out of this, public climate finance directed to developing countries was estimated to reach USD 35 to 49 billion per year (in 2011 and 2012) while international private finance accruing to developing countries amounted to between USD 10 and USD 72 billion per year (over 2008–2011), including foreign direct investment (FDI) and loans. Globally, according to the limited available evidence, between two-thirds and three-fourths of the total climate mitigation finance were estimated to come from the private sector (IPCC, 2014). In that context, during the UN Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2009 in Copenhagen, developed countries committed to mobilize USD 100 billion per year till 2020 in climate finance to address developing countries' needs (OECD, 2016).

1.2.2 FFD: the investment gap

As illustrated in the previous section, the needs for FFD are important, but: (i) all the SDGs are deeply interconnected and integrated approaches can foster synergies across sectors and reduce the financing needs; (ii) the cost of inaction is likely to be much higher than the cost of corrective measures (HLPE, 2017a; UN, 2014).

Global savings, including public and private sources, are estimated to reach about USD 22 trillion a year, and the stock of global financial assets about USD 225 trillion (UN, 2014). Institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds) only in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) held USD 90 trillion in assets in 2014, and could hold up to USD 120 trillion in 2019 (OECD, 2015a). Even a small change in the allocation of those resources would have a huge impact for FSN and sustainable development. At the global level, the resources exist to achieve the 2030 Agenda but the challenge is to improve the coordination and targeting of these resources and to better channel them towards the realization of the SDGs (World Bank, 2015). The progressive realization of the right to adequate food requires a change in the priorities of investments, and particularly of public investments. It also calls for a renewed commitment of states that are ultimately responsible for articulating the different needs of their population and ensuring that all decisions are made according to public interest (UNHCHR, 2012).

In its World Investment Report, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2014) reviewed the different financing needs for sustainable development described in the previous section and estimated that the global level of investments needed for achieving the SDGs, including FSN, could reach USD 5 to 7 trillion per year, out of which USD 3.3 to 4.5 trillion (mid-point USD 3.9 trillion) should be spent in developing countries (see **Table 1**). Considering the current level of investment (USD 1.4 trillion), the annual investment gap for achieving the SDGs in developing countries amounts to around USD 2.5 trillion.

Table 1 Current investment, investment needs and gaps and private sector participation in key SDG sectors in developing countries^a

Sector	Description	Estimated current investment	2015-2030		Average private sector participation in current investment ^b	
			Total investment required	Investment gap	Developing countries	Developed countries
		(Latest available year) billion USD	Annualized billion USD (constant price)			
A	B	C = B-A				
Power ^c	Investment in generation, transmission and distribution of electricity	~260	630–950	370–690	40–50	80–100
Transport ^c	Investment in roads, airports, ports and rail	~300	350–770	50–470	30–40	60–80
Telecommunications ^c	Investment in infrastructure (fixed lines, mobile and internet)	~160	230–400	70–240	40–80	60–100
Water and sanitation ^c	Provision of water and sanitation to industry and households	~150	~410	~260	0–20	20–80
Food security and agriculture	Investment in agriculture, research, rural development, safety nets, etc.	~220	~480	~260	~75	~90
Climate change mitigation	Investment in relevant infrastructure, renewable energy generation, research and deployment of climate-friendly technologies, etc.	170	550–850	380–680	~40	~90
Climate change adaptation	Investment to cope with impact of climate change in agriculture, infrastructure, water management, coastal zones, etc.	~20	80–120	60–100	0–20	0–20
Eco-systems / biodiversity	Investment in conservation and safeguarding ecosystems, marine resource management, sustainable forestry, etc.		70–210 ^d			
Health	Infrastructural investment, e.g. new hospitals	~70	~210	~140	~20	~40
Education	Infrastructural investment, e.g. new schools	~80	~330	~250	~15	0–20

Source: UNCTAD (2014).

Notes: (a) Investment refers to capital expenditure. Operating expenditure, though sometimes referred to as 'investment' is not included. (b) The private sector share for each sector shows large variability between countries. (c) Excluding investment required for climate change, which is included in the totals for climate change mitigation and adaptation. (d) Investment requirements in ecosystems/biodiversity are not included in the totals used in the analysis in this section, as they overlap with other sectors.

1.2.3 Sources of financing

Filling this investment gap, with a specific attention to the needs of developing countries, will require the involvement of all stakeholders and the appropriate use of all available sources of financing.

The ICESDF identified and described four main and complementary sources of FFD (UN, 2014):

- i. domestic public finance, mainly generated through domestic taxes;
- ii. international public finance, including official development assistance (ODA) and international development cooperation (including South–South and triangular cooperation);
- iii. domestic private finance;
- iv. international private finance, including FDI and migrant remittances.

Beyond the domestic public revenue (taxes and royalties), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2014) identified three main elements of development finance:

- i. concessional public finance (aid or loans), granted on terms significantly below market interest rates;
- ii. public borrowing on market related terms; and
- iii. private finance (domestic or international).

This ODI typology aims at drawing attention to the synergies between taxes and aid, as well as to the underutilized potential of public borrowing on the markets. It does not differentiate international and domestic private finance because the ODI considers that both the policies needed to mobilize them and their interactions with public finance are very similar.

Adopting a different perspective, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2018a) differentiates financial instruments by purpose rather than by source and distinguishes:


- *development finance* referring to finance, whether public or private, concessional or not, domestic or international, deployed with a development mandate;
- *additional finance* referring to commercial, non-concessional finance, whether public or private, that does not target explicitly sustainable development.

Blended finance, further developed in Chapter 4, is then defined as “the strategic use of development finance for the mobilization of additional finance towards sustainable development in developing countries” (OECD, 2018a, b). In other words, the challenge is to “incentivize private finance and align it with development objectives” (ODI, 2014)

According to the ODI (2014) concessional assistance and ODA have a particular importance for development as they minimize economic trade-offs in the recipient countries. Aid does not cut profits of domestic companies like taxes. It does not increase debts as public borrowing. Unlike personal remittances, it can be directly spent by the recipient governments to achieve their national development priorities.

ODA reached a record level in 2016, amounting to USD 142.6 billion (OECD, 2018a) . However, the World Bank (2015) reported that ODA levels would more than double if only all OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries were to reach the 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) target first agreed in 1970 by the UN General Assembly. Moreover, as shown in **Figure 1**, ODA’s relative importance in the flow of external finance to developing countries has declined over the past decade with the increase of private capital flows (including FDI) and of personal remittances.

Figure 1 External finance to developing countries, current prices, 2000–2015



Source: Estimates based on OECD statistics and World Bank data on remittances and private capital flows, (OECD, 2018a).

Note: The figures shown are in net disbursements. ODA, other official flows (OOF) and private grants are based on OECD statistics and are net disbursements. ODA and OOF include outflows from bilateral and multilateral institutions (capital subscriptions are included with grants). OOF were negative in 2000, 2001, 2004 and 2006, and were given a null value in the graph. Private grants cover gross outflows from non-governmental organizations and civil society minus support received from the official sector. Remittances are in gross disbursements. Private capital flows include net FDI and portfolio investments.

Beyond ODA level, developing countries face another challenge in financing their development, known as the “missing middle dilemma” (ODI, 2014; Galiani *et al.*, 2014). As national income rises, the cuts-off in international assistance tend to override the rise in domestic public revenue (taxes), thus affecting significantly economic growth and development in lower-middle-income countries.

Much of the debate in *improving* FSN relates to the interactions and synergies between these different sources in *financing* FSN and, in particular, to the catalytic effect of public funding.

Many studies have highlighted the importance of public investments in agriculture for development, showing, for instance, that per capita public expenditure in agriculture and agriculture expenditure intensity¹⁵ are much lower in developing than in developed countries (Mogues *et al.*, 2012; IFPRI, 2017a; Himanshu, 2018). The case of Brazil (see **Box 2**) illustrates the importance of embedding public funding for FSN more strongly in national legislation in order to ensure adequate and long-term financing for FSN despite governmental changes and economic crises.

Box 2 The catalytic effect of public funding for FSN: the case of Brazil

Over the past 15 years, Brazil has strengthened its political commitment to finance and improve FSN. The Brazilian Zero Hunger Programme (Fome Zero) was introduced in 2003 by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Graziano da Silva *et al.*, 2011). In 2006, the Organic Law on Food and Nutrition Security (FNS)¹⁶ defined the concept of FNS and provided the general framework for Brazilian FNS policies. This law also established the general objectives and composition of the National System for Food and Nutrition Security¹⁷ (Rocha, 2009; Graziano da Silva *et al.*, 2011; Chmielewska and Souza, 2011). The human right to food was introduced in the National Constitution approved in 2010 (Maluf *et al.*, 2015).

In May 2016, the Brazilian Interministerial Chamber of Food and Nutrition Security¹⁸ (CAISAN) launched the 2nd PLANSAN (2016–2019) that summarizes the actions to be taken by the federal government to respect, protect, promote and guarantee the right to adequate food to all Brazilians (CAISAN, 2018a). BRL 307 billion were spent by the federal government during the four years of execution of the 1st PLANSAN (2012–2015) and the annual budget devoted to this plan is continuously increasing, from BRL 66.7 to BRL 96.1 billion between 2012 and 2017 (CAISAN, 2018b).

These plans, discussed and designed with the proactive collaboration of civil society through the National Council on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA), include a wide range of programmes, such as food acquisition policies – where the federal government buys food from family farmers for public distribution programmes – and home-grown school feeding policies – where local governments receive funding from the federal branch to ensure that food supply to local schools is acquired directly from smallholder family farmers (de Sousa *et al.*, 2015; Rocha, 2016). As a result of this FNS policy, public spending on social protection in Brazil (17.9 percent of the GDP), is now among the highest in the developing world (Jha and Acharya, 2016).

This FNS strategy was a success. Brazil exited the FAO Hunger Map in 2014, when the prevalence of undernourishment decreased below the threshold of 5 percent of the population (FAO, 2015a) and the percentage of food secure households increased from 65.1 percent in 2004 to 77.4 percent in 2013, while the percentage of severely food insecure households was divided by 2 (CAISAN, 2018b).

However, despite this remarkable progress, because of the economic and political crisis in Brazil, public spending on FNS is currently at risk of being reduced and strategic FSN programmes at risk of being dismantled (CAISAN, 2018a; CONSEA, 2018).

1.3 MSPs: emergence and consolidation of a new approach to governance for FSN and sustainable development

The primary responsibility for adopting effective strategies to secure FSN, to eradicate hunger and all forms of malnutrition lies with states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, many authors highlight states’ disengagement at national level and the shrinking share of public funding in FFD at the global level (Adams and Martens, 2015; McKeon, 2017). At national level, states increasingly delegate to the private sector the delivery of public goods and services they historically

¹⁵ i.e. the ratio between public expenditures for agricultural development and agricultural gross domestic product (GDP).

¹⁶ “Lei Orgânica da Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional” - LOSAN, Law No. 11346/ 2006. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/lei/l11346.htm

¹⁷ “Sistema Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional” (SISAN).

¹⁸ Câmara Interministerial de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (CAISAN). <http://mds.gov.br/caisan-mds>

provided, such as infrastructure, rural credit or insurance (Besley, 1994; McKeon, 2015; UNGA, 2018). At the global level, Adams and Martens (2015) noted the relative decline of the share of core resources in the total budget devoted to development in the UN. Whereas, in 1997, core resources funded 48 percent of UN's operational development and humanitarian assistance activities, this ratio decreased to only 25 percent in 2013.¹⁹

These increasing constraints on public funding for FSN and sustainable development could be released by renewed commitment from states. However, in this context, there is a strong call for finding alternative funding sources to achieve the 2030 Agenda (Pattberg *et al.*, 2012; Adams and Martens, 2015). MSPs are often considered as a possible way to leverage additional funds, in particular private or philanthropic funds, to complement governments' efforts to achieve the SDGs (AAAA, 2015; McKeon, 2017).

This explains the rapid growth of MSPs observed in the past two or three decades (Wageningen Centre for Development Innovation *et al.*, 2017; Pattberg *et al.*, 2012), even though the roots of multi-stakeholder engagement are much older than the term MSP itself.

In France, for instance, Levesque (1993) has developed a multi-stakeholder methodology to elaborate and implement a common strategy or project at the operational level. He experimented this methodology and adapted it in various situations over 30 years since the late 1950s. In the field of rural development, active involvement of non-state actors gained importance by the end of twentieth century along with the growing use of participatory research methods, such as "Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)" developed in **Box 3**. Even if those approaches cannot be qualified *stricto sensu* of MSPs, they show the importance to consider farmers, indigenous peoples and local communities not only as beneficiaries but also as knowledgeable partners in development projects.

Box 3 Participatory Rural Appraisal

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) designates a set of participatory research approaches, tools and methodologies to share and generate knowledge about rural livelihood conditions "from, with and by" local rural people, in order to pave the way for strategic planning and actions. Those methods emerged in the late 1980s to early 1990s. They are grounded on different participatory approaches such as:

- "indigenous technical knowledge" and "activist participatory research", strongly influenced by Freire's (1968) assumption that "poor and exploited people can and should be enabled to conduct their own analysis of their own reality";
- "agroecosystem analysis", developed in the 1980's and closely linked to the science of agroecology that will be explored in more depth in a forthcoming HLPE report on agroecology and other innovative approaches (2019);
- "applied anthropology", that contributed to better appreciate the "richness and validity of rural people's knowledge";
- "field research on farming systems", and farmer's participation in agricultural research, that highlighted the complexity and rationality of a wide diversity of farming practices; "Rapid Rural Appraisal" (RRA).

While RRA methods still relied heavily on *outsiders'* knowledge and expertise, PRA methods acknowledge and give a central importance, not only to the deep traditional or experiential knowledge that farmers and villagers have of their environment, but also to their creative and analytical abilities to discover context-specific and culturally adapted solutions for their future.

In the 1990s, PRA methods were applied in different countries, in four major areas: natural resources management; agriculture; poverty and social programmes; health and food security.

Sources: adapted from Chambers (1983, 1994a, b, c).

¹⁹ In the UN system, two main sources of funds are usually distinguished: regular or core budget (contributions received by UN agencies in support of their mandates or programmes) vs extra-budgetary or non-core revenues (earmarked contributions whose use has been specified by the donor).

At the global level, member states were the sole actors involved in the discussions when the United Nations was founded in 1945. During the 1990s' decade of the UN global summits, non-state actors were given more space in the UN systems and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were allowed to participate directly in global meetings (Weiss and Gordenker, 1996; Otto, 1996; Higgot *et al.*, 2000; Scholte, 2004; Dodds, 2015; Beisheim and Simon, 2016; McKeon, 2017; Zanello *et al.*, 2018).

In 1995, the UN Commission on Global Governance reaffirmed the responsibility of states but invited them to work with non-state actors, building “partnerships – networks of institutions and processes – that enable global actors to pool information, knowledge, and capacities and to develop joint policies and practices on issues of common concerns” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). In 1996, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)²⁰ acknowledged and specified, in its Resolution 1996/31²¹, the consultative relationships between the UN and NGOs (Willetts, 2000).

In 1998, the UN Fund for International Partnerships was established with a donation of USD 1 billion from Ted Turner (Beisheim and Simon, 2016). In 2000, the UN Global Compact²² was established to provide a general framework for cooperation between the UN and the private sector, based on ten principles (UN Global Compact, 2015). The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) also developed a “Partnerships for SDGs online platform”, a global registry of voluntary commitments and MSPs, designed to facilitate the global engagement of all stakeholders in support of the 2030 Agenda, and to provide space for sharing knowledge and expertise among them.²³ The number of initiatives registered in this platform grew from 14 in 2001 to 3 831 in June 2018.

In 2002, during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 in Johannesburg, partnerships for sustainable development were defined as “specific commitments by various partners intended to contribute to and reinforce the implementation of the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations of the WSSD and to help further implementation of Agenda 21 and the MDGs”²⁴ (Kara and Quarless, 2002). This WSSD promoted “Type II partnerships”, defined as “collaborations between national or subnational governments, private sector actors, and civil society actors, who form voluntary transnational agreements in order to meet specific sustainable development goals”, as opposed to more classical “Type I outcomes” (i.e. agreements and commitments made by governments) (Van Hujstee *et al.*, 2007; Dodds, 2015). From 2008 onwards, ECOSOC began to convene annual “Partnership Forums” to strengthen UN collaboration with representatives from the private sector and philanthropic foundations, civil society organizations (CSOs) and academia, with the view to advance the 2030 Agenda.²⁵

More recently, the final declaration of the 2012 Rio+20 Summit (UN, 2012) acknowledged the critical contribution of existing and new partnerships at different scales (from local to global, South–South, North–South) to the achievement of sustainable development. More precisely, the declaration highlighted the importance of partnerships that facilitate the full and effective engagement of all stakeholders, in order to address complex issues and multi-dimensional problems, share knowledge and experiences, and improve access to relevant education and build capacities at all levels. This declaration also stated that: “new partnerships and innovative sources of financing can play a role in complementing sources of financing for sustainable development”.

As mentioned in the introduction, the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015), particularly in SDG targets 17.16 and 17.17, promoted MSPs as a way to facilitate the achievement of all the SDGs. Moreover, the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) adopted the principle of “open, inclusive, participatory and transparent” reviews at all levels, thus opening the door for MSPs to contribute to the SDGs' monitoring, evaluation and follow-up processes (Halle and Wolfe, 2015).

²⁰ See: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/home>

²¹ See: <http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm>

²² The UN Global Compact is the world's largest corporate sustainability initiative, gathering 9 792 companies in 164 countries. It is a “voluntary initiative based on companies' commitments to implement universal sustainability principles and to undertake partnerships in support of UN goals”. See: <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/> (accessed June 2018).

²³ See: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships/> (accessed June 2018)

²⁴ MDGs: Millennium Development Goals. See: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

²⁵ See: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/ecosoc-partnerships-forum>

This emergence of MSPs, as part of a new approach to governance for FSN and sustainable development at different levels, can be linked to the evolution observed in the respective roles of public and private actors. Reid *et al.* (2015), for example, reviewed significant changes on how the private sector and governments have been defining roles, aligning interests and engaging in joint activities. In their view, in the past, governments were expected to design and monitor regulations and the private sector was expected to invest, comply with laws and pay taxes. They argue that, nowadays, a more systematic collaboration is needed when different interests can be aligned, for instance to build an infrastructure of public interest. CSOs can also be involved in such initiatives, giving a voice to those stakeholders most affected by the project, allowing them to share their expertise and experience (Bezanson and Isenman, 2012; Bulloch *et al.*, 2011).

For other authors, this approach – sometimes called “multi-stakeholderism” (McKeon, 2017) – challenges the legitimacy of governments as ultimate decision-makers. They see MSPs as a way to legitimate the growing corporate influence in public decision-making (Andonova and Levy, 2003; Richter, 2003; Utting and Marques, 2013; Valente, 2016), and the growing reliance on philanthropy for investments that should be publicly funded (Zammit, 2003). This approach could increase the risk of conflict of interests (Peters and Handschin, 2012). They highlight the need for transparency and strong accountability mechanisms in MSPs. They express their concern on how “crowding in” corporate funding may lead to “crowding out” public accountability (McKeon, 2017; Adams and Dayringer, 2017).

1.4 MSPs: concepts and definition

With the view to elaborating a common definition of MSPs, this section discusses successively its different elements, i.e. the term “stakeholder”; the appropriateness of the standard three-fold separation of stakeholders in three spheres (public sector, private sector and civil society); the processes that lead to the creation of a MSP; as well as the distinction between multi-actor policy processes and platforms and MSPs.

1.4.1 “Stakeholders” or “actors”?

The term “stakeholder” has been increasingly used since the 1960s (McKeon, 2017). Park *et al.* (2008) indicated that, historically and legally, this term referred to a person who is authorized to represent another absent party. Nowadays, this term is more generally used to designate any person or group who has a “stake”, i.e. an interest, whether financial or not, in an issue. It refers to any person or group who is affected by or can affect the situation or issue at stake, as well as the achievement of an organization’s objectives (Freeman and McVea, 2001; Freeman *et al.*, 2010; Galuppo *et al.*, 2014; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016).

When setting up a MSP, one of the first questions is the identification of the relevant stakeholders to be involved. For instance, when considering a partnership set up to build an important infrastructure (road, rail, bridge, etc.), the relevant stakeholders might be the state that planned the infrastructure, the private company (its owners and employees) charged to build or exploit it, but also the local communities that have no direct financial “stake” in the project but whose environment and livelihoods might be impacted, positively or not, by the construction of this infrastructure.

However, for many actors, in particular in civil society circles (Nyéléni, 2007; McKeon, 2017), this term “stakeholder” hides the immense differences in rights, roles, responsibilities, interests, motivations, power and legitimacy among the partners. Real inclusiveness and substantive participation of all actors require much more than just being invited to sit at the decision-table (Brem-Wilson, 2015). Not every “stakeholder” has an equal “stake” and each category of stakeholders faces distinct challenges. Therefore, these authors call for using the more political term “actor” rather than the neutral term “stakeholder” when discussing FSN-related issues and the progressive realization of the right to adequate food.

Additionally, they argue that, in the perspective of the realization of the right to adequate food, a fundamental distinction has to be made between “right-holders”, citizens, particularly the most vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition, and “duty-bearers”, mainly states that have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate food (Mechlem, 2004; UNHCHR, 2006; McKeon, 2017; HLPE, 2017a). Potential violations of the right to food, by states or non-state actors, should also be considered (Damman *et al.*, 2008). Adopting such a rights-based perspective carries important implications about the respective roles and responsibilities of states and non-states actors (Gready, 2008, Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004) in financing and improving FSN.

While using the term “stakeholders” in this report, in line with the CFS request, the HLPE recognizes the utmost importance of this debate. It considers representation mechanisms and repartition of power within MSPs as key elements to assess performance qualities such as inclusiveness and accountability (see Chapter 3).

1.4.2 “Multi”-stakeholder: different spheres of stakeholders

This section groups stakeholders in different spheres based on their interests, roles and responsibilities, views and perspectives on the issues at “stake”.

The CFS reform in 2009 aimed at ensuring “that the voice of all relevant stakeholders – particularly those most affected by food insecurity – are heard”. Beyond CFS “member states”, the Committee is also open to non-state actors, called CFS “participants”, coming from the five following categories: (i) UN agencies with a specific mandate in the field of FSN; (ii) civil society and NGOs; (iii) international agricultural research systems; (iv) international and regional financial institutions; and (v) private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations (CFS, 2009).

The Addis Ababa Agenda for Action (AAAA, 2015) listed a variety of stakeholders, whose “resources, knowledge and ingenuity” will be instrumental to help national governments to achieve the SDGs, namely: “the private sector, civil society, the scientific community, academia, philanthropy and foundations, parliaments, local authorities, volunteers and other stakeholders”.

The scientific literature commonly defines three broad spheres or categories of stakeholders according to their legal status, namely: the public sector; the private sector; and civil society (Glasbergen *et al.*, 2007; Van Huijstee *et al.*, 2007; Van Huijstee and Glasbergen, 2008):

- the **public sector** covers all forms of public organizations: IGOs, at global and regional levels, including UN agencies; international financial institutions (IFIs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs); states, government agencies in different sectors (including health, nutrition, agriculture, environment, finance, economics, trade, justice); local authorities (at the subnational level); public universities; public research and development (R&D) institutions; as well as other organizations, banks, companies or institutions with a public legal status;
- the **private sector** covers: private individuals (including entrepreneurs, landowners, farmers, etc.); private companies (local, national and transnational) active at different stages of the food supply chain (e.g. production, storage and distribution, processing and packaging, retail and markets); commercial banks; cooperatives and other forms of organizations in the “social economy” with a private legal status; private foundations; other private organizations, institutions or federations – this category also includes publicly owned companies with a private legal status;
- **civil society** gathers all the other non-state actors and non-profit NGOs created around shared values and objectives; this category includes: organizations created by and/or working on behalf of specific groups; organizations representing, for instance, small food producers, consumers, workers, youth, women or indigenous peoples; humanitarian NGOs working on emergency situations or on long-term strategies; geographic, thematic, sectoral, cultural or religious organizations.

This broad classification can be applied in the field of FSN and sustainable development. Nevertheless, it may seem overly simplified, considering the wide variety of stakeholders grouped within each sphere, and the diverse way stakeholders could be analytically classified. In some situations, it may be necessary to go beyond this broad classification and define more precise subcategories, following the principle that the diversity of interests expressed in each category should be sensibly smaller than the divergences observed among different categories (Kolk, 2012). For instance:

- the huge diversity existing in the private sector, from micro-enterprises and cooperatives to multinational corporations, has to be taken into consideration when looking at food systems and studying the strategies of these different actors (AAAA, 2015; FAO, 2016; CONCORD, 2017);
- considering gender dynamics can be critical when studying FSN-related issues such as natural resource management (Meinzen-Dick *et al.*, 1997) and intra-household food security (Quisumbing and McClafferty, 2006; Quisumbing *et al.*, 1995).

This broad classification in three spheres, defined mainly by their legal status, suffers from several limitations. First, depending on their legal status, knowledge institutions (involved in research, development, extension and education) can fall into all three spheres. However, in such institutions the capacity to handle R&D projects serving a public interest may be more closely linked to their sources of financing than to their legal status.

Second, farmers organizations might consider themselves or be perceived either as private actors or CSOs. As illustrated in previous HLPE reports (HLPE, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017b), large-scale intensive farms might have very different interests, strategies, challenges and opportunities, when compared to small food producers (including small farmers, pastoralists, forest-dependent people and fisherfolk). Therefore, this question of where to classify farmers, whether in the private sector or in civil society and, thus, how to better represent their crucial voice and acknowledge their key contribution to FSN, might not find an easy answer. It was pointed out as a persistent and revolving issue in the CFS evaluation (CFS, 2017).

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, went beyond the three spheres of stakeholders defined above, and formalized nine sectors of society, called “major groups” as the main channels through which full and effective participation of all stakeholders should be facilitated in political debates around sustainable development (UNCED, 1992). These “major groups” are: (i) women; (ii) children and youth; (iii) indigenous peoples; (iv) NGOs; (v) local authorities; (vi) workers and trade unions; (vii) business and industry; (viii) the scientific and technological community; and (ix) farmers.²⁶ This categorization was further confirmed in the outcome document of the Rio+20 Conference *The future we want* (UN, 2012). This classification has the merit of distinguishing farmers and the knowledge sector as specific groups. However, it was designed following a top-down approach, giving no opportunity for stakeholders to suggest their own forms of organization (Foster and Anand, 1999). Moreover, it does not consider the diversity and divergence of interests of the stakeholders gathered within the same major group, making the underlying and questionable assumption that each major group should be able to come easily to an internal consensus (McKeon, 2009).

1.4.3 “Partnerships” or “platforms”?

Different terminologies have been used to indicate collaborative arrangements among different stakeholders. While much of the policy literature refers to these arrangements as “partnerships”, other studies use the terms: (i) “platforms” (Warner, 2006; Thiele *et al.*, 2011) to designate collaborations that have ultimately led to an arrangement with a certain formal legal status; (ii) “processes” (Vermeulen *et al.*, 2008) or (iii) “networks” (Roloff, 2008a) for more informal or ad hoc collaboration or cooperation arrangements. It is important to note that these terms are very loosely defined and have often been considered as interchangeable.

MSPs create a working and sometimes long-term relationship. They initiate a dialogue aiming at building trust among different stakeholders that, by sharing resources, responsibilities, risks and benefits, become partners for the realization of common objectives. Therefore, they should be clearly distinguished from more classical contracts, where the collaboration ends with the conclusion of a financial transaction seeking essentially economic benefits for the different parties. They are also different from more limited ad hoc collaborations developed for a specific purpose and duration such as a joint research project or programme where donors or beneficiaries are not actively involved, along with the scientists, in the research process, being only sources of information and/or recipients of the knowledge generated (see section 2.2).

MSPs should also be clearly distinguished from multi-actor policy processes and platforms at international, regional or national levels. They should not be confused, for example, with UN intergovernmental platforms, such as the CFS itself or ECOSOC, nor with national participatory platforms such as the Brazilian National Council on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA)²⁷ in Brazil (Zanella, 2017).

Like MSPs, those multi-actor policy platforms aim to facilitate the participation of non-state actors in policy design, policy convergence and/or monitoring, by providing advice or recommendations to governments on a wide range of issues related to FSN. The CFS, for instance, allows “a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-led

²⁶ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/aboutmajorgroups.html>

²⁷ <http://www4.planalto.gov.br/consea/en>

processes towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings” (CFS, 2009). By ensuring the effective and meaningful participation, and substantive contribution from non-state actors to its discussions, the CFS regularly reaffirms its inclusiveness as an outstanding feature of its new governance model (Duncan, 2015; McKeon, 2015).

Yet, these multi-actor policy platforms differ from MSPs by two important characteristics. First, partners are not co-opted, as can be the case in some MSPs, but participation is open (to all UN member countries in the case of CFS), or defined by national legislation (in the case of CONSEA). Second, in these platforms, decision-making rests unequivocally and entirely in the hands of governments, which has important implications in terms of legitimacy and accountability. For instance, according to its reform document, the CFS “is and remains an intergovernmental Committee in FAO”, where “voting and decision taking is the exclusive prerogative” of Member States (CFS, 2009). While giving a voice to civil society actors and organizations, by allocating them a majority of seats and allowing them to choose the Council’s President, the CONSEA remains an advisory council linked to the Brazilian Presidency (Maluf, 2011; Zanella, 2017).

1.4.4 MSPs: a definition

Building on the definition suggested by the UN Secretary-General (UN, 2003), the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 2015) defined partnerships as “voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both public and non-public, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and, as mutually agreed, to share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits”.

Similarly, Van Huijstee *et al.* (2007) defined “intersectoral partnerships” for sustainable development as “collaborative arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical process, and through which these actors strive for a sustainability goal”. For Hemmati and Dodds (2017), MSPs for sustainable development are “specific commitments and contributions, undertaken together by various partners intended to support the implementation of transformation towards sustainable development and help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other relevant sustainable development agreements”.

The way “various partners” are grouped in “different spheres” can impact the understanding and definition of MSPs. Some authors include both private stakeholders and civil society actors in the same broad category, called either “private”, “non-state” or “non-public” stakeholders (UN, 2003; Schäferhoff *et al.*, 2009; UN, 2012; UNGA, 2015; FAO, 2016). This broad categorization in two different spheres (public and non-public) is likely to create a confusion between MSPs and public–private partnerships (PPPs), i.e. partnerships involving public and private partners. Whereas in this report, public–private partnerships are considered only as a subset of MSPs, the definitions of PPPs suggested in the scientific literature can still be of help to elaborate a comprehensive definition of MSPs.

According to Dobermann (2017), PPPs are cooperative arrangements among two or more public and/or private organizations. Hartwich *et al.* (2007) define PPPs as “collaborative mechanisms in which public organizations and private entities share resources, knowledge and risks, in order to achieve more efficiency in the production and delivery of products and services”, which implies reciprocal obligations and mutual accountability.

The OECD (2012), in their recommendations for public governance of PPPs, uses a more restrictive definition highlighting the formal character of such partnerships: “PPP are long-term contractual arrangements between the government and a private partner whereby the latter delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks”. Vervynckt and Romero (2017) precise that those “long-term contractual arrangements” allow states to delegate to the private sector the delivery and management of infrastructures, assets and services of public interest. In a recent publication, FAO (2016), also focusing on “formalized” partnerships “designed to address sustainable agricultural development objectives”, highlighted in its definition several factors of success of such PPPs, namely: “the public benefits anticipated from the partnership are clearly defined, investment contributions and risks are shared, and active roles exist for all partners at various stages throughout the PPP project lifecycle”.

All these definitions raise questions, further developed in Chapter 3, around legitimacy, transparency and accountability in such partnerships and highlight the need for a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of all the stakeholders involved. The appropriate sharing of resources (of all kinds,


including knowledge, experience, skills and funds), responsibilities, risks and benefits is identified as a key condition of success of MSPs (GKP, 2003). In the case of PPPs, when risks are not properly shared, the partnership is likely to produce high returns for the private partners while the public partners bear all the associated risks and budgetary costs (UN, 2014; Vervynckt and Romero, 2017).

MSPs are not spontaneous: they rely on the stakeholders' capacity to set up necessary steps and conditions for a collective action to take place (Brouwer *et al.*, 2016). A common goal and the pooling of resources alone are not enough to guarantee a coordinated and collaborative arrangement among heterogeneous actors (Olson, 1965). Collective action can only be implemented by developing the appropriate institutions, defined as a set of shared norms and rules agreed to organize common activities. For Ostrom (1990), norms correspond to common values shared within the group governing behaviour patterns, while rules are essentially prescriptions that permit, forbid or require certain actions. These institutions create the framework underpinning the logic of collective action, which acts as an incentive for cooperation and sharing. Ostrom (1998, 2003) placed particular emphasis on reciprocity, mutual understanding, trust and reputation, transparent rules of representation and delegation, as core notions at the heart of collective action.

So, MSPs emerge when stakeholders from different spheres (public sector, private sector and civil society) initiate a collective action, by developing appropriate institutions (shared norms and rules), pooling their complementary resources (human, material, financial) together, sharing risks and responsibilities, to pursue a common objective (see **Figure 2**).

Building on those definitions, and bringing together the elements discussed in previous sections, it becomes possible to suggest a general definition of “multi-stakeholder partnerships” (MSPs) that can be applied in the context of FSN for the purpose of this report.

