



*Food and Agriculture  
Organization of the United  
Nations*

## **Office of Evaluation**

### ***Independent Final Evaluation***

***Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP)  
Country: The Sudan***

***(OSRO/SUD/622/MUL)***

### ***Final Report***

*February 2013*

## Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

### Office of Evaluation (OED)

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## **Composition of the Evaluation Team**

The evaluation team was composed of team leader Herma Majoor (agriculture and rural development expert) and team members Willem van den Toorn (capacity building and institutional development expert), Karl Kaiser (agriculture and rural development expert), Abdul Hamid Rhametalla (food security and livelihoods expert), Awadia Salih Mohammed (food aid/food security and livelihoods expert) and Ian Bartlett (rural investment expert). The profiles of all team members are displayed in Annex 2.

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## Acronyms

ARDC	Animal Resource Development Coordinator
ARDG	Animal Resource Development Group
ARP	Agricultural Revival Program
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BNLIP	Blue Nile Livelihood Improvement Programme
BNS	Blue Nile State
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CARDA	Community Animal Resource Development Associate
CB	Capacity Building
CBNA	Capacity Building Needs Assessment
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPU	Central Project Unit
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DB	Data Base
DG	Director General
EC	European Commission
EMM	Euroconsult Mott MacDonald
EQM	Evaluation Questions and Topics Matrix
ERDP	Eastern Recovery Development Program
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FMO	Framework of Mutual Obligations
FFS	Farmer Field School
GAA	German Agro Action
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HR	Human Resources
HRD	Human Resource Development
IT	Information Technology
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoAARI	Ministry of Agriculture Animal Resources and Irrigation
MOAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
MP	Model Projects
MPP	Micro Project Programme
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPC	National Programme Coordinator
NSA	Non-State Actor
OED	FAO Office of Evaluation
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PE	Programme Estimate
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PM	Project manager
PMU	Programme Management Unit

PSC	Programme Steering Committee
PTF	Project Task Force
RAES	Rural Agriculture an Extension Services
RM	Rural Marketing
RNS	River Nile State
RRP	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme
RSS	Red Sea State
SBG	Small Business Groups
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SK	South Kordofan
SK	South Kordofan State
SMAARF	State Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Forestry
SMoARRI	State Ministry of Agriculture Animal Resources and Irrigation
SPCRP	Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme
STABEX	Stabilisation of Export Earnings
TA	Technical Adviser
TDAS	Tokar Delta Agriculture System
TCC	Technical Coordination Committee
TOT	Training of Trainers
TSU	Technical Support Unit
UN	United Nations
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Security Services
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WFP	World Food Programme

## **Executive Summary**

### ***Information about the evaluation***

- ES1. An FMO was concluded for the use and implementation of the STABEX allocation for Sudan. The Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP) was formulated under the ‘Productive Infrastructures and Rural Livelihoods Rehabilitation’ chapter of the FMO. It consisted of a Capacity Building Component (CB) implemented by FAO (contract signed in August 2007, € 19.07 million for the Sudan and a final duration until December 2012) and a Model Projects Component (MP), implemented by Euroconsult Mott MacDonald (EMM); this contract was signed in March 2008 for an amount of €9 million and a period of 48 months. A Micro Project Component was started after the MTE. It was designed by FAO for € 4 million (€ 2 million for the Sudan) but was finally granted to EMM for only the Sudan as per recommendation of the MTE.
- ES2. The programme has been divided in two sub-programmes, one for the Sudan and one for South Sudan, to address the different human, institutional and food security related circumstances. The program covers River Nile State (RNS), Blue Nile State (BNS), Red Sea State (RSS) and South Kordofan State (SKS). The CB exists of strengthening key institutions, pilot development of key agricultural support services and support to program implementation capacity. The MP component is aimed at support to Rural Livelihoods through financing and implementing investment projects in three States (not in RNS). The MPP provides funds for the government to exercise their learning in all 4 states.
- ES3. The final evaluation has been conducted of both the Sudan and South Sudan from October 2012 until January 2013. This report covers the mission to the Sudan (September/October 2012) and separate reports are available, covering South Sudan and a synthesis between the two countries. The evaluation started with a desk review; subsequently stakeholder interviews took place at capital and State level, supported by an evaluation matrix and an evaluation questions/topic matrix, based upon which questions were developed and findings collated.

### ***Key findings***

- ES4. The SPCRP falls under the framework of the Government’s Agricultural Revival Program and aligns well with EU’s Country Strategy Paper. Most development action is focused on humanitarian aid in the Sudan, but this programme is a development intervention. The Sudan is still in dire need of external support and longer term programs are indispensable.
- ES5. SPCRP was found relevant by the Team as well as by the stakeholders having addressed existing needs and as one of the few development actors having contributed to capacity building of government. The design and as a result the implementation have been rather output-focused. In the design, foreseeable constraints like security issues and seasons were neglected and sustainability was not clearly incorporated. Delivery of institutional and organizational capacity has been sub-optimal, also constrained by the lack of cooperation between the two main contractors has hampered an optimal achievement.
- ES6. The project had rightly targeted relevant Ministries at Federal and State level. Farmers’, fishermen’s and pastoralists’ unions had only been involved at the practical level, not in the design, strategy or monitoring related activities. The target locations were sometimes far away or dispersed, which made upscaling to State level more difficult.



- ES7. Even though following recommendations of the MTE a new logframe was developed, and even though its quality and structure had been improved, it still emphasized the input of CB. The fact that there were no state specific plans further hampered the strategic oversight of stakeholders at State level, who were often confined to a focus on activities as a result.
- ES8. Even though the evaluation was supposed to focus on the implementation after the MTE, the Team was unable to ignore the design limitations. The design led to an increase of capacity building in Government staff skills and farmers' skills. The project conducted an institutional review and proposed revised organizational structures and job descriptions but was not able to make the government follow through on the proposed revised organizational structures
- ES9. Apart from the MPP and SBG component, the implementation of SPCRP was found reasonably effective and efficient. The sustainability may be more problematic, especially since planning, institutional and organisation structure in Government are still weak and budgets may not be available or funds do not arrive as promised. This may also weigh on the maintenance and repair of the physical capacity built by SPCRP.
- ES10. In the CB component, the expenditure was close to or around 80% on average per June 2012. The components FFS, CARDA and SBG scored lowest at percentages between 48 and 66%. The MP component has spent in total 93% and per budget line mostly between 85% and 103%, within the MPP component total expenditure is 99% with singular expenditure between 85% and 109%. The difference between the reported budget and the total budget as per project document was reported to have been caused by exchange rate differences and procurements of physical capacity through EC.
- ES11. The delays within the programme added to the consideration above; during its mission, the Team saw a large part of the project funds still being spent e.g. grants for FFS and delivery of inputs for MPP. Even though AWP and implementation were performed in a timely manner, the large delay at the onset of the implementation had eliminated any catching-up possibilities.
- ES12. The Programme Steering Committee (PSC) had regular meetings and even though micro management sometimes took place, this was less so than before the MTE. The contribution of Project Advisory Committees was found very limited. With the Technical Coordination Committees, established to ascertain sustainability, an effort was made but they provided no guarantee with regard to after-project life.
- ES13. A visibility or communication strategy was developed and implemented; a number of activities though were implemented on an ad hoc basis and not sufficiently tailored to the audience. An M&E framework had been developed but subject to improvement and monitoring was not always taking place in a structured manner. Data were not shared between contractors and no efforts took place to reflect the impact of SPCRP as a whole. The government and contractors went out to get data but little bottom up participation in M&E was found. Good base line studies were performed, but proved to be little used if at all.
- ES14. In Tokar Delta, RSS, EMM had a slightly troubled relation with government and a local NGO partner. Complaints were uttered about insufficient transparency and lack of participation in planning and decision taking. It was admitted that procedures of EMM were faster than FAO but also that they appreciated the strict procedures of FAO.
- ES15. FAO conducted sufficient backstopping with regard to the components FFS (best covered subject), CARDA and SBG. Unfortunately, apart from some of the members

involved in backstopping, FAO's Project Task Force had not played any role after MTE and other members were not even aware of their membership.

- ES16. Government staff has been fully participative in SPCRP, but the fact that they have received regular incentives from EMM and the capacity gap between various levels may prevent government officials from taking up project activities as their regular task in future. The government has had little exercise ground on Small Business Groups (SBGs,) which makes sustainability unlikely.
- ES17. Implementation has been constrained by the security situation (especially in BNS and SK), by high staff turnover at various levels and by the regular restructuring of State Ministries. Multiple delays were mentioned often and more than a year may have been lost as a result. The long term needed for institutional, attitude and practices changes through bottom up approaches takes a lot longer than the available project duration.
- ES18. SPCRP has strongly focused on training; in view of the pre-existing human capacity this focus was found relevant and the satisfaction level among trainees high. Training has been prepared and conducted efficiently but the strategy needed improvement. Training needs assessments were not always carried out and training plans not structurally implemented. Training evaluations focused on trainees' satisfaction rather than of on the use of the increased knowledge and skills in trainees' job performance.
- ES19. New units have been established but some of them were not organised in a structural way; organogrammes were not always logical and often not understood by staff members; organizational reviews had taken place but were narrow and superficial. Job descriptions and performance assessments were often neglected and prepared mechanistically.
- ES20. Improved physical capacity building contributed to the quality of work and the commitment. There was a troubled relation between agriculture and livestock related ministries and department on the use of transport means. It is unsure whether Government will be willing and able to take up responsibility for repair and maintenance.
- ES21. 182 FFS are operational as a result of SPCRP. After advice by technical staff from FAO, the quality of capacity building has improved but the targeted numbers considerably decreased; after MTE, FFS has more closely followed FFS guidelines concepts and approaches. Coordinators are trained at government level and facilitators in the community. Planning and upscaling efforts vary per state but are limited overall. Planning needs to be done in more detail and budget is still unsure. Still, the FFS approach has improved the link between research, extension and farmers. The FFS approach was found to be good value for money and appreciated by farmers.
- ES22. Late backstopping and planning for post-FFS grants made it difficult to provide the FFS group with requested grants; a large number of grants still had to be disbursed and therefore, FAO could not comply with the choices. FFS guidelines were not always followed in this regard. In order to make FFS sustainable, the link to inputs and marketing needs to be strengthened, and coordination with other donors may be favourable.
- ES23. The upgrading from Community Health Worker (CAHW) to CARDA was found valuable; 182 CARDAs were trained, which benefitted roughly 10,000 (agro)-pastoralists. Even though delay was faced, the CARDA system was already accepted by government as favoured approach. CAHWs also function in parallel with CARDAs, partly because they do not meet the requirements for CARDA training and also because there is still need for disease detection and vaccination in remote inaccessible areas. A drug revolving fund was initialized, which as a concept is useful but it still needs strong revision and planning and budgeting for management before that may become viable.

- ES24. The stock route rehabilitation performed under the EMM component proved valuable to nomadic and farming communities both. In BNS, the CB and MP components worked well together, and CARDA services was extended from farm livestock to the herds. In SKS, the stock routes were not targeted under the project, largely for reasons of security.
- ES25. SBGs were considered the weakest component of SPCR. They were no properly linked to other components and often started late, hampering entrenchment into daily routine for the participants as well as government staff.
- ES26. The reporting on the MP component was not always consistent and output focused. Training reports were lacking. Activities in the States have been carried out in a somewhat scattered manner. In RSS, activities on land registration and Tokar Delta Board restructuring had not moved beyond the workshop stage and relations with partners were slightly troubled. In RSS and SK, ownership of the food processing plants had not been properly pursued, casting a doubt on future impact for the community.
- ES27. Micro Projects (MPP) started well after the MTE and are thus still in their infancy, casting doubt on their sustainability. They are linked to other components and mainly consist of inputs. Most stakeholders could not distinguish MP from MPP. MPP were implemented though in a swift manner.
- ES28. SPCR has produced impact through strengthening the skills and knowledge of public bodies and improving livelihood conditions of the poor population, which indirectly led to conflict reduction. Impact on human capacity building would have benefited from a robust organizational development process, but a change in mindset was started in population as well as government; self confidence had reportedly increased in both. Impact of FFS on good practices and productivity was acknowledged, but input and marketing need to be strengthened to make it. The impact of MP and MPP was considered less strong; even though the input provision led to an immediate impact, in the long run it is difficult to estimate. The rehabilitated livestock routes may have a continuous impact and food processing training may help at household nutrition level, even with the processing plant ownership pending.
- ES29. Financial sustainability is problematic as long as the government does not plan and budget the SPCR related approaches in a detailed manner and fund availability is not ensured. The fact that SBG and MPP have started very late make it unlikely that funds will be found for their continuation.
- ES30. With regard to institutional sustainability, government structure and capacity have certainly been strengthened, but robust institutional and organizational structure should have been generated to ensure this in the long run. The viability of some of the newly established units has been questioned and the strengthened human capacity in the institutions should be guided by a structured training strategy to avoid its deterioration. FFS and CARDA approaches have been adopted by government but cannot yet be kept alive without strong government support.
- ES31. At policy level, approaches should be laid down in policies and implementation strategies, in order to not only ensure their sustainability but also to ensure quality control. The overall government implementation strategy may be already reasonably well targeted, but should be more focused and detailed and clearly aligned with policies. The SPCR could have more forcefully contributed by stronger encouragement of policy review and policy formulation, and by incorporating a progressive handover into the project.

ES32. Gender was addressed by ensuring parity and refurbishing Rural Women's Centres, but needs and opportunities of rural women have not been clearly incorporated. The participation of women was low (30% in FFS, 10 out of 182 in CARDA) but, looking at the difficulties to involve women at all, this should be seen as an achievement. Nutrition and HIV/AIDS were not addressed and environmental issues were mostly implicit in the FFS approach, apart from one case where violent pesticides were provided.

ES33. Synergy and connections were found weak at all levels. Cooperation between FAO and EMM was found sufficient in RNS and BNS, but totally insufficient in the other states for various reasons, even though FAO staff made considerable efforts. Synergy within the MP was limited as well. Between result areas, the links should have been strengthened already from the design phase. Furthermore, there was very little cooperation with other development actors and virtually no link with the SPCRP in South Sudan.

### ***Conclusions***

ES34. The relevance and implementation of SPCRP were found acceptable in view of the design limitations and the difficult local circumstances.

ES35. The lack of focus on effective delivery of institutional and organizational capacity and the absence of a framework of cooperation between the two contractors from the design stage curtailed the impact and sustainability possibilities.

ES36. The duration of 4 years and delays at various levels hampered the stakeholders from achieving impact and sustainability.

ES37. The FFS and CARDA approach have been acknowledged as relevant by all stakeholders including the government and may hold a promise for future livelihood improvement if incorporated into government policies and strategies.

ES38. Absence of synergy and lack of a coordination framework have prevented the project from achieving its planned goals to the full extent.

### ***Recommendations***

#### **Recommendation 1: To EU on funding implementation of complex programmes and projects by multiple organisations**

EU should provide guidelines and a framework to the implementers of projects and programmes, if these are co-implemented by multiple organisations. Compulsory cooperative fields of work and activities should be provided as well as methods to optimally combine the contribution from implementing organisations and using the specific expertise of each organisation as an added value. Parallel implementation and separate logframes should not be approved of. Since EU's strategic planning cycle has a length of only 5 years, programmes of a highly complex nature should be avoided and projects should be clearly focused.

#### **Recommendation 2: To EU to be more involved in monitoring and guiding progress of public-private partnerships**

Even though incorporating public-private partnerships is currently high on the agenda, in order for them to be successful in the long run, close monitoring and guidance from the donors may be needed. In SPCRP, the plants' construction should have been finalized at an

earlier point in time, in order to guide the start up of the production process as well as the involvement of trained beneficiaries. It should have been ensured that a contract was prepared and signed by all relevant parties, outlining responsibilities and ownership as well as involvement of the target population and the way in which they would be able to sell their produce to the factory and be involved as employees.

**Recommendation 3: To EU and FAO on incorporating FFS in project and programmes**

Farmer Field Schools have appeared very useful extension and empowerment approaches in various agro-ecosystems. In Sudan the FFS approach has also appeared relevant to the local context. In order to make FFS sustainable and ready for upscaling, further adaptation to local context are needed, including advocacy and support for creating a conducive environment with regard to access of farmers to inputs, credits and marketing. Furthermore, the implementation period at field level needs to be at least two seasons and possibly longer. A more facilitative and bottom-up implementation of the approach should be ascertained. As long as the government will not be able to plan and sustain the FFS, one has to seek other solutions. Since many other donors are interested in using the FFS approach, a combination of efforts may provide an additional impetus.

**Recommendation 4: To development actors including EU and FAO on coordinating efforts in Sudan**

Efforts should be undertaken to coordinate development interventions in Sudan. Currently, most development actors are implementing independently their own programmes and projects, without clearly addressing duplications or gaps at a nation wide level. Even EU funded programmes, despite good intentions phrased at the design stage, fail to coordinate their activities and make use of each others accomplishments, even though opportunities are clearly available. Not only should existing efforts be incorporated at the design stage of projects and programmes, development actors should also have regular coordination meetings at capital level, which do not only focus on humanitarian actions and come up with clear action plans.

**Recommendation 5: To FAO Senior Management on project design**

In the design stage of a programme or project, particular attention should be paid to incorporation of sustainability throughout and to the final handover of tasks in order to ascertain government is ready and capable of continuing after the project's ending. In the last year of the project or programme government counterparts should already have allocated budget lines and take upon them part of the activities which were implemented by the project. If government would not be capable to take upon them all tasks after the project ending because of multiple pressing priorities, the search for additional funding from outside donors should be started before the last year of the programme or project, demonstrating the government's planned contribution.

**Recommendation 6: To FAO Senior Management on project management and planning**

Apart from the duration of the project, weak planning and complicated management issues resulting from the complex design and modality caused additional delays and postponement. It should be allowed to take more project-related decisions at a decentralised level within the countries and planning should be performed in a more detailed and documented manner and shared with all stakeholders, including those at state level. Planning and budgets should be available detailed per state and implementation and follow up should be conducted in a participatory manner with the stakeholders at state level.

**Recommendation 7: To FAO Sudan on advocating with the Government of Sudan on incorporating new livelihood approaches**

In order to incorporate livelihood and agricultural approaches which have proven successful like FFS, FAO should advocate with the Government of Sudan to develop a clear plan at State level. A time path should be provided for introducing or upscaling such approaches, including responsibilities at all levels and an in-depth cost-calculation. Mechanisms to achieve upscaling should be clearly outlined and opportunities for funding from State or Federal level or external funding should be identified at an early stage.

**Recommendation 8: To FAO Sudan on advocating with the Government of Sudan on policy and strategy development**

FAO Sudan should advocate for agriculture and livestock related policies to be developed or adapted and offer technical assistance to accomplish this. The proposal for the national agricultural extension strategy should be further developed and finalized. The livestock policies should also contain details on the CARDA approach and other animal services related issues. Financial and other responsibilities and mechanisms should be clearly outlined and quality control as well as the management of drug provision should be described in this policy. The role of community associates and veterinary services should be clearly outlined. Situations which require action from Federal level like vaccinations to prevent an epidemic should also be clearly described.

**Recommendation 9: To FAO Sudan on supporting the Government of Sudan on funding and continuation of the Capacity Building**

FAO Sudan should support the State and Federal government to continue working on the results that the project has created jointly with its stakeholders and beneficiaries. Support from international donors aimed at the continuation of the most promising SPCR should be actively sought. FAO may support development of a proposal, which should also contain a well planned budget and policies and strategies in order to determine and ensure the Government's role and contribution in such future programme. NGOs should be enlisted in pursuing, particularly, the further expansion of the FFS.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background of the project

1. An FMO (Framework of Mutual Obligations) was concluded for the use and implementation of the STABEX allocation for Sudan. Framed under the ‘Productive Infrastructures and Rural Livelihoods Rehabilitation’ chapter of the FMO, the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP) was formulated to contribute to long-term reduction of poverty and food insecurity by:
  - Enhancing income generating activities in agriculture, livestock production and off-farm rural activities;
  - Strengthening the capacity of local administrations and non-state actors (NSAs).
2. The SPCRCP is a 4-year programme, that aims at contributing to stabilizing peace, enhancing food security and improving livelihoods in selected vulnerable states in the Sudan and South Sudan through building human, institutional and physical productive capacities.
3. Given the different human, institutional and food security situations and related needs and institutional frameworks that exist in the Sudan and South Sudan, the SPCRCP programme has been divided into two separate sub-programmes: one for the North and one for the South. Both sub-programmes have similar objectives and activities, and each one has its own budget and separate implementation arrangements. This evaluation report reflects only the findings in the North, which now Sudan following the separation of country into two independent States. A synthesis report will be submitted at a later stage.
4. The program is implemented in 4 states in Sudan. The situation in Red Sea State (RSS) and River Nile State (RNS) differs considerably from the situation in States South Kordofan (SK) and Blue Nile State (BNS), among others with regard to climate and importance of livestock. More details can be found in the Evaluation against DAC criteria in Annex 7 and the Evaluation Questions and Topics Matrix (EQM) per State in Annex 8. A separate report with observations per State will be submitted as Annex 9.
5. Each sub-programme of SPCRCP has two major components:
  - a. The Capacity Building component to build human, organisational and physical capacity of public and private institutions is implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It includes three sub-components:
    - Strengthening key institutions, namely local State and Non-State Actors;
    - Pilot development of key agricultural support services;
    - Support to programme implementation capacity.
  - b. Support to Rural Livelihoods through financing and implementing investment projects in the selected States and Localities. That includes 3 model projects, as follows: the Tokar Delta Rehabilitation Project, the South Kordofan Livelihoods Improvement Project and the Blue Nile Livelihoods Improvement Project (all three implemented by Euroconsult Mott MacDonald) Furthermore, the Kadugli - Talodi Market Access Project (works contract awarded to the local contractor Manga for Drilling Ltd and supervision services to the engineering company Newtech Consulting Group) was part of SPCRCP. The Evaluation Team has not been able to visit this infrastructure and has only found limited reliable feedback.

6. The € 19.07 million CB contract with FAO was signed in August 2007 for the Sudan and a final duration until December 2012. The MP component was implemented by Euroconsult Mott MacDonald (EMM); this € 9 million contract was signed in March 2008 for an amount of and a period of 48 months.
7. Apart from the CB and the MP components, there is also the Micro Project Programme (MPP). It was submitted by FAO in October 2009 to be implemented in both the Sudan and South Sudan for € 4 million (€ 2 million for the Sudan). The Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) cast doubt on the capacity of FAO to implement the MPP and subsequently it was contracted to EMM to implement in the 4 States of only the Sudan.
8. In the Sudan, the CB building component is implemented in River Nile State, Red Sea State, Blue Nile State and South Kordofan. The Model Project component is implemented in the same states except for the River Nile State. Since in River Nile State loss of agricultural land due to river erosion appeared a severe problem for the small-irrigated farming sub-sector, it was decided to implement the CB component in that state, even though there would be no MP component. At a later stage, the MPP was launched there.

### ***1.2 Purpose and Objectives of Final Evaluation***

9. The final evaluation has been conducted in both the Sudan and South Sudan, but this report will confine itself to the findings in the Sudan. The evaluation has looked at the achievement of both components and all sub-components.
10. The evaluation has examined the performance and achievements of the programme in the Sudan and South Sudan in relation to the expected outputs, envisaged objectives and results. More specifically, the independent evaluation has:
  1. Determined the relevance of the programme;
  2. Evaluated programme efficiency at sub-national, national and regional level;
  3. Evaluated programme effectiveness, assessing the degree to which planned outputs and outcomes have been achieved at the time of the evaluation;
  4. Identified any impacts or likely impacts (positive or negative, determined or undetermined) of the programme;
  5. Assessed the likelihood of sustainability of the programme, i.e. what the enduring results are likely to be after the termination of the programme;
  6. Assessed the synergy and connections between the various programme components, implementers and geographic locations;
  7. Provided lessons learned and recommendations for future normative, operational and organization strategies for food security and rural development related programmes and projects.
11. The evaluation has strived to provide decision makers in the Governments, FAO and the EU with sufficient information to make decisions about future related interventions in the area of food security and rural development in the Sudan and South Sudan.

### ***1.3 Evaluation methodology***

12. The evaluation started with a desk review of key documents developed by FAO, EU ,implementing partners and other stakeholders including background documents on the developmental situation in Sudan and South, project documents, strategic plans, policy documents analytical tools and reports as well as evaluations (notably the Mid-Term



Evaluation (MTE)), reviews and studies of relevance to this evaluation, all used as a basis for further interviews and research.

13. The Team Leader participated in an initial internal 1-day consultation in Rome at FAO Headquarters and a 1-day consultation in Addis Ababa to discuss the ToR for the evaluation with OED evaluation service staff and to interview the key technical and operational units within FAO responsible for supporting the delivery of the SPCRP project. Based upon these interviews and desk review findings, an evaluation matrix and data gathering tools has been developed. An Inception Report, outlining the Evaluation approach and methods, was submitted on 30 September 2012.
14. Semi-structured questionnaires have been developed, based on the evaluation matrix. These have been administered in key informant interviews and focus group discussions held with a range of stakeholders to obtain feedback on the programme activities, results and outcomes. Tracer studies have been used for target groups that have been addressed by the intervention at an earlier point in time. Questions were developed relevant to the groups of stakeholders as per the evaluation matrix in Annex 6.
15. The Evaluation visit of Sudan consisted of a country visit by the entire Team from 28 September to 14 October to the Sudan and the second one (29 October – 12 November) in South Sudan. Stakeholder interviews at capital level as well as field visits to the target states were carried out during the country visit. The team was split up in 3 teams of 2 in order to perform state visits. Each team came up with a state report (submitted separately as Annex 9) containing also a filled-out Evaluation Questions and Topics Matrix. The results of these reports contributed in an important manner to the body of the report.
16. The Evaluation Team could only visit Blue Nile State, River Nile State and Red Sea State for security reasons. The stakeholders from South Kordofan came to Khartoum to share their experiences in a one-day workshop.
17. A debriefing and presentation was held before leaving the country on 14 October 2012, where a summary of the findings was presented. A brief consolidation report/synthesis, highlighting the main findings, conclusions and recommendations, was presented to the PSC in the form of a PowerPoint Presentation. Comments, additions and suggestions from stakeholders were collected and incorporated into the state reports and this final report.

#### **1.4 Report structure**

18. The report will start with a brief description of the developmental context in Sudan and some of the most important interventions of other development actors in the target area. Subsequently relevance, coherence, consistence, set-up and adequacy will be elaborated based on the findings.
19. The report will then move on to implementation related issues like programme management, monitoring and evaluation, technical backstopping and constraints to implementation. The outputs and results will be reflected, followed by the sustainability of SPCRP, a subject that has been deemed of high importance by the Evaluation Team. Impact and crosscutting issues like gender and nutrition will be described.
20. Subsequently, synergy and connections at various levels will be discussed, between implementing organisations, but also between result areas and other programmes and projects. The report will then provide lessons learned, good practices and conclusions and

finish with a list of recommendations, targeted to the relevant stakeholders on specific subjects.

## **2 Context of the Programme**

### **2.1 *Developmental context***

21. The Government's Five Year Strategic Plan and Agricultural Revival Program (ARP) provide the framework for this program. In this ARP, capacity building of government is one of the main pillars; the objectives of SPCRCP align well with the objectives of ARP. The revised version of ARP for 2012-2014 was recently distributed.
22. Since Sudan is still seen as a country in humanitarian settings, many of the interventions have an emergency character and are therefore of short duration. The link between developmental and emergency projects in this country is particularly weak and therefore, a long lasting impact is only rarely achieved by any of the development actors.
23. The Government of the Sudan did not ratify the revised Cotonou Agreement. As a consequence the country has no access to funds deriving from the 10th EDF and it is currently unlikely that this will change for the 11th EDF. However, the EU decided to provide important funding under the Special Fund for Sudan (about EUR 70 million committed in 2011/12), but no decision is taken whether further special funds will be provided. Consequently the Sudan may only profit from budget line funding such as the Food Security Thematic Programme or the one promoting Non-State Actors.