Figure 2 Logic of collective action: MSP creation



Definition 1 Multi-stakeholder partnerships

In this report, *multi-stakeholder partnerships* (MSPs) are defined as any collaborative arrangement among stakeholders from two or more different spheres of society (public sector, private sector and/or civil society), pooling their resources together, sharing risks and responsibilities in order to solve a common issue, to handle a conflict, to elaborate a shared vision, to realize a common objective, to manage a common resource and/or to ensure the protection, production or delivery of an outcome of collective and/or public interest.

In this definition, a “collective” interest shall be understood, in the narrow sense used by Baumol (2004), as the common, mutual interest shared only by the stakeholders collaborating in the MSP and by the institutions, organizations and actors that they represent in the MSP.

By contrast, a “public” interest designates the general interest of the whole society, in all its spheres, that has to be defined at different scales (from local, national, regional to global). Public interest has been defined in various ways, according to different disciplines. In economic sciences, for example, public interest generally denotes the general welfare of the whole society, as opposed to private interests reflecting the welfare of some groups or individuals (Bozeman, 2007; Levine and Forrence, 1990; Stiglitz, 1998). In political sciences, law and public policy studies are more concerned on how an organized society – either through governments or through other forms of organizations – debates, assesses and seeks its public interest (Cochran, 1974).

The tension between these two sets of interests – i.e. “collective” vs “public” interest – may represent a major challenge for MSPs and question their legitimacy. MSPs can be appropriate tools to realize the “collective” interests of their members. Depending on their purpose, governance structure and activities, MSPs can even contribute to the “public” interest. However, they do not have the legitimacy to define what is of “public” interest in the field of FSN, in the general framework of the progressive realization of the right to adequate food. This responsibility ultimately remains in the hands of states and IGOs.

1.5 MSPs: an appropriate mechanism to finance and improve FSN?

As illustrated in the open consultation organized by the HLPE on the V0 draft of this report,²⁸ some stakeholders consider that, as MSPs have been privileged as a means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the question now should be how to improve their performance and efficiency. On the contrary, other stakeholders still question the relevance and desirability of MSPs as a tool to achieve FSN and sustainable development. This section introduces some potential benefits and limitations of MSPs, which are further developed in Chapter 3, in order to help stakeholders determine under which specific context and conditions MSPs can be an appropriate institutional mechanism to finance and improve FSN.

Some authors suggest that the traditional rationale for using MSPs, including PPPs, is to correct market and state failures and enhance the delivery of public goods (e.g. Glasbergen *et al.*, 2007; Narrod *et al.*, 2009; Markelova *et al.*, 2009; Kolk, 2012; FAO, 2016). Brouwer *et al.* (2016) adopted a broader perspective, identifying three main reasons to set up a MSP: address a common issue, find ways to solve or manage conflicts and tensions among stakeholders, or realize a shared opportunity. For Hemmati (2002), MSPs are “processes of decision-finding (and possibly decision-making)” that “bring together a certain number of different interest groups to discuss and reach agreement on a particular issue or set of issues”. Levesque (1993) considered multi-stakeholder processes as a possible way to unlock creativity in order to overcome conflicts.

Two main arguments are generally used to advocate the strategic importance of MSPs.

First, as highlighted in the above definition, the main potential benefit of MSPs is to facilitate the coordinated and targeted use of complementary resources from different stakeholders, in order to preserve and manage collectively a shared resource, or to solve complex and multi-dimensional issues that no stakeholder is able to tackle efficiently alone (Brouwer *et al.*, 2016). According to Dentoni *et al.* (2012), a MSP can also facilitate the mobilization of resources that would not have been mobilized without partnership, by stakeholders acting separately.

²⁸ See: <http://www.fao.org/fsnforum/cfs-hlpe/multi-stakeholder-partnerships-v0>

Second, the process developed within a MSP to reach its objectives can be, in itself, an important outcome of the partnership. This process reflects the openness of different stakeholders to discussion, collaboration and deliberation (Risse, 2000). It can build bridges, synergies among different partners, enabling collective action for a common objective. It creates the conditions for building trust and mutual understanding, and managing tensions and conflicts among different spheres of stakeholders that, otherwise, would not necessarily have the chance or willingness to exchange with each other (Brouwer *et al.*, 2016). Such a process can also give a voice to marginalized and vulnerable groups, generally excluded from the decision-making process.

However, as further developed in Chapter 3, some actors consider that MSPs are not exempt from limitations and do not provide a “silver-bullet” solution in any situation. In particular, they question:

- the real capacity of MSPs to balance power asymmetries among partners in the decision-making process;
- the risk of conflicts between public and private interests, and the withdrawal of responsibilities previously assumed by states or public authorities;
- the higher transaction costs and supposed lower effectiveness associated with MSPs, especially when the number of stakeholders is high (Olson, 1965).

Inclusive processes and governance structures in MSPs are likely to lead to decisions considered as more acceptable and more legitimate by the different stakeholders. However, inclusiveness entails additional costs and, despite the increasing prominence of MSPs in FSN and sustainable development debates, some studies have also indicated that empirical evidence on their efficiency and effectiveness is still notably scarce (Bäckstrand, 2006; Biermann *et al.*, 2007; Glasbergen *et al.*, 2007; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2013).

Depending on their governance structure, there is a risk for some MSPs to reproduce and even reinforce existing power asymmetries and to strengthen the position of the more powerful actors at the expense of the weaker partners or of the marginalized and vulnerable groups excluded from the partnership (Faysse, 2006; Fuchs *et al.*, 2011; Warner, 2006). MSPs are emerging in a context where private and public interests are increasingly blurred. Conflicts between public and private interests can appear in MSPs when the collective or public interest is aligned with the interests of the private partners (GSO, 2015).

Finally, stakeholders have different perceptions on the potential benefits and limitation of MSPs. Facing financial constraints, some states might consider them as a useful tool to mobilize additional funding, including private funding, to achieve public priorities. Some private actors might consider them as a way to influence public decision-making and policy or to improve their own reputation. Some CSOs might acknowledge the role of inclusive partnerships in empowering marginalized and vulnerable actors and their organizations, while raising concerns about the power given, in some MSPs, to the private sector in decision-making processes.

1.6 Building on this context: what contribution of MSPs to FSN?

This first chapter inscribed the potential contribution of MSPs to financing and improving FSN in the overall framework of the 2030 Agenda and in the context of the financing needs for sustainable development. It discussed the concepts and definitions used throughout this report. Chapter 2 completes this conceptual discussion, by a descriptive analysis, illustrating the diversity of existing MSPs and suggesting useful case studies. Based on these two chapters, Chapter 3 further analyses the potential benefits and limitations of MSPs introduced in the first chapter, with the view to identifying, in Chapter 4, pathways for improvement.

2 MAPPING MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS AND THEIR DIVERSITY

MSPs have emerged quite recently as a focus of interest in the FSN-oriented scientific literature beyond social sciences. Evidence and data on MSPs are still limited in time and scope and quickly evolving. It is difficult to find detailed and publicly available information on existing MSPs, especially on budget, finance and impact. Such evidence and data are often self-reported by the MSPs themselves, with no guarantee of independent verification. In this context, during the open consultation organized on the V0 draft of the report, the HLPE suggested a questionnaire that could help different stakeholders to describe and assess MSPs following a common methodology (see **Appendix 1**).

This chapter presents the first part of this questionnaire, suggesting a set of criteria to describe existing MSPs (section 2.1). Based on the available literature and on the results of the HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft, it then identifies and details five main domains of intervention through which MSPs can contribute to finance and improve FSN (sections 2.2 to 2.6).

Although it largely makes use of the material collected during the two HLPE open consultations organized on the scope and on the V0 draft of this report, this report cannot fully reflect the richness and diversity of all the contributions received.²⁹ This is why all this raw material has to be considered, along with the final report, as an important result of this HLPE study. The full proceedings of these two HLPE open consultations, the syntheses of these consultations realized by the HLPE Secretariat, as well as the compilation of the 26 completed questionnaires received are available on the HLPE website.³⁰ Because it is based only on voluntary contributions, no systematic conclusions can scientifically be drawn from this raw material. However, it provides useful insights for this study.

Appendix 2 provides a list of institutions, programmes and multi-stakeholder initiatives reviewed for the purpose of this report, quoted or not in the final report, matching or not the definition suggested in this report for MSP. This list can be used as a glossary of the acronyms used in this chapter and in the whole report. This list, containing useful web-links, can also be used as a source of more detailed information on each initiative.

2.1 MSPs: a set of description criteria

This section presents and illustrates the set of criteria used in the above-mentioned HLPE questionnaire (see **Appendix 1**) to describe existing MSPs.

2.1.1 Thematic domain of action (Question 2)³¹

MSPs can be defined by their thematic domain of action (e.g. food production, natural resource management, education, health). For instance, the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) acts at different levels (both global and national) and in different domains of intervention (see section 2.1.5), maintaining a strong thematic focus on nutrition (see **Box 4**).

The CFS request explicitly pointed to the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) as the overall framework for this report. Therefore, as explained in section 1.1, this report adopts a broad scope and considers not only MSPs directly focused on FSN and agricultural development (SDG2), but also MSPs that, striving for other SDGs, contribute indirectly to FSN.

²⁹ 56 contributions, more than 40 000 words for the consultation on the scope; 69 contributions, more than 70 000 words for the consultation on the V0 draft.

³⁰ See: <http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/reports/report-13-elaboration-process/en/>

³¹ Numbers refer to the questionnaire in **Appendix 1**.

Box 4 The Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition

The **Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN)** is an international organization based in Switzerland, launched at the UN in 2002 to tackle malnutrition in all its forms (undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity). GAIN aims at making healthier food choices more affordable, more available and more desirable, especially for the most vulnerable, focusing on the three following strategic objectives: (i) increase consumer demand for safe and nutritious food; (ii) increase accessibility of safe and nutritious food; (iii) strengthen the enabling environment for designing, implementing and scaling up effective programmes. GAIN mobilizes public–private partnerships, provides financial and technical assistance and helps design, implement and scale up policies and programmes in Africa and Asia to deliver better diets through nutritious products, such as fortified staple foods, cooking oil and flour, and condiments such as salt and soy sauce. GAIN has developed a “knowledge centre”, online platform to generate and share knowledge on nutrition-sensitive policies and programmes. GAIN is managed by a Board of Directors comprising representatives of key donor organizations as well as leading development or scientific experts nominated *intuitu personae*. GAIN’s Partnership Council serves as an advisory council for the Board. It includes representatives from NGOs, academic institutions, donor country governments, developing country governments, businesses, financial institutions and private foundations, as well as existing and future GAIN partnership initiatives.

Website: <https://www.gainhealth.org/>

2.1.2 Scale and geographical scope (Question 5)

MSPs can be described by their scale of operation (from local, national, regional to global), even if, sometimes, the same MSP can articulate different interventions at different scales. MSPs also differ by their geographical scope (i.e. the area, country or region covered).

MSPs with a global scope sometimes rely on a network or develop specific programmes and activities at regional or national levels. Other MSPs operate at the regional level, focusing on a set of countries. For instance, the regional scope of the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) is clearly stated in its mission: “Build resilient food systems *across Africa* through the creation, implementation and assessment of food, agriculture and natural resources (FANR) policies that are both evidence-based and developed in partnership with non-state actors”³² (FANRPAN, 2017) (see **Box 5**). In other MSPs, including many action-oriented MSPs (see section 2.5), the appropriate scale of operation is national or even subnational.

Box 5 The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Analysis Network

The **Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Analysis Network (FANRPAN)** is an autonomous, non-profit, pan-African scientific network involving governments, universities and National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS), CSOs and farmer organizations, as well as private actors and private foundations. It offers a platform where a shared understanding of an issue, informed by research, can emerge among different stakeholders and serve as a basis for policy advocacy at national and regional levels.

FANRPAN’s mandate is to “co-ordinate policy research and dialogue and recommend strategies for promoting food, agriculture and natural resources sectors in Africa by:

- Carrying out mutually agreed collaborative research and institutional development activities;
- Publishing and disseminating research results;
- Providing technical support to national and regional programs;
- Providing opportunities for training and professional development;
- Organizing workshops, scientific conferences and seminars;
- Providing access by the Government to database of information on policy making, advocacy and dialogue; and
- Facilitating linkages of co-operating institutions with relating activities carried out by other participants in FANRPAN’s policy research and professional development programmes”.

FANRPAN was initiated in 1994 by the Ministers of Agriculture of eight Eastern and Southern African countries. FANRPAN’s constitution was finalized in 2001, and the regional network was formally registered in 2003 as a non-profit private voluntary organization in Zimbabwe.

³² Emphasis added by the HLPE.

FANRPAN currently operates in 17 African countries. It relies on a permanent regional secretariat hosted in South Africa, and on a network of hosting institutions, listed on the website, operating as national secretariats and animating “country nodes” in the member countries. Each country node organizes a multi-stakeholder dialogue among government, the private sector, farmer organizations, policy research institutions and non-governmental organizations in order to define policy agenda, undertake policy research and conduct policy advocacy. Two other countries (Ethiopia and Nigeria) are planning to join FANRPAN.

The Annual General Meeting (AGM), gathering all the members of the network, representing the 17 country nodes, is the supreme decision-making body of FANRPAN. A Board of Governors, elected during the AGM, is responsible for providing strategic direction, financial and policy oversight for the organization. The Board comprises representatives of: the two Regional Economic Communities;³³ of South Africa (where FANRPAN’s secretariat is hosted) and Zimbabwe (where the FANRPAN is registered); as well as representatives of farmer organizations, research institutions, donors and the private sector, including private foundations.

Website: <https://www.fanrpan.org>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (contribution #57)

The scale and geographical scope of MSPs can vary through time. The example of the WADI Programme in India (**Box 6**) shows how an MSP, initiated in two Indian districts, has progressively expanded its scale and geographical scope, based on its first results and ability to mobilize actors and further resources.

Box 6 The Wadi Programme

In India, over 150 million people, from different tribal communities, lives on the edges of the forests, struggling for survival. While about 20 percent of the families are landless, the rest of the families own 0.5 to 1 ha of land, where they grow various food crops, without adequate inputs and appropriate technologies.

The Wadi Programme is a comprehensive and participatory programme for the rehabilitation and sustainable development of tribal communities. Its goal is to improve the livelihood of marginalized families in remote areas. The Programme aims at ensuring food security, community health, empowerment of women, education for children, functional literacy for adults, prevention of distress migration and improved quality of life, while conserving the natural resources and respecting their culture and religion. Its main activity is the development of tree-based farming systems (agri-horti-forestry) on small plots of degraded and underutilized lands and of the corresponding value chain.

The Wadi Programme was initiated in 1982 in South Gujarat (Navsari and Valsad districts) as a small project by the BAIF Development Research Foundation.³⁴ It has been progressively expanded and implemented in different tribal areas across India with the support: of the federal and states’ governments concerned; of the German Development Bank (KfW) through the Indian National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD); of the Council for Advancement of Peoples Action and Rural Technology (CAPART) and of different peoples’ organizations and self-help groups. So far, with this Programme, BAIF has assisted nearly 190 000 families and covered over 70 000 ha. BAIF claims that the Wadi Programme allowed over 90 percent of participant families to come out of poverty. NABARD has replicated the Wadi Programme through the “Tribal Development Fund” (TDF), in collaboration with different NGOs, reaching over 435 000 families in 26 Indian states or territories. The Wadi Programme is now largely recognized throughout India as an effective model for tribal development.

Website: http://www.baif.org.in/agri_horti_forestry.asp; <http://baifwadi.org/>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (questionnaire #3)

³³ i.e. the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

³⁴ Formerly registered as the Bharatiya Agro-Industries Foundation (BAIF), the BAIF Development Research Foundation is a non-profit charitable trust established in 1967 to promote sustainable livelihood in rural India. See: <http://www.baif.org.in/>

2.1.3 Structure and organization (Questions 6 to 11)

Any descriptive analysis of MSPs should also consider their structure and organization, including for example the following characteristics:

- **MSP composition (Questions 6 to 8):** Who are the partners (number and diversity) involved from each sphere of society (public sector, private sector, civil society)? Which partner(s) initiated the MSP? Which partners, if any, lead the MSP?
- **Legal status (Question 9):** What is the degree of formalization, and of professionalization of the MSP? If formal, has the MSP a full legal identity and, in particular, the legal capacity to own and manage funds or assets? Can the MSP rely on professional staff to support or facilitate its work and operations?
- **Governance structure and representativeness (Questions 10 and 11):**
What are the roles and responsibilities of the different partners? Are they clearly defined? What are the processes of decision-making in the MSP? How are power asymmetries addressed within the MSP?
How and by whom are the members chosen? Do they speak only for themselves or represent a broader category of stakeholders? How long is their mandate? How does the MSP ensure inclusiveness and “fair” representation of marginalized and vulnerable people most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition?

Legal status

The degree of formalization and of professionalization of MSPs can vary greatly, from totally informal collaborative arrangements to more formal agreements materialized either by a memorandum of understanding or a letter of intent that creates no legal obligations, or by a multilateral contract (or a set of bilateral contracts) creating mutual and legal obligations among partners. In some MSPs, including in many infrastructure PPPs, it might be necessary to create a specific legal structure, sometimes called a “special purpose vehicle”, to channel funds and implement the partnership. The degree of formalization of MSPs depends on various factors including: the scale and objective of the partnership; the nature of the partners and the intensity of their relationships; the complexity of their activities; the way risks and responsibilities are shared among partners; and the efficiency of the judicial system in the country or region concerned (FAO, 2008; Horton *et al.*, 2009a; FAO, 2016).

Some MSPs, such as the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement, started as informal movements and became progressively more formal (see **Box 7**).

Box 7 The Scaling Up Nutrition Movement

The **Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement**'s objective is to establish or strengthen, in its member states, multi-stakeholder platforms to align the efforts and programmes of all stakeholders towards the achievement of national nutrition priorities and strategies (GSO/SUN, 2015).

SUN started as an informal movement after the publication in 2008 of a seminal series in *The Lancet* on maternal and child undernutrition, providing a new evidence-base for action on nutrition (*The Lancet*, 2008). In 2009, a World Bank report (Horton *et al.*, 2009b) estimated at USD 11.8 billion the total annual financing needs to scale-up 13 direct nutrition interventions that have demonstrated their effectiveness in many countries by reducing child mortality, improving nutrition outcomes and protecting human capital. The report has benefited from the expertise of many international agencies, NGOs and research institutions. In the meantime, a collaborative process, involving developing countries, academic and research institutions, CSOs, the private sector, bilateral development agencies, UN agencies and the World Bank, led to the development of a policy brief entitled *Scaling Up Nutrition: a framework for action* published in March 2010 in the *Food and Nutrition Bulletin* (Bezanson and Isenman, 2010), revised in 2011 (SUN Movement, 2011). Within a few months, this framework had been endorsed by over 100 partners with the view to translating it into a roadmap for concrete actions.

Then SUN's institutions became progressively more formal. A High Level Lead Group was established in 2012, supported by an Executive Committee, a Coordinator and a permanent Secretariat based in Geneva, operating under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. The Lead Group assesses the achievement of SUN's objectives, preserves SUN's country driven character and ensures the alignment of all partners with the SUN's 10 Principles of Engagement, listed on the website. These principles ensure that the Movement is flexible while maintaining a common purpose and mutual accountability.

A SUN Movement Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) was established in March 2012 to support the implementation of the first SUN Strategy and Roadmap (2012–2015). This Trust Fund was closed in December 2016.

In 2016, the Lead Group endorsed a new SUN Movement Strategy and Roadmap (2016–2020) defining four strategic objectives to progress towards a world free of malnutrition by 2030: (i) expand and sustain an enabling political environment; (ii) prioritize and institutionalize effective actions that contribute to good nutrition; (iii) implement effective actions aligned with common results; and (iv) effectively use, and significantly increase, financial resources for nutrition (SUN Movement, 2016). A new SUN Pooled Fund Grant Programme, hosted in the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), has been established to implement these strategic objectives. It issued on 1 May 2018 its first call for proposals for around 20 grants of up to USD 114 000 each to support SUN Civil Society Alliance activities at national and subnational levels.

Currently the Movement counts 60 member countries and 3 Indian states (SUN Movement, 2017). In each country, the Movement, working with a SUN Government Focal Point, support the development of national multi-stakeholder platforms working across sectors “to embrace nutrition-sensitive approaches to tackle the underlying causes of malnutrition, as well as nutrition-specific interventions to tackle its direct manifestations”. Non-state partners of the SUN Movement are organized in different networks both at global and national level: SUN Business Network; SUN Civil Society Network; Sun Donor Network; UN Network for SUN.

Website: <http://scalingupnutrition.org/>

Sources: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft: see questionnaire #11 on the SUN Business Network in Zambia and questionnaire #23 on the SUN Movement.

MSP composition and governance structure

An MSP’s composition and governance structure have important impacts on the dynamics of its work, and on its effective capacity to finance and improve FSN. Some MSPs are clearly initiated or led by the public partners, governments or IGOs. In others, the private sector, either private corporations or private foundations, plays the leading role (see for instance section 2.4 on standard-setting MSPs). Sometimes the leadership is shared between partners coming from different spheres of society, as is the case for the Sustainable Food Systems (SFS) Programme of the 10-Year Framework Programme on Sustainable Consumption and Production (10YFP) (see **Box 8**).

PPPs, composed of partners coming only from two spheres of society (the public and private sectors), can be seen as a subset of MSPs. The Addis Ababa Agenda for Action or AAAA (2015), recognizing the diversity of the private sector – ranging from micro-enterprises to cooperatives to multinationals – acknowledges the major contribution of private companies to economic growth and job creation and encourages them to engage as partners, investing and innovating within the long-term perspective of sustainable development, and shifting to more sustainable consumption and production patterns.

At the international level, many institutions have published principles or practical guidelines to frame and implement such engagement with private partners through PPPs (for instance ADB, 2008; OECD, 2012; UN Global Compact, 2015). In many countries, national laws, regulations or guidelines frame the relationships between public and private partners in PPPs (Botlhale, 2016; Seeletse, 2016; FAO, 2016). For instance, in Chile, Decree 164 (1991), updated in 2010, created a legal framework for the collaboration between public and private partners.³⁵ In South Africa, PPPs are governed by the Public Finance Management Act (1999), the Municipal Finance Management Act (2003) and the Municipal System Act (2003), and corresponding regulations (National Treasury, 2007). Treasury Regulation 16³⁶ distinguishes two types of PPPs where the private partner either (i) performs an institutional function on behalf of the public authority or (ii) acquires the use of a public property for a commercial purpose over a specified or indefinite period. The Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NIAF, 2012) elaborated a manual to design and implement PPPs in Lagos State.

³⁵ See: http://www.concesiones.cl/quienes_somos/funcionamientodelsistema/Documents/Law_Regulations.pdf

³⁶ Regulation 1535 of 2003. See: http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/00873_regulation1535.pdf

PPPs have been widely used to develop infrastructures that can have a critical impact on FSN. The World Bank developed a database on private participation in infrastructure (PPI)³⁷ gathering data on more than 6 400 infrastructure projects in 139 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), covering projects in the energy, telecommunications, transport, and water and sewerage sectors. In 2017, private investment commitments reached USD 93.3 billion across 304 infrastructure projects in these sectors in LMICs (World Bank/IBRD/IDA, 2017). Marin (2009) reviewed experiences and performance of PPPs for developing urban water utilities in developing countries over more than 15 years and showed the value of well-designed PPPs for improving the performance of water utilities in developing countries. In Nigeria, PPPs have been successfully used for disaster mitigation (Olokesusi, 2005) and employment creation, through a range of activities including agricultural production (Adebayo and Adegbusi, 2017).

Box 8 The Sustainable Food Systems Programme of the 10-Year Framework Programme on Sustainable Consumption and Production

Addressing the challenge of hunger and malnutrition requires a holistic and systemic approach to accelerate the shift towards more sustainable food systems. The **Sustainable Food Systems Programme of the 10-Year Framework Programme on Sustainable Consumption and Production (10YFP-SFS)** contributes to this transformation by building synergies and cooperation among stakeholders around four work areas:

1. raising awareness on the need to adopt sustainable consumption and production (SCP) patterns in food systems;
2. building enabling environments for sustainable food systems;
3. increasing the access to and fostering of the application of actionable knowledge, information and tools to mainstream SCP in food systems;
4. strengthening collaboration among food system stakeholders to increase the sector's SCP performance.

Under these work areas, the Programme addresses five cross-cutting focus themes: (i) sustainable diets; (ii) sustainability along all food value chains; (iii) reduction of food losses and waste; (iv) local, national and regional multi-stakeholder platforms; and (v) resilient, inclusive, diverse food production systems.

The Programme was initially developed by FAO and UNEP, with the support of Switzerland. Since its launch in 2015, it has been co-led in a multi-stakeholder way by two NGOs, Hivos and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and two governments, Switzerland and South Africa. It currently gathers over 140 members worldwide, grouped into five stakeholder clusters (government agencies; CSOs; research and technical institutions; UN agencies and other international organizations; and the private sector).

The Programme is governed by a Multi-stakeholder Advisory Committee (MAC), with 23 members from the five stakeholder clusters taking their decisions by consensus. The current MAC members, elected for a mandate of two years, renewable twice, are listed on the website. The four co-lead partners are elected by the MAC for a mandate of four years renewable. The UNEP serves as the Secretariat for the Programme.

The Programme relies on a formalized agreement among partners but has no legal personality, nor a shared budget. It is mostly implemented through in-kind contributions of its members and by creating new collaborations and synergies, as well as pooling and building on existing resources in order to use them in a more efficient way.

The Programme has a global scope but is engaged in eight core initiatives, 30 affiliated projects and four trust fund projects described on the website and implemented at regional, national or even subnational level.

Website: <http://www.oneplanetnetwork.org/sustainable-food-system>

Source: HLPE open consultation (questionnaire #4, contribution #23).

³⁷ See: <https://ppi.worldbank.org/>

Box 9 PPPs striving for enhanced FSN

The **Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA)** is an international public–private partnership aiming at developing drought-tolerant and insect-resistant maize varieties using three breeding approaches (conventional, marker-assisted and genetic modifications). Its long-term goal is to deploy these new varieties and make them available to smallholder farmers royalty-free through local African seed companies, to improve resilience and productivity of maize, the most widely grown food crop in Africa. The WEMA involves private foundations, national agricultural research systems, the Monsanto Company, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) of the CGIAR (formerly the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

Website: <https://wema.aatf-africa.org/>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (questionnaire #21).

The **Rural Empowerment and Agricultural Development (READ)** five-year programme (2009–2014) was designed by the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture with the support of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to improve rural livelihoods, infrastructure and overcome productivity constraints for several crops and non-farm activities in 150 villages in five districts of the Sulawesi Tengah province.

Indonesia is the world's third largest cocoa producer (777 500 tonnes in 2013), with approximately 1.5 million ha under production. This sector has experienced an incredible growth in the past years (production increased by almost 80 percent between 2000 and 2005 alone). However, since 2007 productivity per ha started to decrease significantly. Around 87 percent of cocoa in Indonesia is produced by smallholders (plots of lands of 0.5 to 1.5 ha) facing constraints such as pests and diseases, ageing trees and lack of access to resources (credit, fertilizers, etc.). As part of the READ programme, a cocoa value chain PPP was developed.

The first phase of the READ programme (2009–2011) did not involve the private sector, but the mid-term review in 2011 found that the existing technical resources were not enough to provide the know-how needed to assist farmers in stabilizing and increasing yields, especially for cocoa. For the second phase (2012–2014) it was therefore decided to improve the cocoa value chain by transforming the READ programme into a “public-private-producer partnership”, partnering with Mars Symbioscience, benefiting from its experience and technical expertise in this area and its strong record of using good agricultural practices to optimize cocoa yields. The partnership's overall budget amounted to around USD 5 million. Although the financial contribution of Mars company represented only 6.5 percent of this budget, its technical contribution was instrumental to the partnership's success.

According to the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and IFAD (IDS/IFAD, 2015), farmers involved in the partnership: increased yields and production (up to four times more); and improved sales, income and technical knowledge with respect to control groups. Moreover, bean proportion and quality was enhanced (with average weight increasing around 10–15 percent), as well as plant health and soil quality, through the acquired knowledge on correct treatments, appropriate drainage and combination of inputs. Based on this success, IFAD launched the READ Scaling up Initiative (2017–2022) expected to benefit at least 342 000 small farmers for a total budget cost of over USD 55 million (including a private financing of USD 2.21 million).

Websites: <https://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/brokering-development-enabling-factors-for-public-private-producer-partnerships-in-agricultural-value-chains>;
<https://www.ifad.org/web/operations/project/id/2000001181/country/indonesia>

FAO (2016) reviewed 70 case studies of PPPs for agribusiness development in 15 developing countries, ranging from small innovative initiatives (e.g. USD 13 000 invested in Ecuador to develop innovative bamboo products) to wider infrastructure projects (such as the development of a flower trading centre in Beijing for USD 178 million).

Box 9 shows two examples where public and private actors have joined their forces in PPPs to address specific challenges in the field of FSN.

2.1.4 Financing structure (Question 12)

The financing structure of an MSP is likely to impact its performance. How and by whom is the MSP funded? What financial tools and mechanisms are used to channel and pool complementary resources? What are the shares of funds provided by public or private partners?

An analysis of the raw material received during the HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft highlights three different financing patterns in MSPs:

- MSPs entirely or mainly funded by public partners, such as the Pakistan Water Dialogue funded by the US Department of Agriculture (**Box 18**);
- MSPs entirely or mainly funded by private partners, such as Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA, **Box 9**);
- MSPs where a significant part of the funds come from the beneficiaries: for instance the women self-help groups members of the Kudumbashree network in India contributed to the partnership more than the government for the biennium 2015–2016 – see **Boxes 19** and **30**.

These financing patterns are likely to impact MSPs' collective objectives, strategies and agenda.

FAO (2016), in its review of PPPs for agribusiness development, illustrated a variety of funding structures, including: co-equity investments, grants or concessions; nationally funded programmes driven by the public sector or international development projects funded by donor governments or multilateral institutions. Hartwich *et al.* (2007), in their review of 101 PPPs in agricultural research and innovation, studied between 2001 and 2005 in 12 Latin American countries, found that private funds constituted 34 percent of the total funds (an average of USD 171 000 per partnership, with 55 percent from businesses and the remaining 45 percent coming from producers' associations).

It is particularly difficult to draw accurate general conclusions about the financing structure of MSPs and the shares of funds coming from the public or the private sectors – because of the lack of comprehensive methods to value properly in-kind contributions and because of the limited disclosure of financial information by partners, either public or private, engaged in an MSP (Hartwich *et al.*, 2007; FAO, 2016).

However, FAO (2016) found that the share of private investment in partnerships can be linked to the allocation of risks among partners, to the management of intellectual property rights and to the different phases of the project (public funds being more used in the initial phases, while private partners might engage more in the commercialization phase).

Box 10 shows the important role that multilateral development banks (MDBs) and international financing institutions (IFIs), here the World Bank, can play in the mobilization and coordination of funds for FSN and sustainable development at national and international levels.

2.1.5 Main domains of intervention (Questions 13, 14)

MSPs are often described and classified according to their main function. The literature suggests many examples of such classifications. For instance, Brouwer *et al.* (2016) distinguish: policy-oriented MSPs involved in strategic thinking and policy design, on advocacy and policy advice; from more action-oriented MSPs implementing their ideas and decisions, transforming them into concrete action plans.

Focusing on PPPs, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) distinguish:

- *policy PPPs* aiming at designing, advocating for, coordinating or monitoring policies;
- *service delivery PPPs*, engaging non-state actors in the delivery of public services;
- *infrastructure PPPs*, involving the private sector in financing, building and operating infrastructures;
- *capacity building PPPs*, aiming at developing the skills, systems and capabilities of targeted groups or organizations;
- *economic development PPPs*, promoting economic growth and poverty reduction at local, national or global level.

Schäferhoff *et al.* (2009) consider that partnerships can fulfil different functions, “from advocacy and awareness-raising, knowledge exchange, research and development, standard-setting and implementation, to service provision, and the creation of markets”.

Based on previous literature reviews (Nelson, 2002; Pattberg *et al.*, 2012; Beisheim and Liese, 2014), Beisheim and Simon (2016) found that MSPs' typologies are very often organized around the core function of the partnership and identified three main types of MSPs:

- MSPs for sharing knowledge;
- MSPs for providing services;
- MSPs for setting standards.

Box 10 Resource mobilization and coordination: the role of the World Bank

The **Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)**, initiated and hosted by the World Bank, is a global partnership of more than 30 leading organizations, listed on the website, including UN agencies, IFIs, regional development and investment banks, national development and cooperation agencies, as well as private foundations.

Despite significant funding for financial inclusion (USD 34 billion in 2015), 2 billion people are still excluded from the formal financial system (CGAP, 2017). Established in 1995, the CGAP develops innovative solutions to advance financial inclusion to improve the livelihoods of the poor, through high-level advocacy, practical research, knowledge sharing and capacity building, as well as through active engagement with financial service providers, policy-makers and funders. The CGAP historically played a critical role in developing a sustainable microfinance sector, contributing to professionalization in this sector and to the development of standards and good practices (CGAP, 2014).

The CGAP is governed by its Council of Governors, comprised of representatives of all CGAP's members, which defines CGAP's broad policies and strategic directions. The CGAP is ruled by an Executive Committee providing oversight and guidance to the Operational Team, and approving the workplan and budget on behalf of the Council of Governors.