### **2.2 *Other interventions in the area***

24. A number of other developmental actors are conducting interventions in the target area of SPCRCP. A number of UN organisations are active in the country. IFAD is implementing a project supported by The Netherlands in South Kordofan and the World Bank is implementing programmes in various States under the Multi-Donor Trust Fund which will terminate by the end of 2012. In Red Sea State German Agro Action (GAA), UNIDO, and the EU funded Eastern Recovery Development Program (ERDP) are implemented.
25. The international NGOs SOS Sahel and Sudan Red Crescent are active in Red Sea State. International NGOs face a hard time as the cooperation with them (for instance Oxfam, ACCORD and Save the Children UK) has been terminated by the government.

### **3 Concept and relevance**

#### **3.1 *Relevance of the programme and its activities***

26. SPCRCP was found to be relevant in the sense that it has addressed definite needs at Federal and State levels. Structural deficiencies following years of underinvestment in human, physical and organisational capacities within the State were addressed. SPCRCP fits in well with not only government strategies and programmes, but also with the EU strategy and policies as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement provided a conducive environment for launching such a programme.
27. All stakeholders confirmed the relevance of the programme and its activities. Even though other donor funded programmes and projects are ongoing in the target areas and overall in Sudan, SPCRCP is one of the few focusing on government capacity building. Not only was the increased capacity found valuable, it was also deemed to be the most likely route towards sustainability.
28. The design is very much output focused, and the main focus is on training related outputs. The approach to training was insufficiently strategized and structured and not sufficiently aligned with existing or envisaged organisational structures and the reporting was mainly quantitative, based on trainees' satisfaction rather than performance assessment.
29. The Project Documents, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared without any evidence of State-specific design. Instead, for both CB and MP components, the programme operated through Annual Work Plans (AWPs) and Programme Estimates (PE) to be approved at the central level. As a result, state-specific conditions, uncertainties and other adverse conditions were and could only find their way into the AWPs and PEs in an ad-hoc fashion. Not only were adverse conditions, such as unforeseen but expectable security issues not considered in the design, but also neglect of regular weather and seasonal conditions have caused additional delay. The absence of state-specific SPCRCP plans strengthened the output focus, prevented oversight of achievements against state-specific indicators of purpose, and prevented this final evaluation of assessing activities, achievements and outputs against state-specific goals, purposes, conditions and planning.
30. Levels of skills in the state – public bodies, NSAs, families, private sector – were low at the time the project was conceived. The project's strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore fully relevant. Training topics were selected cooperatively with the Ministry staff based on their perceived needs.
31. Like before, during the MTE, it was observed that contributions to peace-building, Government's financial and technical contribution and sustainability analysis had been insufficiently addressed in the design. An exit strategy study had been conducted in the second phase of the programme as recommended in the MTE but the exit strategy was weak and rather general in nature. It provided, like the original design of the project, a mere wish list and has therefore not significantly improved sustainability.
32. The design was ambitious in planning a broad range of activities and its central character was to aim 'to build institutional and organisational capacity'. The lack of

coordination planning between the two contractors complicated this issue to a certain extent.

### **3.2 *Relevance of Targeting***

33. Under the CB component, in most cases the targeting was relevant, even though socio-economic indicators were not clearly present in the selection criteria. In most cases, people were very poor; their nutrition was limited and not varied; there was no health access and poor quality of education. Only in RNS in one location, some of the beneficiaries of the Model Projects appeared to undertake the model project activities additional to their existing livelihood activities; their nutritional habits were varied and some of them already possessed boats, a boat fuelling station or cool storage containers.
34. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with agriculture, forestry, animal production, range land and fisheries for institutional, organisational and human resource capacity building. These ministries are the backbone of the public administration dealing with the state's agricultural and animal production capacity.
35. In the design of the programme, Community Organisations like Farmers' Union, Pastoralist and Fishermen's Union were not consulted. They were involved as target groups in the programme in activities like training and input provision and appreciated that involvement, but they also found that in general, they were insufficiently consulted at the strategic level and in identification of needs and design of project plans, not only in EU projects but also in other development interventions. In SPCRP, they had not been involved in the design of the project, in the development of plans and strategies and neither in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).
36. The Project Document mentions capacity building of Non-State Actors (NSAs), a denomination that appeared to be interpreted differently by various stakeholders. Some interviewees found it to be the interest groups emerging from Farmer Field School (FFS) and Small Business Groups (SBGs) training; others found it should be NGOs or civil society organisations. From the relevant goal under CB, "Strengthening key institutions, namely local State and Non-State Actors" the Evaluation Team assumes that NSAs include all of the groups above. Apart from the SBGs, Farmer Field Schools and CARDA groups, which have only been established towards the end of the programme, SPCRP has demonstrated insufficient involvement and strengthening of NSAs. Farmers' Unions and Pastoral Unions have been involved in training workshops and in the Rural Market & Small Business component but opportunities to involve them at the strategic level have been missed.
37. In most of the States, the coverage of the programme with regard to localities and locations was dispersed. Localities were far apart and their population consisted of only a very minor part of the State's population. This will have a dampening effect on future upscaling and may give rise to tensions among the large part of population that does not benefit. The relatively better impact in RNS, a smaller State, underlined, that focusing implementation in a small area may facilitate upscaling by already showing impact at an early stage.

### **3.3 *Coherence and consistency between objectives, outcomes and outputs***

38. At the time of the MTE there were several logframes available. Following the MTE recommendations, FAO developed two single logframes, one for Sudan and one for South

Sudan. The quality and structure of this logframe was better but it still focused on the CB component and did not sufficiently provide linkage to MP related activities or results, obstructing the creation of synergy between the two.

39. The absence of a commensurate state-specific SPCR Plan forced the evaluation to investigate activities, achievements and outputs in their own right at State level. Annual Work Plans and Annual Programme Estimates were formulated and implemented, approved by the central management offices of FAO and EMM, respectively, and at state-level one can only assume that these are in line with the SPCR overall Project Document.
40. The evaluation was supposed to focus on implementation after MTE; however, design limitations had an effect even on the implementation throughout the entire lifetime of the project and could therefore not be neglected. The Project Document is focused on activities, achievements and outputs, and it is not results-oriented as a matter of principle. Annex 1 and Sub-annex 1.1 to the FMO bear witness. Therefore, the implementation could only have been activity-oriented, pursuing the completion of the list of outputs reflected in this document.
41. According to the ProDoc, SPCR was expected to contribute to a significant long-term reduction in the level of poverty and food insecurity by enhancing income generating activities in agriculture, livestock production and off-farm rural activities that primarily benefit poor households. Due to the fragmented nature of the project the increase of income generation may be limited. The second objective, “strengthening the capacity of local authorities and non-state actors to maintain and further develop (the income generating activities)” was only achieved in so far as building of capacity on agriculture, livestock and fisheries related activities, and mainly limited to local authorities. The translation into income generation for population however was lacking.
42. Programme management from FAO and EMM was not often synergetic; the offices were in different places and sometimes not even close to each other. There have been no regular meetings or communications. FAO was not invited for capacity building as per project documents and as planned in the original design. Overall there was an inconsistency in timing; EMM frequently did not or could not wait (as a result of limited project duration) with implementation until the CB component had completed training activities. Starting from 2012 though, FAO and EMM at least began to conduct regular meetings at Khartoum and at state level in BNS, leading to the development of an activity matrix and further cooperation.
43. The four year time-frame is considered unrealistic to deliver a programme of this nature. It is however unlikely that future programmes will have a longer duration when taking into account the (maximally) 5 year strategic planning cycles of EU and the Government.

## 4 Implementation

### 4.1 Efficiency

44. The implementation was found to be efficient. Budgets were spent to a large extent and it turned out that allocations had been good as no major over or under expenditure was observed. Given the difficult circumstances, project staff and stakeholders achieved an acceptable level of implementation.

#### 4.1.1 Programme budget and expenditure

45. The budget for the CB component of the SPCRCP is divided between Programme Coordination Units (principally technical assistance); Physical Capacity Building (principally building infrastructure and providing furniture and equipment); Human Capacity Building (principally training) of government staff; and Development of Rural Services. The budget allocation for each of these principal budget lines is indicated in the table below with an indication of the accumulated expenditure against budget as of September 2012. Most of the expenditures, including total expenditure, were around or above 80% at the end of June 2012; only Development of Rural Services was an outlier at 70%, of the FFS component (€1,972,585) 67% had been spent; for CARDA/CAHW out of €903,118, only 49% had been spent and for SBG, out of €596,430 only 57% had been spent.

**Table 1: 2007-2012 Programme Expenditure against Budget SPCRCP CB Component in Euro per end of June 2012**

CB component	Total budget	Spent up to now	Expenditure as part of budget (%)
<b>SPCRP-North PCU</b>	4,923,100	4,330,070	<b>87.95%</b>
<b>Physical CB</b>	3,485,285	4,231,385	<b>82.37%</b>
<b>Human CB</b>	3,942,460	3,525,696	<b>89.43%</b>
<b>Development Rural Services</b>	5,049,581	3,532,482	<b>69.96%</b>
<b>FFS</b>	1,972,585	1,318,122	<b>66.82%</b>
<b>CARDA/CAHW</b>	903,118	438,883	<b>48.59%</b>
<b>SBG</b>	596,430	342,064	<b>57.35%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,072,167</b>	<b>15,611,175</b>	<b>81.86%</b>

46. Programme Estimates (PE) were agreed to cover the Model Project and Micro Project component for the Blue Nile Livelihoods Improvement Project, the South Kordofan Livelihoods Improvement Project, and the Tokar Delta Rehabilitation Project (TDRP) and the Micro Projects Component. The PE is divided in expenditures for Model Projects and Micro Projects, with for both the expenditures related to the Khartoum based Programme Management Unit (PMU) separately reflected. Currently, the Project is implemented under PE3 and spending has almost been finalized. Up to now, under the MP component 93% has been spent, with expenditures between 77% and 103%. The lowest expenditure is in Tokar Delta, which coincides with the implementation problems reflected later in this report. In the MPP, 99% has been spent, with expenditure in budget lines between 84% and 109%.

**Table 2: 2007-2012 Programme Expenditure against Budget SPCRCP MP and MPP Component**

Model Projects	Total budget	Spent up to now (total PE1, 2 + 3)	Expenditure as part of budget (%)
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<b>Model projects (MP)</b>			
<b>Blue Nile State</b>			
<b>Activities</b>	1,480,401.09	1,362,197.11	<b>92</b>
<b>Capital Investment</b>	603,635.13	544,287.84	<b>90</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>	748,729.23	770,555.05	<b>103</b>
<b>Sub-total Blue Nile State</b>	<b>2,832,765.45</b>	<b>2,677,040.00</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>Tokar Delta, Red Sea</b>			
<b>Activities</b>	141,937.86	127,847.85	<b>90</b>
<b>Capital Investment</b>	31,034.63	23,743.09	<b>77</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>	2,517,554.14	2,245,391.11	<b>89</b>
<b>Sub-total Red sea State</b>	<b>2,690,526.63</b>	<b>2,396,982.05</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>South Kordofan</b>			
<b>Activities</b>	768,418.58	693,818.24	<b>90</b>
<b>Capital Investment</b>	117,668.97	100,004.72	<b>85</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>	1,111,351.51	1,080,563.71	<b>97</b>
<b>Sub-total South Kordofan</b>	<b>1,997,439.06</b>	<b>1,874,386.67</b>	<b>94</b>
<b>PMU</b>	266,486.76	259,422.91	<b>97</b>
<b>Total MP</b>	<b>7,787,217.90</b>	<b>7,207,831.63</b>	<b>93</b>

<b>Micro projects (MPP)</b>			
<b>Blue Nile State</b>	166,379.31	165,347.59	<b>99</b>
<b>Red Sea State</b>	269,827.59	271,469.55	<b>101</b>
<b>River Nile State</b>	470,689.66	481,661.90	<b>102</b>
<b>South Kordofan</b>	162,068.97	136,386.90	<b>84</b>
<b>PMU</b>	16,034.48	17,557.41	<b>109</b>
<b>Total MPP</b>	<b>1,085,000</b>	<b>1,072,423.35</b>	<b>99</b>

47. The differences between the budget amount in the project documents and the reported budget (MO Euro 7.78 million versus 9 million; MPP Euro 1.085 million versus Euro 2 million) was reported by EMM as caused by exchange rate differences and by the fact that transport and other procurements done through EC were not reported.

#### 4.1.2 *Implementation of activities*

48. In general, the Programme has been implemented efficiently and effectively and value for money and efforts was delivered. Even though as a result of different circumstances structural capacity enhancement was not always fully reached, time, effort and money were mostly well used to implement the activities as such; most activities were effectively implemented.

49. The design implicitly and explicitly co-opts communities, state and local public bodies (and to a lesser extent NSAs) and is therefore geared to leverage project resources and create 'good value for money'. Insufficient allowance was made for disturbances and conflicts, mainly because these were not adequately reflected in the design; project staff tried however to progress as good as possible in view of these disturbances.

50. One of the roles of the project has been to monitor and guide the use of financial resources and the physical capacity building. It is highly uncertain whether the government will be able to continue maintenance and repair of equipment and means of transport, since budgets are limited and funds do not always arrive as budgeted. The staff members of government have not yet often been able to plan and budget activities in a structural manner and have been relying in many cases of full support from the project.

51. A large part of the project funds have been spent on physical capacity building like refurbishment of offices and procurement of furniture, cars and equipment. Whilst there was a dire need for these investments and stakeholders reported a better work environment and an improvement of their work quality and commitment as a result, it was sometimes found that these investments were not used to the full extent. Especially computer equipment was not fully exploited since government staff was not always aware and trained to use the computers in all aspects of their work, notwithstanding the fact that a large number of government staff had been trained.
52. During the Evaluation mission, the Team witnessed a very large part of the project money actually being spent. In the CB budget, especially regarding development of services, large amounts were still outstanding per end of June 2012 which may illustrate this finding. As a result of delays and postponements and sometimes lack of good planning, both EMM and FAO tried to complete as many activities as possible before the project's ending, in order not to have to lose the budgeted funds.

#### **4.2 Programme management and coordination**

53. Especially in view of the difficult circumstances, FAO programme management was found adequate. Not having had to grapple with the co-implementation modality possibly would have improved the effectiveness of management.
54. Implementation and management have taken place as much as possible at decentralized level. For the Capacity Building sub-programme, FAO has established a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) in Khartoum, headed by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) or by a local Project Manager (PM) supported by an international CTA. Four Technical Support Units (TSUs) have been established at State level. The TSUs as well as the PCU staff report to the CTA. The CTA reports to the budget holder in Rome. For delivering the activities, FAO collaborates with the Ministries through Memoranda of Understanding and Letters of Agreement.
55. Programme management at State level operated through AWP and Programme Estimates to be approved at central level. While implementing, specific activities required additional approval from central level. Whilst this is understandable from a control point of view, it decreased the strategic oversight at State level and moved the focus towards outputs. The decision making process of the TSU was sometimes delayed because of having to involve the PCU in Khartoum or FAO Rome in decision making, a result of FAO's organizational procedures.
56. Both contractors chose to manage the Programme centrally, from a central management and administration office in Khartoum, with 'management outposts' at state level. The Project Document was not sub-divided into state-specific project documents, neither by FAO nor by EMM. For the FAO component, AWP were formulated in consultation between state and central level management; the EMM activities were implemented in a similar manner within the Programme Estimates (PEs).
57. The management and administrative configuration is in accordance with the output orientation of the project document, and does not per se yield state-specific results that can be evaluated against a state-specific SPCR sub-programme.
58. In general, the AWP were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, programme activities were largely implemented on time and progressed generally as planned. The PCU and TSU and the leaders of the CB and MP components



proved in most cases capable of handling the programme in an efficient manner. Unfortunately, the large delay at the onset of the implementation had eliminated any catch-up possibilities and now the programme has neared its end, however, it is even less sure that matters will be progressed in an efficient way.

59. The top-down approach to development, which was still too much used in various activities, hampered an optimal achievement. Even activities like FFS, which are bottom-up by nature, were sometimes conducted in a top-down manner. A change towards a more facilitative approach was acknowledged as important by all stakeholders, but looking at the historic background and existing practices it may take a number of years until the approach will be bottom up throughout.
60. There is a National Programme Coordinator (NPC) designated by the Government in Khartoum, who has been coordinating both the CB and the MP implementation. He dedicated his time to the Programme on a part-time basis and he has contributed to increased synergy between the components after the MTE as well as certified government input at capital level. He is also coordinating the Technical Coordination Committees, which have been set up to replace the TSUs after the project's phasing out.
61. The SPCRP Programme Steering Committee (PSC) is the oversight mechanism, envisaged to meet regularly, and provide strategic oversight as well as operational guidance and arbitration where and when deemed desirable. A national PSC comprised of members from both Sudan and South Sudan was not initialized as foreseen in the original plan. The PSC for Sudan was chaired by the National Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and included members from various State Ministries of Agriculture, FAO and the European Union. The originally planned participation by an observer from GoSS appeared impractical and was not pursued.
62. The PSC was tasked to provide technical support and assistance to local institutions involved in implementation; to monitor and review the CB component and was responsible to oversee and approve procurement and funds disbursement under the CB component. The PSC may have duly executed this task, as is reflected in the minutes of the 15 PSC meetings conducted, but it did not succeed in systematically bridging the separation of the two components; the PSC meetings concerned operational rather than strategic matters and oversight. The National Programme Coordinator, who was assigned to contribute to this issue, appeared well aware of the project and its strategic needs but was also too much overloaded with other tasks to be able to make a large contribution.
63. Since the time of the MTE (May 2012), meetings were held 9 February 2011, 10 April 2011, 1 November 2011 and 8 May 2012. Two meetings were held during the evaluation mission: 1 and 14 October 2012. The number of participants varied between 5 and 19. In all meetings, there were representatives from FAO, EMM, EUD and the government.
64. The Project Advisory Committees (PACs) on the other hand appeared very weak in all states and did not produce any clear results. They were not even mentioned in any of the interviews and their contribution was entirely unclear. The Team has not been able to find any documents or other proofs of the added value of these committees.
65. Technical Coordination Committees (TCCs) were set up after the MTE in order to facilitate the exit and improve sustainability. They often were headed by the Director General (DG) from the State Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation (MoAARI) and had members from the Department of Planning and other government bodies. The quality of these committees was varied. In RSS, the Committee seemed

strong; they met on a weekly basis and reported on a monthly basis. Their focus however was still strongly programmatic and follow up was not entirely clear. In other states the meeting frequency was even lower.

66. Since the TCC are coordinated by the National Programme Coordinator who is funded by the project, their sustainability is even less sure when project funds are no longer available. In some states, it was said that the responsibility of assets would be handed over to the TCC, which may be difficult in view of their after project life. It is highly unsure how effective these committees will be after 2012.
67. The Project Task Force (PTF) from FAO has not played any role as an integral advisory body in the post-MTE period. As far as the Team could find, there had been no (virtual) meetings and there were no specific issues addressed. Some of the members had been active as technical back-stoppers in relevant subjects, but other listed members were not even aware of their membership and had never participated in any PTF related communication.
68. No communication strategy or visibility strategy was available to guide the project implementation. The use of audio-visual materials was mostly ad-hoc, not deliberately or strategically intended to support the project. Visibility materials and methods were general different per state, with regard to the quality of materials, the use of the media and the frequency of sharing results inside and outside the project audience. Materials were not always adapted to the target audience; in FFS, more than half of the training materials contained written parts, whereas it appeared that only 25% of the participants in the FFS visited were literate.
69. EMM has implemented its projects through Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in each state, whereas FAO used their TSUs for implementation. The implementation offices from both contractors were often not located close to each other and the implementation areas were not always the same. Distances between the locations made it more difficult for both to optimally profit from each other's input and link their project contributions as it was meant in the design.
70. The government in Tokar Delta, RSS reported that they were disappointed about their lack of involvement and participation in the MP related procurement, planning and action. They felt, that the MP implementers were very much focused on achieving a high rate of expenditure and less so on supporting the government in creating a sustainable intervention. They were highly satisfied though with the transparency and participative approach of FAO, even though they did find procedures to be too lengthy.
71. In Tokar Delta there had also been a troubled relation between the MP and the local NGO Omhail Society. This NGO reports to have been involved in organising payment and works on mesquite eradication with farmers and showed lists of payment. They believed that they have been promised more funds and more work than was actually performed. They also stated that a contract had been promised repeatedly but never signed. EMM on the other hand believes that they only provided this NGO with a small amount of money to work on mesquite pod milling, an activity that was never performed nor mentioned by Omhail Society.

#### **4.3 *Monitoring and Evaluation***

72. A baseline survey and situation assessment survey were conducted to help the project team measure and report on the project's outcome and impact. A database system was developed and

installed at the Monitoring Units of the four target state Ministries to provide reliable information on the accomplished activities and results achieved by each state.

73. Still, the quality of the M&E system as a whole needed improvement as it was insufficiently comprehensive regarding the achievement of the entire project. The M&E activities were conducted on parallel trails by FAO and EMM. No data were shared and no collective reporting took place. Even though data collection was conducted, insufficient efforts took place to reflect the impact of SPCRP as a whole. The stakeholders at field level were not clearly involved in collection or analysis of data. M&E training was conducted for government staff but the acquired knowledge was not used to the full extent in the project's monitoring.
74. Monitoring Units were set up within the ministries of agriculture; methods and approach improved as a result of training. Transport means and equipment were provided by the project also to conduct M&E. The use of transport means was however found to have contributed to outreach in a more significant way than to M&E. This may be caused by the fact, that M&E in general was not conducted in a very participatory way. The government as well as the contractors relied on visiting the sites and compiling themselves the data instead of putting also emphasis on stakeholders collecting and bringing in data.
75. Monitoring and efforts by the MP were extremely limited; no clear efforts were made to come up with baseline surveys or impact measuring, not even rapid assessments. FAO has at least tried to conduct regular monitoring, has produced baseline assessments as well as impact assessments of various components. The quality would have benefited though from the use of formats and a more structured approach.

#### **4.4 *Technical backstopping***

76. Technical backstopping has been provided by FAO on the subject of extension and rural advisory services, FFS, Community Animal Resource Development Associate (CARDA) and SBG on a number of occasions. Technical backstopping took place through telephone and internet communication but also in the form of regular visits. Technical subjects were covered but also more strategic issues. With regard to capacity building, limited backstopping took place.
77. FFS was definitely best covered; 14 visits by technical staff from Rome from various levels and consultants/FFS resource persons were made after the MTE with durations between one week and 2 months. Visits were made to Khartoum and to all target states.
78. For CARDA, 4 missions were conducted (one from Addis Ababa and three from Rome), for the follow up of the new manual, general support to implementation and development and follow up of a new road map.
79. For SBG, 8 visits of backstopping staff were made, five by FAO staff from Ethiopia, Uganda and Rome and three by a consultant. The subjects of the backstopping were related to value chain development, participatory agro-enterprise development and policy development and lasted anywhere between 1 day and 3 months.
80. For Extension and Rural Advisory Services, 7 missions were undertaken by FAO technical staff from Rome and consultants/extension policy resource persons, for overall support to implementation and the development of a draft national extension strategy and state action plans.

#### **4.5 *Government's participation***

81. Government extension is important for FFS but it has not been sufficiently institutionalised since the time is too short and not budgeted for. The fact that EMM has provided financial incentives to Government on a regular basis has not helped to make Government officials see the SPCR related activities as part of their regular workload.
82. There appears to be a considerable gap in knowledge and capacity between people at the higher level in Khartoum and those responsible for implementation. Government staff members at lower level were often misinformed and were found unaware about the content and implications of their own basic policies.
83. The project has supported the establishment of marketing units within the state governments. The marketing structure and access are weak and government support has been limited. The government staff has been trained in a Training of Trainers (TOT) on business management as well as specific marketing activities related to agricultural products. With this capacity, they have learned to train community members to add value to their produce and improve sales. There has been little opportunity however to try out this knowledge so it seems improbable that these activities will continue after the project's ending.

#### **4.6 *Constraints to implementation***

84. The security situation has been an ongoing constraint. Especially in SK and BN the security situation seriously hampered the quality and speed of implementation. Some activities had to be transferred to different localities or entirely closed. As a result, communities could not be reached, activities started late or not at all or had to be abandoned halfway, decisions on replacement action came late in the project life, communities hesitated to get fully engaged with the project and staff became less motivated. Still, especially in BN, the extent of achievement in the light of these limitations should be commended. Demarcation of livestock routes which have been rehabilitated in coordinated action by many stakeholders are an example thereof.
85. A high staff turnover at all levels (FAO TSUs and PCU, EU and government) has hampered implementation and decreased the impact of human capacity building, especially at government level. The PCU in Khartoum has had three Technical Advisers (TAs) during the implementation of the project; in EU international staff, who had been working and building up knowledge and expertise on SPCR, left because of the usual rotation. In government, staff members left after training because they could use their increased capacity to receive a better salary elsewhere, which is not necessarily negative. State Ministers were frequently replaced or saw their level of responsibility changed as a result of separation or re-unification of Ministries.
86. Delays emerging over the project's duration at various levels hampered the smooth progress at other levels. As a result of various backlogs resulting from FAO, EU and government procedures, a delay of more than a year occurred. Even though this delay took place at the beginning of the programme, the effects still weighed on today's outcome. Since the activities in all areas had started much later than foreseen, it was difficult to round them up in time and even more difficult to expect and measure any

impact at household level. Lengthy procedures with all stakeholders and lack of decision making power at decentralized level obstructed a smooth implementation in the field.

87. In the ARP, a number of constraints are brought up which have also appeared relevant to SPCRP. Lack of political and institutional stability has hampered a smooth roll out of the activities. At state level, during the life time of the project, ministries of agriculture and livestock have been separated and brought together again. These have been lengthy and complex processes, which have drawn away attention and resources from SPCRP related issues.

## **5 Results and contribution to objectives**

88. A large number of outputs were produced under both the CB and the MP/MPP components. A summary list of outputs per target State may be found in Annex 5.

### ***5.1 Outputs and outcomes under the Capacity Building Component***

#### ***5.1.1 Human capacity building***

89. Trainings were valued by government staff and the satisfaction level was high. Most trainees said to have enjoyed the trainings and found they might also benefit from their increased knowledge at a later stage. Various assessments had been carried out but it was difficult to estimate the extent to which the learning had been used in the daily work of government staff. M&E assessments of training were somewhat shallow and did not always sufficiently look beyond the trainees' satisfaction.
90. Targeted training has been extended to generic subjects such as report writing and basic computer skills, and in a range of specialized subjects such as research methods, statistical analysis, database management, evaluation methods and plant and veterinary practices. This was found appropriate and effective, when looking at the identified absence of capacities and the need to address these before strengthening more specific ones.
91. Training has been prepared, conducted and followed up efficiently. Proper procedures were followed and the required coordinating infrastructure at component level was provided. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at state level, the decision to acquire trainers and curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU for that purpose, was appropriate.
92. About 60% of the staff in members in the State Ministry of Agriculture Animal Resources and Irrigation (SMoAARI) was trained only once, while about 40% of the staff were trained more than one time. Even though on-the-job training was also conducted, the impact of participating in just one training course over a period of 4 years is assumed to have at best limited impact on staff performance. It is possible though, that the high turnover of staff has negatively contributed to the training frequency. Identification and selection of fewer key areas for training and training of fewer staff members but more intensively would have had a bigger and longer lasting impact than has been the case under SPCRP's CB strategy.
93. Training results evaluation has been undertaken, but have had no further implications. The quality and use of output was not carefully checked and the training sessions and selection of trainees were not linked to the organisational structure and human resources development plans. It is unclear to which degree staff performance assessment is fully professionally done, and the project did not plan to support the ministries in this regard. The focus seemed more on the number of people trained and training sessions conducted than on the quality and usefulness. Even though trained staff appeared young, committed and enthusiastic enough, a more strategic and structured approach would have improved their performance.

#### ***5.1.2 Institutional capacity building***

94. Under SPCRP, new units have been established at State Ministry level. In some States there are now 4 separate units (training, market, M&E, database), others

established a Planning Unit with various subunits. RSS has even proposal writers in the Planning unit, who have already been successful in acquiring funding during the Kuwait Conference for the East Sudan Peace Agreement. It would however have been better if an overall structure had been used for all 4 target States. On the other hand, the units have added to the Ministries' competence and reach.