Website: <http://www.cgap.org/>

The **Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP)** is an international Financial Intermediary Fund administered by the World Bank and governed by a Steering Committee, comprised of voting members (representatives of donor countries and recipient regions) and non-voting members (UN agencies; the World Bank and other MDBs; the International Finance Corporation [IFC]; and CSOs). The GAFSP, considering that around 75 percent of the poor live in rural areas and usually depend on agriculture, and considering that agriculture growth is much more effective to reduce poverty than growth in any other sector, aims at improving the FSN and livelihoods in low-income countries by: (i) raising agricultural productivity; (ii) linking farmers to markets; (iii) reducing risk and vulnerability; (iv) improving non-farm rural livelihoods; and through (v) technical assistance, institution building and capacity development.

The GAFSP is active in 38 countries (with around 58 percent of funds invested in Africa). Since its inception in 2010, it has reached over 7 million farmers and their families. With its current portfolio (nearly USD 1.3 billion in December 2016), the GAFSP is expected to reach more than 12 million people. GAFSP channels its funds to:

- countries through the “public sector window” (USD 1 019 million), which assists strategic country-led or regional programmes that result from sector-wide country or regional consultations and planning exercises such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP);
- private companies and financial institutions through the “private sector window” managed separately by the IFC (USD 226 million), providing blended finance solutions, providing long- and short-term loans, credit guarantees and equity to support private sector activities for agricultural development and FSN, particularly in smallholder agriculture and value chains that may not attract commercial funding due to perceived high risks;
- small producers' organizations, through the pilot “missing middle initiative” (USD 13.2 million), contributing to address the largely unmet demand of finance for 450 million small-scale farmers (cultivating less than two ha each), estimated by GAFSP at USD 450 billion.

Websites: www.gafspfund.org;
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/caadp.shtml>

Sources: HLPE open consultation (questionnaire #6); GAFSP (2009, 2016).

The questionnaire submitted by the HLPE for open electronic consultation, along with the V0 draft of this report, listed different “areas of contribution” for MSPs, including policy design and implementation, advocacy and awareness, inclusiveness and priority given to women as well as to marginalized and vulnerable groups more affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, capacity building, resource mobilization, direct or indirect contributions to FSN, and monitoring and evaluation.

Based on the literature and on the results of this consultation, the HLPE identified five main functions, each materialized by a specific domain of intervention for MSPs, presented in more depth in the following sections:

1. Knowledge co-generation and capacity building
2. Advocacy
3. Standard-setting
4. Action
5. Fundraising and resource mobilization

The different domains of intervention of MSPs identified in this chapter are closely inter-related and the same MSP can act in different domains and might have multiple outcomes. For instance, agricultural R&D, knowledge generation and capacity building of various stakeholders are fundamental to design and implement the radical transformations needed to build more sustainable agriculture and food systems. Nonetheless, these five domains can help practitioners and decision-makers to define broad categories of MSPs that might face similar challenges or opportunities. Each domain is presented in the following sections, and illustrated by concrete examples of existing MSPs.

2.2 Knowledge co-generation and capacity building

MSPs can play a key role in knowledge co-generation and capacity building, in particular through the collection and sharing of information and experiences. R&D on complex FSN-related issues, such as agricultural development or natural resource management, require multi-stakeholder, transdisciplinary, participatory and solution-oriented approaches that also incorporate non-scientific stakeholders in research design, data collection and analysis (Hirsch Hadorn *et al.*, 2006; Rist *et al.*, 2007; Hirsch Hadorn *et al.*, 2008; Lang *et al.*, 2012). In other words, non-scientific stakeholders not only engage in a R&D project only as sources of information or as final beneficiaries of the project, but also as active participants to the process of knowledge co-generation. When small farmers and local communities are involved in R&D at every stage, the science or results generated are more likely to be useful for them, adapted to their needs and applicable in practical terms.

While quality in R&D is usually associated with the strength of the scientific process (including, for instance, strict protocols and independent external peer reviews), transdisciplinary and participative R&D is more concerned by the “social robustness” of knowledge (Nowotny, 2000). How salient, valid and legitimate knowledge is in a specific social and political context depends not only on its relationship with an abstract ideal of scientific objectivity, but also on how stakeholders themselves evaluate its usefulness and appropriateness (Cash *et al.*, 2006; Rosendahl *et al.*, 2015a).

The CGIAR Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC, 2015) studied the increasing and critical role of stakeholder involvement and MSPs in agricultural research for development (AR4D), highlighting the shift observed in recent decades from a scientific and technical perspective on R&D to a more holistic and multi-stakeholder approach of innovation systems.³⁸

MSPs involved in knowledge co-generation and capacity building can be initiated by governments and public agencies, including research institutions and extension services, partnering to varying degrees with local communities, or with farmer, food producer or consumer organizations. They can also involve private institutions participating either as donors or as R&D partners. They can operate at the global, regional or national levels. Such MSPs are generally formal agreements, based on either a memorandum of understanding or a contract. They often have a formal governance structure, as in the case of FANRPAN (see **Box 5**).

MSPs involved in knowledge co-generation can focus on a very specific issue such as bean production in Africa, or they can cover a broader issue such as sustainable agriculture (see **Box 11**).

³⁸ Innovation systems will be explored in more depth in the forthcoming HLPE report to be presented at the CFS 46 Plenary session in October 2019.

Box 11 Examples of MSPs involved in knowledge co-generation

The Pan-Africa Bean Research Alliance (PABRA) is a network of over 570 partners (governments and public institutions, universities, NGOs, and private companies, including seed companies) working together in 31 countries.

The common bean is the most important, widely grown and consumed grain legume in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa where it is cultivated on 6.3 million ha each year. Beans are not only an important source of non-animal protein, but also one of the best sources of iron and zinc. PABRA conducts R&D projects to improve bean production in Africa, focusing on seven main areas: (i) breeding; (ii) integrated crop management; (iii) nutrition; (iv) seed systems; (v) gender; (vi) linking farmers to markets; and (vii) monitoring and evaluation. PABRA is funded mainly by governments and public development agencies but also receives funds from the European Commission, the CGIAR and private foundations.

Website: <http://www.pabra-africa.org/>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (questionnaire #22).

The **African Orphan Crops Consortium (AOCC)** is striving to address hunger and malnutrition through the development of native nutritious crops. The AOCC, based in the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF, Nairobi, Kenya), gathers the NEPAD, UN agencies, universities, private companies from the food industry and genetics, private foundations and global NGOs. Its goal is "to sequence, assemble and annotate the genomes of 101 traditional African food crops to improve their nutritional content". The resulting information is put in the public domain and made available to small farmers across Africa. The Consortium trains plant breeders in genomics and marker-assisted selection. ICRAF also supports partnerships with private companies and farmer organizations to domesticate native nutritious crops, such as the *Allanblackia* tree, and develops their production and the corresponding value chain.

Website: <http://africanorphancrops.org/>

Source: Pye-Smith (2009).

A community of **platforms in partnership for research and training** (*dispositif de recherche et enseignement en Partenariat - dP*), initiated by the French Government and the Centre for International Cooperation in Agricultural Research for Development (CIRAD), is rapidly emerging throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. These platforms foster collaboration among different partners (research and academic institutions at national and international level, international organizations, farmer organizations, and other public and private partners) willing to pool their human, technical, material and financial resources and to initiate a long-term partnership on a shared research theme and a defined geographical area. Currently more than 20 dP, listed on the website, have been established on various themes related to forests, sustainable agricultural and rural development, agro-ecological practices, public policies and governance for FSN.

Website: <https://www.cirad.fr/en/our-research/platforms-in-partnership-for-research-and-training>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (contribution #22).

The **Swedish International Agricultural Network Initiative (SIANI)** was launched in 2008 by the public Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) as an open and inclusive network to promote sustainable agriculture for FSN and poverty reduction and contribute to the achievement of SDG2. SIANI gathers representatives from multilateral agencies, governments, civil society, farmer organizations, academia and the private sector. It organizes expert working groups to consolidate the knowledge on and contribute to a holistic understanding of emerging issues related to FSN and sustainable development. SIANI explores topics such as: climate change and resource conflict; rural transformation; gender and equality; health and nutrition; trade and production; and landscape management.

Website: <https://www.siani.se/>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (questionnaire #5).

Beyond knowledge co-generation, MSPs can also play an important role for knowledge sharing and capacity building at different levels, from local to global (see **Box 12**).

Box 12 Examples of MSPs involved in knowledge sharing and capacity building

The **Southern Africa Food Lab (SAFL)** was founded in 2009 to promote creative responses to the problem of hunger. It offers a platform to facilitate the interaction, communication and collaboration among different stakeholders, including those with conflicting interests, in order to promote innovative solutions for more sustainable food systems through awareness raising, collaborative learning and experimental actions. It gathers development banks and public development agencies, private companies and private foundations, academic institutions, NGOs and farmer unions.

Website: <http://www.southernafricafoodlab.org>

The **Voice for Change Partnership (V4CP) Programme**, initiated by SNV (formerly the Foundation of Netherlands Volunteers) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), is funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It aims at building the capacity of local CSOs, and generating high-quality evidence in order to influence policy-makers. V4CP opens a space for 52 CSOs to suggest solutions to fight malnutrition at local levels, linking these local efforts with advocacy at the national and subnational levels in order to promote effective FSN policies and enhance government and private sector accountability. V4CP focuses on four main issues: (i) food and nutrition security; (ii) renewable energy; (iii) resilience; and (iv) water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). The programme is currently implemented in six countries across Africa, Latin America and Asia (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya and Rwanda).

Website: <http://www.snv.org/project/voice-change-partnership-v4cp>

Sources: SNV (2017).

Grow Asia was established as a result of the World Economic Forum of 2009. It is a multi-stakeholder network of over 300 partners (private companies, governments, NGOs and farmer organizations). By 2020, Grow Asia is expected to reach 10 million smallholder farmers and enable them to increase their yield and profits by 20 percent, using 20 percent less water and emitting 20 percent less greenhouse gases per tonne of production. To achieve this target, Grow Asia facilitated the emergence of five MSPs at the country level (in Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines and Viet Nam). These country MSPs are locally-led, in alignment with country goals, and market-driven, developing inclusive business models and giving a central role to small farmers. Grow Asia and the country partnerships serve as knowledge sharing platforms to promote innovative and scalable solutions for FSN and sustainable development, including digital solutions, inclusive finance and farmer organization. Grow Asia is supported by the strong commitment and leadership of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments and the ASEAN Secretariat, and through generous funding from the Government of Australia and the Government of Canada. The partnership is coordinated by the Grow Asia Secretariat based in Singapore.

Website: <https://www.growasia.org/>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (contribution #60).

2.3 Advocacy

MSPs can be involved in advocacy and awareness raising on major issues related to FSN and suggest possible pathways towards more sustainable food systems, building on the complementary resources and expertise of the partners involved. **Box 13** presents examples of such MSPs at national, regional and global levels.

These MSPs do not operate only at the national level, but also at regional and global levels, since FSN is a global challenge. Such MSPs can be initiated and led by public agencies or by the private sector, private corporations or private foundations. Private actors play a key role in food systems, across the food supply chain, in the food environment, and as influencers of consumer behaviour. Therefore, their knowledge and expertise is critical in advocacy MSPs. The challenge is to ensure that partners involved in such MSPs contribute to addressing FSN beyond advocating for their own interests, including through influencing policy design. This raises questions around power asymmetries and conflicts of interest (COI), further explored in Chapter 3.

Box 13 Examples of MSPs involved in advocacy and awareness raising

Food Change Labs have been developed in different countries by Hivos and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in collaboration with local partners with the view to building fairer and more sustainable food systems. A Food Change Lab is a multi-stakeholder social innovation process that gives to citizens the centre role in generating a better common understanding of the situation, finding adapted and innovative solutions to their food challenges and building coalitions for change. These Labs discuss not only technological but also social innovations, covering innovative policies, new business models and behaviour changes.

For example, the **Uganda Food Change Lab**, initiated in collaboration with the Kabarole Research and Resource Centre (KRC), gathers local stakeholders from Fort Portal town and from the Kabarole district in Uganda, Ugandan CSOs and national policy-makers. Food Portal's population is expected to grow rapidly from 50 000 to 500 000 inhabitants by 2040. In this context, the Lab raises awareness and advocates at the local level for a more productive and more sustainable local food system for all the citizens of the Kabarole district, with occasional links to national policy issues. The Lab seeks to achieve the following objectives: (i) secure access to sustainable diets for the urban poor by working together with informal street-food vendors and the municipality of Fort Portal; (ii) ensure that policy planning instruments at different levels, including the national plans for urbanization, integrate the needs of largely informal food systems; (iii) raise awareness on sustainable diets among urban and rural households through citizen-driven research projects, community events and campaigns on the local radio; and (iv) forge new connections between producers and consumers, foster innovations, share knowledge and best practices with the view to capitalizing on the district's agriculture and food system through local value adding and local food processing.

Websites: <https://www.foodchangelab.org/>;
<https://hivos.org/activity/food-and-energy-change-labs>

Sources: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (questionnaire #26, contribution #28); Hivos/IIED/KRC (2016).

The **Global Water Partnership (GWP)** was founded in 1996 to advocate for integrated water resource management (IWRM). The GWP is a multi-stakeholder network with over 3 000 partner organizations in 183 countries. In 2018, this network counts 13 regional and 63 country water partnerships. In 2015 and 2016, the GWP and African governments conducted 11 country consultations in Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe) followed by a pan-African workshop organized in Addis Ababa in May 2016. These consultations used the HLPE report on water (HLPE, 2015) to initiate a strong multi-stakeholder approach among governments, the private sector and other stakeholders and to identify, at a practical level, specific national and regional priorities in line with the HLPE and CFS policy recommendations.

Websites: <http://www.gwp.org>;
<http://www.gwp.org/en/we-act/themesprogrammes/Nexus-Water-Food-Energy-Ecosystems/>;
http://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/about-gwp/publications/briefing-notes/briefing_note_nexus_africa.pdf

The **World Water Council (WWC)** was established in 1996 as an "international multi-stakeholder platform", "to promote awareness, build political commitment and trigger action on critical water issues at all levels, to facilitate the efficient conservation, protection, development, planning, management and use of water in all its dimensions on an environmentally sustainable basis for the benefit of all life on Earth". It gathers over 300 partners in more than 50 countries, including: governments and intergovernmental institutions; private enterprises and professional associations; academic institutions; civil society organizations and water user associations. The WWC organizes every three years the World Water Forum, the world's largest event on water, gathering tens of thousands of key stakeholders of the water community, including politics, multilateral institutions, academia, civil society and the private sectors, to increase awareness and catalyse collective action on water issues.

Website: <http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/en>

2.4 Standard-setting

Since the late twentieth century, MSPs have played an increasing role in the development of voluntary and market-based standards to promote sustainable practices across agriculture and food systems. These market-based approaches are built on the assumption that growing demand for certified "sustainable" products will lead to better prices for and higher production of such products. They contribute in particular to strengthen the link between food producers in developing countries and

consumers in developed countries, offering to producers new market opportunities and fairer trade conditions. Food industry or CSOs, usually large NGOs, often take the lead in such partnerships, often in collaboration with each other. The public sector, if it participates, is rarely the leading partner in these “market-based” initiatives, which differ from public standards or government-driven initiatives that are more based on regulation and/or public-policy support (Fransen and Kolk, 2007). Many of these MSPs began as informal agreements and later became formal and institutionalized partnerships with clearly defined rules of participation and governance structures.

As shown in **Box 14**, these standards can be developed following different approaches: international standards can build upon existing national standards (bottom-up approach), or they can provide guidelines for national standard setting (top-down approach). Sometimes, as is the case for Fairtrade, international standards can even apply directly in different countries.

Some global partnerships do not produce any standards themselves but provide a space of dialogue to build a common understanding of the best practices, indicators and metrics to define and assess sustainability that can then be used to build standards at national level, adapted to the national context (see **Box 15**).

Box 14 Multi-stakeholder sustainability standards

The **Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC)** and the **Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)** are the two most important international independent voluntary and multi-stakeholder certification schemes, introduced in the 1990s to raise awareness and promote the sustainable management of forests and the trade of sustainably managed forest products. The PEFC covers 313 million ha of forest, 750 000 forest owners and 20 000 forestry companies. The FSC covers almost 200 million ha of forest. Some forest areas are covered by both schemes. Both schemes are organized on two levels (international and national) but, while the PEFC follows a bottom-up approach building upon national standard systems, the FSC adopts a top-down approach, evaluating national systems against its international standards. While not directly dedicated to FSN, both schemes contains criteria that contribute to it, including provision and preservation of ecosystem services, control of hunting and fishing, use of pesticides and indigenous peoples’ rights to forests.

Websites: <https://ic.fsc.org/en> ; <https://www.pefc.org/>

Sources: PEFC (2010); FSC (2015); HLPE (2017b).

The **Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)** was initiated by the WWF and Unilever in 1996 as an independent non-profit organization to develop principles and criteria for sustainable fishing and traceability along the supply chain. The blue MSC label is only applied to wild, sustainable and traceable fish or seafood from MSC-certified fisheries. The MSC fisheries standard is based on three main principles: sustainable fish stocks; minimized environmental impact; and effective fisheries management. The MSC is funded by public and private partners and NGOs. The MSC is governed by a Board of Trustees nominated *intuitu personae* for their knowledge and expertise, coming from different sectors and regions. The Board is advised by a Technical Advisory Board and a Stakeholder Advisory Council, and assisted by MSC professional staff, based in different offices around the world. The Stakeholder Advisory Council consists of 17 experts, including two Co-Chairs, nominated by the Trustees and representing mainly the seafood industry and fisherfolk organizations, the conservation community, the market sector and academia, with one representative coming from the public sector.

Website: <https://www.msc.org/>

The **Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)** was formally established in 2004, under Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code, which defines the associations as a “global, multi-stakeholder initiative” to “transform the market by making sustainable palm oil the norm”. The RSPO gathers over 3 800 members in 92 countries, including plantation companies, processors and traders, consumer goods manufacturers and retailers of palm oil products, financial institutions, environmental NGOs and social NGOs, from many countries that produce or use palm oil. In 2018, almost 12.5 million tonnes of palm oil are already certified, covering 2.7 million ha and representing 19 percent of the global palm oil production. Over 317 000 ha are certified in smallholder farms, contributing to improve the livelihoods and management practices of nearly 90 000 smallholders. The RSPO is managed by a Board of Governors comprised of 16 members designated for two years by the General Assembly. The Board is supported by four Standing Committees (Standards & Certification; Trade & Traceability; Communications & Claims; Finance) and by a permanent Secretariat based in Kuala Lumpur.

Website: <https://www.rspo.org/>

The **Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS) Association** was created in 2006 in Switzerland as a global, multi-stakeholder platform to encourage current and future responsible soybean production and reduce social and environmental impacts while maintaining the economic status for the producers. It aims at: facilitating a global dialogue on soybean; reaching consensus among key stakeholders linked to the soybean industry; developing and promoting a sustainability standard for the production, processing, trading and use of soybeans; monitoring the sustainability of soybean production at the global level; and mobilizing diverse sectors. The RTRS certified its first producers in 2011 in Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. It gathers over 200 members. "Participating members" are divided into three different constituencies (producers; industry, trade and finance; CSOs) with equal voting rights at the General Assembly. The RTRS is also open to "observing members" that do not belong to any of the three above-mentioned constituencies, including: regulatory authorities; government agencies; consulting and audit firms; academia; and donor organizations. They can take part in the discussions within the General Assembly but have no right to vote.

Website: <http://www.responsiblesoy.org/?lang=en>

Fairtrade is an international system to support fair trade practices with the view to improve small producers' livelihoods, fight against child labour, defend the rights of rural workers, promote gender equality and address climate change. **Fairtrade International** is a non-profit organization established in 1997 in Bonn, Germany, and currently comprises over 20 national Fairtrade organizations, such as Max Havelaar in France, the Netherlands and Switzerland; three producers' networks (in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean) representing in total 1.6 million small farmers and small food producers organized in different cooperatives in 75 countries; and nine marketing organizations to promote Fairtrade in new markets.

Website: <https://www.fairtrade.net/>

Box 15 Multi-stakeholder fora to design and assess pathways towards sustainability

The **World Banana Forum (WBF)** aims at transforming banana and plantain production (around 145 million tonnes annually in 135 countries for USD 45 billion) that provides income or food to some 400 million people (Prada and Castro, 2016). The WBF is a global platform, hosted in FAO, which brings together governments, research institutions, producers, retailers, importers, exporters, consumer associations, trade unions and CSOs. The WBF seeks to foster collaboration among stakeholders, with the view to build a consensus on and facilitate the dissemination of best practices for banana's sustainable production and trade. The WBF created three working groups focusing on the three dimensions of sustainability (environmental, economic and social): (i) sustainable production systems and environmental impact; (ii) distribution of value along the banana supply chain; and (iii) labour rights (including gender equity and working conditions).

Website: <http://www.fao.org/world-banana-forum/en/>

The **Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB)**, initiated in 2010 and legally established in 2012, is a "global, multi-stakeholder initiative" to improve the sustainability of the global beef value chain "through leadership, science and multi-stakeholder engagement and collaboration". The membership of the network as a whole exceeds 500 companies and organizations representing hundreds of thousands of producers and tens of millions of cattle, covering a significant portion of the global beef value chain in key producing and exporting regions. GRSB's members are grouped in six constituencies: producers and producer associations; the commerce and processing sector; retail companies; civil society; national or regional roundtables; and allied industry initiatives. The first five constituencies are represented on the Board of Directors. Participation in the GRSB is also open to regulatory authorities, governmental agencies, consulting and auditing firms and donor organizations, as consulting members.

In 2014, during the biennial Global Conference on Sustainable Beef, GRSB's members approved the 32 criteria for sustainable beef organized around five main domains: Natural Resources; People and the Community; Animal Health & Welfare, Food Safety and Quality. These criteria provide a common framework that national and regional roundtables can use to develop indicators, metrics and means of verification of beef sustainability adapted to their specific context. The Canadian Roundtable for Sustainable Beef was the first to establish its own certification system.

Website: <https://grsbeef.org/>

Source: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (contribution #54).

2.5 Action

Action-oriented MSPs are involved in activities ranging from natural resource management and agricultural development to food processing and distribution. Certainly, many of their activities could also be linked to advocacy or standard setting, knowledge co-generation and capacity building, but action-oriented MSPs primarily focus on operational and result-oriented contributions to FSN and sustainable development. They deliver goods and services and implement policies, programmes and projects at different scales, from global to local.

Some MSPs, like the Food Security Cluster (see **Box 16**), work in emergency situations, while others develop longer-term development activities. Some MSPs, created in emergency situations, can then evolve and adopt a broader mandate and a longer-term perspective.

Box 16 The global Food Security Cluster

The global **Food Security Cluster (gFSC)** was established in 2011 to coordinate the food security response during humanitarian crises, addressing issues of food availability, access and utilization. Co-led by FAO and WFP, the gFSC is active in 29 countries. It involves around 60 global partners and associates including UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements, NGOs, civil society, academia and other relevant stakeholders with a food security mandate. The gFSC, working with national cluster systems, provides guidance at the country level to support a coordinated and timely response to human or natural disasters or protracted crises. For the period 2017–2019, the gFSC is planning to achieve four strategic results: (i) strengthened effectiveness of food security coordination systems at the country level; (ii) enhanced partnerships and collaborative initiatives at the global level; (iii) scaled-up advocacy, communication, resource mobilization and humanitarian systems policy; and (iv) a fostered programmatic approach to coordination action. The gFSC developed several thematic working groups focusing on: cash and markets; food security and livelihoods in urban settings; nutrition; preparedness and resilience-building activities through the humanitarian programme cycle; and programme quality, including technology and innovation.

Websites: <http://fscluster.org/>;

Source: gFSC (undated).

2.5.1 MSPs involved in natural resource management

These MSPs are devoted to the management of a shared (public or common pool) natural resource (such as water, land, forest) at different scales, from landscape to global levels. This management is likely to require the involvement, as well as the collective and coordinated action, of many stakeholders.

In the field of water management, the HLPE (2015) described the multiplicity of institutions (whether public or private) and the different categories of stakeholders (governments, private companies, farmers, fisherfolk, urban users, etc.), each with distinct objectives, that are involved in or affected by the management of water resources (quantity and quality) and services, at different scales, for multiple uses. It analysed power imbalances between different stakeholders regarding access to and control over water resources. It explored different allocation mechanisms and governance tools that enable the involvement of diverse stakeholders in water management, including decentralized governance and collective management of water resources, especially at the local and community level.

At the landscape level, the HLPE (2017b) highlighted the need to move beyond the “land-sparing” vs “land-sharing” debate towards more integrated landscape management, involving diverse stakeholders to achieve multiple, and often competing, objectives on the same space in a sustainable way, making the best use of limited natural resources and minimizing the damage to the environment (see also **Box 17**).

Box 17 Integrated Landscape Management

Integrated Landscape Management (ILM) approaches have a long history, although under different names, such as “whole landscape” management, “multifunctional agriculture”, “eco-agriculture”, “bioregional planning”, “multifunctional landscapes”, “rural territorial development” and “biocorridors”. ILM adopts a systemic approach, considering interactions between plants, animals, humans and the environment, as well as synergies and trade-offs between different objectives, beyond the farm gate, at different spatial and temporal scales.

Scherr *et al.* (2013) defined ILM as a “long-term collaboration among different groups of land managers and stakeholders to achieve the multiple objectives required from the landscape”. ILM “breaks the silos” between sectoral policies or between administrative territorial divisions, and adopts a systemic and multi-stakeholder approach to address complex and multi-faceted issues. More precisely, Scherr *et al.* (2013) highlighted five characteristics of ILM:

- (i) shared or agreed management objectives considering the full range of benefits, goods and services needed from the landscape;
- (ii) ecological, social and economic interactions in the landscape managed to realize positive synergies or to mitigate trade-offs among interests and actors;
- (iii) field, farm and forest practices designed to achieve multiple objectives at the landscape level, including human health and well-being, food and fibre production, climate change mitigation, conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services;
- (iv) collaborative, community-engaged processes for dialogue, planning, negotiating and monitoring;
- (v) market and public policies designed to achieve these multiple objectives.

The literature offers useful insights on ILM approaches, on their challenges and conditions of success. For instance, Estrada-Carmona *et al.* (2014) documented the increasing application of ILM in Latin America and the Caribbean. Minang *et al.* (2015) have explored how multifunctional landscapes can contribute to addressing climate change issues. Caron *et al.* (2017) identify the advantages and the limits of territorial development approaches. Buck and Bailey (2014) illustrated with concrete examples how ILM approaches, by improving the “socio-ecological resilience” of agro-ecosystem and local communities, can contribute to overcome chronic and acute food insecurity. Heiner *et al.* (2017) acknowledged MSPs as a promising and innovative approach and provided practical guidelines to enhance their contribution to sustainable landscapes through ILM, illustrated by concrete case studies. Rosendahl *et al.* (2015b), as well as Zanella *et al.* (2015) illustrated how local CSOs can be instrumental to ensure that the needs and rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups are properly considered in ILM approaches.

These MSPs might be more or less formal, depending on the legal and cultural environment in the considered country. Scale is a critical dimension in these MSPs: they have to define the appropriate level of operations that enable an efficient management of the shared resource. This appropriate scale can vary from the local level (for instance a water basin as in the case of the Pakistan Water Dialogue) to the international level (as in the case of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership) (see **Box 18**).

Box 18 Examples of MSPs involved in natural resource management

The **Pakistan Water Dialogue**, initiated in 2011 and funded by the US Department of Agriculture, is implemented by the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), in collaboration with various research and academic institutions across the country. It aims at building effective partnerships to promote and disseminate the best watershed rehabilitation and water saving technologies and practices, improving water capture, storage and use for agriculture and reducing water and soil losses in Pakistan. The partnership also involves local governments, local NGOs, farmer organizations and private partners and has trained around 2 700 agricultural service providers and professionals throughout the country.

Website: <https://mel.cgiar.org/projects/pakistanwaterdialogue>

Sources: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (questionnaire #17); Anwar and Aslam (2015).

The **MERET³⁹ (formerly Rural Land Rehabilitation) Programme** initiated in 1980 by WFP in collaboration with the Ethiopian Government focuses on land rehabilitation and integrated watershed management in Ethiopia. The programme operates in six Ethiopian regions with 451 food-insecure and drought-prone communities. The Programme provides food and cash assistance to help targeted local communities, in particular women, to invest in sustainable land and water management practices, homestead development and income generating activities (Food for Assets). For instance, participants can receive 3 kg of wheat per day for their participation in public rehabilitation works for ecological restoration of degraded or non-productive lands or climate change mitigation (such as afforestation, area closure, terracing, wells rehabilitation, protection against floods and droughts, etc.). The Programme also provides technical assistance at community and sub-watershed levels, and supports capacity building and dissemination of best practices. The Programme has enabled the restoration of more than 400 000 ha of degraded land in 72 chronically food-insecure Ethiopian districts. Between 2012 and 2015, MERET supported annually around 650 000 people. Buck and Bailey (2014) consider that the Programme significantly improved productivity, income, livelihood and resilience in targeted communities. MERET has been acknowledged in different UN Summits on climate change as a model of sustainable development, building resilience for FSN that should be replicated in degraded agro-ecosystems across Africa.

Website: <https://www.mrfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2013-04-16-Ethiopia-MERET.pdf>

The **Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP)**, launched at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, is a “non-binding” MSP currently comprising over 105 members cooperating on a voluntary basis following the principles and objectives defined in its “Cooperation Framework” adopted in November 2016 (CBFP, 2016). CBFP members are committed to the “conservation of the biodiversity and the sustainable management of Central African forest ecosystems, the fundamental rights of their populations to benefit from forest resources and the imperative to reconcile development needs with conservation in the framework of international cooperation”. The CBFP is open to any partner (states, international institutions and organizations, NGOs, research and academic institutions and private sector entities) adhering to its Cooperation Framework. The CBFP annual meeting of Parties serves as its General Assembly. CBFP members are grouped in seven colleges (namely: the Regional; Civil Society; International NGOs; Private Sector; Donor; Scientific and Academic; Multilateral Colleges) all represented in the CBFP Council. The CBFP is led on a voluntary basis by one of its members serving as Facilitator for a period of two years.

Website: <http://pfbc-cbfp.org/home.html>

2.5.2 MSPs involved in agricultural development, food processing and distribution

FAO (2016), in its review of agri-business PPPs, showed the great diversity of potential domains of intervention for partnerships involved in agricultural development, food processing and distribution. It developed a purpose-based classification of these PPPs, distinguishing: (i) PPPs aiming at developing agricultural value chains (VCD); (ii) PPPs for joint agricultural research, innovation and technology transfer (ITT); (iii) PPPs aiming at building and upgrading market infrastructure (IM); and, (iv) PPPs delivering business development services to farmers and small enterprises (BDS).

With their knowledge of the local context, CSOs can also play a key role in partnerships involved in agricultural development, food processing and distribution. They contribute to adapting the collective action to the local conditions (whether environmental, economic, social or cultural), as well as to the precise needs of the local communities. They help better target the resources towards the marginalized and vulnerable groups most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, ensuring their voices are heard in the MSP.

Box 19 shows some examples of MSPs involved in different stages of agriculture and food systems. MSPs active in food distribution often operate at subnational or national level, to ensure local coordination of farmers, food supply chains, food processors and/or food service operations and to adapt the intervention to the local context. This participative approach is likely to increase the effectiveness of the intervention, improving access to food even in remote areas (see **Box 20**).

³⁹ MERET stands for “Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions”. Meret also means “land” in Amharic.

Box 19 MSPs for sustainable agricultural development and food production

The Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock (GASL), initiated following a recommendation made by the FAO Committee on Agriculture in 2010, acknowledges the critical role played by the livestock sector in sustainable agricultural development for FSN. GASL's members are structured in seven cluster groups: public sector; private sector; academia and research; donors; NGOs; social movements and community-based organizations; IGOs and multilateral institutions. Around 250 participants gather once a year in a multi-stakeholder meeting to address existing and new challenges. A Guiding Group, composed of five representatives of each cluster provides overall strategic direction and guidance to the GASL.

The GASL brings together small- and large-scale producers. It seeks to build consensus on the pathways towards sustainable livestock development and to foster coherent and collective changes in policies and practices through policy dialogue, joint analysis, innovation and investments. The GASL aims to address the following issues simultaneously: global food security and health; equity and growth; and resources and climate. It has developed nine thematic and/or regional action networks, presented on the website and focusing on issues such as antimicrobial resistance, resource use efficiency, sustainable use of waste (circular economy), silvo-pastoral systems, animal welfare or social development.

Among these action networks, the Livestock Environmental Assessment and Performance (LEAP) Partnership was established in 2012 to develop comprehensive guidance and methodology to better understand and assess the environmental performance of livestock supply chains, while also considering the economic and social viability of the sector. Through the collaboration of more than 450 experts from all regions of the world, LEAP developed environmental assessment guidelines for different livestock supply chains and a global database on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of the five main feed crops (maize, wheat, barley, soybean and cassava).

Websites: <http://www.livestockdialogue.org/>;
<http://www.fao.org/partnerships/leap/en/>

Sources: HLPE (2016); HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (contribution #54).