95. In order to achieve a structural institutional capacity building, organizational reviews need to take place and organogrammes revised. Organogrammes were developed and proposed, but the government did not get round to implementing them and thus, they were still found unclear and sometimes job descriptions were not always available or suitable and as one of the results, no performance assessments are conducted. Staff members were often unsure about their place in the organization; they carried out tasks and reported to "just do what the boss told them", they had no access to job descriptions or regular professional performance assessments.
96. Organisational reviews have taken place but were insufficiently penetrating to lead to substantive recommendations for procedures, protocols, structure and human development needs. This threatens the cohesion and collective strength of the ministries even more so in the light of separation and re-unification of State Ministries.
97. RSS has extension sections under different departments of the ministries e.g. horticulture, plant protection, forestry and fisheries. An extension forum was established for coordination and exchange. This forum, however, seemed only participated by management staff. Extensionists themselves were not aware or informed about the forum, most of the time they did not even know when such forums were taking place. SPCR did not contribute to solving this issue.
98. Building on its experiences in developing rural extension and advisory services SPCR developed a proposal for a national agricultural extension strategy, through a participatory and consultative approach involving all key stakeholders concerned with the development of the agricultural sector at federal and state (BN, RN, RS and SK) levels. The proposed strategy uses the objectives of the Agricultural Recovery Programme as its basic reference, and provides a vision of what the agricultural extension system should look like, and a strategic plan outlining how to achieve this vision. While the proposed strategy document constitutes the first ever developed comprehensive extension policy framework for agricultural extension in the Sudan, further action is needed to involve all states (non-SPCR) in consultations towards adjusting, fine-tuning and endorsing the document as a national extension strategy.

### 5.1.3 *Physical Capacity building*

99. A list of details regarding outputs and provisions by the project may be found in Annex 5. The improved condition of the buildings has added to the quality of work and to the commitment of government staff members. The means of transport are highly appreciated even though a need remains. Livestock related ministries and departments often reported to be disadvantaged as compared to agriculture related ministries and departments. The Team found a truth value in this statement but doubted the reported extent of it.
100. The repair and maintenance of buildings, cars and equipment has been planned and conducted by the project without any clear input or support by the Government. It is unclear whether the Government will indeed be willing and able to plan and budget for this after the programme's termination, even though promises were made.

#### 5.1.4 *FFS*

101. In Sudan, already in 1993 the first FFSs were established, funded by the Dutch Government. Unfortunately, as a result of war these were discontinued and obviously, upscaling was impossible. Still, the concept had left behind a positive impression and was adopted by the government in 2003.

#### **Achievements**

102. SPCR was instrumental in the introduction of FFS in Sudan; as a result, government has introduced the FFS approach into their planning and budgeting approach and other donors (for instance Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and EU itself) have also started replicating the implementation of FFS. The impact of FFS at household level, especially within the cycles started at the beginning of SPCR's implementation, has been found promising.

103. 222 FFS groups were started in the 4 target states, out of which 182 FFS are still active. 364 farmer facilitators are operational, 2 per school. The table underneath provides an overview of the established and active FFSs per locality, as well as the percentage of women among the total participants as per October 2012.

**Table 3: Established and active FFS per Locality/State (2012)**

State	Localities	#FFS established	#FFS active	% female participants
<b>SK</b>	7	85	64	<b>35</b>
<b>BN</b>	3	62	47	<b>50</b>
<b>RN</b>	2	41	39	<b>16</b>
<b>RS</b>	2	34	32	<b>28</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>182</b>	

104. An FFS strategy workshop was held in each state; policy support was expressed in each of the target states, which culminated into a national strategy workshop at Federal level. An action plan for FFS sustainability will be developed based on the recommendation of strategy workshops.

105. Each state has a FFS state team trained according to a clear FFS methodology. The FFS team members proved able to conduct basic FFS training, provide backstopping to activities, set up supporting research and develop FFS programmes at state level; in total 69 FFS coordinators, 5 FFS supervisors and 4 state level Research staff have been trained under SPCR. The well-structured and tested methodology allowed the coordinators to quickly organize, expose and train farmers in a full range of new knowledge, skills and farming practices; the benefits reaped after 1 year were small-scale but visible for all members. A number of farmers had improved knowledge of farming practices and net production values were reported to have gone up in several places.

106. Through the FFS approach, the project was able to create a significant improvement of the relationship between research, extension and farmers and their community. The FFSs delivered value for money. At limited cost, the FFS assist farmers to increase their productivity across a full range of farming practices and gain knowledge and understanding. The FFSs operated to full satisfaction of the farming communities and the individual farmers.

107. Farmers and the farmers' union reported lasting increases in knowledge and improvement of farming practices. The FFSs and the farming communities report rewarding communication with the ministry's research and extension services, which was



virtually absent before the project. The role of the Agricultural Research Station, established in RSS under the project, was valued in this regard.

108. After a first backstopping visit to Sudan from FAO Rome in June/July 2010, after the MTE, some problems were identified with regard to understanding the FFS concept and skills to implement the FFS. Therefore, in most of the states the focus shifted from a multiple-problem based approach to a focus on one crop, selected by the farmer participants. This complied better with the existing FFS approaches. A number of other recommendations were followed up and it was brought up by many stakeholders that this has led to an improvement in the strategic approach and implementation of FFS and a greater degree of satisfaction.
109. The grants that were distributed upon completion of the FFS according to acceptance of the group proposal contribute to the impact of the FFS. Grants requested by FFS groups were for example for additional livestock, storage room, equipment or irrigation tools. Some grants were for sustaining and improving activities, which the group was already involved in, whereas others were for diversification of income. In both cases the grant may contribute to further increase and sustain income.
110. A number of other donors as well as the Government itself have now adopted the approach in Sudan, which may open the way to other solutions like the training of Master Trainers.

#### **Opportunities for improvement**

111. Even though the Government of Sudan appeared positive and willing to further adopt and upscale the FFS approach, the concept and approach still needs to be further adapted to Sudan's local conditions and requirements by taking into due account the constraints faced by farmers related to inputs, credits and marketing. Even though in principal the FFS aim at achieving as much as possible in view of the context, without providing appropriate solutions in these areas, farmers will soon loose ability and interest to continue boosting production and the FFS approach will be doomed to fade out. The project might have adopted efforts to advocate for a conducive policy environment, accompanied by an effective implementation strategy while allowing for state-specific conditions.
112. Recommended by the backstopping officer, it was decided to concentrate on quality of FFS rather than quantity. The target number of FFS was reduced by more than half, as a result of the security situation in the southern states as well as to cater for a focus on improved quality. Consequently, the number of FFS established was found very low by the Evaluation Team, even though it was understood that the situation was not conducive to targeting a much higher number. Also, the technical backstopping missions had been conducted only at a very late point in time, which made it difficult to implement adaptations in a large number of FFSs.
113. Delays were problematic for the implementation of the FFS. Since grants were planned to be distributed after the implementation of two seasons in the field, the total duration of an FFS would amount to 2 ½-3 years including the preparation and selection phase. The project had planned 2 to 3 rounds of FFS. Those FFS that started in 2011 could therefore only complete one season, upon which the grant was distributed immediately. The first season usually consisted of work on a demonstration plot, and therefore the farmers had not been able to apply their newly acquired skills on their own

plot. Even though they reported profits from the new technique in the demonstration plot, the passing of almost 9 months before they would be able to actually apply the knowledge may well negatively affect the final outcome at household level.

114. Even though guidelines were formulated, the late workshop on grants and grant management in early 2012 combined with procedures of Government and FAO did not allow the project to sufficiently embed and follow guidelines and procedures.
115. The fact that backstopping only started by mid 2010, the delay in establishment, absence of clear guidelines and length of FAO procedures and the inadequate planning with regard to the agricultural seasons led to difficulties in post-FFS grant provision. Especially in RNS, by the time FFS had finished there was insufficient time for submitting of proposals and providing grants per selection of the beneficiaries. In some cases, groups were pressed into proposing a certain item which later appeared less feasible (sheep in Arba'at, RSS). In one case, all beneficiaries were offered fertilizers, which they could sell to use the proceeds to acquire their first choice to overcome time constraint.
116. The project developed recommended practices, recommendations and training materials but these were mainly on crop production. The current FFS approach and strategy does not always adequately integrate livestock with crop production, particularly with regard to utilizing effectively the manure as a replacement to commercial fertilizer.
117. The limited coordination and cooperation between FFS/Extension and Rural Marketing-SBG prevented addressing the problems that FFS members and farmers in general face with regard to inputs, credit and marketing.
118. FFS groups have been successful up to now with regard to using the acquired knowledge whilst the project was ongoing, but this practice will be difficult to sustain without external input. The practice of setting up and participating in Farmer Groups and benefitting from such group forming has been insufficiently elaborated, leaving graduated FFS groups in isolation.
119. In most cases, the organizational set-up of extension concentrated decision making at the State level and gave the Locality insufficient role to play. This gave rise to loss of time and insufficient possibilities to address the local needs in an efficient manner.

#### 5.1.5 CARDAs

##### **Achievements**

120. The concept of CARDA evolved from the CAHW (Community Animal Health Worker) concept rooted in the emergency modus in a participatory process involving all major stakeholders of the livestock sector. CARDA was initiated in Sudan by the project, based on 'best' international practice regarding animal productivity. The project had organized an international workshop on this issue in April 2010 in Khartoum with participants from 8 countries. In 2011, the upgrading from CAHW to CARDA was started. Apart from animal health related issues, components like animal nutrition, cross breeding, reproductive health care, marketing and processing of animals and communication skills were added to the curriculum.
121. Shortly after the workshop, the CARDA concept was endorsed at federal and state level as the official model for dealing with livestock and animal health related matters below the existing government services. The project provided each CARDA with a basic tool kit and procured a set of drugs, even though not all CARDAs had received the drugs yet at the time of evaluation.

122. The upgrading from CAHW to CARDA was found relevant and useful by all stakeholders. 182 CARDAs were trained and among them 10 were women. The content of training for CARDAs has been broadened as compared to CAHWs, animal nutrition, breeding, animal products processing and livestock marketing were added to the curriculum. The requirements have also been tightened, for instance, literacy is now obligatory. In some of the states, it was decided to select new candidates for CARDA training. In other states, the best CAHWs have been identified as candidates for follow up CARDA training.
123. CARDA and CAHW are well understood in SMOAARI and integrated in the overall animal production and health services concept of the State Government. The Animal Resources Department in RNS planned to request sufficient budgets in 2013 for training an additional 80 CARDAs and upgrade the CAHWs through further complementary training particularly in animal nutrition. In RSS, for the time being the approach is only implemented in Tokar Delta and therefore, upscaling is not yet likely to happen in the near future. In some States, both CARDAs and CAHWs were found to be functioning. There is still a need felt for CAHWs in concentrating on disease detection and vaccination. Since considerable resource had been spent on building the capacity of CAHWs, it was justifiable to still also involve the CAHWs, since not all of them could be (re)trained as CARDAs. Not only had the curriculum been broadened, the requirements for CARDAs were also more extensive than for CAHWs and thus not all CAHWs could be upgraded by training. To achieve the planned number of trained CARDAs, sometimes trainees were newly identified without CAHW background.
124. Even though it was difficult to collect hard evidence, reportedly, livestock healthy life and productivity increased considerably. Net animal husbandry revenues were estimated to increase approximately by 30-70%. The time though to reach an increase in productivity is longer than in FFS, up to 2-3 years.
125. Livestock farmers reportedly value CARDA and appreciate that it is more inclusive than CAHW and that it more positively affects household income. When asked, farmers reply that they will continue to practice the changes in animal husbandry CARDA taught them. The ministry's animal production directorate and departments also reported to have adopted CARDA as the leading principle of their extension operations.
126. CARDAs emphasized the necessary freedom to incorporate other livestock related issues into their curriculum, one of them being access to fodder. This was confirmed by the Pastoralist Union to be a problem of major concern. The same union reported that CARDAs were already very useful to them, especially with regard to disease recognition.
127. The provision of a free mobile phone network services to connect CARDAs and ARDGs across the country, is a remarkable achievement. It helps maintaining the link between the government as service provider at central level and community service providers in different locations.

### **Opportunities for improvement**

128. A high staff turn-over, like already reflected in other area's, has been eroding the implementation of the CARDA model from the very start of its implementation. Loss of staff is anticipated to continue in the future, and only appropriate counter measures may prevent the whole CARDA approach from disappearing. Even though the project has tried to advocate with government and with the CARDAs themselves by demonstrating

the usefulness and benefit, after the project's phasing out it will be difficult to influence this issue.

129. The new manual for CARDAs arrived later than expected in late November 2011, thus creating a delay in the training and making follow-up and ensuring sustainability of the CARDAs as a concept and the revolving drug fund more difficult.
130. As a result of the late start, before the project's end the experience gained by CARDAs and in operating ARDGs may not yet be entirely sufficient for increasing production and productivity of the livestock sector. The government will not have gained sufficient experience yet in supervising effectively CARDAs, ARDGs and CAHWs.
131. The CARDA concept and practice involve training Animal Resource Development Coordinators (ARDC) who in turn train and support community selected facilitators. Each CARDA will work with a community (Animal Resource Development Group (ARDG)), an approach which is more or less similar to FFS. Still, there is little cooperation between FFS and CARDA.
132. A revolving fund was set up for provision of drugs, additives and equipment to replace the drugs, additives and equipment provided by SPCRP. The revolving drug fund however only offered the provision of drugs against payment of the drugs at a later stage. No additional payment was foreseen for cases of debt failure or other mishaps. There was no clear department or structure responsible for managing the fund. The fund is of a complex nature and management of in- and outflow of money and drugs, shelf life and logistics will need to be supervised. Quality control regarding the drugs was not incorporated in the system. Replacing used drugs may need imports and foreign exchange. Management of the fund therefore needs to be carefully planned and budgeted.
133. Some CARDAs saw the fund as a potential future source of microcredit for future unrelated business, and it was apparently not clear to them that the sole purpose of the fund is for veterinary drugs and additives as well as livestock equipment.
134. In some areas, pharmacies were present and drugs could be freely procured, making that part of CARDAs' work less relevant. And though CARDAs were trained in other fields than animal health, in practice, many CARDAs confined themselves to drug sales and vaccination. This was aggravated by the fact that they often work on a voluntary basis and receive no fee for their work. Some CARDAs brought up the limited need for drug sales to the Evaluation Team and would have preferred to concentrate on issues like fodder provision.
135. CARDA is extended to livestock farmers, not to herders and nomadic communities. In BNS, as a component of Stock Routes Rehabilitation, CARDA services were and are extended to the herds, albeit on a modest scale. The herders appreciate the services and are prepared to pay for them. In other states, CARDA has not (yet) been extended to herders and herds, but this should be considered seriously in future, possibly in connection with herd reducing Government ambitions and projects.

#### *5.1.6 Rural Marketing and Small Businesses.*

136. This focus area has been brought up as weak by many interviewees. It has appeared difficult to establish market links. Furthermore, even though some of the small business groups were composed of formerly trained people like FFS participants and fishermen, there were also many groups that were started completely new. As a result, they had not taken off properly and some even had to be abolished. It must be mentioned, though, that the budget for this component was considerably smaller than that for the other

components, namely 30% of the total FFS budget and 66% of the CARDA budget. As a result, the scales of implementation and impact automatically have become smaller.

137. SBGs started late, many of them in 2011 and a substantial number of them only in 2012. The SBG concept and practice is therefore in its infancy and will prove sustainable only with considerable technical and money assistance. SBG participants are generally quite appreciative of the project activities in this regard.
138. The SBG concept and strategy are still slowly evolving. Even though post-FFS groups have graduated into SBG groups, the approach has often been stand-. It needs to be structurally combined with and integrated into the FFS approach. Little efforts were undertaken to link the different groups with each other, and/or to link the SBGs with financial institutions. The project did not initiate coordinated marketing efforts either.
139. The SBG projects, unlike FFS, suffered from limited technical backstopping, which resulted in a lack of focus and lingering teething problems. There was no clear strategy for registration of the groups, some were registered as Community Based Organisations whilst others were not; in both cases they received input from the project.
140. The establishment and staffing of a marketing unit within the SMOAARI and training of support staff is a good achievement, which may contribute to providing government support after the project has ended. The fact however that government staff had to be trained in many single subjects without having used such knowledge in practice for a long time may cause such services not to continue; the lack of budget and existence of other priorities within the government aggravates the matter.
141. Since 2011, the SBG introduced the value chain approach. Even though this meant yet another late change in approach, the outcome was positive. The SBG sub-component assisted and trained staff of the Planning Department in regularly collecting prices and quantities of major agricultural commodities and disseminating this information through mass media. It is doubtful however, if the government will make the allocation in the budget of the coming years required for continuing with the compilation and dissemination of marketing information as started under the programme.
142. The programme has trained the SBG members in group management, community resources management, book-keeping, value chain approach, networking, processing of different types of vegetables and fruits, the catching and processing of fish, production and processing of poultry, and the production of fodder and alfalfa seeds. In some cases, group members were also trained by the MP/MPP.
143. Business plans were not always developed and if they were, they were often rudimentary and insufficiently detail, particularly with regard to credit and marketing strategy. Little was known about the income generated by the different SBGs with the help of the received training and equipment and not much effort was done to collect such information.

## **5.2 *Outputs and outcome level achievements under the Model Project Component***

144. The contract with EMM started from March 2008 and their field work was initiated in the beginning of 2009, but not much information on the implementation was found in the MTE report. It was brought up that at that time EMM had only just started their implementation, however, after one year there should have been at least some sign of implementation. At the time of this Final Evaluation, EMM had already more or less

finalized the activities and three TAs had left the country, whilst the CTA was on a long annual leave.

145. The progress reports handed in by EMM contained insufficient details; they were very much output focused. There were no training reports available. Information in the tables did not always coincide with the narrative and discrepancy in numbers and dates was found. EU has not always been able to pay sufficient attention in order to force EMM to come up with a better quality reporting. PSC has to approve the reports but usually lacked time and technical capacity to go into the details of the report.
146. The activities and outputs are often somewhat scattered. In BNS, whereas the livestock routes support was reasonably coherent, various kinds of activities related to agriculture and horticulture, fisheries and microfinance were set up to increase income, without a coherent underlying strategy. The activities were implemented as within a pilot like approach.
147. Small numbers of SBG were set up on a broad number of different food items. The participants were trained by government staff from market units in the four states, who had acquired their knowledge in a TOT in Khartoum. The cost-effectiveness of this construction is doubtful, since each of the government trainers may only be able to train one or two SBGs.
148. In SKS, the MP among others set up horticultural and agricultural activities on model farms; for these farms, land was donated by the community. The produce is used for health and nutrition classes for women. As a result of the conflict situation, the construction of a number of wells had to be stopped leaving the farmers to stick to rain fed agriculture.
149. Hafirs were built and found by the Pastoralist Union to have a good impact. In RSS, the value of mesquite flour production was very much doubted by the same group, since they felt it was toxic for all animals but camels. This flour production did not get past a trial stage as it seems, anyway.
150. The MP has carried out various studies in several States on relevant subjects, but no clear link was found to implementation or adaptation of activities. The studies came up with findings and recommendations, but probably due to lack of sufficient remaining time, these could not always be followed up.
151. In Tokar Delta, one of the goals of MP was to work on land registration and restructuring of the Tokar Delta Board. In both cases, it was reported that workshops had been organised, but no further outcome could be found and even no workshop reports were provided. The Tokar Delta Board restructuring had apparently been approved but not implemented, whereas with regard to the land registration no visible changes had taken place.
152. In RSS and SK, food processing plants had been set up by the MP. It was envisaged to hire participants of SBGs, trained by the project in food processing, as employees by these plants. The proceeds of the plant's business were to be shared with the community. At the time of the evaluation however, it was completely unclear how ownership would be arranged, let alone who would benefit from the plant. Whereas EMM was still convinced that a private company would gain ownership by signing a 10-year lease, and sharing the profit with the community, the Government was convinced that the lease period would be of only 1 year, upon which the Government was to decide what to do with the plant in future. Profit sharing, the establishment of a community fund or involvement of local trained population was not all certain.

153. The Evaluation Team found that when they visited the plant, it was completely empty and clearly unused. It was reported to have only been operational for one day in April 2012, but it looked like that had only been a show round of packaging. In SKS the situation did not seem much different, gathered from the feedback received during the workshop. Its ownership and further details are not laid down in a signed contract, there may be economic benefit for the region, but it will not reach the original target population and even their increased capacity may be lost.
154. As the plant in RSS had only worked one day and the plant in SKS not at all, it had not been possible for MP staff to guide the start up of the food processing at the work floor and to ensure that the teething problems would be overcome. Hiring of employees had not started and there was no firm commitment, which left the private company free in using any employees they want upon start of the production process.

### **5.3 *Outputs and outcome level achievements under the Micro Projects Component***

155. The project activities under MPP should be complementary to FSS and CARDA by nature. The MPP were intended to provide on- and off-farm employment as well as entrepreneurship and incomes outside, yet often connected with, regular agricultural activities and animal husbandry.
156. In the original October 2009 proposal by FAO, Micro projects (MPP) were meant to strengthen the role of the State level MoAARI to support community selection of potential projects, to train communities in developing action plans and to monitor and evaluate project implementation. In practice, this has not happened. MPP have supported training, provided input and helped State level government in supporting only the projects planned under SPCRP. Based on these activities however, the government has not built sufficient capacity to select potential project and support building community action plans. The MTE highlighted the absence of strategic linkages in the FAO proposal on MPP, and these linkages have not become considerably stronger.
157. In three out of four States, both MP and MPP were implemented and it appeared difficult for both implementers and beneficiaries to distinguish between the two. Thus, MPP turned into an additional funding source of MP, instead having a focus of its own.
158. In RNS, only MPP was implemented and thus activities had only been started after the MTE. Nonetheless, even without the support of a MP PIU in the state, EMM managed to roll out the activities in a coordinated, quick and qualitative manner. The implementation and decision taking in the MPP component was reported to have been non-bureaucratic and fast.
159. The MPP activities started late (mostly in 2011) and were implemented for a short time only. As a result, they were still in their infancy when the project closed and have not had the time to mature and get entrenched, which will decrease the likelihood of sustainability.
160. The approach has been mainly through working with and providing input to groups. This may be more efficient than when targeting individual entrepreneurs, but will perhaps also be less penetrating, particularly so in the micro-finance and small business activities.

#### 5.4 *Impact*

161. The design aimed at positive and considerable impact in the areas of support to peace and conflict reduction, tangible support to people in need by helping them to improve their livelihood conditions, and strengthening structure of public bodies. With regard to peace and conflict prevention, the impact has been mostly indirect through the achievement of improvement of livelihood conditions of various target groups, thereby respecting needs of others. Some impact in the field of strengthening the institutional capacity of public bodies has been achieved but the impact may have been bigger if a more structural approach had been used.
162. The impact of human capacity building would have been greater if training had been part of a robust organisational development process starting with a mandate analysis and followed up by functional analysis, structure analysis and commensurate action to strengthen the organisational and institutional dimensions of the ministry. In that case, training would have been organically embedded rather than ad-hoc raising of skills and knowledge as was done now.
163. The implementation of SPCR in the field has given rise to a change in mindset, an increase in self-confidence and a change of practices. Also within the Ministries, government staff members showed a change in vocabularies, increased self-confidence and the belief that they could address certain project issues independently now. Even though such changes are hard to measure, the Evaluation Team felt that they were present in most cases.
164. The FFS approach in Sudan up to now has been focused on the increase of production and productivity. These are not stand alone issues though, but depend on the availability of inputs on one other hand and accessibility of existing infrastructure of markets on the other hand. Currently, inputs as well as market infrastructure are problematic and it will therefore be difficult for farmers to not only sustain their increased productivity, but also to ensure that by selling the (now) excess produce their income will increase. If this is not done, the additional crops will only benefit the nutrition at household level and impact with regards to improved livelihoods will remain absent.
165. The impact of the MP implementation was considered less strong. A large part of the MP focused on delivery of inputs, which may have helped improve the livelihood of the target population but only in the short run. No mechanism was included to guide the target population to obtain a continuing access to such inputs.
166. Only in South Kordofan in the MP, a positive impact was acknowledged. Community members reported that they not only had a better knowledge and understanding of horticulture, but that their production and income had increased, that they had started projects with new vegetables and even had been able to set aside savings for health and education.
167. Impact on livelihood of population can only be ensured, if the ownership and working of the two food processing plants, established by the MP component in SK and RSS, are secured before the end date of the project. Poor farmers were supposed not only to sell their excess produce to the plant, but also to be involved as employees. Rules on pricing and wages should thus also be part of the contract.
168. Even if the food processing training will not be used at factory level, the trainees will be able to use it in their households when the prices of the crops they have produced are too low to sell. Thus, they do not only decrease their (post harvest) losses, but also



improve the nutritional status by increasing access to nutrition at times when the season is not beneficial for certain agricultural products.

## 5.5 *Sustainability*

169. Through seeking to involve the communities and NSAs and ascertaining their acceptance as well as an implicit intention to support the project's positive results upon termination of the project, SPCRP has made an effort to make the results sustainable.
170. Sustainability is a complex matter including policies, strategies, institutional and organisational structures with a financial, ecological and cultural dimension and includes ownership, competence, resource availability, political and communities' will to continue, and selection of the subjects of sustainability. As such it does not feature explicitly in the design of the project.
171. The proposal for a national agricultural extension strategy developed and the 4 states action plans chart the course for future directions in rural extension and advisory services, aiming to capitalize on and sustain the developed capacities and experiences generated through SPCRP. However, further follow-up action is needed to finalize, endorse and operationalize the proposed strategy, post SPCRP life-time.

### 5.5.1 *Financial sustainability*

172. The government acknowledges the value of the approaches like FFS and CARDA, but finding financial resources is a different matter. Funds may come from Federal level or be made available at State level. Even though approaches like FFS and CARDA are now part of the regular budgets, this does not certify the arrival or availability of funds, even if budgets are approved. SMOARRI or RSS shared, that they had not received funds from federal level in 2012, and that the future looked bleak. Furthermore, it still appeared difficult for government staff to present the overall financial and management picture underlying such budget lines.
173. Financial sustainability might have been better ensured if the planning processes would have occupied a more central place of attention. Now, review and strengthening of planning processes, tools and techniques have not been addressed in a structured manner. Review and strengthening of budgetary arrangements and procedures and strengthening of connections between budgetary and financial management on the one hand and resource allocation planning on the other should have received more emphasis by the project, to enable the Government to address these issues independently after the project's ending.
174. Groups from SBG and MPP have been started very late in the project and have not yet been sufficiently entrenched. As a result, they have no regular access to funds like microcredit; as soon as the inputs provided by the project have been exhausted, the established groups may fade out, apart from a few exceptional cases where there was a very strong leader or an extremely positive group dynamic.
175. Since the Government of Sudan did not ratify the Cotonou Agreement, future funding from EU is only available from the Special fund for The Sudan; this implies that decisive power in the projects will not be with the governments and funding is limited and can only be provided to projects at state level.