Kudumbashree is a programme set up in 1997 by the State Poverty Eradication Mission (SPEM) of the Government of Kerala (India) for poverty eradication, local economic development, social development and women empowerment. Under this programme, a community network was established and progressively extended to cover the entire state of Kerala. As of March 2017, this network has gathered over 4.3 million women (one per family) organized in a three-tier structure: 277 175 "neighbourhood groups" at the lower level, are affiliated to nearly 20 000 area development societies at the ward level, and 1 073 "community development societies" at the local government level. This three-tier structure facilitates the partnership between women's groups, the local governments and financial institutions, including the Indian National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). Supported by the SPEM and in collaboration with banks, the neighbourhood groups provide micro-credit to their members, using the groups' savings, and helping them engage in various income-generating activities including food production, processing and retail.

Website: www.kudumbashree.org

There are also cases where an initiative may not fall strictly under the MSP definition suggested in this report, but nonetheless utilizes a multi-stakeholder approach to achieve important results for FSN. **Box 21** gives an example where such multi-stakeholder approaches helped strengthen the link between global assistance providers, such as WFP, and local beneficiaries. The French Inter-ministerial Group on Food Security (GISA)⁴⁰ is another example of multi-stakeholder initiative active in the field of international cooperation for FSN. The GISA is a multi-actor platform bringing together different French stakeholders (relevant French ministries, the French Development Agency [AFD], foundations, research institutions, civil society and farmer organizations). The GISA follows a transdisciplinary and intersectoral approach to suggest practical ways to strengthen food security in developing countries.

⁴⁰ In French: Groupe interministériel français sur la sécurité alimentaire (GISA). See: www.gisa-france.fr

Box 20 Food distribution

The **Distribuidora CONASUPO, SA (DICONSA)** is a Mexican network of more than 27,000 fixed and 300 mobile rural stores across the whole country, managed by local communities working in collaboration with the Mexican Government system to distribute subsidized food in remote rural areas, thus contributing to improve FSN and realize the right to food inscribed in the Mexican Constitution. DICONSA has a formalized governance structure. The store's management and oversight team is elected by the village assembly and send representatives to the regional council which oversees warehouse operations. In the late 2000s, DICONSA also launched a programme to provide access to financial services for low-income rural families through its rural stores. This programme is supported by a USD 3.6 million grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Websites: www.gob.mx/diconsa; <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2009/09/Diconsa-to-Offer-Financial-Services-in-Rural-Mexico>

Source: Fox (2007a).

Farm-to-Institution programmes in the United States of America, promoted by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), aim to give to farmers and ranchers opportunities to develop alternative markets, selling their local produce to schools, hospitals, cafeterias, etc. At the same time these initiatives also improve consumers' access to fresh, healthy food and local food and have the potential of changing food purchasing and education practices at schools and early care settings. Operating in kindergarten through grade-12 settings, Farm-to-School initiatives have been shown to effectively increase consumption of fruits and vegetables among students (Bontrager Yoder *et al.*, 2014).

An example with specific focus on early care of children from low-income communities is the *Farm-to-Head-Start*⁴¹ initiative in Minnesota, United States of America (IATP, 2016). This initiative, facilitated by a Minneapolis-based CSO, focused on creating the necessary conditions for the Hmong American Farmers Association (HAFA) to access institutional markets and larger food supply chains, through selected partnerships with catering and processing companies. By working on common objectives, mutual trust and maintaining the right level of flexibility, partners were able to set up effectively the logistics of sourcing, delivering and serving the local foods from HAFA to the Head Start centres, making fresh, healthy and local food available to children the targets of their programmes.

Websites: <http://www.farmtoschool.org/>; <https://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/farm-institution>; <https://www.fns.usda.gov/farmtoschool/farm-school>

Sources: NFSN (2017); IATP (2016).

Box 21 Purchase for Progress

The **Purchase for Progress (P4P)** programme was initiated by WFP in 2008 in 20 countries, helping over 1 million small farmers to engage with formal markets. This programme is progressively expanding, now reaching more than 35 countries. Stable demand encourages small farmers to invest and catalyses the efforts of a wide variety of partners. Under P4P, WFP directly purchases food from small farmers and supports governments and private partners to do so. At the household level, WFP helps farmers to increase quality and productivity and improve their storage solutions to reduce post-harvest losses. WFP also aims at strengthening farmers' organizations to empower smallholders, in particular women, to increase their bargaining power and improve their access to markets and financial services. At the national level, WFP assists governments to develop an enabling environment for small farmers and rural communities and promotes mutually beneficial private sector engagement with small farmers, coordinating the efforts across the food supply chain.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), FAO and WFP have joined their efforts in the "Smallholder Value Chains and Resilience Programme", in partnership with donor governments, the DRC Government, NGOs and farmer organizations, to: provide short-term food assistance to the most vulnerable populations while rehabilitating productive assets at the community level; improve smallholder livelihoods following the P4P approach; and support social cohesion, gender equality, peace and reconciliation.

Website: <https://www.wfp.org/purchase-progress/overview>

Sources: HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft (questionnaire #13); Mitchell and Leturque (2011); Sumberg and Sabates-Wheeler (2011); Lawson (2012); Anguko (2018).

⁴¹ Head Starts are federally funded anti-poverty programmes of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), providing comprehensive early childhood education, health, nutrition and parental involvement services.

2.6 Fundraising and resource mobilization

Fundraising and resource mobilization for FSN and sustainable development is another domain of intervention where MSPs can play an important role. With the view of reducing the FFD investment gap depicted in Chapter 1, MSPs can foster synergies and avoid fragmentation of efforts, contributing to better mobilization, coordination and targeting of public and private funds for FSN, provided that their efforts are aligned with national priorities and the overall framework of the 2030 Agenda. This may be performed through innovative mechanisms such as blended finance facilities, further explored in Chapter 4.

Even if fundraising and resource mobilization can be the main activity of an MSP, it is rarely its final objective. These MSPs are generally also active in other domains of intervention, using the resources collected, alone or in collaboration with other partner organizations (see **Box 22**).

IFIs and MDBs often play a leading role in such MSPs, in collaboration with donor governments and private foundations (see section 2.1.4). These MSPs generally have a formal legal status giving them the capacity to channel, own and manage funds and assets. They often have a clearly defined governance structure, typically composed of a Steering Committee or Executive Board where the decisions are ultimately taken and of an advisory group gathering the other relevant stakeholders. They can generally rely on a well-structured team of permanent and professional staff.

Box 22 Examples of MSPs involved in fundraising and resource mobilization

The **New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN)** was launched in 2012 at the G8 Summit hosted by the United States of America, with the objective to lift 50 million people out of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa by 2022. This partnership is dedicated to unlock and promote responsible private investment in African agriculture, governing natural resources responsibly, in order to benefit small farmers, particularly women, and reduce hunger and poverty. The NAFSN encourages diverse stakeholders (including African governments and institutions, the private sector, civil society, donors, research institutions and other development partners) to commit to specific policy reforms and investments, outlined in negotiated “cooperation frameworks” that support national priorities for agriculture and food security investment. New Alliance stakeholders report annually on the progress made regarding these commitments. The NAFSN directly contributes to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) overarching goals set by the Malabo Declaration (AU, 2014) to end hunger and halve poverty in Africa by 2025.

However, many NGOs have heavily criticized the NAFSN, considering that it favours the interests of transnational business corporations at the expense of small farmers and the environment in the ten African countries in which the initiative operates. In February 2018, France announced its withdrawal from the initiative based on an independent assessment that showed the mixed results of the NAFSN's implementation in Burkina Faso (Alpha and Sédogo, 2017).

Websites: <https://new-alliance.org/>; <https://www.globalagriculture.org/whats-new/news/en/33010.html>; <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/health-education-gender/events/article/development-food-security-09-02-18>;

The **Grow Africa Partnership** includes international and domestic private companies, public organizations, farmer organizations, service providers, financial institutions, development organizations and NGOs aiming at increasing responsible private sector investment in agriculture, paying specific attention to smallholder farmers. It was founded jointly in 2011 by the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2011. The Partnership gathers over 200 companies and governments in 12 countries. Partner companies have made formal commitments to invest in agriculture, with the government of the country concerned. The Partnership also manages a platform of over 650 organizations investing in African agriculture.

Website: <https://growafrica.com/>

The Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF) is a multi-donor platform, led by private foundations in collaboration with USAID, aiming to close the global smallholder financing gap. Through a collaborative process involving farmers, donors, finance providers and other stakeholders, the ISF developed innovative solutions to address the challenges associated with direct-to-farmer lending (such as lending risks and service delivery) and identified five main areas for innovation: infield efficiency, agronomic learning, credit assessment, portfolio diversification and individual motivation.

Websites: <https://www.isfadvisors.org/>; <http://globaldevincubator.org/gdi-projects/initiative-for-smallholder-finance/>; <https://www.dalberg.com/our-experience/initiative-smallholder-finance-smallholder-impact-and-risk-metric>; <https://www.dalberg.com/system/files/2017-07/direct-to-farmer-finance-innovation-spaces-playbook.pdf>

The Global Financing Facility in support of Every Woman Every Child (GFF) was established at the Addis Ababa FFD Conference in 2015 to improve the health and nutrition of women and children. Each year, 5 million mothers and children are dying due to preventable poor health and nutrition conditions in 50 countries. According to the GFF, USD 33 billion are missing each year to address this challenge.

The GFF supports country-led efforts and brings partners around the table to agree on a clear national set of priorities and plan of action. The GFF Trust Fund acts as a catalyst to mobilize and foster the coordinated use of domestic and international,⁴² public and private sources of financing. The GFF also helps governments to set up strong monitoring and evaluation systems. The GFF currently operates in 26 countries and aims to raise USD 2 billion by the end of 2018.

The GFF engages with different partners both at global and national levels, including civil society, finance providers (e.g. donor governments, private foundations, international institutions or development banks), the private sector, UN agencies and other stakeholders. In the GFF's multi-stakeholder approach, civil society partners are critical to ensure that national plans effectively reach the marginalized and vulnerable communities and answer to their needs and that the governments are held accountable for their actions. Engaging with the private sector, the GFF aims at leveraging private resources, capacity and expertise to improve the health and nutrition status of women, children and adolescents.

Website: <https://www.globalfinancingfacility.org/>

2.7 Concluding remarks

This chapter listed key characteristics of existing MSPs, illustrating their wide diversity in terms of thematic domain of action, scale of operation and geographical scope, structure and organization, and financing structure. It also identified five main domains of intervention, often interlinked, where MSPs can make a critical contribution to financing and improving FSN.

This huge diversity of existing MSPs must be taken into consideration when trying to understand the potential benefits and limitations of different MSPs (Chapter 3), as well as the possible ways to improve their performance (Chapter 4). This chapter could also serve as a starting point to further elaborate a more comprehensive typology, grouping in the same type MSPs sharing similar characteristics and/or facing similar challenges and opportunities.

⁴² Including funds from the International Development Association and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

3 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS

This chapter discusses potential benefits and limitations of MSPs, as well as a set of criteria for assessing their performance, examining the trade-offs between these criteria. It is illustrated as appropriate by concrete examples of MSPs using the mapping suggested in Chapter 2.

The final objective of this chapter is to help better understand the possible contributions of MSPs to financing and improving FSN in the framework of the 2030 Agenda. In that perspective, this chapter aims at providing common tools and a common methodology to different stakeholders to perform and share their own assessments of existing MSPs.

3.1 MSPs: potential benefits

This section presents in more depth the arguments, introduced in Chapter 1, used to advocate the potential value-added of MSPs, i.e. the two main potential benefits that MSPs are likely to bring when compared with non-multi-stakeholder processes where stakeholders act in isolation.

3.1.1 Pooling complementary resources, sharing risks and responsibilities

The AAAA (2015) views MSPs as an important tool to “mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources” of different partners, in order to “complement the efforts of Governments, and support the achievement of the SDGs, in particular in developing countries”.

As highlighted in Chapter 1, the primary benefit of MSPs is the mobilization and coordinated use of complementary human, material and financial resources from different stakeholders to solve a common issue that no stakeholder would have been able to tackle alone. Pooling complementary resources together in an MSP can foster synergies and help the partners to better share risks and responsibilities, to attract new resources or to better target and use more effectively existing resources to achieve an MSP’s goals and targets for FSN and sustainable development.

For example, when signing the Yaoundé Declaration in March 1999 and the “*Treaty on the conservation and sustainable management of forest ecosystems in Central Africa and to establish the Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC)*” (February 2005, Brazzaville Summit), the Central African states of the Congo Basin confirmed their environmental commitment. In 2005, during the Brazzaville Summit, they adopted COMIFAC’s “*Convergence plan for the sustainable management of Central African forest ecosystems*” then revised in July 2014. This convergence plan defined a strategic framework and priorities for action for sustainable forest management and conservation. It allocated specific roles and responsibilities for the different categories of stakeholders, members of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (see **Box 18**), including civil society, the private sector and international donors, to support the efforts of national governments that alone would not have enough resources to implement ambitious conservation programmes.⁴³

In the field of international cooperation, the example of the Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa) Programme (see **Box 23**) shows how sharing responsibilities and coordinating the use of their different resources in a multi-stakeholder approach can be more effective and impactful for FSN and sustainable development than isolated actions undertaken separately by stakeholders.

⁴³ All the documents quoted in this paragraph are available at <http://pfb-cbfp.org/keydocs.html>

Box 23 The Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa) Programme

PAA Africa is a multi-stakeholder, innovative development cooperation initiative, developed under the P4P umbrella described in Chapter 2 (Box 21). It aims at enhancing FSN and income generation for vulnerable communities through support to agricultural production and institutional purchases from smallholder farmers for school feeding programmes. The programme, launched in 2012, is built on a strong partnership between FAO, WFP, the Brazilian Government and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), each partner bringing its own specific contribution.

WFP offered its expertise on local procurement and delivery of humanitarian aid, FAO provided technical and agricultural assistance, and the Brazilian Government shared its knowledge and experience on national food acquisition and home-grown school feeding programmes.⁴⁴ The UK DFID provided financial resources and facilitation. The Programme has been implemented in five African countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal). In these five countries, national governments and CSOs were actively involved in the coordination and implementation of the programme. CSOs were instrumental for capacity building and engagement of local communities, small farmers and their organizations.

During the second phase of this programme (2014–2016), over 2 600 tonnes of food (including cereals, legumes, fruits and vegetables) were purchased from almost 16 000 small farmers and distributed to more than 37 000 school children.

Website: <http://www.wfp.org/purchase-progress/news/blog/lessons-learned-purchase-africans-africa-initiative>

Sources: Miranda *et al.* (2017); WFP/FAO (2017).

Moreover, as illustrated in section 2.5.1, stakeholder involvement through MSPs can enable the collective sustainable and integrated management of a shared natural resource (land, water, forest), at a territorial level, for multiple and often competing uses, considering the diverse and sometimes diverging interests, needs and rights of different stakeholders. In France, coordinated arrangements between farmers and environmentalists favored an integrated and territorial approach to rural development in the late 20th century (Beuret, 1999). More recently, the National Food Programme (Programme national pour l'alimentation – PNA), established in 2010 by the law,⁴⁵ defines the objectives of the French Food Policy, taking into account social justice, youth food education and waste reduction. The PNA is firmly grounded on partnerships with local authorities, non-profit associations and the private sector. In 2014, the French law for the future of agriculture, food and forests (2014),⁴⁶ stated that the objectives of the PNA and of the Regional Plans for Sustainable Agriculture (Plan régionaux de l'agriculture durable – PRAD) can be addressed through “territorial food projects”, bringing together producers, transformers, retailers, local public authorities and consumers (Gitz, 2016).

The HLPE (2017b) presented innovative multi-stakeholder approaches to forest governance at different scales, including community-based forest management and joint management of forests, which share ownership, access and use rights on forest lands and trees, as well as responsibilities between states, local governments, private corporations and local communities. It highlighted that stakeholder involvement in such governance mechanisms is increasingly used and promoted across the world as an enabling condition for sustainable forest management, a way to achieve multiple benefits, and to manage tensions and trade-offs between the different uses of forest and between the different stakeholders (including forest-dependent people, people living near forests or more distant stakeholders).

Several risks (e.g. political, financial, environmental, operational, etc.) can either affect or be dealt with by MSPs. For instance, MSPs' performance and activities in a given country can be affected by political risks, political instability and policy change, as in the case of a project piloted by the Humanitarian Forum Yemen for empowering local CSOs in local governance (UNDEF, 2015). But through MSPs, risks can also be shared by partners, enabling them to undertake collective projects

⁴⁴ Namely, the Food Acquisition Programme (*Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos* – PAA) and the National School Feeding Programme (*Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar* – PNAE). For more details on these programmes, see for instance Graziano da Silva *et al.* (2011); Swensson (2015), as well as: <http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/seguranca-alimentar/programa-de-aquisicao-de-alimentos-paa>; and <http://www.fnpe.gov.br/programas/pnae>

⁴⁵ In French: Loi de modernisation de l'agriculture et de la pêche (loi n°2010-874 du 27 juillet 2010).

⁴⁶ In French: Loi d'avenir pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et la forêt (loi n°2014-1170 du 13 octobre 2014).

that no stakeholders could have tackled alone. For instance, in Uganda, a partnership was created between the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and the Mukwano group of companies to boost sunflower production. The partnership trained 250 lead farmers and 45 000 sunflower outgrowers were contracted. Private partners helped farmers to plant trees around their farms, to act as windbreaks, mitigate climate change effects and diversify their activities and income sources. This collaboration enabled farmers to strengthen their resilience and to reduce the environmental risks associated with climate change and wind erosion, as well as economic risks, by diversifying their production (FAO, 2013, 2016).

3.1.2 Improve mutual understanding and build consensus

By providing a space for policy dialogue among different stakeholders, considering their diverging views, interests, motivations, needs and rights, as well as with different forms of knowledge and expertise, MSPs can contribute to: improve mutual understanding among partners; facilitate knowledge sharing and reach a better and common comprehension of the situation (see **Box 24**); and foster deliberation, consensus building and policy design, vetting decisions more thoroughly before moving forward (Fransen and Kolk, 2007; Roloff, 2008b).

MSPs can provide a space and offer a mechanism for deliberation (Schouten *et al.*, 2012). Deliberation is understood in political and social sciences as a process seeking to weigh different perspectives in order to come to a common understanding of or a consensus on a given issue, through discussion and communication, rather than through power struggle. This implies that stakeholders are willing to discuss and ready to change their own views as appropriate (Habermas, 1984; Risse, 2000; Dryzek, 2002). If the rights, interests and needs of the different stakeholders are appropriately considered and the decisions taken, the strategies and action plans elaborated by a given MSP are likely to be more widely accepted and better implemented by all, leading ultimately to better outcomes in terms of FSN and sustainable development.

Dryzek (2012) identified and discussed four foundations of deliberative governance: legitimacy, representation, communication and consensus. Legitimacy, in general terms, refers to the acceptance and recognition of the given order, guaranteed by governments, authorities, institutions, political regimes and other decision-making processes and bodies. Political science has explored the sources of political legitimacy and how governments in the exercise of power have been acquiring or losing legitimacy (Weber, 1958; Rothstein, 2009; Gilley, 2009). Social sciences have extended the analysis of legitimacy beyond formal government, also exploring how social groups and NGOs accept decision-making and authority (Atack, 1999; Hudson, 2001; Steffek and Hahn, 2010; Garling *et al.*, 2013). In that sense, law is not the only source of legitimacy.

Box 24 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic

In 2017, FAO and WFP conducted a joint Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) in the Syrian Arab Republic to estimate crop production and assess the overall food security situation of the country after several years of conflict. This CFSAM critically reviewed the information provided by the Government, cross-checking it with field observations, satellite imagery, rainfall records and information gathered from other sources, including:

- interviews and focus group discussions with various stakeholders (staff of governorate agricultural directorates, crop and livestock producers, millers, traders, displaced and resident households and other key informants);
- secondary data coming from WFP or made available by the Syria Food Security Cluster (see **Box 16**);
- meetings with the relevant ministries at the national level, as well as with relevant international and national organizations including UN agencies and NGOs.

This multi-stakeholder process gathered valuable information in terms of crop estimations, impacts of displacement, trends in markets and livelihoods, nutrition status and food assistance needs. This information helped the different stakeholders to reach a common and a more precise understanding of the situation on the ground, enabling them to design adapted and effective policies and programmes.

Source: FAO/WFP (2017).

Legitimacy not only reflects the quality of being legal but also the quality of being in accordance with wider principles of human rights, social justice and equity and, for that reason, of being reasonable and acceptable for the members of a group, and for the society as a whole (Simmons, 2001; Prato, 2014; Hibbert, 2017). Some authors explored legitimacy in the context of MSPs, in relation with qualities shaping MSPs performance, such as inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and effectiveness, further discussed in section 3.3 (Bäckstrand, 2006; Fuchs *et al.*, 2011; Mena and Palazzo, 2012).

Multi-stakeholder approaches can be instrumental in facilitating and strengthening non-state actors' involvement in and contribution to policy design. The new "policy network theory" (or lobbying theorem), as employed by Pattberg *et al.* (2012), insists on the importance that informal or formal interactions have among stakeholders beyond formal institutions, in policy design. Fox (2005) argues that collaboration between states and CSOs, through what he defines as "cross-sectoral coalitions", can facilitate pro-poor institutional change by offering external societal support to ideas circulating within state administration. For instance, the CAADP Partnership Platform (CAADP PP) annual conferences were instrumental in improving mutual understanding and shaping national and regional agricultural agendas in Africa (**Box 25**). In Mexico, the participation of local communities in the management of the DICONSA network (**Box 20**) not only improved the delivery of food to poor communities in remote rural areas but also altered power asymmetries between stakeholders and contributed to institutional changes, influencing a reform of food aid regulations (de Gortari, 1988).

Box 25 The CAADP Partnership Platform

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), launched in 2003 by the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), provides a comprehensive policy framework for poverty reduction, FSN, shared prosperity and improved livelihoods in Africa (AU, 2003; AU/NEPAD, 2003).

CAADP focuses on agricultural development, targeting 6 percent of annual growth in agricultural GDP and at least 10 percent of public expenditures devoted to agriculture. It aims at transforming African agriculture through increased investments in agribusiness and agrifood value chains, improved agricultural markets at national and regional levels, enhanced food security and sustainable management of natural resources. It helps countries to review their own situation and identify optimal investment opportunities. It encourages them to develop National Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plans (NAFSIP). As a result, in December 2015, 39 AU member states had already developed formal NAFSIPs. Public agricultural expenditures have doubled since the launch of the CAADP, increasing on average by more than 7 percent a year across Africa.

The CAADP Partnership Platform (CAADP PP) is an annual multi-stakeholder conference whose 14th session, held in Libreville, Gabon (25–27 April 2018), gathered over 400 leaders from African governments and national parliaments, from international organizations and development partners, from farmers, CSOs and private agribusiness corporations. The conference enabled participants to share their experiences on various issues related to agricultural development, including policies, institutions and technologies. The conference called for renewed multi-stakeholder partnerships and strengthened accountability mechanisms to transform African agriculture and reach the goals set by the Malabo Declaration (AU, 2014).

Websites: <https://www.donorplatform.org/caadp.html>;

<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/caadp.shtml>;

<https://au.int/en/newsevents/20180425/14th-caadp-partnership-platform>;

<https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180427/14th-caadp-partnership-platform-calls-realisation-au-malabo-commitments>

3.2 MSPs: limitations and challenges

To realize their potential, MSPs will have to overcome their limitations and address the main challenges identified in this section.

3.2.1 Tensions among partners

Partners in an MSP, who have different values and philosophies and who possibly have never discussed with each other before, often need to overcome initial distrust and tensions in order to work efficiently and effectively together on a shared agenda for their mutual benefit (Adekunle and Fatunbi,

2012) and to come to a clear definition and a common understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities in the partnership.

Tensions can appear among partners because of mistrust or diverging views on: (i) the shared values of the partnership; (ii) the diagnosis of the situation and on the ways forward; (iii) the short- and long-term common objectives of the partnership; (iv) its strategy and priorities for action; and (v) the time and resources needed to implement the common plan of actions.

For example, stakeholders may disagree on: the importance and relative weight of negative social and environmental impacts of food production; on the extent to which these negative effects can be directly attributed to agriculture expansion and current food systems; and on the extent to which these negative impacts outweigh the positive effects of food systems. They may also disagree on the respective roles that public regulation, and multi-stakeholder voluntary standards, should play in framing the pathway towards sustainable development (Cheyns, 2011; Hospes *et al.*, 2012). HLPE (2016) provided insights on these questions applied to the livestock sector, which has complex, both positive and negative, impacts on FSN and sustainable development.

These tensions can affect the roles and responsibilities partners are playing or are willing to play in a given MSP. They are grounded on the different interests and motivations partners have to engage, or not, in the partnership.

In turn, the partners' interests and motivations to engage in a partnership are closely linked to their perception of the associated benefits and risks (USAID/CED, 2016). One example of such risks is the "reputational" risk that engaging in an MSP can pose. In formalized MSPs, partners can be jointly and individually held accountable for the actions of the other partners. Therefore, a single partner, through inappropriate actions, can cause reputational damage for the whole MSP. For instance, MSPs could pose a reputational risk to UN agencies, IGOs, states and other public actors when they partner with an organization that does not respect international or national norms or laws. Because of such "reputational" risks, other partners may hesitate to engage in the MSP (Martens, 2007). To mitigate this reputational risk in PPPs, USAID/CED (2016) recommended: (i) a thorough pre-screening of the partners; and (ii) a clear definition of the limits of each partner's engagement (in terms of timeframe, resource commitment, etc.).

Interests and motivations also depend on each partner's objectives and principals (Martens *et al.*, 2002).⁴⁷ Governments are ultimately accountable to their citizens. They usually pursue multiple, sometimes competing, objectives at different scales, such as enhancing FSN while preserving natural and/or protected ecosystems (HLPE, 2017b). They might see MSPs as a way to benefit from the expertise and ideas of non-state stakeholders to define national objectives and priorities, and as a tool to mobilize non-state actor resources, in particular private funds, to achieve these objectives.

Private companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders and profit is generally their central objective.⁴⁸ They can see their participation in MSPs as a way to influence policy discourse and decision-making at different scales, while improving their image and reputation and acquiring a new legitimacy (Roloff, 2008b). Some private companies may use MSPs as a tool for "greenwashing" or "bluewashing",⁴⁹ to tame external criticism, without changing substantially their objectives or methods (Dauvergne, 2008, 2016; Mees-Buss and Welch, 2014). Some private companies might also use MSPs to promote a specific brand name, deriving benefits in terms of image out of proportion with their limited financial contribution. This has been pointed out by Utting (2015) as one pitfall of the Fairtrade movement.

CSOs are ultimately accountable to their members, striving for a shared goal that they consider of collective, if not of public, interest. They might strive for MSPs: (i) that effectively empower marginalized and vulnerable actors, most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, which face difficulties in influencing public decision-making; and (ii) that hold states and private companies accountable for their actions through strong and transparent monitoring mechanisms at different

⁴⁷ For example: principals in a private company would be the shareholders; in the public administration the parliamentarians or the voters; and in an NGO the members. Cases of multiple principals and objectives have been analysed in depth in the literature.

⁴⁸ Although not necessarily the only one. In particular, cooperatives or other private organizations of the social economy are not guided only by profit. Their principals and governance mechanisms may differ from those of purely profit-oriented private businesses (Borzaga and Defourny, 2004; Ortmann and King, 2007).

⁴⁹ "Bluewashing" denotes the attempt by a private company to strengthen its reputation through the use of the UN logo (Berliner and Prakash, 2015).

scales. CSOs themselves should ensure, through internal accountability mechanisms, that the positions they defend reflect the needs of the most vulnerable, from local to global levels, rather than the interests of their donors.

COI can also generate tensions in MSPs. The OECD (2003) defines a “conflict of interest in the public service” as “a conflict between the public duty and private interests of public officials, in which public officials have private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities”. In more general terms, COI refer to situations where individuals or organizations use their position in a collective or public initiative, or their influence in the public debate, to promote their own private interests (Rodwin, 1993; Thompson, 2005; Richter, 2005, 2015; Gomes, 2015; Bellows *et al.*, 2016; Lie and Granheim, 2017).

In the context of FSN policies and research, Nestle (2001) studied how some food processing companies abuse their position in government advisory bodies to influence public nutrition standards at the expense of public health. HLPE (2017a) illustrated how vested interests in food systems can conflict with public health and nutrition goals by influencing: international and national policies, norms and standards; scientific R&D; and consumer preferences. It argued that, in this context, it will take time to build trust and mutual understanding among different partners and that partnerships between the public and the private sectors should be based on a common ethic.

When COI are not properly addressed in an MSP, the risk exists that what the MSP presents as a shared agenda and as a goal of collective or even public interest reflects, in reality, the interests of the most powerful actors and that the MSP reinforces existing power asymmetries among partners (see section 3.2.2). Rules and guidelines to prevent and address COI should be established, at international and national levels, including: clear rules of participation in policy-setting and normative work; enhanced transparency and disclosure of interests; strengthened accountability mechanisms; and open access monitoring mechanisms (WHO, 2016a; Brot für die Welt/Global Policy Forum/Misereor, 2017; HLPE, 2017a).

Finally, corruption can be another source of mistrust and tension among stakeholders. Vermuelen *et al.* (2008) argued that in many countries corruption has a major influence on the way governments and public stakeholders operate and on their relationships with businesses, media and civil society. Many studies have reviewed the evidence on corruption in developed and developing countries, with the view to assess its level, its consequences on public efficiency and its impacts on FFD and economic growth and development (see for instance: Olken and Pande, 2012; Freckleton *et al.*, 2012). At the global level, the Global Financial Integrity (GFI, 2017) estimates that, in 2014, the illicit financial inflows to developing countries represented between USD 1 300 and 2 500 billion while the illicit financial outflows from developing countries amounted to USD 620 to 970 billion. In Africa, losses linked to illicit financial outflows and corruption are estimated to reach USD 50 to 80 billion annually (AU, 2018), which correspond to the investment needed to eradicate hunger globally (see section 1.2.1). This figure is probably widely underestimated because of the difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics on such financial flows. Specific multi-stakeholder initiatives and partnerships have been established with the view to contribute to curbing corruption (see **Box 26**).

Box 26 The Partnering Against Corruption Initiative

The Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) was formed in 2004 by the WEF, which recognized corruption as one of the world’s main economic and political challenges, hindering economic growth, weakening trust among stakeholders, increasing social inequality and interfering with innovation. PACI establishes a dialogue between government leaders, local public authorities, the private sector, civil society and academic experts on the possible ways to enhance transparency and promote a culture of integrity. It is developing an anticorruption agenda governed by a set of principles and international best practices.

In March 2018, PACI launched a “Tech for Integrity platform” (T4I), as a result of its multi-year project “The future of trust and integrity” to accelerate anticorruption efforts and reduce the time needed to make a tangible impact. This platform aims at providing technological solutions, exploiting the potential of new technologies, such as big data analytics, blockchain, artificial intelligence and e-governance, to understand and tackle issues related to corruption.

Websites: <https://www.weforum.org/communities/partnering-against-corruption-initiative>;
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_Future_Trust_Integrity_2P_2017.pdf

3.2.2 Power asymmetries among partners

Food systems and food governance are characterized by immense power asymmetries among actors (Zanella *et al.*, 2018). Previous HLPE reports (2016, 2017a) described the rapid concentration of power in agriculture and food systems, over the past decades, in the hands of a few transnational corporations. Three-quarters of the global grain trade is controlled by only four or five transnational commodity trade companies. Through diversification and integration, both vertically and horizontally, these companies have increased their control across the food supply chains, from inputs (seed, agrochemicals) to distribution and retail (De Schutter and Cordes, 2011; Murphy *et al.*, 2012). Thus, the locus of power and decision-making in food systems has moved away from farmers to traders and retailers, and from states to private companies (Lang *et al.*, 2009; Lang and Barling, 2012).

Many studies (e.g. McMichael, 2005; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Fuchs and Kalfagianni, 2010; Sojamo *et al.*, 2012; McKeon, 2015, 2017) describe the growth of “corporate power” in food and water governance at different scales (from local to global). Some authors (Fuchs, 2007; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009) distinguish:

- instrumental power, which reflects corporations’ capacity to directly influence policy processes and decisions, for instance through lobbying or funding political campaigns;
- structural power, which refers to the influence exerted by corporations on states through their position in the economy or through their participation in governance mechanisms such as MSPs or PPPs; and
- discursive power, which designates corporations’ capacity to frame the issues, and develop narratives and norms that reinforce their position and legitimacy.

As highlighted in the previous section, there is a risk, sometimes fuelled by COI, for MSPs to reproduce existing power asymmetries and strengthen the position of more powerful actors at the expense of marginalized and vulnerable groups. For instance, Fuchs *et al.* (2011) recall that many MSPs that intend to have a global scope are in fact dominated by stakeholders in the North – a call that particularly fits the MSPs for sustainability standards mentioned in Chapter 2. Studying the examples of MSC and RSPO (see **Box 14**), Ponte and Cheyns (2013) examined how expert knowledge and process management negatively affected the capacity of small-scale actors, especially from developing countries, to effectively engage in international standard setting.

Faysse (2006), studying MSPs as a way to manage conflicts over natural resources, presented them as a place of dialogue and power struggle. He highlighted the risk for weaker stakeholders to participate in MSPs when, because of participation and negotiation rules, pressure from stronger stakeholder, lack of resources and time dedicated to capacity-building or lack of negotiating skills, the weaker partners can be led to accept decisions that, although contrary to their interests, would appear as consensual decisions. He presented the case of the “Lower Olifants” water user association (WUA) in South Africa, where a downstream community of coloured users, invited to join the WUA along with White commercial irrigation farmers situated upstream, faced difficulties in defending its views and finally abandoned the WUA. The non-participation of coloured users in the WUA weakened their position when they finally tried to claim the fulfilment of their rights from the Ministry of Water Affairs.