### 5.5.2 *Institutional sustainability*

176. The targeted public bodies are stronger than before the project, sufficiently so that further reinforcement of the organizations may organically follow. The newly acquired skills and knowledge are generally to the point and useful, will largely remain that way and will be co-opted by new staff entering the public bodies. Yet, skills and knowledge need to be used continuously and reinvigorated, and systematic performance assessment should be initiated and embedded in regular Human Resource Management. Also, the design has largely neglected activities that are necessary to generate robust institutional and organizational structure which is a primary condition to ensuring sustainability. It seems to take for granted that elements such as strategic planning, effective M&E, human resource development and inclusive and effective management practices can be established and kept going without comprehensive institutional and organizational development.
177. An analysis of mandate and functions of key public agencies has been missing already from the design stage. During the implementation, a review of organizational structure and procedures has been conducted but has not led to major adaptations. Departmental responsibilities and operational Terms of Reference have not been assessed and revisited. A review of staffing requirements and job descriptions has not been carried out. These omissions have led to a significant reduction of the opportunities for institutional sustainability.
178. Nonetheless, even though a structured approach was missing, some aspects of institutional sustainability of the SPCRP may still be reasonable. As a result of the activities, there are trained staff members, and training, marketing and M&E units have been established in most states. Technically, there are projects like FFS and CARDA, which look like they may be taken up as viable parts of the government approach.
179. The Training Units and Centres supported by SPCRP are instrumental in upscaling the FFS and CARDA approach. They provide the physical space and means for training of government staff involved and new CARDAs. The manuals provided by SPCRP are useful, user friendly and based on the newest information.
180. Human capacity building and development and targeted training need continuous attention while considering for instance staff transfers, promotions, record keeping and special attention to field staff. It is doubtful whether the government will be able to provide the resources to continue this attention after the project's phasing out to prevent this strength from gradually eroding.
181. Training Needs Assessments need to be rolled over at least once every two years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed or new staff entered needing training. The Training Unit at the ministry should see to that, and ensure that they themselves are an up to standard HRD unit. It is unclear if they have that mandate and budget.
182. Extension work requires time and resources. Since facilitators trained by the project lack these resources and have to work on their own farms when extension advice is needed most urgently, it cannot be expected that trained facilitators will carry on their extension work on a systematic and relevant scale; without external support to the trained facilitators, the FFS approach is doomed to fade out rather sooner than later.
183. In RSS, an Agricultural Research Centre was established under SPCRP, similar to such centres already existing in other states. Even though the Ministry reported to be planning and committed to continue the work of this Centre, the staff members of the

Centre itself were apparently not aware of this and reported that 2 out of 3 staff members will not be available for the Centre after 2012, that the land available to the Centre would be decreased and that overall they were in doubt that the Centre would survive longer than 1 year. It was unclear to the Evaluation team, whether this was a matter of miscommunication or whether the government had really no intention of continuing to operate the Centre.

### 5.5.3 *Sustainability at policy level*

184. Even though human and some institutional capacity have been built, the location of responsibility is still centralised. Sustainability will only become possible if the changes brought about by SPCRP are entrenched in the system. To ensure entrenchment, policies will need to be developed or adapted, reflecting all relevant issues with regard to responsibilities and finance in the area of rural development, agriculture and livestock.
185. Although not foreseen in the original project design, SPCRP developed a proposal for a national extension strategy, and implementation action plans, aiming to provide a framework for sustaining and scaling up of SPCRP experiences and results. While this is a step in the right direction, further steps need to be taken by the government to finalize and operationalize the national strategy. At the state level, resources need to be identified by the government to implement the state action plans.
186. FFS groups will probably not continue as specific groups, but technical knowledge and expansion of networks and knowledge may help to improve livelihoods in the long run. Farmers and facilitators are not sufficiently strong to set up FFS by themselves, since the approach is fairly new and not sufficiently embedded yet. On the other hand, the government has become sufficiently convinced of the relevance of the approach and is in fact working on the adoption of FFS on a wider scale. The outcome of the strategic FFS meeting on 24 September 2012 confirmed this intention.
187. The extent to which the upscaling of FFS has been planned up to now is still too small to provide a major shift in approach. For the year 2013, in RSS, only 6 new FFS have been planned; in RNS 12, in SKS 50 and BNS almost none. For a proper upscaling, a detailed plan should still be developed, a full cost calculation exercise carried out and possibilities of immediate funding outlined.
188. The upgrading from CAHW to CARDA has been found valuable in view of relevance and sustainability. CARDAs became part of a wider net of livestock professionals and their services are relevant to the future needs. The government has endorsed CARDA as the official method for livestock production and health below the government veterinary service. To ensure sustainability, however, all aspects of CARDA should be enrolled into a government policy. The programme established a revolving fund for the provision of drugs, additives and equipment, without clearly addressing the long term issues. Issues like additional deposit for bad debtors and other financial losses, quality of drugs, logistics, management of the fund itself, the in and outflow of money and the need for foreign exchange to procure new drugs should be clearly addressed. Responsibilities, mechanisms and financial issues are not yet laid down in a government policy and have not been properly addressed as part of the project either.
189. Government has insufficient money and human resources available to carry on the activities for which their capacity was built. Unfortunately, the design of the project did not contain sustainability approaches like the progressive transfer of responsibility or compulsory increasing government funding. When these were identified in the exit strategy study, it was too late to rectify.

## **5.6 Gender, nutrition and other crosscutting issues**

190. In the project document, it is stipulated that “gender and HIV/Aids related problems are considered as cross-cutting issues whenever relevant”. Whereas gender sensitiveness has at least been observed to a certain extent, HIV/AIDS is nowhere mentioned. Nutrition, which is acknowledged as an important subject within food security programmes, has not been addressed.

### **5.6.1 Gender**

191. Project effort was focused at gender parity and the project conducted a week-long ToT for gender sensitivity and mainstreaming in agriculture and rural development.. Nonetheless, the project should have analysed gender needs and opportunities at the beginning of the project, ensuring these to be addressed as part of the activities. The monitoring system should have collected gender sensitive data and issues like time saving techniques could have been incorporated.

192. Women were involved in FFS and SBGs, and active as CARDAs. Some women were trained at government level to guide the project implementation. The FFS and CARDA groups in most of the states did not have many female coordinators and facilitators though. The reason mostly given is that work is heavy, requires mobility and riding motor bikes which the communities do not encourage or even permit.

193. Seeking the active involvement of women has probably contributed to sustainability at household level. It has been observed that women spend a larger part of additional income on nutrition and education for their households, intrinsically leading to more income generating possibilities in the future.

194. Rural Women Centers have been refurbished and model farms established in Women’s departments under the MP. Women were trained on food processing. Under CB, the utmost effort was made to incorporate women into FFS and to train female coordinators and facilitators on their behalf.

195. In FFS in RSS and RNS States, at the onset there were problems enrolling any women. In 2008 in RNS FFSs were started with 602 men and no women. Slowly however this has changed and women have taken up 30% of membership and 11 of the 39 FFS operational at the end of the programme are women-only FFS. In RSS, a mixed group has even been established. Gender training was conducted for the FFS coordinators and purposively female coordinators were installed.

196. Among 182 CARDAs selected and trained, 10 were women (none in SKS). Even though the percentage of women seems low, it was seen as a breakthrough, since it has appeared very difficult to enrol women in activities like these. In some cases, they were only able to go out to areas close to the project offices, since motor cycles were only used by men. The advice of female CARDAs however was well taken by the male herders, which holds a promise for future female involvement.

197. From interviews and meetings, it appeared that the traditional role of women in the communities and families, particularly in their responsibility for cash and nutrition, make them a good repository for changes in the mindsets, attitude and activities regarding marketing, cash economy and nutrition and health issues.

198. By targeting women and convincing them to be active as CARDAs and in FFS, a contribution has been made towards gender equality, especially since such participation

was unusual before. Looking at the size of the target group and the absence of addressing other strategic gender needs, the impact may be limited, but it is too early to judge the extent in detail.

#### 5.6.2 *Other crosscutting issues*

199. Attention for environment protection is implicit in the FFS approach with emphasis on integrated pest management and reduction of the use of herbicides and pesticides. In SKS, stakeholders reported to use fewer chemicals after having participated in FFS. In RNS, however, the chemical Roundup had been provided and used as herbicide without farmer participants being made aware of the implications. The conservation agriculture approach, which was brought up in FAO Rome as user- and environment friendly and a favoured approach, was not clearly adopted in any of the FFS.
200. The improvement of household nutrition was not pursued as a goal within the programme. At a coincidental base, produce from FFS were once or twice used for nutrition training. This is unfortunate, since at a worldwide scale the link between agriculture and healthy nutrition is more and more acknowledged and could have been exploited relatively easily in SPCRP.

## 6 Synergies and connections

### 6.1 *Collaboration between FAO and EMM*

201. At the design stage of the programme, the intervention was developed based on the assumption that FAO would implement both the CB and the MP component. The synergy between CB and MP was not only foreseen, it was the backbone of the proposed action. Thus, the MP would be used to support the government in applying their acquired capacity and knowledge, as a sort of “on-the-job” training. When EU decided to grant the components to different implementers, it was supposed that synergy would establish itself automatically. This appeared not necessarily the case, not in planning and activities but also not geographically.
202. The structure of the Programme had completely changed by splitting it up in two components, but no coordination mechanism was introduced to link the CB to the MP at various levels and no further attention was paid to the issue. No compulsory collaborative activities were introduced into the programme to facilitate synergy and cooperation. Even though EMM according to project documents could incorporate FAO capacity building support whenever needed, EMM was supposed to fund this from their project budget. As a result, collaboration has been minimal, relations tense and each of the implementers has focused on their own goals and design.
203. After the MTE, efforts were made to improve the cooperation. Monthly meetings were conducted at Khartoum and State capital level, and joint activity matrices were developed. Still, apart from BNS and RNS to a lesser extent, cooperation beyond meetings remained limited.
204. In RNS, a good example of synergy was nonetheless found. Capacity building was provided first by the CB component. Upon finalization, the MPP provided inputs as voiced by the target groups and beneficiaries during the preparatory and planning phase. The cooperation and coordination between the CB and MPP components was exceptionally good here, resulting in coordinated approach and logical sequencing of interventions starting with the CB training the communities and MPP delivering, after CB had completed training the communities and building the organizational structures, the materials and goods in the areas of livestock, fisheries and horticulture. All interventions were identified jointly between villagers and government and with the facilitation by mainly CB staff; they addressed major constraints experienced by these communities as result of the flooding and the loss of land and livestock.
205. In BNS, the cooperation between CB and MP was found sufficient as well. The functional combination, in one single person, of project manager MP, PSC Member for the State, de facto member of the TSU, Director Planning and Acting DG in the absence of the DG proved an efficient vehicle to bring the various activities and parties together when needed.
206. In SKS stakeholders reported cooperation and synergy between CB and MP to be almost absent. Each component trained and worked with their own beneficiary groups, without paying attention to linking the activities to achieve an optimal result. For unclear reason, the MP Manager from government had been replaced just before the end of the project, which complicated completion of implementation and relations.
207. In RSS, the cooperation appeared very limited. There was a tense relationship between the various project partners and all appeared to be implementing according to

their own plans, without consulting the others. Even in a relatively small area like Tokar Delta, hardly any cooperation had been established.

208. The fact that a task division was not clearly provided within SPCR was also obstructing a good synergy. Even though FAO was supposed to be mainly responsible for the capacity building and EMM for the support to livelihood component implemented by way of financing and implementing investment projects, in reality EMM also conducted capacity building (physical and human) on a “if and when needed” basis. Also, inputs have been alternately provided by both organisations in different locations. There has been no coordination between the two implementers on avoidance of duplication or aligning the timelines and target area’s to each other’s needs and actions.
209. Synergy in the MP component itself was also lacking. The MP design was one of 3 separate model projects in three separate states, the MPP being added as a separate additional project at a later stage. The CTA was responsible for the management of all three projects and the MPP, but the implementation was conducted along parallel trails, as was the reporting. No clear regular exchange has taken place regarding lessons learned or experiences, even though the model projects, whilst implementing different activities, worked with the same stakeholders towards the same goal.
210. One final issue concerns the highly centralised management of the project. The absence of state-specific SPCR Plans prevented strategic oversight at state level and implied that the implementation was output driven at state as well as at central level and that the CB and MP components went their own ways. The second final issue concerns the PSC. The minutes of PSC meetings indicate that the discussions at that level were focused on operational and not on strategic matters, and rarely concerned creating synergy between the components.

## **6.2 Synergy and exchange between the Sudan and South Sudan and other countries**

211. Even though the programme was meant to cover both Sudan and South Sudan (which belonged to one country in the beginning of the project), there was never a true synergy between the two. As both areas/countries are very different, this may be understandable, but still opportunities were missed. The countries were often backstopped and guided by different staff members at FAO Headquarters, and different private companies were responsible for the implementation of MP. The planned national PSC never took off and the envisaged observer from South Sudan never participated in the Sudanese PSC.
212. There has been only one exchange meeting with South Sudan, organized for the Ministry of Agriculture by EMM and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the private company involved in implementing the MP in South Sudan. Furthermore, the Evaluation Team has not found any trace of SPCR related communication and exchanges of lessons learned and experiences.
213. Some training materials (for CARDA and FFS) have been used in both Sudan and South Sudan. Looking at the fact that the project made use of activities and approaches, suitable for various countries, more effort could have been made to develop and use materials in a concerted manner.
214. A study tour to the Islamic Republic of Iran was made from 25 to 30 September 2011 with Farmer Field Schools Supervisors, Rural Advisory and Extension Services Coordinators to obtain information on appropriate strategies for effective implementation

of FFS programme and create networks with FFS implementers from a country which is further ahead in FFS. Even though the participants very much appreciated the travel, it was not clear how they made appropriate use of the learning and networks.

### **6.3 *Links between result areas and activities***

215. Like reflected in section 3.2 of the report, the Project Document was largely focused on activities and less so on results. As a consequence, activities were often implemented in isolation without ensuring synergy and coherence between the result areas. This has rendered results and impact fragmented and sub-optimal.
216. There was no clear link or understanding of this link between FFS, CARDAs and SBGs. FFS members could have benefitted more from their enrolment into SBGs whereas SBG members could have profited from their increased agricultural knowledge and skills as well as production and productivity, brought about by FFS. Too little use was made of these connections. Even though FFS and CARDAs worked through similar communities, these efforts were not clearly linked either.
217. Some positive examples of links supported or strengthened by SPCRPs have been found as well. The links between farmers, research and extension have been strengthened by FFS. The stock routes not only have a beneficial effect on livestock quality and income, they also reduce existing conflict situations between farmers and herders and decreased loss of farming produce caused by cattle migration.

### **6.4 *Cooperation with other projects and programmes***

218. When the FMO had just been developed and SPCRPs, the Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action (SIFSIA) and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme (RRP) were designed, the underlying assumption of synergy played a major role. Whereas SIFSIA would have provided information to serve as a basis for RRP and SPCRPs, RRP would have worked from the community upwards linking into the capacity building in government performed by the SPCRPs. The description of the action mentioned that “SPCRPs will coordinate with these interventions. RRP mostly relies on NGOs working at community levels”. It was also mentioned that “the experience of the SPCRPs will feed SIFSIA while the outcome of the SIFSIA’s information systems and policy development work should guide SPCRPs”. Over the years however, delays and postponements as well as changes took place in all three programs, and as a result the connection slowly faded. The Evaluation Team has found very little proof of any coordination or cooperation between these EU funded projects.
219. Cooperation with other EU funded projects like ERDP or projects funded by other donors was very limited. In RSS, a positive exception was found in the form of a monthly fisheries forum, conducted between project staff of SPCRPs, ERDP and UNIDO, but no further clear efforts could be identified between implementers of donor related interventions.
220. Also with other external donor funded projects and programmes, cooperation was found limited or even absent. Even though other development actors worked in the same States on similar subjects, their field interventions were often geographically segregated per locality and each development actor was assigned a number of Localities. This inhibited meeting and cooperation at field level, apparently also hampering further coordination at capital level.