Participation of the weakest partners is key to address power asymmetries in MSPs. It is useful to distinguish here the formal right to participate from substantive, meaningful or effective participation (Dodds, 2015; Duncan, 2015; Zanella *et al.*, 2018). Brem-Wilson (2015) qualifies participation as “effective” only if the stakeholders: (i) are able to communicate their views in an intelligible and persuasive manner for their interlocutors; (ii) can participate physically and timely at key meetings; (iii) have enough knowledge and information on the issue in discussion; (iv) are aware of and comfortable with the dynamics of participation, the protocols and procedures; and (v) not only have the formal right to speak but are effectively heard by the other interlocutors. All these conditions require adequate resources (time, expertise, communication skills and financial resources) and the limited resources of the weaker partners can hinder their effective participation and engagement in MSPs. On the contrary, the most powerful partners can use their resources not only to fund MSPs’ activities but also to influence MSPs’ agenda (Sridhar, 2012; Moran, 2007, Utting, 2001).

The lack of communication skills in particular can increase the difficulty for the weakest partners to engage in discussions in an MSP (Gaarde, 2017; Brem-Wilson, 2015, 2017). For marginalized and vulnerable groups from non-English speaking countries, the challenge is not only to express their views in English, used as a working language in many international MSPs, but also to “translate” their own communication modes into technocratic discourses (McKenna and Graham, 2000).

Effective participation of the weaker partners in MSPs, enhanced by inclusiveness, accountability and transparency further explored in section 3.3, is certainly necessary but probably not sufficient to reduce power asymmetries in MSPs. More research is still needed on the adequate ways to assess and address power asymmetries and COI in MSPs, and on the respective roles of public regulation and voluntary guidelines and standards in that regard.

3.2.3 Transaction costs

Decision-making in MSPs can be more complicated than in other non-multi-stakeholder processes, including because: (i) activity planning and resource utilization requires additional coordination; and (ii) divergences and tensions might arise between partners, slowing down or stopping the process – see also section 3.2.1. Multi-stakeholder collaboration thus entails inherent legal, financial and technical costs to both establish and maintain a partnership, which can be considered as additional transaction costs (Furubotn and Richter, 1991; Dudkin and Väilä, 2006; Marshall, 2013). Dudkin and Väilä (2006), studying transaction costs in PPPs concluded that they vary greatly across countries (including because of their different legal systems) and across sectors, and that they tend to be significantly higher (in percent of projects' capital value) in smaller- (below GBP 25 million for the public sector) or longer-term (over 50 months) partnerships.

Involving different stakeholders in an MSP is a demanding process, especially in the initial phases, that requires time, specific skills and expertise, as well as financial resources. MSPs – particularly those involved in knowledge generation, capacity building and advocacy – need to meet regularly. Standard setting MSPs like the MSC, the RSPO and the RTRS (see **Box 14**) took time (around three years) to design their principles and operational methods of work before they could start their work on specific topics such as monitoring, branding or market development.⁵⁰ In DICONSA (see **Box 20**), community members not only spend time for meetings at the village level but also send representatives to regional warehouse meetings. Similarly, in Kudumbashree (see **Box 19**) the process of forming women's groups has required a lot of time and effort.

Although focused on PPPs, the study of Vervynckt and Romero (2017) can illustrate the costs, and risks, associated with MSPs. The authors distinguish direct costs usually associated with regular private investments (such as costs of capital and construction costs⁵¹) and indirect costs (including the transaction costs associated with negotiating and setting the contract and running the project, as well as the renegotiation costs when needed). They also distinguish:

- “explicit payments”, fixed in a formal contract and usually spread over its lifetime, that can be easily included in public budget planning; from
- “contingent liabilities” (or hidden costs), whose timing and magnitude depend on the occurrence of uncertain future events, that create a budget risk for the PPP governance in the future. Some of these liabilities can be specified in the contract (such as minimum income streams, guaranteed rates of return, guaranteed currency exchange rates, etc.) and provisioned in the public budget. Others are highly unpredictable and might appear only if the PPP fails to deliver the expected output on time.

A clear definition of the respective roles and responsibilities of different partners, as well as clear and efficient mechanisms to allocate, use and monitor the resources engaged in a partnership, is likely to reduce both the transaction costs and the risks that hidden costs might pose to public budget planning (OECD, 2012; Vervynckt and Romero, 2017).

Time is also a challenge: engaging in an MSP can entail immediate costs while the potential benefits might only appear later. In the long run, MSPs, by facilitating the mobilization and coordinated use of complementary resources, and by improving mutual understanding among stakeholders, can contribute to reduce the costs associated with social exclusion (Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015), with tensions and conflicts among partners, or with the fragmentation and duplication of efforts of stakeholders acting in isolation (Boschet and Rambonilaza, 2018). In other words, inclusiveness, accountability and transparency (see section 3.3) generate transaction costs in MSPs but are also

⁵⁰ See: <https://www.msc.org/about-the-msc/our-history>; <https://rspo.org/about>; <http://www.responsiblesoy.org/about-rtrs/history/?lang=en>

⁵¹ Comparing the cost of 227 new road sections, financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) between 1990 and 2005 in 15 European countries, Blanc-Brude *et al.* (2006) found the ex-ante cost of construction to be 24 percent higher through PPPs than through traditional public procurement.

likely to produce positive results. Therefore, the transaction costs inherent to MSPs' setting up and processes could be considered as valuable investments in the long term.

Further research, applying existing transaction costs theories (see for instance: North, 1992; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Rao, 2003; King, 2007; Williamson, 2008; Acquier *et al.*, 2017) to the specific case of MSPs, could help better understand the immediate and long-term implications of the transaction costs associated with MSPs setting up and operations, and the conditions under which MSPs, including through inclusiveness, accountability and transparency, can contribute more efficiently to finance and improve FSN.

3.3 MSPs: qualities that shape their performance

The 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) highlighted the need to ground sustainable development on human rights, including the right to safe drinking water and sanitation and improved hygiene and the right to adequate food. The right to adequate food establishes seven "PANTHER" principles, originated from different human right treaties: participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law (FAO, 2011). These "PANTHER" principles provide a coherent framework that should frame any assessment of MSPs to finance and improve FSN.


Making MSPs work requires balancing different qualities. In political sciences, many authors have suggested criteria to evaluate the performance of political decision-making processes and of governance mechanisms (OECD, 1991; Vedung, 1997; Dahler-Larsen, 2011). Some authors explicitly suggest using such criteria to assess the performance of MSPs for sustainable development (Hämäläinen *et al.*, 2001; Bäckstrand, 2006; Thabrew *et al.*, 2009; OECD, 2015b; Dodds, 2015; Beisheim and Simon, 2016), including PPPs (Yuan *et al.*, 2010; UN Global Compact, 2015; FAO, 2016).

Since the 1970s, many social scientists have been focusing their work on evaluation research, or "theory-based evaluation", in order to improve the rationality of policy choices and decision-making. Evaluation research aims at measuring the effects of a programme against its expected outcomes, with the view to improve future programming, as well as to prevent or limit unintended consequences of action (Weiss, 1972, 1997; Wholey, 1979).

In that perspective, authors have developed "logic models" (Wholey, 1994; Cooksy *et al.*, 2001; Wholey *et al.*, 2010; Knowlton and Phillips, 2013), "programme theories" (Bickman, 1987, 1989, 1990), "theories of change" (Weiss, 1995; Kolk *et al.*, 2010; Oosterveer *et al.*, 2014; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016; Van Tulder *et al.*, 2016; Kusters *et al.*, 2017), or "logical frameworks" – LogFrame – (Coleman, 1987; Gasper, 2000; Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005; Morton, 2009; Chambers, 2010). All these tools and methods, with their limitations, aim at establishing and describing the causal links between the resources needed for a programme, its activities, its immediate outputs, its short- to long-term outcomes, and its strategic objectives.

Those models usually articulate the inputs (resources engaged in a programme), the activities (actions undertaken in the programme), the outputs, directly produced through these activities, and the intended or unintended outcomes that result from the programme (see **Figure 3**).

Figure 3 MSPs for FSN: a logic model for collective action



Note: The figure above is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to provide an idea of the general blocks of the logic model underpinning MSPs for FSN, illustrating some examples.

For instance, GAIN (see **Box 4**), in its annual report 2015–2016 (GAIN, 2017) developed a performance measurement framework (PMF) to track its progress in the realization of its strategy. This PMF defines key indicators of efficiency and effectiveness of internal processes that facilitate timely and effective programme delivery, then scaled up to achieve ultimately greater impact.

The seven “PANTHER” principles, as well as the above-mentioned studies, inspired the HLPE in the identification of eight qualities, illustrated in this section, that shape MSPs’ performance to finance and improve FSN.

As highlighted in section 3.1, one of the main value-added of the MSPs is to bring stakeholders together in a way that they become genuine partners. Process and outcomes are tightly linked in MSPs (Brouwer *et al.*, 2016; Zanella *et al.*, 2018). The quality of the process not only determines the performance and the results of MSPs, but can also often be considered as a result in itself. Therefore, any assessment of a given MSP must cover not only its results, but also its processes. In this perspective, this section divides the qualities that shape MSPs’ performance into:

- result-related qualities: effectiveness, impact and capacity to mobilize resources; and
- process-related qualities: inclusiveness, accountability, transparency, reflexivity and efficiency.

Detailed and independently checked data on a given MSP may not be publicly available, in particular when it comes to its legal and financial arrangements. Therefore, the purpose of this section is not to provide detailed, comprehensive and comparative assessments of existing MSPs, but rather to suggest relevant assessment criteria and methods. The qualities discussed in this section are also reflected in the third part of the questionnaire developed by the HLPE (see **Appendix 1**, questions 15 to 20) that can be used by governments and non-state actors to perform their own assessments of existing MSPs.

3.3.1 Results-related qualities

In line with these logic models, this section considers three “results-related” qualities: effectiveness, impact and capacity to mobilize resources.

It is important to conceptually distinguish impact from effectiveness (Hulme, 2000). While effectiveness denotes the realization of immediate outputs and short-term outcomes, impact refers to longer-term and broader outcomes, and to the ultimate results of the MSP, whether direct or indirect, expected or unintended. For instance, in the case of humanitarian assistance:

- indicators such as the number of tonnes of food aid delivered, or the amount of funds mobilized could be compared with the initial targets to assess effectiveness;
- whereas an impact assessment would consider the FSN status of the vulnerable groups targeted measured by indicators such as the Global Hunger Index, a composite indicator would cover undernourishment, child wasting, child stunting and child mortality (IFPRI, 2017b).

Defining indicators and metrics to assess these qualities, in particular effectiveness, might be easier in more “action-oriented” MSPs.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness denotes the extent to which a system delivers its expected outputs and immediate outcomes. Effectiveness has been assessed, for example, in relation to how international environmental agreements can deliver the objectives that governments committed to (Victor *et al.*, 1998; Young, 1999). Effectiveness of interventions in agriculture can be measured against different objectives, such as for instance their ability to mitigate nitrogen and phosphorus losses (Cherry *et al.*, 2008) or their capacity to improve nutrition outcomes (Berti *et al.*, 2004).

Over the past year, through its different programmes, GAIN reached 768 million people with one or more nutritious foods (18 percent more than the previous year). This number is considered as a core indicator of effectiveness in GAIN’s PMF (GAIN, 2017). According to the ISF (**Box 22**), the “credit provided by informal and formal financial institutions, as well as value chain actors, currently only meets an estimated USD 50 billion of the more than USD 200 billion needs for smallholder finance in the regions of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia” (ISF, 2016). ISF thus measures its effectiveness by the amount of funds it mobilized to reduce this financing gap.

While there has been a proliferation of MSPs created to address numerous sustainable development issues, some studies that systematically assessed their effectiveness showed that few MSPs manage to generate outputs matching their self-reported objectives (Biermann *et al.*, 2012; Pattberg *et al.*, 2012). Pattberg and Wideberg (2016), analysed a sample of 340 MSPs related to the implementation of the 2002 WSSD and found that 38 percent showed low to no measurable output, and about 38 percent of partnerships with measurable output engaged in activities with no direct relation to their publicly stated goals, leaving only 24 percent of MSPs in which the outputs were matching the self-reported objectives. In other words, they found that most MSPs established in the context of the WSSD are not (at least until now) actually delivering on their promises, undermining their claims of legitimacy. These results may be partly due to the fact that MSPs are relatively new in most of the contexts in which they are found. In addition, empirical research and available data generated by MSPs themselves are still scanty, leaving many aspects of MSP operations and achievements still poorly understood and documented. This has left a gap between the sometimes strong case made for MSPs and the apparent difficulty to demonstrate their effectiveness.

Impact, and impact assessment

The scientific literature suggests a wide array of definitions for impact, from stricter definitions that consider impact only where direct causal links have been identified (i.e. White 2009; Duflo *et al.*, 2006) to broader definitions that tend to focus more on long-term change in human well-being (UNDG, 2011). In the case of MSPs for financing and improving FSN, partners might have different understandings of the broader, long-term impacts expected from their collaboration and of the best ways to measure and evaluate these impacts.

Hearn and Buffardi (2016), reviewing the diverse definitions adopted for impact by 12 international and national development cooperation organizations,⁵² identified six main dimensions to be covered in impact assessment studies (see **Box 27**).

One of the main debates in the literature on impact assessment focuses on impact attribution. Applied to MSPs for FSN, this debate aims at addressing the following questions:

- Is it possible to identify the specific direct and indirect contributions of an MSP to FSN, differentiating these specific contributions from the effects of other exogenous factors?
- How to measure such contributions?

Stern *et al.* (2012) highlighted the diversity of impact assessment methodology.

Box 27 Six dimensions of impact assessment

1. *Application*: is the evaluation being used to assess potential effects (prospectively), intended or desirable effects, or measured and observed impacts (retrospectively)?
2. *Scope*: is the evaluation assessing specific changes, broad changes or as many changes as possible to make a judgment?
3. *Subject and level of change*: is the evaluation assessing impacts on a person's life (individual), communities (groups), policies (institutions), landscapes (environment), etc.?
4. *Degrees of separation*: is the change expected from linear and direct pathways or through more complex and systemic ones?
5. *Immediacy, rate and durability of change*: is the evaluation assessing impacts and their change over time?
6. *Homogeneity of benefits*: how is the evaluation assessing the distribution of impacts among different groups, communities, gender?

Source: adapted from Hearn and Buffardi (2016).

⁵² OECD-DAC, UK DFID, World Bank, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, US Agency for International Development (USAID), European Commission (EC), United Nations Development Group (UNDG), Global Environmental Facility (GEF), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Health Organization (WHO) and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

A common way to evaluate impacts is to compare the situation where specific interventions occurred with the situation without interventions (the counterfactual situation) (Ravallion, 2008). Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), i.e. experiments where certain groups are intentionally and randomly allocated to receive or not a given intervention, have been widely used, in particular in health and nutrition sciences, to reduce the bias when assessing the impact of an intervention (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Gera *et al.*, 2012; Vitolo *et al.*, 2012; Olney *et al.*, 2015; Ndanuko *et al.*, 2016; Iannotti *et al.*, 2017). However, RCTs, especially in the field of FSN, might raise ethical issues when a random group is deprived of an intervention important for its FSN and livelihood (Reddy, 2012). Where counterfactual situations can be elaborated through statistical methods, using existing databases, RCTs might not be necessary (Rogers, 2008). Nevertheless, this statistical approach may fail to capture correctly the specific context where the intervention has been performed, as available data might differ in a number of dimensions.

MSPs should also be assessed with regards to alternative non multi-stakeholder processes with similar objectives and outcomes. This comparative assessment should assess the “value for money” and the “additionality” of MSPs. A higher “value for money” denotes a greater positive gain for society for a similar investment (OECD, 2012; FAO, 2016). “Additionality” is a wider concept used to cover the synergy effect of the partnership. An MSP brings additionality if the contribution of each partner is indispensable for achieving the common goal and implementing strategies, programmes and projects that could not have been realized by stakeholder acting separately, or that would have been delayed (FAO, 2016; OECD, 2018a).

Participatory methods, relying on the evaluation of the intervention or programme by the actors affected, can also provide useful insights for impact assessment (Chambers *et al.*, 2009; Alvarez *et al.*, 2010).

Some authors have questioned the feasibility and even the relevance of measuring attribution. They consider that the primary result of an impact evaluation should not be to quantify attribution (through the identification of counterfactuals and causal links) but to encourage policy-makers to engage a broad reflection on possible and practical ways to improve development practice (Roche, 1999; Pawson, 2013).

The lack of information available on the results achieved by MSPs, including PPPs, is a key challenge for assessing their impacts on FSN and sustainable development (MFA, 2013; FAO, 2016). Specific quantitative and qualitative metrics and indicators, as well as adapted monitoring and evaluation systems, should be designed in each partnership to enable impact assessment going beyond the simple measure of the financial resource leveraged or the number of people involved in or reached by the partnership. Further research could use the criteria suggested in this report to develop innovative methodologies to assess the short- and long-term impacts of MSPs for FSN and sustainable development.

Capacity to mobilize resources

This third result-related quality, which could be considered as part of the effectiveness of an MSP, deserves specific attention when assessing the contribution of MSPs to financing FSN. Resource mobilization is understood as the process and activities involved in securing new and additional resources for an initiative, programme or partnership, as well as making the best use of existing resources.

Resource mobilization theories (RMT) emerged during the 1970s, building on the insights of organizational sociology, to better understand the dynamics and tactics of social actors and social movements that determine their capacity to effectively mobilize resources to pursue their goals and desired social changes (Lipsky, 1968; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983; Zald and McCarthy, 1987; Edwards and Gillham, 2013). For the Partnership for agricultural water for Africa (see **Box 28**), mobilizing resources is essentially about mobilizing “money, people and political will”.

Box 28 The Partnership for agricultural water for Africa

The **Partnership for agricultural water for Africa (AgWA)** is an autonomous partnership among FAO, IFAD, IGOs at global and regional level, governmental agencies, international financial and development institutions, networks of universities and research institutes and CSOs “who have a common interest and important capacities” to scale up investment in agricultural water management (AWM) in Africa, that are socially equitable, profitable at the farm level, economically viable, environmentally friendly and sustainable. Its Secretariat is hosted by the FAO Subregional Office for Eastern Africa, Addis Ababa.

AgWA focuses its actions on five priority areas:

- advocacy: disseminating information on AWM and pushing forward this topic on national and international political agendas;
- partner harmonization: providing a platform for closer collaboration, policy dialogue and harmonization among partners;
- resource mobilization: increasing and sustaining the flow of resources towards AWM;
- generating and sharing knowledge around issues related to AWM;
- capacity building, for informed decision-making on AWM at all levels.

Websites: <http://www.fao.org/agwa/home/en/>; <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5537e.pdf>

More precisely, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) identified five types of resources:

1. moral resources, including legitimacy, integrity, support and celebrity;
2. cultural resources, including cultural and communication products, tools and knowledge advocating for the goals of the organization;
3. human resources, including labour, experience, skills, expertise and leadership;
4. material resources, including financial resources, buildings, equipment; and
5. socio-organizational resources, including infrastructures, social networks and organizations.

RMT suggests that the capacity of an organization to achieve its goals, which determines its impact, is correlated with its capacity to mobilize resources. This capacity to mobilize resources is, in turn, related to different criteria, including the organization’s size, as well as its degree of formalization and professionalization (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Staggenborg, 1988; Edwards and Gillham, 2013).

In its earlier formulations, RMT devoted more attention to the mobilization of material resources from external sources. The attention has now shifted from this issue of resource availability towards the more pressing questions of sustainable access to resources and of resource inequality (Edwards and Gillham, 2013). Edwards and McCarthy (2004) identified four main mechanisms of resource generation in social movements that could also be applied to MSPs: (i) “self-production” of resources through the activities of the organization; (ii) “aggregation” of the individual resources of its constituents into collective resources; (iii) “co-optation or appropriation” of external resources through the relationships they have with other organizations; and (iv) “patronage” by an individual or organization through private donation, foundation grants or contracts. This issue of access to resources raises the following questions: What is the proportion of internal or external resources? To what extent do external supporters constrain the agenda and activities of an organization, thus impacting its capacity to achieve its goals? (Edwards and Gillham, 2013)

Two main questions can be raised in relation to resource mobilization in MSPs:

- Are MSPs actually effective in mobilizing additional resources, in particular financial resources for FSN and sustainable development?
- What are the risks associated with the growing influence of private funds in public governance?

Biermann *et al.* (2012) concede that it is difficult to estimate the percentage of additional funds effectively leveraged by MSPs, including PPPs, for FSN and sustainable development (see also section 4.3). Some studies highlight the low overall private sector involvement in PPPs, suggesting that limited additional funding is raised through these partnerships (Hale and Mauzerall, 2004; Pattberg *et al.*, 2012). Other authors, such as Schmidt-Traub and Sachs (2015), consider that MSPs contributed to leverage, and timely deliver additional investments and resources. Accurate estimation of costs and capacity to deliver timely the resources mobilized are also critical for the success of a

partnership (Hartwich *et al.*, 2007; FAO, 2016). In conclusion, while there seems to be a potential in MSPs to leverage new funds, further research is needed to better document their current achievements.

According to some authors (Bull *et al.*, 2004; Brühl, 2007; Martens, 2007; Dodds, 2015; Adams and Martens, 2015; Beisheim and Simon, 2016), the proliferation of MSPs and PPPs to address public challenges and the increasing reliance on private and non-core funds to deliver outcomes of public interest might, under certain conditions:

- increase corporate influence on political discourse and agenda-setting and weaken representative democracy (Richter, 2003; Zammit, 2003; Utting and Zammit, 2009; McKeon, 2017, 2018);
- contribute to focus the attention on issues where technical solutions can bring immediate benefits at the expense of, instead of addressing the needs of, the most vulnerable;
- contribute to the fragmentation of global food governance, raising new challenges in terms of accountability, coherence and efficiency (Margulis, 2013; Clapp *et al.*, 2015; Boschet and Rambonilaza, 2018);
- threaten the stable delivery of public goods and services when funding relies more on private sources and becomes increasingly unpredictable – as has occurred in some cases in PPPs delivering water utilities (Marin, 2009; Bakker, 2010).

3.3.2 Process-related qualities

The process-related qualities reflect the extent to which MSPs efficiently facilitate the discussions between stakeholders, enabling them to work together for a shared objective. The 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) underlines the need to “promote peaceful and *inclusive* societies for sustainable development” and to “develop effective, *accountable* and *transparent* institutions at all levels”⁵³ (SDG target 16.6). These process-related qualities highlighted in the 2030 Agenda strongly impact the legitimacy of a given MSP, of its actions and decisions.

Inclusiveness

Inclusiveness, understood as ensuring “that the voices of all relevant stakeholders – particularly those most affected by food insecurity – are heard” (CFS, 2009), can contribute to strengthen the acceptability and legitimacy of decisions taken in an MSP, as well as to address power asymmetries and ensure equity (Dodds, 2015).

Assessing inclusiveness in an MSP raises the following questions (Hemmati, 2002; Vermeulen *et al.*, 2008; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016):

- Does the MSP include all “relevant” stakeholders?
- Who can participate in the discussions? Who takes the final decision?
- Do the rules and representation mechanisms of the MSP ensure a full and effective participation of all stakeholders (especially those actors most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition) and a “fair” representation in the decision-making and implementation process?
- If an equal voice is not given to each stakeholder, are there any mechanisms to, at least, identify and acknowledge power asymmetries within the MSP?
- If the main objective of the MSP is to share knowledge and experiences, is it using diverse forms of knowledge to inform the debate?

It is important to stress the difference between including all “relevant” stakeholders versus just including all stakeholders. Some MSPs might potentially support certain groups or purposely want to disregard other stakeholders, if such distinction is considered necessary to achieve the desired objectives.

MSPs that try to fill a democratic deficit, for example, can choose to give more space to those stakeholders that are usually marginalized in standard political processes, as a way to counterbalance the power of more influential actors. Some marginalized populations may not feel comfortable entering directly a mixed forum, especially if it includes traditional rivals or actors in a position of power over them. They might prefer to meet first among themselves or with “like-minded” actors, to develop a shared agenda before embarking on negotiations with other partners. This strategy has been used not only in MSPs but also in some human-rights-based multi-actor policy processes and platforms such as

⁵³ Emphasis added by the HLPE.

CONSEA (Mendonça Leão and Maluf, 2014), which gives the prominence to CSOs. CONSEA is composed of 60 representatives with one-third coming from different government agencies, and two-thirds from civil society, including only two seats reserved for the private sector.

Stakeholders can also decide to boycott or to withdraw from an MSP when they are not in accordance with its governance mechanisms, processes or results (see the example of NAFSN in **Box 22**). Boycotting an MSP can be a way for a partner organization to delegitimize it provided that this organization has enough influence to defend its position (see the case of the “Lower Olifants” WUA presented in section 3.2.2).

Future research could further explore these strategic decisions to engage in, boycott or withdraw from an MSP, and their implications for the different actors concerned or affected by these decisions.

Accountability

Accountability is usually understood as the responsibility that a representative or a group acquires with the action of speaking or deciding on behalf of someone else. From a rights-based perspective, accountability ultimately links the “duty-bearers” to the “right-holders” (Beisheim and Simon, 2016). According to Swinburn *et al.* (2015), “accountability is ultimately about governance and power and determines how and why decisions are made, who makes decisions, how power is used, shared, and balanced, whose opinions are important, and who holds whom to account”.

Some authors distinguish internal from external accountability (Keohane, 2003; Fuchs *et al.*, 2011; Zanella *et al.*, 2018). Internal accountability refers to the responsibility that a representative acquired vis-à-vis the group of actors represented. External accountability refers to the wider responsibility, acquired by each partner or by the whole MSP, vis-à-vis all actors potentially impacted by the representative’s decisions and, more broadly, vis-à-vis the whole society.

In political science, the concept of accountability has been widely used, applied and scrutinized in democratic and electoral contexts (Przeworski *et al.*, 1999; Bovens *et al.*, 2014). Democratically elected representatives are ultimately accountable to their electorate through the mechanism of elections. The assumption is that, to be re-elected, a representative needs to provide a satisfactory account of his or her actions and decisions to the electorate.

Challenging this view as a simplistic and overoptimistic assumption found in western-liberal democracies, other authors have investigated the notion of accountability in non-democratic contexts where representation by election is unlikely, unfeasible or irrelevant (Chambers, 2003; He, 2006; He and Warren, 2011; Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011; Dryzek, 2012; Martens and Seit, 2017). For instance, Scholte (2004) discussed whether the growing involvement of a civil society organization in international negotiations could help strengthen accountability in the long term. Biermann and Gupta (2011) investigated sources and mechanisms of accountability in earth system governance⁵⁴, exploring possibilities such as the inclusion of competing perspectives, formal representation of civil society organizations in intergovernmental institutions and different options of voting in international negotiations.

These authors provide useful insights for assessing accountability in MSPs, where representatives may not be selected through democratic elections. They consider that, when assessing accountability in these cases, it is important to check whether the representatives have institutional (legal, formal or informal) obligations to:

- report on their actions and decisions to their constituencies (i.e. the stakeholders they represent), or more widely to the whole society;
- be held responsible for the possible consequences (positive and negative) of their actions and decisions.

In this sense, any assessment of accountability in an MSP should examine not only the processes of selection of the representatives, but also their effective obligations towards their constituencies (internal accountability) and towards the whole society (external accountability), as well as the way they implement their mandate.

⁵⁴ Earth system governance is defined as “the interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and informal rules, rule-making systems, and actor-networks at all levels of human society (from local to global) that are set up to steer societies towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to global and local environmental change and, in particular, earth system transformation, within the normative context of sustainable development” (Biermann *et al.*, 2009).

Transparency

Transparency implies that all relevant stakeholders have open or easy access to the best available information on an MSP's governance, rules, processes, budget and sources of funding, activities and decisions (OECD, 2012). Transparency is key to avoid corruption or political capture (FAO, 2016). Transparency is instrumental for conflict resolution among partners (OECD, 2012).

Transparency is considered as an important condition for legitimacy (Hale, 2008; Fox, 2007b) and for accountability (AAAA, 2015; Vervynckt and Romero, 2017). In particular, transparency is essential in the selection of the private partners in a PPP (FAO, 2016) or for the selection of civil society representatives in intergovernmental debates (Clark *et al.*, 1998; McKeon, 2009) to avoid accusations of preferential treatment or illegitimate representation in the partnership.

At the international level, the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention, 1998) establishes rules to strengthen transparency through enhanced access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice (Lee and Abbot, 2003; Hartley and Wood, 2005; Wates, 2005).

The free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is a crucial concept crystalized in numerous UN conventions and treaties (Ward, 2011; Hanna and Vanclay, 2013; Franco, 2014). The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2007 by the UN General Assembly (UN, 2008), refers directly to this concept in its article 19: "*States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous Peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them*". Although this concept deals with many other aspects, transparency, access to information and public participation are critical elements of FPIC.

Beyond international agreements and national regulations, some multi-stakeholder initiatives aim to enhance transparency (see **Box 29**).

It is important to note that transparency implies ensuring access to information on an MSP not only to the partners involved, but also to all the affected stakeholders and to the general public, particularly when the MSP is delivering an outcome of public interest.

Box 29 Multi-stakeholder initiatives to enhance transparency

The **Open Contracting Partnership**, initially hosted by the World Bank, was established in 2012 through the collaboration of a diverse set of stakeholders across governments, the private sector and civil society. The Partnership estimates that public contracting amounts annually to over USD 9.5 trillion worldwide (15 percent of the global GDP) and represents for governments the major risk of corruption. It aims at increasing transparency in public procurement by promoting "open contracting", i.e. by "publishing and using open, accessible and timely information on government contracting to engage citizens and businesses in identifying and fixing problems". It focuses on:

- advocacy to challenge vested interests and improve the global norms in public contracting;
- supporting a network of partners to implement open contracting projects and adopt the Open Contracting Data Standard;
- generating knowledge and gathering evidence on open contracting.

The Partnership developed the **Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS)**, a global non-proprietary standard, reflecting the whole contracting cycle. This standard defines a common data model that enables users and partners to disclose and share data and documents at all stages of the contracting process. It enhances transparency and allows in-depth analysis of contracting data by a wide range of users around the world.

Websites: <https://www.open-contracting.org/about/>; <http://standard.open-contracting.org/latest/en/>

The **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)** aims at promoting a global standard for open and accountable management of natural resources by requiring partner countries and companies to disclose information on the key steps in the governance of their oil, gas and mining revenues. It currently features 51 implementing countries and declares an estimated USD 2.4 trillion of revenues disclosed through EITI reports. However, research has pointed out that the Initiative has not yet generated attributable governance improvements leading to reduced corruption, at least in the case of two key countries, Azerbaijan and Liberia (Sovacool and Andrews, 2015).

Website: <https://eiti.org/>

Assessing transparency in an MSP supposes examination of the following questions:

- Does the MSP provide clear, complete and accessible information on its processes, decisions, actions and outcomes?
- Does the MSP provide clear, complete and accessible information on its funding: origin and utilization?
- Who is entitled to request additional information on the MSP? Is there a clear, accessible and efficient process to obtain such additional information?

Does the MSP provide the relevant information in an understandable way for different stakeholders, including in different appropriate languages (see section 3.2.2)?

Reflexivity

Reflexivity is increasingly used in governance studies to denote the capacity of a given system to learn from mistakes, to assess long-term trends and to react accordingly (Rhodes, 1997; Voss *et al.*, 2006; Marsden, 2013; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016). Instead of trying to avoid shocks, reflexive systems can learn from them and adapt themselves in response. Reflexivity thus appears as a condition of resilience and, more broadly, of sustainability (OECD, 1991). Dodds (2015) used the word “flexibility” in a similar sense to designate the capacity of a partnership to adjust over time to a changing reality and to different contexts. This criteria links in an MSP the results and the process, using the results obtained to progressively and iteratively improve the process.

Reflexivity is grounded on regular monitoring and evaluation of the situation (context, trends, challenges and opportunities), of the objectives, processes, activities, outputs and outcomes (Van Mierlo *et al.*, 2010). The SUN Movement (**Box 7**), for instance, used the lessons learned from the implementation of their first Strategy and Roadmap (2012–2015) and the operation of their first Multi-Partner Trust Fund to elaborate their second Strategy and Roadmap (2016–2020) and design their new SUN Pooled Fund Grant Programme.

Standard setting MSPs, such as the FSC, the RPSO and the RTRS (all described in **Box 14**), initially focused on building a common understanding of the concept of “sustainability” based on a set of principles, criteria and indicators, adapted to the concerned sector or value chain, and agreed among all members. At a later stage – once the standards were defined – these MSPs became more involved in implementing and promoting their standards, based on the reflexive observation that promotion initially left to individual partners was not sufficient and that a collective and coordinated effort was needed to achieve impact at scale (Ponte *et al.*, 2011).

Efficiency

Efficiency is generally understood as the relationship between the benefits produced (outputs and outcomes) and the resources engaged (inputs). Pareto (1906) considered as efficient a situation where resources are optimally allocated in such a way that it is impossible to increase one individual's well-being without worsening the situation of another individual. For Palmer and Torgerson (1999):

- technical efficiency reflects the physical relationship between inputs and outputs;
- productive efficiency refers to the optimization of an outcome for a given cost, or of the cost associated to a given outcome – this concept enables the comparison of diverse interventions with comparable outcomes; and
- allocative efficiency covers not only the relationship between inputs and outputs, but also the distribution of outputs in a given population.

Bromley (1990) stressed the ideological dimension of Pareto-efficiency and of other measures of economic efficiency, as well as their influence on policy analysis. More recently, the schools of ecological economics and sustainability economics have also applied the concept of efficiency in different ways, exploring the tensions between efficiency and equity, or expanding the notion of economic efficiency to include social and ecological dimensions (Remig, 2015).

When assessing an MSP's efficiency, the question is the extent to which a given MSP makes the best use of its limited (human, material and financial) resources to strengthen its contribution to FSN and sustainable development. A given MSP might be very effective while not necessarily efficient, if it spends a lot of resources to realize its objectives on time.

This efficiency assessment might be hampered by the difficulty to quantify some inputs (such as the time spent to engage in the partnership beyond the formal meetings, or the in-kind contributions of various partners) or some benefits whether intangible or only observable in the long run (such as enhanced trust between partners or improved FSN status in the targeted situation). For this reason, it is critical to elaborate, when setting up the MSP, sound evaluation metrics and indicators, agreed among all the partners.


The efficiency of MSPs should also be compared, where appropriate, with the efficiency of other non-multi-stakeholder processes pursuing similar objectives. This assessment is essential for stakeholders to make a decision on the resources they wish to engage in multi-stakeholder processes. Making this decision, stakeholders have also to consider that, as mentioned above, the apparently higher transaction costs inherent to MSPs can produce positive results in the long run (see section 3.2.3).

3.3.3 MSPs: a logical framework for assessing performance

There are many links, synergies and trade-offs between the eight qualities presented before. For example, increased inclusiveness can lead to strengthened accountability and transparency. Transparency can also contribute to accountability. All the three factors taken together are likely to enhance the legitimacy of an MSP, but also to generate transaction costs and to reduce efficiency at least during the MSP's initial phases (see section 3.2.3). It is important for the successful design and implementation of MSPs that these trade-offs are well understood and considered over time.

The links between the eight qualities might be very context-specific. Therefore, the purpose of **Figure 4** is not to explore them systematically nor to suggest a comprehensive model applicable in all situations. **Figure 4** only suggests a possible logical framework for a comprehensive assessment of MSPs. It illustrates the interrelationships existing between these eight qualities and shows that they have to be considered and assessed altogether.

Figure 4 MSPs for FSN: a logical framework for assessing performance



Note: Process-related qualities are light green rounded rectangles; result-related qualities are dark green rounded rectangles.

Box 30 shows as an example an analysis of Kudumbashree (see **Box 19**), using the framework presented above.

Box 30 Kudumbashree performance assessment

Results-related qualities

Effectiveness

Jacob (2009) considered that Kudumbashree met its objectives of poverty reduction and income generation. Through their participation in Kudumbashree, women satisfied their basic needs (including FSN and housing) and improved their livelihoods. They acquired new skills and were supported to start income-generating activities. They were liberated from the heavy dependence on external moneylenders and from extreme poverty.

Impact

Kannan and Raveendran (2017) realized a 10-year assessment (2005–2015) of the impact of Kudumbashree in terms of poverty reduction and women's empowerment. Kudumbashree women have found a political voice and gained leadership qualities. They have acquired the capacity to express their views in meetings and claim government resources. They have expressed higher levels of self-esteem. Nearly 16 000 Kudumbashree women have participated in local elections and over 7 000 have been elected in different bodies, including over 300 in leading positions. In terms of economic empowerment and financial inclusion, 96 percent of the Kudumbashree women surveyed had opened a bank account in their own name.

Scaling up is another indicator of impact. The Kudumbashree network has progressively extended to cover the whole Indian state of Kerala. Kudumbashree women are now engaged, through the Kudumbashree National Resource Organization (NRO), in training and advising similar women's groups and government programmes in 16 Indian States.

Capacity to mobilize resources

In 2015-2016, Kudumbashree pooled financial resources coming from the federal government and from Kerala State (INR 2770 million), from banks (INR 24 800) and from the people themselves, through thrift and saving groups (INR 3 420 million).

Process-related qualities

Inclusiveness

Kudumbashree has reached 4.3 million women (out of a total population of around 33 million people in Kerala in 2011). According to Kannan and Raveendran (2017), two-thirds of them can be considered as "poor and vulnerable". About one-fifth are widowed, divorced or separated women.

Accountability

The three-tier democratic structure of the women's groups presented in **Box 19**, as well as the central role played in the partnership by public authorities at different scales (central Indian Government, State of Kerala, districts and municipalities) contributes to accountability.

Transparency

The Kudumbashree website not only has detailed information on financial budgets and expenditures but also minutes of meetings held. Book-keeping and auditing are undertaken at all levels, including the community level. Any member can ask for a copy of the audit report.

Reflexivity

Kudumbashree has shown its reflexivity in relation to a housing scheme. In the past, banks had lent funds to Kudumbashree community development societies (CDS), the highest level of organization in the network. However, the CDS lacked proper accounting skills and procedures and encountered management issues. Later, the Government introduced a new housing grant scheme. This created tensions between Kudumbashree women that had received the loans and those who benefited from the Government grant. After tripartite discussions, organized in the Kudumbashree network between the Government, the banks and the women's groups, it was decided that the Government would take over the outstanding loans, and that the banks would lend funds directly to the neighbourhood groups, the lowest level of organization.

Efficiency

It is argued that the Kudumbashree network enhanced efficiency through collaboration among public authorities at different levels, women's groups and other partners (including banks). For example, the Kudumbashree network (**Box 19**) was used successfully to conduct a vaccination campaign in India, probably at a lower cost than if all the women in the network had to be reached individually.

Websites: <http://www.kudumbashree.org/>; <http://kudumbashree.org/pages/173>;
<http://www.keralanro.org/>;
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/entrepreneurship/kudumbashree-keralas-all-women-rs-2262-core-savings-group-finances-microenterprises-of-members/articleshow/42397292.cms>

Sources: Kannan and Raveendran (2017); Jacob (2009); and interviews realized by the authors.

3.4 Concluding remarks

The process of bringing stakeholders together determines the performance and the results of the MSPs and is often a result in itself. As such, any assessment of a given MSP must not only cover its tangible results but also the process itself.

With the view to helping stakeholders realize their own assessment of MSPs' contribution to FSN and sustainable development, this chapter reviewed the potential benefits and limitations of MSPs. It also identified eight qualities, whether result- or process-related, that shape MSPs' performance. It finally proposed a possible logical framework for comprehensive MSPs' assessment that considers the logical context-specific links, synergies and trade-offs between these qualities.

Based on this work, the following chapter will explore internal conditions and factors in the external environment that could help improve MSPs' contributions to FSN and sustainable development.

4 PATHWAYS TO IMPROVE THE CONTRIBUTION OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS TO FSN

As illustrated in the previous chapters, the use of MSPs in the landscape of food governance at different scales does not take place without controversy. Besides a conceptual debate on the exact definition of concepts such as stakeholders and partnerships, scientists and other actors question the potential benefits and limitations, the performance and even the relevance of MSPs as a suitable institutional mechanism to finance and improve FSN (e.g. Zammit, 2003; Richter, 2004; Valente, 2016; Pattberg and Widerberg, 2016; McKeon, 2017; Martens and Seit, 2017). MSPs should be considered as a means rather than a goal. They do not provide a “silver bullet” solution for any problem and might not be the most appropriate institutional approach in any situation.

However, MSPs have been identified as a privileged means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda (SDG 17). Considering the proliferation of MSPs over the past decades, as part of a new approach to governance for FSN and sustainable development, another stream of literature (e.g. Brouwer *et al.*, 2016; Heiner *et al.*, 2017; Beisheim and Simon, 2016; FAO, 2017c; Zanella *et al.*, 2018) focuses on practical ways to improve MSPs' performance.

This is why this last solution-oriented chapter explores the internal conditions (section 4.1) and factors in the external environment (section 4.2) that can contribute to enhance MSPs' contributions to FSN and sustainable development. Internal conditions refer to what can be done or changed within the MSP, by the partners themselves, or by the MSP as a group, to improve its performance. The external environment refers to the environment in which MSPs operate, framed mainly by states (and IGOs) but also shaped by non-state actors. The last section focuses specifically on possible contributions of MSPs for financing FSN (section 4.3).

4.1 Improve MSPs' performance: internal conditions

MSPs are often triggered by external shocks, such as food price shocks (Watson, 2015), policy and institutional changes (Van Wijk *et al.*, 2011), or natural disasters. Their establishment rarely follow a rational and linear process.

Nevertheless, the HLPE identified six important steps to follow for establishing a MSP based on a review of the literature (e.g. Levesque, 1993; Kania and Kramer, 2011; Dodds, 2015; OECD, 2015b; UN Global Compact, 2015; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016; Beisheim and Simon, 2016; FAO, 2016; Heiner *et al.*, 2017).

This six-step method (**Table 2**) can concretely contribute to address the three main challenges identified in Chapter 3 (namely: (i) mistrust and tensions among partners; (ii) power asymmetries; and (iii) transaction costs). **Table 2** also illustrates how each step is linked to the eight qualities suggested in Chapter 3 to evaluate MSPs' performance.

Table 2 Six-step method to establish an MSP

General steps	Specific steps	Challenges impacted	MSP qualities affected
1 IDENTIFY THE RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS AND AGREE ON THE PROBLEM STATEMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. identify the “relevant” stakeholders to be involved b. clearly define the issue at stake, the rationale to set up the MSP c. clarify the different stakeholders’ expectations, interests and motivations 	Build trust and synergies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness Inclusiveness Transparency Accountability
2 ELABORATE A SHARED VISION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. elaborate a shared vision and define common goals and values b. identify divergences, diversity of values, and possible sources of tensions or conflicts between partners c. explore possible directions for collective action 	Build trust and synergies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impact Capacity to mobilize resources Inclusiveness
3 CLEARLY DEFINE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. identify the complementary contributions of each partner, as well as the possible collaborations and synergies among them b. clarify the relationships needed among partners to achieve the common goals c. clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the different partners d. identify potential COI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build trust and synergies Address power asymmetries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness Impact Transparency Accountability Efficiency
4 CREATE THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. establish appropriate governing bodies (e.g. Steering Committee, Board, Secretariat, etc.) b. establish appropriate rules of engagement, participation and representation c. set up strong and transparent conflict resolution mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Address power asymmetries Reduce transaction costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inclusiveness Transparency Accountability Efficiency
5 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT A COMMON STRATEGY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. define clear objectives and targets, precise the timeline b. develop strategies, actions and activities to achieve these objectives c. evaluate, from the start, the resources (human, financial, material) needed to design and implement the strategy d. mobilize the required resources to design and implement the strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build trust and synergies Reduce transaction costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness Impact Capacity to mobilize resources Transparency Accountability Reflexivity Efficiency
6 REGULARLY MONITOR AND EVALUATE THE RESULTS AND THE PROCESS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. establish strong and transparent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms b. define metrics and indicators to concretely assess the achievement of objectives and targets c. undertake periodic reviews on the first 5 steps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build trust and synergies Address power asymmetries Reduce transaction costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness Impact Transparency Accountability Reflexivity Efficiency

4.1.1 Build trust and foster synergies among partners

As highlighted in Chapter 3, improved mutual understanding among partners is determinant for MSPs effectiveness and impact. The following elements can contribute to build the needed trust and to foster synergies among partners in an MSP.

Identify the relevant partners and agree on the problem statement (Step 1)⁵⁵

As soon as potential partners identify a new opportunity for collaboration, they need to agree on the problem statement, i.e. the rationale for setting-up the MSP, and to identify additional relevant partners. Those two issues cannot be tackled separately as new partners might bring their own views on the issue at stake.

It is critical to clarify during this first step each partner's expectations, interests and motivations in order to build the partnership on sound foundations and to enhance effectiveness, transparency and accountability at later stages. Standard-setting MSPs (**Box 14**), for example, initiated partnerships by negotiating statements of intent, where these aspects were covered, before moving into other activities. This clarification is instrumental for partners to identify areas of potential tensions and prevent conflicts (Step 2). It can also help partners better understand the specific and complementary value-added each of them can bring to the partnership, as well as to address potential conflicts of interest (Step 3).

Elaborate a shared vision and recognize possible sources of conflicts (Step 2)

Beyond the common diagnosis of the situation and of the issue at stake, partners need to agree on their collective goals and common values. A strong vision, shared by all the partners, such as the consecutive versions of the SUN Movement Strategy and Roadmap (**Box 7**), will help the MSP mobilize resources and achieve impact at scale. At this stage, as mentioned in Chapter 1, partners should explore the tensions between their collective interest and the public interest of the whole society.

Partners can progressively build trust and synergies despite their divergences or diversity of values, if this diversity is properly acknowledged and considered in the partnership. The clear and transparent communication of these diverging views contributes to the identification of potential sources of tension or conflict. It also delimitates the boundaries of possible collective action. In other words, at this stage, partners have to understand on what they agree, why they disagree and, possibly, to "agree on their disagreements" in order to evaluate what they are able and willing to do together.

Foster stakeholder engagement at each step of elaboration of an MSP

Engagement and effective coordination of different stakeholders are key conditions of success of a partnership (USAID/CED, 2016; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016). Stakeholder engagement is understood here as the involvement of partners in the MSP to achieve a collective goal, as opposed to the instrumental interest of a stakeholder using the partnership to advance its own interests.

Trust between partners can only be built and preserved through continuous stakeholder engagement at each step of elaboration of an MSP. To become genuine partners rather than only beneficiaries and to get a better sense of ownership of the MSP, stakeholders need to be involved from the beginning in the elaboration of the partnership, instead of been included only at the end when the key decisions on the vision, strategy and governance structure of the partnership have already been taken.

More broadly, stakeholder engagement in governance mechanisms at different scales is increasingly recognized as a way to achieve multiple and sometimes competing objectives, as well as to manage tensions or conflicts between stakeholders (HLPE, 2017b). In particular, the HLPE (2017b) illustrates how different countries, such as the Central African Republic, Peru and Ecuador, are progressively recognizing in their constitutions and laws the traditional rights of local communities and indigenous peoples and guaranteeing their involvement in forest management.

Stakeholder engagement can generate new forms of organization. **Box 31** illustrates how producers and consumers can join their forces to coordinate together demand and supply at a local scale (Ye *et al.*, 2010; Van der Ploeg *et al.*, 2012; HLPE, 2013).

⁵⁵ Numbers refer to the six steps in Table 2.

Box 31 Alternative markets in Ecuador's central highlands

The Chimborazo province in Ecuador's central highlands is rich in traditional culture and landscapes. It enjoys a high level of agricultural biodiversity. The traditional farming methods used in this region, with very limited use of agrochemicals, makes it an important source of "healthy" food for rural and urban dwellers. To promote this agroecological local food production, in 2010 two development organizations, EkoRural (rural) and *Fundación Utopía* (urban), and a consumer group from Riobamba city (*Canasta Comunitaria Utopía*), launched alternative commercialization channels, initiating direct transactions with an association of small producers from the rural community of Tzimbuto (*Asociación Nueva Generación*).

Farmers, dissatisfied with the limited bargaining power over prices that conventional markets offered, with intermediaries controlling transaction and exploiting their vulnerable position, were seeking more equitable alternatives to secure their livelihoods. On the other side, consumer movements wanted to promote more sustainable food systems and healthier diets through responsible food choices.

This MSP between consumer groups and smallholder farmer associations, facilitated by development organizations, responded to the needs of both groups and generated an "alternative local agrifood network". This network also enabled a redefinition of roles and leadership among farmers, encouraging women to assume new responsibilities (e.g. in organizing deliveries, attending public events to report on experiences, supporting debates and discussions on various platforms and giving radio interviews).

Data on sales to *Canasta Comunitaria Utopía* over the period 2010–2012 revealed that, by selling their products directly to the consumer groups rather than on the wholesale market, producers achieved significantly higher returns and reduced price volatility. On the other hand, the partnership enabled consumers to afford healthier and more diverse diets with no perceived additional costs. Consumers also considered this partnership as a social space to build direct relationships with producers and to exchange information on different issues.

Websites: <http://ekorural.org>;
<https://utopiariobamba.wixsite.com/canastacomunitaria>

Source: Borja and Oyarzún (2014).

Set up appropriate facilitation mechanisms

Setting-up an appropriate facilitation mechanism is of utmost importance to enhance trust and synergies between partners, enabling them to go through the six-step process illustrated in **Table 2** and to build their MSP on a strong basis. As appropriate, this mechanism can involve an external facilitator, or a group of facilitators, with no vested interest in the partnership. The facilitator can bring to the discussions his/her external and neutral perspective, his/her technical knowledge of issues at stake ("content facilitation"), or his/her previous experience of multi-stakeholder processes ("process facilitation") (Levesque, 1993; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016; Heiner *et al.*, 2017). He/she can help to elaborate facilitation tools adapted to the need of the partnership. This facilitator can also mitigate power asymmetries in a partnership, providing a specific support to the weakest partners, in particular those most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, who may lack the needed resources and skills to engage effectively in the partnership (Brouwer *et al.*, 2016; Heiner *et al.*, 2017) – see also section 3.2.2.

For instance, an important governance feature of the GAFSP described in **Box 10** is its independent Technical Advisory Committee (TAC).⁵⁶ The TAC is comprised of up to 12 high-level technical experts on agriculture and FSN, coming both from low- and high-income countries, covering a wide diversity of regional or sectoral expertise. It provides independent technical advice to facilitate the allocation of available funds by the GAFSP's Steering Committee.

CFS *Voluntary guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of national food security* –VGGT – (FAO, 2012) were implemented in South Africa following a multi-stakeholder process (**Box 32**). This experience showed the critical importance of a trusted and neutral convener, the role played by FAO, to facilitate the advancement of the whole process, to build trust among the various actors, and within each actor group, to provide technical assistance and capacity building for the more vulnerable partners, with the view to address and overcome power asymmetries (Kalas, 2007; Nederlof *et al.*, 2011; Rioux and Kalas, 2017).

⁵⁶ See: <http://www.gafspfund.org/content/technical-advisory-committee>

Box 32 Country-level implementation of the VGGT in South Africa

The Government of South Africa requested FAO to support and facilitate the implementation of the VGGT (FAO, 2012) with the view to address its national priorities: FSN, sustainable and equitable natural resource management and sustainable land reform. The country-level implementation of the VGGT in South Africa followed an inclusive and participatory approach that enhanced country ownership and commitment through multi-stakeholder engagement, dialogue and trust building (FAO 2015b; Kalas *et al.*, 2017). Three national multi-stakeholder workshops and various learning events and programmes were organized to raise awareness on the VGGT and to build up the capacity of different actors, including in civil society and grassroots organizations, levelling the playing field among partners and providing the weakest partners the required technical and communication skills (Kurbalija and Katrandjiev, 2006; Kalas, 2007; Saner, 2007).

At the heart of this process emerged a multi-actor platform, designed and elaborated with all stakeholders. (Kalas *et al.*, 2017), aiming at creating a space for dialogue and at developing consensus on priorities.

Several lessons can be drawn from this experience. First, such a multi-actor process can strengthen the consensus around the needed policy and legal reforms. It can contribute to generate or increase the political will needed to adopt and implement such reforms (see also the example of Senegal described in Box 34). Second, this experience showed the importance of time: (i) to progressively build trust among partners, even within a specific actor group; (ii) to reach a common understanding of the situation; and (iii) to develop a consensus on the common strategy. Third, it stressed the critical role of a credible, neutral convener and facilitator in the process, to build trust among partners, to address and overcome power asymmetries (Kalas 2007; Nederlof *et al.*, 2011; Rioux and Kalas, 2017). A core group of people involved in the process around this facilitator is also needed to keep the momentum and move forward.

Source: adapted from a personal contribution of P.P. Kalas and L.J. M. Jansen (FAO).

4.1.2 Acknowledge and address power asymmetries

Power asymmetries among partners were identified in Chapter 3 as a crucial concern in MSPs for FSN and sustainable development. Failure to acknowledge the role of power asymmetries and power dynamics is pointed out as a major deficit in MSP analysis (Brower *et al.*, 2013). Although there will never be equal power resources among partners, partnerships are more likely to succeed when a balanced relationship is established between collaborating parties (Chicksand, 2015). The following elements can contribute to acknowledge and address power asymmetries in MSPs.

Clearly define roles and responsibilities (Step 3)

In many MSPs no clear distinction is made among the various categories of stakeholders in terms of interests, roles and responsibilities and with no consideration of power asymmetries undermining the partnership from the start (McKeon, 2018). A strong agreement among partners on their respective roles and responsibilities as well as the transparent identification of potential COI are constantly identified in the literature as an important condition of success in MSPs (e.g. OECD, 2015b; Beisheim and Simon, 2016; FAO, 2016; USAID/CED, 2016; McKeon, 2017).

This clear definition of roles and responsibilities is a pre-requisite to delimitate and mitigate the risks associated with the partnership, to acknowledge and address existing power asymmetries, and to avoid duplication of efforts (FAO, 2016). It also contributes to enhance transparency and accountability in the partnership, and to avoid conflicts among partners and duplication of efforts (**Box 34**).

Create the appropriate governance structure (Step 4)

Once their respective roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and agreed, partners can elaborate together the appropriate governance structure for their partnership (Hiemstra *et al.*, 2012). In order to balance power asymmetries in MSPs for FSN, they should:

- create an inclusive governance structure that gives priority to the marginalized and vulnerable stakeholders and groups, most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition (Buck and Bailey, 2014; McKeon, 2018);
- establish appropriate and transparent rules of engagement and effective participation, ensuring that all the relevant stakeholders, particularly the most vulnerable, not only have the formal right to participate but also the capacity to meaningfully influence decisions (Brem-Wilson, 2015; Duncan, 2016) – see section 3.2.2;

- establish clear rules of representation in the partnership that do not overlook the power imbalances and the divergence of interests existing between different group of stakeholders, for instance between small-scale food producers and large agribusiness corporations (CONCORD, 2017; McKeon, 2018); or between gender (Goetz, 2003; Paxton *et al.*, 2010);
- establish appropriate governing bodies (e.g. General Assembly, Steering Committee, Advisory Bodies, Secretariat), reflecting clearly the different roles and responsibilities undertaken by different stakeholders (political leadership and decision-making, technical advice, logistical support);
- establish appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms (see below).

All these characteristics contribute to enhance transparency, as well as internal and external accountability by addressing the following questions: Who is allowed to participate in the partnership? Who takes the decisions? On whose behalf? For whose benefit?

Set up strong and transparent conflict resolution mechanisms (Step 4)

Conflicts in MSPs may have many sources, from personal incompatibilities to competing interests and diverging values. Brouwer *et al.* (2016) consider conflicts as normal and inevitable in an MSP. They argue that conflicts can be a necessary step and that conflict resolution might open new avenues for a desired change to happen. They distinguish: (i) the conflicts that constitute the rationale for establishing a multi-stakeholder process or partnership; and (ii) those that emerge between partners within an existing MSP. They consider open communication and mutual understanding among partners as key conditions for conflict resolution. They highlight the constructive role that a neutral and external facilitator can play in conflict resolution. They suggest “interest-based” negotiation⁵⁷ as an effective way to solve a conflict by finding a win–win solution that is: “(1) clear, (2) acceptable and attractive to all parties, and (3) better than each party’s best alternative”. Galuppo *et al.* (2014) consider reflexivity and “paradoxical thinking”, i.e. tackling and managing paradoxes instead of hiding or avoiding them, as key levers to manage tensions and conflicts in multi-stakeholder processes.

In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 3, COI can be a major source of tension or conflict among partners. The way MSPs deal with COI affects their legitimacy and their capacity to pursue objectives of public interest for FSN and sustainable development. OECD (2005) developed a toolkit, and guidelines to manage COI in the public sector, highlighting the critical importance of transparency in decision-making and in COI resolution. It suggested practical ways to deal with COI that might be applicable in MSPs for FSN, including:

- effective and complete disclosure of adequate information allowing an accurate identification of COI;
- liquidation of the conflicting interest by the concerned individual or organization;
- exclusion of stakeholders from decision-making processes affected by their COI;
- restricted access for stakeholders to particular information linked to their COI;
- assessment and resolution of the COI through a “blind-trust” arrangement, i.e. through the mediation of a third party with no interests in the issue;
- regular monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the organization’s COI policy.

WHO (2016b) also developed a framework for engagement with non-state actors. WHO is currently working on an “Approach for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in the policy development and implementation of nutrition programmes at country level”. A first draft document (WHO, 2018) was presented to the 71st session of the World Health Assembly in May 2018.

The food industry, including companies producing “unhealthy” food products,⁵⁸ including sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), is deeply involved in MSPs striving to end malnutrition in all its forms, including overweight and obesity. This involvement is likely to generate COI: do those MSPs effectively pursue public health and nutrition goals, or rather promote the private interests of their members? (Lie and Granheim, 2017).

The SUN Movement (see **Box 7**) recognizes that states have the primary responsibility to address COI, respecting the relevant international treaties, conventions, codes or resolutions, and the applicable national laws and regulations. In that perspective, SUN developed a toolkit to help national

⁵⁷ i.e. a method of negotiation, popularized by Fisher *et al.* (1991), aiming at discovering the shared interests hidden behind the diverging stated positions.

⁵⁸ The classification of food items as “healthy” or “unhealthy” is still debated in the nutrition scientific community. For a more detailed discussion, please refer to the HLPE (2017a) report on *Nutrition and food systems*.

governments prevent, identify, manage and monitor COI in national SUN multi-stakeholder platforms (GSO/SUN, 2015). This toolkit is based on the ten SUN Movement principles of engagement⁵⁹ that include: integrity; inclusiveness; transparency and mutual accountability.

However, Lie and Granheim (2017) raised concerns about the legitimacy of MSPs such as SUN to develop their own guidelines and pointed out the risk that such guidelines interfere with the work of national governments, UN agencies or other IGOs. They also discussed their specific concerns on the SUN reference note, including for instance the tension between transparency and privacy in the disclosure of COI-related information.

OECD (2005) considered that guidelines and training material are useful to provide concrete examples and practical methods for COI resolution, in particular in quickly evolving areas such as PPPs or engagement of the public sector with NGOs. It valued non-state actors' involvement and consultation for the design and implementation of the COI policy. Nevertheless, it stated that the necessary principles and essential requirements of the COI policy should be defined by the public sector, through laws and codes.

4.1.3 Reduce transaction costs

Given the transaction costs inherently associated with MSPs, Adams and Martens (2015) suggested to balance carefully the allocation of available funds for FSN and sustainable development between MSPs and public programmes, led by UN agencies or national administrations.

Nevertheless, transaction costs should not lead to discard *a priori* multi-stakeholder approach: the AAAA (2015) acknowledged the need to strengthen partnerships for development by reducing transaction costs. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the transaction costs inherently associated with MSPs can be considered as long-term investments to strengthen inclusiveness, transparency and accountability.

When they build trust and reduce tensions among partners, address power asymmetries, manage conflicts and ensure full and effective participation of the weaker partners, MSPs are likely to contribute more effectively in the long run to FSN and sustainable development than isolated actions undertaken separately by stakeholders. FAO (2016), for instance, illustrated how capacity building and organization of small-scale producers, through PPPs, increased their access to markets and modern value chains, while reducing, for private agribusiness companies, the transaction costs generated by the direct interaction with a great number of small providers.

Many studies on collective action consider building trust as an important strategy for reducing transaction costs (Becerra and Gupta, 1999; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Marshall, 2013; Devaux *et al.*, 2009; Ray and Bhattacharya, 2011) – thus pointing to measures that were already explored in section 4.1.1. Appropriate governance structure and conflict resolution mechanisms are also instrumental to manage properly interactions between partners and, thus, to reduce transaction costs (see section 4.1.2).

Moreover, the following elements can also contribute to reduce transaction costs in MSPs.

Design and implement a common strategy (Step 5)

A strong common strategy, with precise, shared objectives and a timeline is instrumental to reduce transaction costs in MSPs because, by aligning the activities of all the partners with the collective objective, it avoids fragmentation and duplication of efforts. Moreover, a strong initial agreement on the roadmap can save time in discussions and negotiations at later stages, during the implementation of the strategy.

Many major global initiatives, such as GAIN (Box 4), SUN (Box 7), and 10YFP-SFS (Box 8) organize their actions in commonly agreed strategies, improving coordination and coherence among partners. Global strategies can also be sub-divided in more specific national and/or regional strategies. For example, in the framework of the CAADP, the AU declined SDG2 for Africa (AU, 2014) and encourage AU member states to develop national investment plans for agriculture and food security (Box 25).

The International Land Coalition (ILC), founded in 1995, now gathers over 200 member organizations (CSOs and IGOs) in over 64 countries. ILC aims at realizing "land governance for and with people at the country level, responding to the needs and protecting the rights of those who live on and from the

⁵⁹ See: <http://scalingupnutrition.org/about-sun/the-vision-and-principles-of-sun/>

land". To achieve this goal, ILC defined 10 commitments and three strategic objectives: connect, mobilize and influence (ILC, 2017). At the country level, ILC is setting-up or strengthening multi-stakeholder national land-platforms, encouraging the development of national joint strategies.⁶⁰

By reducing transaction costs over time, such common strategies are likely to improve the efficiency of an MSP and to affect positively its effectiveness and impact. In turn, an enhanced impact of the MSP on FSN and sustainable development will probably increase its capacity to mobilize additional resources to achieve its goals.

Establish strong and transparent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Step 6)

Strong, regular and transparent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms require additional resources (time, expertise, financial resources). However, they can also strengthen reflexivity in the partnership, enabling partners: (i) to tackle complex and non-linear issues (Levin *et al.*, 2012; Kusters *et al.*, 2018); (ii) to learn from past experience and adapt their strategies and activities to an evolving context; and, (iii) to identify timely emerging challenges and possible solutions. They can help to quantify transaction costs in a given MSP and identify possible pathways to progressively reduce them with the view to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.

Such M&E mechanisms are fundamental to enhance internal and external accountability in MSPs (Blagescu *et al.*, 2005). The information generated by M&E is also instrumental, for partners or for external stakeholders not involved in the MSP, to better assess the MSP's impacts on FSN and sustainable development. This information can also help to evaluate more precisely the amount of resources required for the MSP's operations, as well as the contribution required from each partner at each step of the MSP's roadmap. Such information can be determinant for stakeholders to join or renew their engagement in the MSP, increasing its capacity to mobilize additional resources and to use existing resources more effectively.

4.2 Improve MSPs' performance: external environment

Beyond the internal conditions reviewed in the previous section, MSPs' performance is also affected by the external environment, framed mainly by states and IGOs but also shaped by non-state actors, in which MSPs operate. This section reviews enabling conditions in the external environment, organized around three main broad areas: (i) transparency and accountability; (ii) knowledge sharing and capacity building; and (iii) policy convergence and sound institutions.

4.2.1 Increase transparency and accountability

Transparency and accountability are repeatedly pointed out in the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) and in the AAAA (2015) as essential conditions for sustainable development. In 2015, the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 2015), in its resolution "Towards global partnerships", requested ECOSOC to discuss, during its 2016 partnership forum, "the best practices and ways to improve, inter alia, transparency, accountability and the sharing of experiences of multi-stakeholder partnerships and on the review and monitoring of those partnerships, including the role of Member States in review and monitoring".

Integrity, transparency and accountability are the three general principles governing the UN system-wide approach to partnerships for sustainable development and the strategic efforts initiated for "*Repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda*" (UN Global Compact, 2015; UN, 2017).

Transparency and accountability are also constantly highlighted in the literature as key elements to assess MSPs' performance (e.g. Dodds, 2015; Beisheim and Simon, 2016; see also Chapter 3). High levels of transparency and accountability, including effective communication strategies, are instrumental in MSPs: for preserving trust between partners; for addressing power asymmetries and empowering the weaker partners; and, as a consequence, for maintaining and renewing stakeholder engagement in the long run (USAID/CED, 2016; Brouwer *et al.*, 2016; Heiner *et al.*, 2017). Transparency and accountability are at the core of the "MSP Charter" currently developed by the MSP Institute and Tellus Institute through participative methods and open consultation.⁶¹

⁶⁰ See: <http://www.landcoalition.org/> and <http://www.landcoalition.org/en/national-engagement-strategies>

⁶¹ See: <http://misp-charter.org/>

Section 4.1 illustrated internal conditions that can enable MSPs to strengthen transparency and accountability. However, states and, at the international level, the UN and other IGOs, have the responsibility to establish and enforce laws, codes and standards that ensure appropriate levels of transparency and accountability in partnerships, contributing in particular to the proper prevention, identification, management and monitoring of COI (see section 4.1.2). In that perspective and with the view to enhance integrity, accountability for and transparency of the UN's engagements with non-state actors, Hoxtell (2016) discussed the appropriate level of intergovernmental oversight and control on MSPs involving the UN and suggested three alternative scenarios (see **Table 3**).

Table 3 Intergovernmental oversight and control on MSPs, in the context of the 2030 Agenda

Scenarios	Measures
1 Building on existing practices	No intergovernmental oversight. Adoption of good practices. Basic measures to ensure that MSPs are following their own policies or guidelines on due diligence, reporting, monitoring and review. Greater coherence and knowledge sharing among agencies is supported, for example, on how to deal with conflicts of interest. A comprehensive and system-wide mapping and review of existing partnerships across the UN-system is conducted.
2 Light intergovernmental oversight	Marginal formalized system of oversight. More standardization and harmonization on practices for due diligence, reporting, monitoring and review, such as internationally agreed guidelines. A systematic review of an existing set of principles is conducted, shared and made binding. UN fora such as the ECOSOC and the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) assume a more active role in reviewing partnerships.
3 Strong intergovernmental oversight	More demanding system of intergovernmental oversight. Besides internationally agreed guidelines, it would also include mechanisms to ensure that common standards are being adhered to. A new intergovernmental process for negotiating principles in MSPs is launched, prospectively achieving binding guidelines. System-wide due diligence standards are implemented across the UN-system and evaluation frameworks for monitoring and reviews are developed and implemented.

Source: adapted from Hoxtell (2016).

Beisheim and Simon (2016) also suggested options for strengthening transparency and accountability in the cooperation between the UN system and non-state actors, including:

- register MSPs involving the UN system on an open online platform to enhance transparency and knowledge sharing. It is important to note that simple registration will have limited value-added without clear guidance on the adequate level of information to be reported. In particular partnerships should disclose appropriate information on goals and commitments, members and their contributions, and financial arrangements (Adams and Martens, 2015; UNGA, 2015);
- apply existing principles and guidelines (e.g. UN, 2003; UN, 2011; UN Global Compact, 2015) and set-up appropriate due diligence⁶² procedures (UNDP, 2013);
- improve reporting mechanisms (see also Hoxtell, 2016): work on a standardized reporting format to facilitate information checking and sharing and exploring the relevance of mandatory reporting or voluntary self-reporting depending on the context;

⁶² The “due diligence” process refers to the reasonable investigations to be undertaken before signing a contract or engaging in a partnership with another stakeholder. The UN Development Programme developed a policy on due diligence to guide its engagement in partnerships with the private sector (UNDP, 2013).

- use UN fora and other platforms to support learning and knowledge sharing at international and national levels (see section 4.2.2);
- organize periodic reviews to assess MSPs' contributions to FSN and sustainable development.

States could build on these general principles developed at the international level in the UN system, as well as on the international conventions and treaties mentioned in Chapter 3, to elaborate appropriate frameworks, adapted to their national context, to ensure transparency and accountability in MSPs.

4.2.2 Share knowledge and build capacity

Chapter 2 illustrates with some concrete examples how MSPs can contribute to knowledge co-generation, knowledge sharing and capacity building among their members and beyond (see also **Box 33**). Capacity building within MSPs can also be promoted by engaging different staff from partner organizations in partnership meetings, contributing to create a common working knowledge and culture in the partnership (The Partnering Initiative, 2011; Hemmati and Rogers 2015).

Knowledge sharing and capacity building within and among MSPs, among different spheres of stakeholders and across regions and countries, can be further fostered by a supportive external environment. In the field of FSN and sustainable development, UN fora and other platforms⁶³ can serve to monitor and share best practices at all levels (CFS, 2009). They could contribute to support capacity building, knowledge and experience sharing on the potential benefits and limitations of MSPs as well as on the possible ways to enhance their contribution to FSN and sustainable development. They provide a space for networking, creating synergies between partnerships, showcasing progress and learning from each other's experiences (Mert and Chan, 2012). Such platforms can organize learning events and initiatives specially dedicated to M&E, knowledge sharing and capacity building, such as the Global Thematic Event (GTE) organized by CFS during its 43rd Plenary session (October 2016), on the implementation of the VGGTs (CFS, 2016a, b).

Box 33 The World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers

The **World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers (WFF)** gathers small-scale fisher organizations, committed to defend fundamental human rights, social justice and culture of small-scale fish harvesters and fish workers, and to promote sustainable management of fisheries and aquatic resources to protect the livelihoods of present and future generations.

In 2016, WFF organized in the United Republic of Tanzania a national capacity building workshop directed to different stakeholders (government, academia, researchers, fishers, civil society, private sector and women fish processors and traders from the great Lakes of Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa). This workshop aimed at raising awareness and building capacity of national small-scale fisheries actors along the principles of the FAO (2015c) voluntary guidelines for small-scale fisheries. This workshop also served to raise awareness at the national level on the work of the CFS and the HLPE. The HLPE (2014) report on sustainable fisheries helped the participants to identify and discuss how Tanzanian policies and regulations at various levels can help to protect life and livelihoods of small-scale fishers, fish workers and fishing communities.

Website: <http://www.worldfisherforum.org/>

⁶³ e.g.: the annual ECOSOC Partnership Forum already mentioned in Chapter 1; the Partnership Exchange organized each year around the HLPF (see: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf/PartnershipExchange>); or the UN "Technology Facilitation Mechanism" created by the 2030 Agenda (see: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/tfm>)

The AAAA (2015) explored different options to enhance innovation, knowledge sharing and capacity building, cooperation and partnerships among stakeholders, including through:

- (i) the use of information and communication technology;
- (ii) the establishment of multi-stakeholder partnerships dedicated to strengthened international cooperation and collaboration in R&D and to effective, targeted and country-driven capacity building in developing countries;
- (iii) the balanced and effective protection of intellectual property rights in both developed and developing countries;
- (iv) the protection and development of indigenous peoples' cultural heritage and traditional knowledge;
- (v) the catalytic use of public funding and public policies for critical R&D projects;
- (vi) the creation of a Technology Facilitation Mechanism based on multi-stakeholder collaboration.

4.2.3 Support policy convergence and develop sound institutions at all levels

Governance is “the set of political, social, economic and administrative systems, rules and processes: (i) that determines the way decisions are taken and implemented by the various actors; and, (ii) through which decision-makers are held accountable” (HLPE, 2017b). More specifically, focusing on partnerships between states and non-state actors, governance can be understood as “all the formal and informal rules, institutions, and organizations and processes through which public and private actors articulate their interests; frame and prioritize issues; and make, implement, monitor, and enforce decisions” (FAO, 2014).

A good governance system would enable all the stakeholders to “do the right thing” (FAO, 2016) and to align their efforts with the SDGs, as well as with national public priorities. It would address the concerns highlighted in Chapter 3 and, in particular, help: (i) prevent or mitigate the fragmentation and duplication of efforts that some authors link with the proliferation of MSPs for FSN and sustainable development; and (ii) regulate non-state actors' participation and corporate influence in public debates and decision-making processes. Policy convergence and sound institutions are two elements of a strong governance system.

Support policy convergence, policy coherence and coordination

As highlighted in the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015), states, the UN system and other IGOs have to enhance policy coordination and coherence at different scales, respecting each country's policy space and leadership (SDG17).

In the field of FSN and sustainable development, international fora such as the ECOSOC Partnership Forum or the CFS can serve as platforms to foster policy convergence at international level, and to promote policy coordination and alignment of actions at regional and national levels (CFS, 2009). National platforms such as CONSEA can play a similar role at national level.

UN agencies are instrumental in articulating global policy instruments and frameworks with national policies, and with actions on the ground. The UNDP for instance, frequently connects its programmes with national partnerships for sustainable development (Nagler, 2018). FAO (2017c) illustrates how Senegal implemented the VGGT through a multi-stakeholder approach (**Box 34**). Designing more SFS and fighting malnutrition in all its forms also requires coordination and policy coherence across sectors at different scales, including: agriculture; environment; energy; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); health; education; fiscal policies; economic and social development (Hawkes, 2017; UNSCN, 2017; HLPE, 2017a).

Box 34 A multi-actor platform to implement the VGGT in Senegal

Senegal established in 2012 the National Land Reform Commission (Commission nationale de réforme foncière – CNRF) to undertake a major reform of its rural land tenure system. To discuss this reform, the CNRF adopted a multi-actor approach with the view to build Senegalese future land policy on a wide and strong consensus.

A national multi-actor platform gathering about 100 partner organizations was set up in 2014 to operationalize and implement the VGGT in Senegal. This platform was supported by FAO, IFAD, donors governments (France, Italy), the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment, and the Agricultural and Rural Foresight Initiative (Initiative prospective agricole et rurale – IPAR), an independent think-tank. The National Council for Consultation and Rural Cooperation (Conseil national de concertation et du coopération ruraux – CNCR), a national platform of farmer organizations, mobilized for a long time on land tenure issues, was strongly engaged in the discussions. The CNRF also conducted 108 decentralized consultations, which involved around 38 000 people.

In 2016, a Project Management Manual was developed by the Steering Committee of the multi-actor platform to define the roles and responsibilities of its members with the view to enhance coordination and avoid duplication and disputes among members.

As a result of this participatory process, the CNRF was able to submit to the President of the Republic a comprehensive Land Policy Document, suggesting shared orientations for a possible reform of the land tenure system, in line with the VGGT, validated by all the actors in October 2016 and submitted to the President of the Republic in April 2017 (CNRF, 2016). After the submission of this final report, the CNRF was dissolved by Decree (n° 2017-998, 16 May 2017).

Websites (in French): <http://www.cncr.org/>; <http://www.ipar.sn/directives-volontaires/>; [http://www.ipar.sn/La-commission-nationale-de-reforme-fonciere-CNRF-est-morte-vive-la-nouvelle.html?lang=fr](http://www.ipar.sn/La-commission-nationale-de-reforme-fonciere-CNRF-est-morte-vive-la-nouvelle.html?lang=fr;); <http://www.ipar.sn/DECLARATION-DU-CADRE-DE-REFLEXION-ET-D-ACTION-SUR-LE-FONCIER-AU-SENEGAL-CRAFS.html>

Decree n° 2017-998, 16 May 2017: <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/Sen175453.pdf>

Source: CFS (2016b), FAO (2017c).

Develop sound institutions at all levels

States, the UN system and other IGOs have the primary responsibility to “promote the rule of law at national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all”, and to “develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” (SDG16), providing the supportive environment needed for MSPs to effectively contribute to FSN and sustainable development.

A sound and stable macro-economic, policy and institutional environment is needed at international and national levels to limit institutional, financial, commercial and operational risks, generated for instance by corruption, political and regulatory instability, or poor physical and financial infrastructures (ODI, 2014; FAO, 2016; OECD, 2018a). As mentioned in the HLPE open consultation on the V0 draft of this report, such an enabling environment is indispensable to encourage non-state actors, including private corporations, to strengthen their engagement and increase their investments for FSN and sustainable development in the overall framework of the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015).

Building on FAO (2016) review of PPPs for agribusiness development, three main characteristics of a supportive environment for partnerships can be identified at national level:

- a supportive legal and regulatory framework where appropriate laws, regulations, norms and rules are in place and effectively enforced, in line with international agreements, treaties, conventions, codes and guidelines;
- supportive physical or financial infrastructures that ensure access to resources, services and markets;
- appropriate incentives (taxes and subsidies) able to compensate or mitigate the risks and transaction costs incurred by non-state actors when engaging or investing in a partnership for FSN and sustainable development.

Box 35 illustrates how institutional change, here a new law in Nepal, can generate, through collective action, an important impact for FSN and sustainable development (**Box 34**).

Box 35 Institutional change and collective action in Nepal

The increasing use of wood as a source of energy, especially for cooking, has been a major source of deforestation and forest degradation in Nepal since the 1990s. In 1993, a new Forest Act introduced the concept of leasehold forest, i.e. “national forest handed over as a leasehold forest to any corporate body, industry or community established under the prevailing law which desires to take the leasehold forest for any of the following purposes: (a) to produce raw materials required for industries based on forest products; (b) to sell and distribute or utilise the forest products by promoting its production through afforestation; (c) to operate the tourism industry in a way that is compatible with conservation and development of the forest; (d) to operate agro-forestry in a way that is compatible with conservation and development of the forest; and (e) to operate a farm of insects, butterflies and wildlife in a way that is compatible with the conservation and development of the forest”.

The Government of Nepal, with the financial support of IFAD and technical assistance from FAO, used this concept to grant tax-free leaseholds on degraded forests to poor and marginalized communities, called Leasehold Forest User Groups (LFUGs) with the double objective to alleviate poverty and restore degraded lands. The Phase I **Hills Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development Project** (HLFFDP, 1992–2002) was implemented in ten districts. The Phase II **Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Programme** (LFLP, 2005–2014) was extended in 22 districts.

Degraded areas with less than 10 percent crown cover reported, at the end of the programme, a forest cover reaching up to 80 percent, improved varieties of forage and a higher diversity of native woody species. And, with the income generated from the leasehold forests, households of the LFUGs were able to pay for health, education and daily expenses. The leaseholds were granted for 40 years, with a possible extension for another 40 years. This long-term tenure assurance is an important factor of success of the programme: it enabled poor and marginalized people, unable to buy land, to make long-term projects and investment plans on initially degraded lands.

Source: SEEPOR Consultancy, 2014; Brouwer *et al.* (2016).

Impartial, accessible, effective and efficient judiciary and public administration are indispensable to create this supportive environment, to prevent corruption and manage COI (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; EC, 2017). They give citizens clear assurance that misconducts and corruption lead to sanctions. They generate confidence, allowing stakeholders to take greater risks.

4.3 Financing FSN and sustainable development: way forwards

As highlighted in Chapter 1, the important investment gap in FFD and the increasing constraints on public funding for FSN and sustainable development explain the strong call for finding alternative funding sources to achieve the 2030 Agenda (ODI, 2014; UN, 2014; UNCTAD, 2014; AAAA, 2015; OECD, 2018a) and the proliferation of MSPs over the past decades.

MSPs can contribute to financing FSN and sustainable development by: (i) mobilizing additional funds through advocacy and innovative funding mechanisms; and (ii) facilitating the coordinated and targeted use of existing funds, aligning them more effectively with FSN and sustainable development global and national public priorities.

This section discusses how to redirect public and private funds towards FSN and sustainable development and explores the potential of innovative funding mechanisms.

4.3.1 Directing public and private funds towards FSN and sustainable development

The question of how to better orient existing financial resources towards global and national public goals and priorities is still debated. Not only public and private financing can be better coordinated, including through MSPs and PPPs but also, legal, regulatory and fiscal public frameworks can play a catalytic role in redirecting public and private funds towards FSN and sustainable development.

Coordinate public and private financing: the World Bank “cascade approach”

In March 2017, the World Bank (2017a, 2017b) proposed a “cascade-approach” to better articulate public and private financing for development and to maximize the impact of development investments in situations of scarce public resources.

The cascade approach is a step-wise dynamic approach assessing successively the possibility to meet development financing needs through: commercial financing; upstream reforms to correct market failures; blended finance instrument; and/or purely public development finance. Each step is explored after the previous one is considered unfeasible (World Bank, 2017a; OECD, 2018a).

This approach, initially applied to infrastructure, could be expanded in many sectors, including finance, housing, renewable energy, crisis response, climate action, agribusiness, nutrition and health, education and women empowerment.

The rationale behind this “cascade approach” is to “reserve scarce public financing for those areas where private sector engagement is not optimal or available”, i.e. when high risks, and/or low returns jeopardize the economic viability and sustainability of private investments.

However, this assumption can be contested. As stressed in Chapter 1, constraints on public funding for FSN and sustainable development could be alleviated with a stronger political will and renewed commitment from governments. Moreover, many authors consider that FFD approaches should be based on human rights, rather than on purely economic and financial considerations (e.g. Alston and Robinson, 2005; INESCR, 2010; Olawuyi, 2015)

Reorient fiscal incentives and public spending towards FSN and sustainable development

Current fiscal incentives and public expenditures could be reoriented towards FSN and sustainable development, including by creating “green” or nutrition-sensitive taxes, or removing subsidies harmful for FSN or the environment. The HLPE (2017a) discussed the importance of nutrition-sensitive food taxes and subsidies to achieve healthier diets and enhanced FSN, illustrating this discussion with concrete examples. In Mexico for instance, after one year of taxation, purchases of taxed SSBs had declined by 12 percent, and by 17 percent among lower socio-economic households.

This reorientation should also aim at avoiding the capture of a significant part of public funds by elites (e.g. Beath *et al.*, 2015) and at strengthening and better targeting the support provided to the more vulnerable, most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, ensuring that “no one is left behind” (UN, 2018).

Observing the tax-to-GDP ratio variability across developed and developing countries⁶⁴ can provide insights for a renewed reflection on the level of taxes adapted to each national context. Supporting fiscal justice, fighting against illicit financial flows and corruption (see section 3.2.1), against tax evasion and tax havens could also contribute to reduce losses in public revenue, thus sparing public funds that could be redirected to FSN and sustainable development (e.g. Oxfam, 2016).

Concretely, this reorientation of fiscal incentives and public spending towards FSN and sustainable development could be implemented in many ways, including through:

- more progressive taxation systems (e.g. Weller and Rao, 2008);
- strengthened international tax cooperation⁶⁵ (e.g. UN, 2018); or
- a better repartition of agricultural subsidies at global, regional and national levels, so that they support more effectively poor and vulnerable small farmers, in particular in developing countries (e.g. Wise, 2004).

Redirect credit from commercial banks towards FSN and sustainable development

States can improve access to credit or address credit market failures either through MDBs or national public banks,⁶⁶ or by imposing on private commercial banks minimal norms and requirements for credit to development initiatives. **Box 36** illustrates the case of India which has a long history of social- and development-oriented banking and credit policy.

⁶⁴ See available data from OECD (2017) and from the World Bank website: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS> (Accessed June 2018)

⁶⁵ A “Platform for collaboration on tax” was established in April 2016 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD, the UN and the World Bank Group: see <http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/platform-for-tax-collaboration>. The “Global Forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes”, created by some OECD countries in the early 2000s, now gathering 150 members, is the foremost international body in the field on international tax cooperation: see <http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/>.

⁶⁶ Such as the NABARD in India, involved in the Wadi Programme (**Box 6**) or in the Kudumbashree network (**Box 19**). See: <https://www.nabard.org/>

Box 36 Banking and credit policy in India

In 1974, the Reserve Bank of India issued guidelines requiring both public and private banks to direct at least one-third of their net credit to the so called “priority sector” (which includes agriculture and small-scale industry). This percentage was raised to 40 percent in the early 1990s and interest rates were set by the Government (Banerjee *et al.*, 2004; Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2005). These guidelines defined subtargets for lending to small and marginal farmers and to micro enterprises. More recently, the Reserve Bank of India extended these priority sector lending guidelines to large foreign banks. This banking and credit policy also aimed at improving access to banking services in rural areas, especially for poor and marginalized communities (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2005).

A National Credit Fund for Women (Rashtriya Mahila Kosh – RMK) was established in 1993 by the Indian National Government with the view to foster women’s socio-economic empowerment. RMK provides loans to intermediate organizations, NGOs or microfinance institutions (MFIs) that, in turn, provide access to credit to women’s self-help groups. Nevertheless, in their review of financial inclusion for the World Bank, Demircuc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) found that only 21 percent of the people in the poorest income quintile, and 26 percent of all women, had an account in a formal financial institution (vs 35 percent of the total population). In order to strengthen its efforts to reduce this banking and credit gap, the Indian National Government created the National Women’s Bank (Bharatiya Mahila Bank – BMB) in 2013. The BMB was then merged with the State Bank of India in 2017.

Websites:

Reserve Bank of India: https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=43079;

Rashtriya Mahila Kosh: <http://rmk.nic.in/>;

Bharatiya Mahila Bank: <http://www.bhartiyamahilabank.co.in/p/about.html>

States, in collaboration with banks and financial institutions, can also support the development of social financing instruments, aiming to address essential development needs, to support vulnerable groups, or to finance enterprises or organizations of the social and solidarity economy (**Box 37**). At the global level, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group (IFC) issued in 2017 a Social Bond Programme merging two previous schemes (the Banking on Women launched in 2013, and the Inclusive Business Bond Programme launched in 2014), which had already raised respectively USD 268 and USD 296 million.⁶⁷

Box 37 Social and solidarity economy

Gueslin (1987) described the emergence of the concept of **social economy** in France, since the 19th century. Broadly speaking, this term covers a wide diversity of institutions and organizations struggling to conciliate economic activities with social concerns. It includes enterprises, associations, cooperatives, mutual insurances, and foundations that aim at increasing social inclusion, reducing existing inequalities, while at the same time generating revenues and economic value (Draperi 2005, 2007).

Solidarity economy is often considered a part of social economy, though the differences between the two are still under debate. It consists of organized economic activities that strive to go beyond the mere integration of social aspects, actively avoiding exploitation of labour and overtly expressing solidarity and equal rights for workers, while at the same time questioning the aim of specific economic activities. It integrates social and political equity and reciprocity objectives in the organization of trade and exchanges, production and consumption. Fair trade (see **Box 14**) is an emblematic case of solidarity economy (Laville, 2010).

4.3.2 Financing FSN and sustainable development: the potential of innovative funding mechanisms

This section explores the potential of some innovative funding mechanisms, namely blended finance, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and self-financing, to mobilize private funds for sustainable development. Such tools are widely used, including through PPPs, in many sectors (in particular

⁶⁷ See:

https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc_new/ifc+governance/investor+relations/socialbonds

infrastructure) to advance the 2030 Agenda. Further research could help better document the specific impact of such tools on FSN at different scales and how MSPs could better mobilize such innovative financing arrangements to enhance FSN.

Blended finance

Based on the assumption that neither the private nor the public sector will be able alone to fill the FFD investment gap, the UN and other major international institutions encourage the development of blended finance⁶⁸ facilities (UN, 2014; ODI, 2014; AAAA, 2015; World Bank, 2015; OECD, 2018a). According to the IFC (2017), and in line with the “cascade approach” presented in the previous section, blended finance solutions can help realize projects that, despite their high development impact, would not attract strictly commercial finance because of high risks and/or unproven returns.

Several NGOs pointed out the lack of evidence showing that blended finance instruments meet development goals (e.g. EURODAD, 2013; Oxfam, 2017; CONCORD, 2017). OECD (2018a) highlights the need for further research to better document the potential and impact of blended finance on development. In particular, clear metrics are needed to better monitor blended finance instruments. Nevertheless, OECD (2018a) argued that early evidence already illustrates the catalytic potential of blended finance instruments to mobilize additional private investments for development goals.

In a survey realized in 2016, Benn *et al.* (2017) identified an amount of USD 81 billion of private investments leveraged through blended finance by official development finance between 2012 and 2015. Though this amount may seem very limited when compared with the total annual FFD investment gap of USD 2.5 trillion mentioned in Chapter 1, the OECD underlines the rapid development and the potential of blended finance instruments. A further survey realized in 2017 identified 356 blended finance facilities and funds⁶⁹ launched between 2000 and 2016 (OECD, 2018a). According to the WEF (2016), public and philanthropic capital invested in blended finance have leveraged, through blended finance, up to 20 times more private funds.

Box 38 illustrates, through two other examples, how blended finance can contribute to achieve development goals.

Box 38 Blended finance and development needs

The **International Finance Corporation (IFC)** of the World Bank Group was founded in 1956 with the idea that “the private sector is essential to development”. The IFC now operates in more than 100 countries, unlocking private investments, creating markets and opportunities, with the view to support the two goals of the World Bank Group: ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity. Since 1956, the USD 2.6 billion in capital leveraged by IFC enabled the unlocking and delivery of more than USD 265 billion for businesses in developing countries. In 2016, USD 117 million of donor funds catalysed more than USD 1 billion of IFC and private sector financing.

Website:

https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/home

The **Lives and Livelihoods Fund (LLF)** was established in September 2016 by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in partnership with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. By pooling donor grants with private (market-based) loans, the LLF aims at offering to low-income IDB member countries concessional finance for projects addressing essential needs in health, agriculture and basic infrastructure. Funds are held in a multi-donor trust fund administered by the IDB. Over 2016–2020, the fund is expected to deliver USD 2.5 billion (including USD 0.5 billion from donors and USD 2 billion from IDB ordinary capital resources) to fight disease and poverty in IDB member countries. Donor grants needed to initiate a project should not represent more than 15 or 35 percent of the total project costs (depending on the member country’s level of wealth), the rest being financed by IDB loans. In this way each dollar donated to the fund unlocks further funds in accessible loans for the development project.

Websites:

<https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Where-We-Work/Middle-East-Office/Lives-and-Livelihoods-Fund>;
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/~media/GFO/Office/Middle-East/LLF/IDB_LLIF_Guide_WEB.PDF

⁶⁸ See definition of blended finance in Chapter 1.

⁶⁹ The OECD distinguishes “blended funds” that engage directly public and private investors, from “blended facilities” pooling together public funds that can then be used by development banks and other intermediaries to crowd in private finance (OECD, 2018a).

To effectively contribute to sustainable development, blended finance mechanisms should be aligned with the SDGs, developed with the participation of the concerned stakeholders, address the challenges highlighted in previous chapters (in particular power asymmetries, transparency and accountability) and give the priority to smallholders and to the more vulnerable (EURODAD, 2013; Oxfam, 2017; CONCORD, 2017). The OECD (2018a) identified key concepts that could help assess the effectiveness and impact of blended finance, such as “concessionality, additionality, mobilization and catalysation”.⁷⁰

In an effort to address such concerns, the OECD, in collaboration with key stakeholders from the private sector, civil society and governments, developed a set of blended finance principles to unlock commercial finance for achieving the SDGs (OECD, 2018b) :

- “Anchor blended finance use to a development rationale;
- Design blended finance to increase the mobilisation of commercial finance;
- Tailor blended finance to local context;
- Focus on effective partnering for blended finance;
- Monitor blended finance for transparency and results.”

Corporate social responsibility

The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines CSR as a way for private enterprises to consider “the impact of their operations on society” and to “affirm their principles and values” both internally and in interaction with other actors. ILO considers CSR as “a voluntary, enterprise-driven initiative”, referring to activities that “exceed compliance with the law”.⁷¹

The UN Global Compact, presented in Chapter 1 as the world’s largest initiative to promote corporate sustainability, encourages private companies to align their strategies and operations with ten core principles in the area of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption with the view to advance societal goals.⁷² For the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 2002), corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the: “commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life”.⁷³

OECD (2011) developed guidelines for multinational enterprises suggesting non-binding principles and standards for responsible business, respectful of internationally agreed standards and of applicable national laws and policies. Drawing on the principles of the UN Global Compact, these guidelines cover nine thematic dimensions: (i) disclosure of information; (ii) human rights; (iii) employment and industrial relations; (iv) environment; (v) combating bribery; (vi) consumer interests; (vii) science and technology; (viii) competition; and (ix) taxation. Those guidelines were endorsed on 25 May 2011 by 42 OECD and non-OECD countries, representing 85 percent of FDI.⁷⁴

The Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA, 2016) provided a general overview of sustainable or responsible investments⁷⁵ across different regions of the world (Europe, North America, Asia - excluding Japan, Australia and New-Zealand). The GSIA (2016) stressed the positive dynamic around sustainable investment: they found that, between 2014 and 2016, sustainable investments increased by 25 percent reaching a total amount of USD 23 trillion.

Over the past decades, CSR has become an important topic for research (e.g. Gordon, 2001; Fox *et al.*, 2002; Woicke, 2005; Crane *et al.*, 2008; Lindgreen and Swaen, 2010).

⁷⁰ Concessionality and additionality have been defined respectively in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.

⁷¹ See: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_116336.pdf

⁷² See: <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles>

⁷³ The WBCSD gathers over 200 leading businesses, representing 19 million employees and USD 8.5 trillion in combined revenues, willing to advance together the transition to a sustainable world. See: <https://www.wbcsd.org/>

⁷⁴ See: <https://www.csrcompass.com/oecd-guidelines>

⁷⁵ In this review, the GSIA adopted a broad definition of sustainable investment, encompassing similar notions such as: responsible investment or socially responsible investment.

Crane *et al.* (2008) reviewed the various definitions of CSR used by different public, private and civil society organizations across the world and identified six core characteristics of CSR. CSR covers: (i) voluntary business initiatives going beyond legal obligations that, (ii) considering a wide range of interests through multi-stakeholder participation, (iii) agree on a set of common values and core business practices, (iv) beyond mere philanthropy, with the view to (v) internalize or manage social and environmental externalities and to (vi) reconcile economic profitability and social responsibility.

These six characteristics of CSR are still debated and raise many questions, for instance:

- Has CSR a real impact on the core business practices of large corporations? Beyond mere philanthropy, do those corporations consider environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in their management practices and economic activities?⁷⁶
- Should CSR remain a voluntary practice? What is the optimal balance between voluntary and mandatory requirements?

After decades of predominance of the “voluntary” approach to CSR, new forms of CSR, combining voluntary and mandatory aspects, are emerging in different parts of the world, at regional⁷⁷ or national level (Gatti *et al.*, 2018). **Box 39** illustrates the case of India where CSR funding has been enhanced by a law requiring large corporations to spend on social and economic development.

Box 39 The new Indian Companies Act (2013)

In 2013, in India, the new Companies Act (CA) devoted a whole section (n° 135) to CSR. It requires large companies (exceeding fixed thresholds for net worth, turnover or net profit) to:

- constitute a CSR Committee of the Board, charged to formulate, recommend and monitor the CSR policy;
- spend each financial year at least two percent of the average net profits made during the last three financial years on the activities included in their CSR Policy.

Activities included in CSR policies must be related to development challenges, including: (i) extreme hunger and poverty; (ii) education; (iii) gender equality and women empowerment; (iv) child mortality and maternal health; (v) HIV, AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (vi) environmental sustainability; (vii) employment; (viii) social business projects; and (ix) federal or state governments development funds.

According to the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII, 2013), the CA is expected to impact a minimum of 6 000 Indian large companies and to generate around INR 200 billion for CSR activities in India. As the CA is very recent, very few studies for the moment focused on its effective impact. However, some early studies already reported an increase in the number of firms reporting CSR activities, in the percentage of firms respecting the 2 percent threshold for CSR spending, and in the total amount of CSR expenditures (Bansal *et al.*, 2017; Bhomik, 2017). The Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) regularly discloses on its website the CSR expenditures of each company. For the fiscal years 2015–2016, the total CSR expenditure reported by 5 097 companies reached INR 98 billion. However, 39 percent of these companies reported very small amounts of CSR expenditures (less than INR 1 000).

Websites:

Indian Companies Act (2013) <http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf>;

Data from the MCA: <http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/csrdatasummary.html>

Self-financing through community mobilization

As illustrated by the Kudumbashree network (**Boxes 19 and 30**) self-financing through community mobilization is another promising avenue for financing and improving FSN and advancing the SDGs.

At their 6th Summit (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1991), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)⁷⁸ heads of state or government considered that mobilizing the poor and enabling them to participate directly in the decisions affecting their livelihoods is a central for poverty alleviation. They

⁷⁶ Friede *et al.* (2015), in a review of around 2 200 individual studies showed the positive impact that considering ESG criteria in the management of a corporation can have on its financial performance.

⁷⁷ See for instance the EU directive (2014/95/EU) regarding the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0095&from=EN>

⁷⁸ See: <http://www.saarc-sec.org/> and http://globalsummitryproject.com.s197331.gridserver.com/archive/saarc/saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/cat-detailbf4a.html?cat_id=51#

charged an Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation (ISACPA) to elaborate, for their 7th Summit (Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1993), a strategic framework for poverty alleviation focused on social mobilization and empowerment (SAARC, 1992). The ISACPA was reconstituted in 2002 to undertake a comprehensive review of existing poverty alleviation policies and programmes that helped SAARC leaders to elaborate a “Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation”.⁷⁹ Subsequent summits further consolidated the role of ISACPA, requesting it to coordinate follow-up actions to advance the 2030 Agenda. In this context, a SAARC Poverty Alleviation Fund was established, to collect the financial contributions of SAARC members (Lama, 2010).

Box 40 highlights the key role plaid by Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) in Pakistan to engage the poor and vulnerable people and their local communities and organizations in mobilizing their own human and financial resources to plan, implement and monitor development projects.

Box 40 Community savings as collateral for self-development

The Aga Khan Foundation established the **Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)** in 1982 to contribute to improve livelihoods and alleviate poverty in villages of Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral districts in Pakistan. AKRSP works in close collaboration with IGOs, donor governments and other public and private donors and partners including FAO, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Global Affairs Canada, USAID, the European Union, KfW Development Bank (Germany), the governments of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and of the Gilgit-Baltistan district in Pakistan, Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and the Skills Development Council (SDC).

Since inception, AKRSP has established 79 Local Support organizations (LSOs), covering 5 198 village level organizations (VOs) where more than 82 000 men and women have been trained in a wide range of organizational and productive skills. Since inception, AKRSP has mobilized PKR 534 million in VOs savings, mainly used as collateral to improve access to credit for the communities, and disbursed PKR 1 028 million in loans for development projects. These loans were used in different sectors including: rural infrastructures, low-cost sanitation, housing, health, education, agriculture, the food supply chain, natural resource management, credit for micro enterprise and social protection. AKRSP also provides training and technical assistance for the local rural communities to these projects. AKRSP’s initial mandate of doubling the monthly income of the communities was achieved within the first ten years after inception.

In 1991, inspired by the AKRSP model, the Pakistan Government set-up a National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) with an initial endowment of PKR 500 million. This development model was replicated all over the country through 11 provincial and regional Rural Support Programmes (RSPs). Since 1991, these RSPs have reached around 45 million people. In 2017, 752 LSOs, covering 6 670 VOs, were engaged in the NRSP. The NRSP is supported by its own network of community and microfinance institutions established throughout the country. Under its “Microfinance and enterprise development programme”, the NRSP has already disbursed over PKR. 176 billion in development loans to local communities (NRSP, 2017). This NRSP network is one of the largest microfinance provider in Pakistan. The Government is also using the NRSP network to disburse interest-free loans.

This RSP development model has been replicated in other South Asian countries such as India (Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty in Andhra Pradesh – SERP), Myanmar (pilot projects under UNDP’s South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme - SAPAP), Tajikistan (Mountain Societies Development Support Programme – MSDSP) and Bangladesh (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee - BRAC).

Websites:

<http://www.akdn.org/our-agencies/aga-khan-foundation>;

<http://www.akdn.org/aga-khan-rural-support-programme-pakistan>;

http://www.rspn.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Outreach_35.pdf;

<http://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/programme-documents/BU-CP-2013-2015.pdf>

⁷⁹ See: [http://saarc-sec.org/uploads/digital_library_document/11_Plan_of_Action_on_Poverty_Allev .pdf](http://saarc-sec.org/uploads/digital_library_document/11_Plan_of_Action_on_Poverty_Allev.pdf)

4.4 Concluding remarks

This last chapter explored some promising avenues to strengthen MSPs' performance and to mobilize innovative funding mechanisms to redirect more effectively public and private funds towards FSN and sustainable development.

However, because most experiences are recent, further research is needed to better document the real impact of MSPs and innovative funding mechanisms on FSN and sustainable development and to better assess their potential. In particular, future research could:

- define practical ways to identify, assess and address conflicts of interest and power asymmetries in MSPs;
- elaborate clear metrics and methodologies to document the impact and the potential of MSPs and of innovative funding mechanisms;
- better document successes and failures of existing MSPs;
- adapt the lessons learned from the use of PPPs, MSPs and innovative funding mechanisms in other sectors to agriculture and food systems, food security and nutrition, paying attention to the specific needs and rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups.

CONCLUSION

FSN is a complex and multidimensional issue that needs to be addressed through comprehensive, holistic and cross-sectoral approaches, involving at different scales many different stakeholders coming from the three spheres of society (public, private and civil society). This positions MSPs at the centre of the FSN debates and challenges.

The proliferation of MSPs over the past decades as part of a new approach to FSN, as well as the scientific and political debates around them, encourages scientists and other stakeholders to assess them critically, without taking them for granted or dismissing them *a priori*. As illustrated in this report, MSPs should be considered as a means rather than as a goal. They do not provide a “silver-bullet” solution to any problem, in any context.

MSPs can contribute to: build trust and mutual understanding among partners; to pool together complementary resources from different stakeholders (knowledge, skills and expertise, human, material and financial resources); and to share risks and responsibilities. Therefore, by fostering synergies among partners, MSPs can enable stakeholders to tackle issues that they could not have addressed separately and to generate in the long run positive results for FSN and sustainable development.

MSPs provide platforms for dialogue among stakeholders but they can also be a place of power struggle. To effectively contribute to financing and improving FSN, MSPs have to overcome tensions and mistrusts among partners, power asymmetries and conflicts of interest. They will have also to cope with the transaction costs inherently associated with multi-stakeholder process with the view to transforming these costs into long-term investments, generating positive results.

The report suggests a logical framework and a set of interrelated criteria to describe and assess MSPs. These criteria can help governments and non-state actors to perform their own assessment of existing MSPs, to exchange information within, among and beyond MSPs, with the view to identify concrete pathways to improve their performance and their impact on FSN and sustainable development. These framework and criteria could serve as a starting point for further research to better identify pathways for improvement. This should in particular help in designing an operational typology, grouping in the same type MSPs sharing similar characteristics, fulfilling similar functions and/or facing similar challenges and opportunities. Such an exercise would pave the way to more specific recommendations directed to each category of MSPs.

This report identified increased transparency and accountability, improved data collection and information sharing as key conditions for MSPs to better contribute to financing and improving FSN and to effectively strive for the progressive realization of the right to adequate food. As per its fifth role (CFS, 2009), CFS and “CFS-like” platforms at national level could play a central role to promote transparency and accountability in FSN-related MSPs. They could encourage the development of strong monitoring mechanisms and provide space for dialogue, enabling stakeholders to share best practices at all levels. In that respect, the ongoing reflection in CFS on monitoring could also inspire similar multi-actor platforms and more operational MSPs at different levels.

As illustrated in this report, MSPs have emerged quite recently as a focus of interest in the FSN-oriented scientific literature beyond social sciences. Available evidence and data on MSPs are still fragmented, limited in time and scope, and quickly evolving. They rely mainly on self-reported data or on partial reviews based on a limited set of partnerships. Further research is therefore needed to better document the successes and failures, as well as the overall and long-term impact of existing MSPs at different scales. Further research could also help design and implement concrete pathways to improve MSPs’ performance for financing and improving FSN. Such research could, for instance, try to adapt the lessons learned from experiences of PPPs and MSPs in other sectors to the fields of agriculture and food systems, food security and nutrition.

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<http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/reports/report-13-elaboration-process/en/>

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Existing MSPs: Case study questionnaire

The following questionnaire aims at collecting detailed inputs on existing MSPs. This material is to be used where appropriate by the HLPE to illustrate its abovementioned report #13 with concrete examples.

1. Name of MSP:	# (for HLPE use only):
<p>2. Thematic domain of activity:</p> <p>(...) Food production; food supply chain;</p> <p>(...) Natural resource management;</p> <p>(...) Education, information, knowledge sharing;</p> <p>(...) Resource mobilization;</p> <p>(...) Other (specify):</p> <p>Brief description of mandate / activities / objectives:</p>	
3. Website (official website of the MSP and, or, relevant web sources):	
4. Year of Origin / Creation:	
<p>5. Scale/Level of operation (choose one option):</p> <p>() Global (Specify major areas/regions of presence:.....)</p> <p>() Regional (Specify region⁸⁰:.....)</p> <p>(...) Sub-regional (Specify sub-region⁸¹:</p> <p>() National (Specify country.....)</p> <p>() Local (specify country:</p>	

⁸⁰ For the answer to this question, please use the 7 “FAO regions”: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East, North America, Southwest Pacific, as described online:<http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsbhome/council/council-election/en/>

⁸¹ In some cases it might be relevant to specify a sub-region or a regional intergovernmental organization such as African Union, European Union, MERCOSUR, ASEAN...

I) STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

6. Number of main partners:

7. Composition of the MSP: list of main partners: names and/or categories (i.e.: public sector, private sector, civil society, *others*⁸²)

8. Which partner(s) initiated the MSP? How the MSP may have evolved?

9. Degree of formalization: does the MSP result of an informal agreement, or is there a formal structure of decision-making?

(...) full legal entity: legal personality

(...) formalized agreement among partners, but no legal personality for the MSP

(...) informal arrangement

Describe the decision-making process (including frequency of meetings of the governing bodies...)

10. Governance structure: describe the roles, responsibilities and level of involvement of the different partners in the partnership. Describe, the case being, power asymmetries between partners. Which partner(s) lead the MSP?

⁸² See V0 draft for a more detailed description of the three first broad category. For "others", please specify.

11. Representativeness: How and by whom are the members chosen? Do they speak only for themselves or represent a broader category of stakeholders? How long is their mandate? How does the MSP ensure inclusiveness and “fair” representation of the most affected people?

What are the channels of communication between the MSP and the government(s)? Are the decisions/recommendations of the MSP to the government(s) are prescriptive or consultative? What public strategies/priorities this partnership supported at different scales?

12. Finance: How and by whom the MSP is funded? Who underwrites the partnership? Add relevant data about the budget, and budget share of each category of partners (public, private, civil society). Is the budget sufficient for work plan implementation? What are the financial tools and mechanisms used by the MSP?

II) OUTCOMES

13. What is the main function of the MSP? Is it mainly:
 (...)“policy-oriented”
 (...) “action-oriented”
 (...) Other (specify):

14. What are the main areas of contribution of the MSP? Please tick in the table below the main, secondary and tertiary areas of contribution of the MSP.

Outcome Area	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
1. Policy design, policy implementation, laws, advocacy and awareness			
2. Increased participation/inclusiveness: priority given to women as well as to marginalized and vulnerable groups.			
3. Capacity building, among the MSP partners, and beyond			
4. Resource mobilisation and fund raising			
5. Activities related to facilitating improved FSN outcomes (e.g. environmental stewardship towards biodiversity/ water conservation...)			
6. Outcomes that directly contribute to FSN (e.g. increased production, economic growth, income			

and employment generation, improved diets, better nutrition education and information...)			
7. Monitoring and evaluation			
8. Other (Specify: _____)			

For each of the areas of contribution mentioned above, please give examples of the MSP outcomes and impacts:

What are the main organizational and collective benefits gained from setting-up this MSP?

III) OVERALL ASSESSMENT

15. Please rank your overall assessment of the MSP, ranking from 1 to 5 (with 1 being lowest to 5 highest)

16. Explain your above ranking

17. How do you assess the MSP according to the following criteria (*high, medium, low*)? Why?

Criteria / Assessment	Low	Medium	High
Inclusiveness (the intention to include everyone affected by decisions, especially those who are routinely ignored)			
Accountability (assigned responsibility that a representative or a group acquires with the action of speaking or deciding on behalf of someone else)			
Transparency/Access to Information (openness to public scrutiny, availability of information)			
Reflexivity (capacity of a MSP to learn from mistakes, to assess long-term trends, and to react accordingly)			
Effectiveness (assessment of the achievement of MSP's objectives)			
Efficiency (comparison between the use of resources with the potential benefits the MSP can generate, including intangible benefits)			

<p>Resource mobilisation (raising of financial resources, and other enabling resources to improve FSN)</p>			
<p>Impact (impact on FSN in its four dimensions at different scales)</p>			
<p>18. Any comments on the above ratings:</p>			
<p>19. How do you rate the power relations between participants? (choose one option) <input type="checkbox"/> More Equal <input type="checkbox"/> Equal <input type="checkbox"/> Less Equal <input type="checkbox"/> Un-equal</p>			
<p>20. Explain your above rating</p>			
<p>IV) THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, LESSONS LEARNED AND WAYS FORWARD</p>			
<p>21. Could you identify current strengths supporting and/or weakness challenging the MSP?</p>			
<p>22. Could you identify projected threats and/or opportunities that the MSP would cause/offer, (included for those stakeholders that are not included in the MSP)?</p>			
<p>23. Which conditions could enable the MSP to better function?</p>			
<p>24. What is the potential of this MSP to influence public priorities across sectors and allocation of budget for improved FSN? What is its potential to mobilise further funds for improving food security and nutrition?</p>			
<p>25. What is the potential of this MSP to address the specific needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition?</p>			

26. How can other regions/countries use this experience to organize similar spaces? what are the necessary conditions to extrapolate/adapt/scale-up this MSP experience?

REFERENCES

27. The HLPE is interested by any article, mainly scientific references but also practical experiences on MSPs you would like to share (scholarly articles, reports, reviews, analysis, etc):

28. Any other observation.

Appendix 2 Glossary

This appendix provides a list of institutions, programmes and multi-stakeholder initiatives reviewed for the purpose of this report, quoted or not in the final report, matching or not the definition suggested in this report for MSP. This list can be used as a glossary of the acronyms used in this chapter and in the whole report. This list, containing useful web-links, can also be used as a source of more detailed information on each initiative.

Full name	Acronym	Geographical scope	Website
Action Against Hunger		Global	www.actionagainsthunger.org.uk
Action Aid		Global	https://www.actionaid.org.uk/
Adaptation Fund	AF	Global	https://www.adaptation-fund.org/
Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund	AECF	Africa	http://www.aecfafrica.org/
African Orphan Crops Consortium	AOCC	Africa	http://africanorphancrops.org/
African Plant Breeding Academy	APBA	Africa	
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme	AKRSP	Pakistan	http://www.akdn.org/aga-khan-rural-support-programme-pakistan
Agroforesterie Cameroun		Cameroon	https://www.cirad.fr/nos-recherches/dispositifs-en-partenariat/liste-des-dispositifs/agroforesterie-cameroun
Agro-forestry Systems in Central America	AFS-PC	Central America	https://www.cirad.fr/en/our-research/platforms-in-partnership-for-research-and-training/list-of-platforms/afs-pc
Agro-silvo-pastoral systems in West Africa	ASAP	West Africa	https://www.cirad.fr/en/our-research/platforms-in-partnership-for-research-and-training/list-of-platforms/asap
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	AGRA	Africa	https://agra.org/
Alliance for Water Stewardship	A4WS	Global	http://a4ws.org/
Animal Production South Africa	ARC	South Africa	http://www.arc.agric.za/arc-api/Pages/ARC-API-Homepage.aspx
Asia Roundtable on Food Innovation for Improved Nutrition	ARoFIIN	Asia	http://www.arofiin.org/
Association pour le Développement Economique et Social en Afrique	ADESA	Africa	https://www.adesaf.fr/
Balochistan Agriculture Project		Pakistan	www.fao.org/pakistan/programmes-and-projects
Banco Solidario	BancoSol	Bolivia	https://www.bancosol.com.bo/secciones/quienes-somos
Bangladesh National Nutrition Council	BNNC	Bangladesh	
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee	BRAC	Bangladesh	http://www.brac.net/
Banking for Food Programme of Rabobank		Global	https://www.rabobank.com/en/about-rabobank/food-agribusiness/vision-banking-for-food/index.html
Bharat Agro Industries Foundation		India	http://www.baif.org.in/
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation		Global	https://www.gatesfoundation.org/
Biosciences Eastern and Central Africa	Beca-ILRI	Eastern and Central Africa	http://hub.africabiosciences.org/activities/capacity-building
Brazilian National Council on Food and Nutritional Security	CONSEA	Brazil	http://www4.planalto.gov.br/consea

Business Call to Action	BCtA	Global	https://www.businesscalltoaction.org/
Business for 2030		Global	http://www.businessfor2030.org/goal-2-end-hunger
Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships	CCPPP	Canada	http://www.pppcouncil.ca/
Canasta Comunitaria Utopía		Ecuador	https://utopiariobamba.wixsite.com/canastacomunitaria
Capacity Development and Fellowship Program for Young Arab Professionals		MENA Region	
Caribbean Animal Health Network	Caribvet	Caribbean	https://www.caribvet.net/
Caribbean Farmers Network	CAFAN	Caribbean	http://www.caribbeanfarmers.org/
Central Africa Forest Initiative	CAFI	Central Africa	http://www.cafi.org/
Centre for International Governance Innovation		Global	https://www.cigionline.org/
Civil Society Mechanism	CSM	Global	http://www.csm4cfs.org/
Climate Investment Funds	CIF	Global	http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/
Commission nationale de réforme foncière	CNCR	Senegal	http://www.cncr.org/
Committee on World Food Security	CFS	Global	http://www.fao.org/cfs
Competitive Fund for the Improvement of Rice		Mexico	
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme	CAADP	Africa	https://www.donorplatform.org/caadp.html
Congo Basin Forest Partnership	CBFP	Congo Basin	http://pfbc-cbfp.org/home.html
Conservation Agriculture in SE Asia	Cansea	SE Asia	http://cansea.org.vn/
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	CGAP	Global	http://www.cgap.org/
Coral Triangle Initiative	CTI	Asia	http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.org/
Council for Food Security and Nutrition of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries	CONSAN-CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries	https://www.cplp.org/id-4669.aspx
Dairy Hub and Dairy Academy Development		Bangladesh	www.tetrapak.com/ffdo
Distribuidora CONASUPO, SA (Rural Food Stores)	DICONSA	Mexico	www.gob.mx/diconsa
East Africa Farmers' Federation	EAFF	East Africa	http://eaffu.org/
EcoAgriculture Partners		Global	https://ecoagriculture.org/
ECOSOC Partnership Forum		Global	https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/node/4965587
EkoRural		Ecuador	https://ekorural.org/
Enhancing Food Security in Arab Countries		Near East and Africa	www.ICARDA.org
Ethical Trading Initiative	ETI	Global	https://www.ethicaltrade.org/
European farmers/European agri-cooperatives	COPA-COGECA	EU	http://www.copa-cogeca.be/Menu.aspx
Every Woman, Every Child	EWEC	Global	https://www.everywomaneverychild.org/
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	EITI	Global	https://eiti.org/
Facility for Refugees, Migrants, Forced	FARMS	Global	https://www.ifad.org/web/quest/farms

Displacement and Rural Stability			
Fairtrade International	Fairtrade	Global	https://www.fairtrade.net/
FAO and WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission	CFSAM	Syria	http://www.wfp.org/food-security/assessments/crop-food-security-assessment-mission
Farm-to-Institution programmes		USA	https://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/farm-institution
Federación de Asociaciones Rurales del Mercosur	FARM	Mercosur countries	http://www.farmercosur.org/
Feed the Future Initiative	FFT	Global	https://feedthefuture.gov/
Fishforever		Global	http://www.fishforever.org/
Food Change Labs		Uganda, Zambia, Indonesia	https://www.foodchangelab.org/
Food For All		USA	https://foodforall.com/
Food Rights Alliance	FRA	Uganda	www.fra.ug
Food Security Cluster	FSC	Global	http://fscluster.org/
Food Security Information Network	FSIN	Global	http://www.fsincop.net/global-network/about/en/
Food Security Sector Working Group	FSSWG	Lebanon	http://fscluster.org/page/about-food-security-cluster
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Analysis Network	FANRPAN	Sub-Saharan Africa	https://www.fanrpan.org/
Forest Stewardship Council	FSC	Global	www.fsc.org/
Forests of Central Africa	FAC	Congo Basin	https://www.cirad.fr/en/our-research/platforms-in-partnership-for-research-and-training/list-of-platforms/fac
Fundación Alternativas		Global	http://www.fundacionalternativas.org/
Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock	GASL	Global	http://www.livestockdialogue.org/
Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme	GAFSP	Global	http://www.gafspfund.org/
Global Alliance for Climate-smart Agriculture	GACSA	Global	http://www.fao.org/gacsa/en/
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	GAIN	Global	https://www.gainhealth.org/
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation	GAVI	Global	https://www.gavi.org/
Global Business Alliance for 2030	GBA	Global	http://www.gbafor2030.org/
Global Coordination Mechanism on NCDs	GCM/NCD	Global	http://www.who.int/ncds/gcm/en/
Global Donor Platform for Rural Development		Global	https://www.donorplatform.org/international-processes.html
Global Environment Facility	GEF	Global	www.thegef.org
Global Financing Facility in support of Every Woman Every Child	GFF	Global	https://www.globalfinancingfacility.org/
Global Framework for Climate Services (WMO)	GFCS	Global	http://www.wmo.int/gfcs/
Global Fund		Global	http://globalfund.org
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria		Global	https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/
Global Harvest Initiative		Global	http://www.globalharvestinitiative.org/
Global Network Against Food Crises		Global	http://www.fsincop.net/global-network/about/en/

Global Partnership for Education		Global	https://www.globalpartnership.org/
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef	GRSB	Global	https://grsbeef.org/
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance	GSIA	Global	http://www.gsi-alliance.org/
Global Vision International	GVI	Global	http://www.gviworld.com/about-us/
Global Water Partnership	GWP	Global	https://www.gwp.org/
Governance Innovation	GovInn	Africa	http://governanceinnovation.org/
Green Climate Fund	GCF	Global	https://www.greenclimate.fund/home
Groupe Interministériel Pour la Sécurité Alimentaire – Interministerial Group on Food security	GISA	France	https://www.gisa-france.fr
Grow Africa		Africa	https://www.growafrica.com/
Grow Asia		Asia	https://www.growasia.org/
Hills Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development Project	HLFFDP	Nepal	https://www.ifad.org/web/ioe/evaluation/asset/39831723
HLPF Partnership Exchange		Global	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf/PartnershipExchange
Human Research Protection Programme	HRPP	USA	http://research-compliance.umich.edu/human-subjects
Humanitarian Data Exchange	HDX	Global	https://data.humdata.org/
Humanitarian Forum Yemen		Yemen	http://www.hfyemen.org/
Hydronet		Global	http://www.hydronet.com/
IFRC-WFP Capacity Strengthening Initiative		Global	http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/governance/working-partners/
Improving Soil Fertility and Soil Health in Pakistan through Demonstration and Dissemination of best practices of farmers	SFP	Pakistan	https://mel.cgiar.org/projects/27
Initiative for Smallholder Finance	ISF	Global	https://www.isfadvisors.org/
Initiative prospective agricole et rurale	IPAR	France	http://www.ipar.sn
Innovation et Amélioration Variétale en Afrique de l'Ouest	IAVAO	West Africa	https://www.iavao.org/
Integrated Seed Sector Development	ISSD	Africa, Asia	http://www.issdseed.org/
Interdisciplinary Research Project to Explore the Future of Global Food and Nutrition Security	FOODSECURE	Global	http://www.foodsecure.eu/
International Baby Food Action Network	IBFAN	Global	http://www.ibfan.org/
International Finance Corporation	IFC	Global	https://www.ifc.org
International Land Coalition	ILC	Global	http://www.landcoalition.org/
International Society of Arboriculture	ISA	Global	https://www.isa-arbor.com/Who-We-Are/Our-Network
Irrigated systems in North Africa	SIRMA	North Africa	https://www.cirad.fr/en/our-research/platforms-in-partnership-for-research-and-training/list-of-platforms/sirma
Kabarole Research Centre	KRC	Uganda	http://krcuganda.org/
Kudumbashree	KS	India	www.kudumbashree.org

Land O'Lakes		Global	https://www.landolakes.org/
LANDnet	LANDnet	Uganda	http://www.landnet.ug/
Landscapes for People, Food and Nature initiative	LPFN	Global	http://peoplefoodandnature.org/
Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Programme	LFLP	Nepal	https://www.ifad.org/web/operations/project/id/1285/country/nepal
Lives and Livelihoods Fund		Asia, Africa, Middle East (Muslim countries)	https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Where-We-Work/Middle-East-Office/Lives-and-Livelihoods-Fund
Lives and Livelihoods Fund	LLF	Near East	https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Where-We-Work/Middle-East-Office/Lives-and-Livelihoods-Fund
Livestock Environmental Assessment and Performance	LEAP	Global	http://www.livestockdialogue.org http://www.fao.org/partnerships/leap/en/
Locally Managed Marine Area Network	LMMA	Asia and Pacific	http://lmanetwork.org/
Lower Olifants Water User Association		South Africa	https://www.lorwua.co.za/
Management of Emerging Risks in Southeast Asia	GREASE	SE Asia	https://www.grease-network.org/
Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions	MERET	Ethiopia	https://www.wfp.org/disaster-risk-reduction/meret
Marine Stewardship Council	MSC	Global	https://www.msc.org/
Markets and Agriculture Linking Chains in Asia	MALICA		https://www.malica.org/
Mountain Societies Development Support Programme	MSDSP	Tajikistan	http://www.akdn.org/where-we-work/central-asia/tajikistan/agriculture-and-food-security-tajikistan
Multi-actor Platform for VGGT Implementation in Senegal		Senegal	http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6271e.pdf
Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Toolkit		Uganda	https://www.multisectoralnutritiontoolkit.co.ug
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development	NABARD	India	https://www.nabard.org/
National Inclusive Rural Businesses Programme	PRONERI	Ecuador	
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition	NAFSN	Africa	https://new-alliance.org/
New Vision for Agriculture	NVA	Global	https://www.weforum.org/projects/new-vision-for-agriculture
No Wasted Lives Coalition		Global	https://www.nowastedlives.org
Nutrition for Growth	N4G	Global	https://nutritionforgrowth.org/nutrition-growth/
One Health	OI	Global	http://www.onehealthglobal.net
Open Contracting Data Standard	OCDS	Global	https://www.open-contracting.org/about/ http://standard.open-contracting.org/latest/en/
Orange Fleshed Sweet Potato Project		South Africa	www.arc.agric.za
Pakistan Water Dialogue-Diffusion and Adoption through Partnership and Action		Pakistan	https://mel.cgiar.org/projects/pakistanwaterdialogue
Pan-Africa Bean Research Alliance	PABRA	Africa	http://www.pabra-africa.org/
Pan-African Farmers Organization	PAFO	Africa	http://pafo-africa.org/

Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	PACI	Global	https://www.weforum.org/communities/partnering-against-corruption-initiative
Partnership for Aflatoxin Control in Africa	PACA	Africa	http://www.aflatoxinpartnership.org/
Partnership for Agricultural Water for Africa	AgWA	Africa	http://www.fao.org/agwa/home/en/
Partnership for Indonesia Sustainable Agriculture	PISAgro	Indonesia	http://www.pisagro.org/
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health	PMNCH	Global	http://www.who.int/pmnch/en/
Partnership for Research and Training	Divecosys	West Africa	https://www.divecosys.org/
Partnership for Sustainable Agriculture in Vietnam	PSAV	Viet Nam	http://psav-mard.org.vn/en
Pay for Success	PFS	USA	http://www.payforsuccess.org/
Platform for Agricultural Risk Management	PARM	Global	http://p4arm.org/
Platform for collaboration on tax		Global	http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/platform-for-tax-collaboration
Platforms in Partnership for Research and Training	dP	Global	https://www.cirad.fr/en/our-research/platforms-in-partnership-for-research-and-training
Productive Partnerships Support Project		Colombia	http://projects.worldbank.org/P041642/productive-partnerships-support-project?lang=en
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification	PEFC	Global	www.pefc.org
Programme of Support Services to Promote Access to Rural Markets	PROSAAMER	Peru	https://www.ifad.org/web/operations/country/id/peru
Promoting Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Development	SEED	Global	https://www.seed.uno
Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative	PPLPI	Global	http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1522e/i1522e00.htm
Public Policy and Rural Development in Latin America	PP-AL	Latin America	https://www.cirad.fr/en/our-research/platforms-in-partnership-for-research-and-training/list-of-platforms/pp-al
Public Private Development Partnerships	PPDP	Global	https://www.sida.se/English/partners/our-partners/Private-sector/About-Business-for-Development/Public-Private-Development-Partnerships-PPDP/
Public-Private-Producer-Partnerships	4P's	Global	http://www.snv.org/project/partnering-value-4p
Purchase for Progress	P4P	Global	https://www.wfp.org/purchase-progress/overview
Purchase from Africans for Africa	PAA Africa	Africa	http://www.wfp.org/purchase-progress/news/blog/lessons-learned-purchase-africans-africa-initiative
Rainforest Alliance		Global	https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/
Regional Food Security Analysis Network	RFSAN	Middle East	http://rfsan.info/
Research Platform: Production and Conservation in Partnership	RP-PCP	Southern Africa	https://www.rp-pcp.org/
Right to Food Campaign		India	http://www.righttofoodcampaign.in/home
Rockefeller Foundation - YieldWise Food Loss		Africa	https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/initiatives/yieldwise/
Round Table on Responsible Soy	RTRS	Global	www.responsiblesoy.org

Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil	RSPO	Global	www.rspo.org
Rural Empowerment and Agricultural Development	READ	Indonesia	https://www.ifad.org/web/operations/project/id/2000001181/country/indonesia
Rural Resilience Initiative (WFP/Oxfam America)	R4	Africa	http://www1.wfp.org/r4-rural-resilience-initiative
Safe Access to Fuel and Energy (WFP)	SAFE	Global	http://www.wfp.org/climate-change/initiatives/safe
SARD-SC Project		Africa/Sub-Saharan Africa	http://sard-sc-wheat.icarda.org/
Scaling Up Nutrition	SUN	Global	http://scalingupnutrition.org/
Self Employed Women's Association	SEWA	India	http://www.sewa.org/
Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty in Andhra Pradesh	SERP	South Asia	http://www.serp.ap.gov.in/SHGAP/
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	SAARC	South Asia	http://www.saarc-sec.org/
Southern Africa Food Lab	SAFL	Southern Africa	http://www.southernafricafoodlab.org/
Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions	SACAU	Southern Africa	http://www.sacau.org/
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania	SAGCOT	Tanzania	https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/sagcot
Southern and Eastern Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute	SEATINI	Uganda	http://www.seatiniuganda.org/
Specialized Meeting on Family Farming of MERCOSUR	REAF	Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)	http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/294024/
Strengthening Partnerships, Results, and Innovations in Nutrition Globally	SPRING	Global	https://www.spring-nutrition.org/
Support to Agricultural Research for Development of Strategic Crops in Africa	SARDC-SC	Africa	http://sard-sc.org/
Support to the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme	KISEPD	Kenya	http://www.unhcr.org/ke/kalobeyei-settlement
Sustainable Diets for All	SD4All	Global	https://hivos.org/focal-area/sustainable-diets-all
Sustainable Food Systems (SFS) Programme of the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production (10YFP)	SFS	Global	http://web.unep.org/10yfp/programmes/sustainable-food-systems-programme
Swedish International Agricultural Network Initiative	SIANI	Global	https://www.siani.se/
System Initiative on Shaping the Future of Food Security and Agriculture (World Economic Forum)		Global	https://www.weforum.org/system-initiatives/food-security-and-agriculture
System of Rice Intensification	SRI	Global	http://sri.ciifad.cornell.edu/index.html
Tata Trusts		India	http://www.tatatrusts.org/

The Power of Nutrition		Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia	http://www.powerofnutrition.org/
Tree based farming for rehabilitation of tribal families in India	BAIF	India	http://www.baif.org.in
UN "Technology Facilitation Mechanism"		Global	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/tfm
UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	ESCAP	Asia and the Pacific	http://www.unescap.org
Union Farms of Africa	UFA	Africa	www.unionfarmsof africa.com
Union Maghrébine et de l'Afrique du Nord des Agriculteurs	UMNAGRI	Maghreb countries	http://www.umnagri.com
Voices for Change Partnership	V4CP	Global	http://www.snv.org/project/voice-change-partnership-v4cp
Wadi Programme	WADI	India	http://baifwadi.org/
Water Efficient Maize for Africa	WEMA	Africa	https://wema.aatf-africa.org/about-wema-project
WBCSD	WBCSD	Global	https://www.wbcd.org/
West Africa Bank	WADB	West Africa	https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/
West African Agricultural Productivity Program	WAAPP	West Africa	http://www.waapp-ppao.org/en
World Banana Forum	WBF	Global	http://www.fao.org/world-banana-forum/en/
World Farmers' Organisation	WFO	Global	http://www.wfo-oma.org/
World Forum of Fisher People	WFFP	Global	http://worldfishers.org/
World Water Council	WWC	Global	http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/

Appendix 3 The HLPE project cycle

The High Level Panel of Experts for Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) was created in October 2009 as the science–policy interface of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS).

The CFS is the foremost inclusive and evidence-based international and intergovernmental platform for food security and nutrition (FSN), for a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-led processes towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring FSN for all human beings.⁸³

The HLPE receives its working mandate from CFS. This ensures the legitimacy and relevance of the studies undertaken, and their insertion in a concrete political agenda at international level. The report elaboration process ensures the scientific inclusiveness and the independence of the HLPE.

The HLPE produces scientific, policy-oriented reports, including analysis and recommendations, serving as a comprehensive and evidence-based starting point for policy debates at CFS. The HLPE aims at providing a better understanding of the diversity of issues and rationales when dealing with food and nutrition insecurity. It thrives to clarify contradictory information and knowledge, elicit the backgrounds and rationales of controversies, and identify emerging issues.

The HLPE is not mandated to conduct new research. The HLPE draws its studies based on existing research and knowledge produced by various expertise-providing institutions (universities, research institutes, international organizations, etc.), adding value by global, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary analysis.

HLPE studies combine scientific knowledge with experiences from the ground, in the same rigorous process. The HLPE translates the richness and variety of forms of expert knowledge from many actors (knowledge of local implementation, knowledge based on global research and knowledge of “best practice”) that draw on both local and global sources into policy-related forms of knowledge.

To ensure the scientific legitimacy and credibility of the process, as well as its transparency and openness to all forms of knowledge, the HLPE operates with very specific rules, agreed by the CFS.

The HLPE has a two-tier structure:

1. A Steering Committee composed of 15 internationally recognized experts in a variety of FSN related fields, appointed by the Bureau of CFS. HLPE Steering Committee members participate in their individual capacities, and not as representatives of their respective governments, institutions or organizations.
2. Project Teams acting on a project specific basis, selected and managed by the Steering Committee to analyse/report on specific issues.

The project cycle to elaborate the reports (**Figure 5**) includes clearly defined stages, starting from the political question and request formulated by the CFS. The HLPE institutes a scientific dialogue, building upon the diversity of disciplines, backgrounds, knowledge systems, the diversity of its Steering Committee and Project Teams, and open e-consultations. The topic-bound and time-bound Project Teams work under the Steering Committee’s scientific and methodological guidance and oversight.

The HLPE runs two open consultations per report: first, on the scope of the study; second, on a V0 “work-in-progress” draft. This opens the process towards all experts interested as well as to all concerned stakeholders, who are also knowledge-holders. Consultations enable the HLPE to better understand the issues and concerns, and to enrich the knowledge base, including social knowledge, thriving for the integration of diverse scientific perspectives and points of view.


It includes an external scientific peer-review on a pre-final draft. The report is finalized and approved by the Steering Committee during a face-to-face meeting.

HLPE reports are published in the six official languages of the UN (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish), and serve to inform discussions and debates in CFS.

All information regarding the HLPE, its process and all former reports are available on the HLPE Website: www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe

⁸³ CFS Reform Document, available at www.fao.org/cfs

Figure 5 HLPE project cycle



CFS Committee on World Food Security
HLPE High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
StC HLPE Steering Committee
PT HLPE Project Team