## **7 Lessons learned and good practices**

### **7.1 Lessons Learned**

221. The following lessons learned were identified by one or more stakeholders interviewed:

1. Even though SPCRCP has delivered a considerable amount of capacity building, particularly with regards to human skills and knowledge, and as a result government staff members are more capable and knowledgeable, low availability of financial and human resources and absence of conducive institutional structure hampers optimal use of that capacity.
2. The need in the Sudan is so vast, that a long term involvement by multiple actors is needed to make a life changing impact.
3. The Government of Sudan has many priorities and limited budget. Even though the SPCRCP activities are now often incorporated into the regular state budgets and may be approved, this does not guarantee arrival of funds.
4. Activities introduced by the program should be incorporated into the government budget at an early stage; a good cost calculation needs to be made for upscaling from the onset and planning needs to be done in a participatory way.
5. Documents like the Project Document and other relevant project documentation should be shared at an early stage with as many stakeholders as possible, to increase the understanding of the concept and ownership of the action, which will enhance the speed of implementation and the impact of the activities.
6. Similarly, elaborating planning documents/logframes, budgets as well as Annual Work Plans at State level would be more operational and would increase both understanding and ownership of the programme.
7. Signing Letters of Agreement with the government has helped implementation, flexibility and fund mobilization.
8. Recovery and development programme similar to SPCRCP would require 6 – 8 years for realising and measuring impact at community level.

### **7.2 Good practices**

222. The following good practices have been identified:

1. Training and supporting people from the community system as was done on the subject of animal health has appeared a good solution to address the shortage of veterinarians and bridge the gap until the country will avail of sufficient educated veterinarians to also cover the needs at rural level.
2. Physical capacity building not only provided the government staff with a better working space and equipment and means of transport to do their work, the improvement was such that it also increased commitment and lifted the spirits, thus contributing to a better quality of work output.
3. Gender equality was enhanced by using the CARDA and the FFS approach, especially if the design is gender sensitive. The approaches appear to be good modalities to address gender equalities in gender sensitive circumstances.
4. In some states, the best CAHWs have been identified as candidates for follow up CARDA training, thus making good use of their already acquired knowledge and experience.
5. The Model Projects set up horticultural activities on model farms on land donated by the community. The produce is used for health and nutrition training for women.

### 7.3 *Follow up to the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation*

223. The Mid-Term Evaluation has come up with a number of recommendations. Some were for South Sudan and will not be addressed here. Underneath, the extent of follow up of the relevant and most important recommendations in the second part of the project's duration is highlighted.
224. *The Programme Steering Committees (PSC) at Federal levels should now assume a more "strategic" oversight and coordination function and be inclusive of other relevant Government Ministries and other projects complementary to the SPCRCP.* This has been partly followed up. The PSC has made an effort to steer away from micro-management, however, no other ministries were invited and there was no clear effort to link to other relevant projects. The PACs had not assumed more extensive responsibility as was recommended, in fact, they seemed even less important to SPCRCP than before the MTE.
225. *Each State should articulate its strategy for moving forward on developing Rural Advisory and Extension Services (agriculture, animal resources, private institutions and rural businesses); should develop joint annual work plans and budgets.* This recommendation was partly followed: some strategies were developed but not all and not to the full extent. Joint annual work plans and budgets were still lacking; monthly coordination meetings between the CB and the MP component had been conducted, but the joint action plans have only been developed in BNS and RNS. M&E, which was also supposed to be conducted in a more joint manner, was still conducted in a totally separate way. Each component had its own responsible stakeholders to collect data and no joint reporting has taken place.
226. *FAO must immediately review its management and technical structure.* Half of the recommendation was followed. National administrative assistants were recruited and trained, enabling them to focus exclusively on their intended technical responsibilities. Even though some members of the PTF were involved in technical backstopping, the FAO PTF as a supporting body, which was supposed to have become more accountable, has actually become less accountable and active after MTE.
227. The MPP was awarded to EMM instead of to FAO as was *recommended by the MTE.*
228. *To ensure sustainability, TSUs and PIUs must be fully embedded within appropriate Government structures at State level and financial incentives to Government staff must stop immediately. Exit strategies for implementing partners and entry strategies for government counterparts must be developed.* This recommendation was partly followed. Even though an exit strategy study was conducted, its outcome did not contribute a great deal towards ensuring sustainability. Technical Coordination Committees were established to replace PIUs and TSUs but it is doubtful whether they will do so after project life. Financial incentives to Government were still given.
229. A no-cost extension was granted until December 2012 *as was recommended by the MTE.* The MP component was wrapping up its last activities and payments at the time of the Evaluation as planned, and the CB Component has used the additional time to complete its activities.

## 8 Conclusions and recommendations

### 8.1 Conclusions

#### **Concept and relevance**

230. Even though the Evaluation as per TOR should focus on the post-MTE implementation, it was found that adverse design characteristics had major consequences for the quality of the implementation of SPCRCP and especially on its impact and sustainability. The focus on output and lack of incorporation of sustainability in the design clearly had an influence on the quality of the implementation.
231. The relevance as well as the achieved outputs of SPCRCP were found reasonably good, especially in view of the difficult circumstances in the country, which might have impeded the full achievement of the results. Most of the stakeholders shared, that SPCRCP was one of the few programmes pursuing government capacity building, which was seen as indispensable for sustainability.
232. Approaches like FFS and CARDA have appeared highly relevant and adopted and accepted by both the Government and the target population. If adapted further to local conditions and incorporated into government policies, these approaches may be valuable for future internal and external focus. The SBG approach appeared less relevant and will be more difficult to be adopted by Government for upscaling.

#### **Effectiveness and efficiency**

233. Especially when the difficult circumstances were taken into account, the project was found reasonably effective and efficient. Most of the planned outputs were achieved and the outcomes were found good value for money.
234. A duration of four years would already have been short for a highly complex program like SPCRCP if it had started in time and delays and postponement at various levels shortened the actual implementation period to less than 3 years. A lack of proper planning aggravated this fact, leading to shortened cycles of activities and hastened implementation and disbursement at the end of the project.

#### **Impact and sustainability**

235. The lack of focus on effective delivery of institutional and organizational capacity and the absence of a framework of cooperation between the two contractors from the design stage curtailed the impact and sustainability possibilities.
236. Even though the situation in Sudan was difficult and the security constraints hampered a smooth implementation, the achievements are still remarkable. Especially in BNS, where security was a major issue, impressive achievement and stakeholder cooperation has taken place.
237. Absence of synergy, cooperation and coordination between the co-implementers, has hampered SPCRCP to perform to the full extent possible and fully achieve the planned impact and sustainability. Rules for cooperation and a coordination mechanism were not provided after part of the project was granted to EMM, which caused absence of synergy throughout the entire project duration.

## 8.2 Recommendations

### **Recommendation 10: To EU on funding implementation of complex programmes and projects by multiple organisations**

EU should provide guidelines and a framework to the implementers of projects and programmes, if these are co-implemented by multiple organisations. Compulsory cooperative fields of work and activities should be provided as well as methods to optimally combine the contribution from implementing organisations and using the specific expertise of each organisation as an added value. Parallel implementation and separate logframes should not be approved of. Since EU's strategic planning cycle has a length of only 5 years, programmes of a complex nature should be avoided and projects should be clearly focused.

### **Recommendation 11:**

### **Recommendation 12: To EU to be more involved in monitoring and guiding progress of public-private partnerships**

Even though incorporating public-private partnerships is currently high on the agenda, in order for them to be successful in the long run close monitoring and guidance from the donor may be needed. In SPCRP, the plants' construction should have been finalized at an earlier point in time, in order to guide the start up of the production process as well as the involvement of trained beneficiaries. It should have been ensured that a contract was prepared and signed by all relevant parties, outlining responsibilities and ownership as well as involvement of the target population and the way in which they would be able to sell their produce to the factory and be involved as employees.

### **Recommendation 13: To EU and FAO on incorporating FFS in project and programmes**

Farmer Field Schools have appeared very useful extension and empowerment approaches in various agro-ecosystems. In Sudan the FFS approach has also appeared relevant to the local context. In order to make FFS sustainable and ready for upscaling, further adaptation to local context are needed, including advocacy and support for creating a conducive environment with regard to access of farmers to inputs, credits and marketing. Furthermore, the implementation period at field level needs to be at least two seasons and possibly longer. A more facilitative and bottom-up implementation of the approach should be ascertained. As long as the government will not be able to plan and sustain the FFS, one has to seek other solutions. Since many other donors are interested in using the FFS approach, a combination of efforts may provide an additional impetus.

### **Recommendation 14: To development actors in general including EU and FAO on coordinating efforts in Sudan**

Efforts should be undertaken to coordinate development interventions in Sudan. Currently, most development actors are implementing independently their own programmes and projects, without clearly addressing duplications or gaps at a nation-wide level. Even EU funded programmes, despite good intentions phrased at the design stage, fail to coordinate their activities and make use of each other accomplishments, even though opportunities are clearly available. Not only should existing efforts be incorporated at the design stage of projects and programmes, development actors should also have regular coordination meetings at capital level, which do not only focus on humanitarian actions and come up with clear action plans.

### **Recommendation 15: To FAO Senior Management on project design**

In the design stage of a programme or project, particular attention should be paid to

incorporation of sustainability throughout and to the final handover of tasks in order to ascertain government is ready and capable of continuing after the project's ending. In the last year of the project or programme government counterparts should already have allocated budget lines and take upon them part of the activities which were implemented by the project. If government would not be capable to take upon them all tasks after the project ending because of multiple pressing priorities, the search for additional funding from outside donors should be started before the last year of the programme or project, demonstrating the government's planned contribution.

**Recommendation 16: To FAO Senior Management on project management and planning**

Apart from the duration of the project, weak planning and complicated management issues resulting from the complex design and modality caused additional delays and postponement. It should be allowed to take more project-related decisions at a decentralised level within the countries and planning should be performed in a more detailed and documented manner and shared with all stakeholders, including those at state level. Planning and budgets should be available detailed per state and implementation and follow up should be conducted in a participatory manner with the stakeholders at state level.

**Recommendation 17: To FAO Sudan on advocating with the Government of Sudan on incorporating new livelihood approaches**

In order to incorporate livelihood and agricultural approaches which have proven successful like FFS, FAO should advocate with the Government of Sudan to develop a clear plan at State level. A time path should be provided for introducing or up-scaling such approaches, including responsibilities at all levels and an in-depth cost-calculation. Mechanisms to achieve up-scaling should be clearly outlined and opportunities for funding from State or Federal level or external funding should be identified at an early stage.

**Recommendation 18:**

**Recommendation 19: To FAO Sudan on advocating with the Government of Sudan on policy and strategy development**

FAO Sudan should advocate for agriculture and livestock related policies to be developed or adapted and offer technical assistance to accomplish this. The proposal for the national agricultural extension strategy should be further developed and finalized. The livestock policies should also contain details on the CARDA approach and other animal services related issues. Financial and other responsibilities and mechanisms should be clearly outlined and quality control as well as the management of drug provision should be described in this policy. The role of community associates and veterinary services should be clearly outlined. Situations which require action from Federal level like vaccinations to prevent an epidemic should also be clearly described.

**Recommendation 20: To FAO Sudan on supporting the Government of Sudan on funding and continuation of the Capacity Building**

FAO Sudan should support the State and Federal government to continue working on the results that the project has created jointly with its stakeholders and beneficiaries. Support from international donors aimed at the continuation of the most promising SPCR should be actively sought. FAO may support development of a proposal, which should also contain a well planned budget and policies and strategies in order to determine and ensure the Government's role and contribution in such future programme. NGOs should be enlisted in pursuing, particularly, the further expansion of the FFS.

# Annexes

## Annex 1. Evaluation terms of reference

*Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP)*  
*Terms of Reference (Aug/2012) - Final Evaluation 2012*  
*Commissioned by: The European Union, Sudan*  
*Technically Supported/Managed by: The Office of Evaluation, FAO*

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### Acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EU	European Union
EMM	Euroconsult Mott MacDonald
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
GoS	Government of Sudan
GIZ IS	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH

	(German Technical Cooperation)
MPP	Model Project
MTE	Mid Term Evaluation
NAO	National Authorising Officer (GoS)
OED	Office of Evaluation (FAO)
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SPCRP	Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (analysis)
ToRs	Terms of Reference

## 1. Background of the Initiative

1.1 The Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP) is to be seen in the framework of the overall objective or development goal of the European Commission's development assistance to Sudan that is *consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development*. The EU assistance is based on a multi track response strategy involving the design of interventions for different timeframes (immediate, medium, long term) and for different geographic/administrative levels. Among the different initiatives foreseen under the 'Productive infrastructures and rural livelihoods rehabilitation' chapter of the Framework of Mutual Obligations (FMO), the SPCRCP is expected to contribute to a significant long-term reduction in the level of poverty and food insecurity by i) enhancing income generating activities in agriculture, livestock production and off-farm rural activities that primarily benefit poor households and ii) strengthening the capacity of local administrations and non state actors to maintain and further develop them.

1.2 SPCRCP is a four-year National programme that aims to contribute to stabilizing peace, enhancing food security and improving rural livelihoods in selected vulnerable states of the Sudan through building human, institutional and physical productive capacities. Given the different human, institutional and food security situation and related needs and institutional frameworks that exist in the Sudan and South Sudan, the SPCRCP programme has been divided into two separate sub programmes: one for the North and one for the South. Both sub-programmes have similar objectives and activities, and each one has its own budget and separate implementation arrangements. These Terms of reference (ToRs) are therefore common for two similar evaluations to be conducted in parallel, for each of the sub-programmes. This also reflects one of the basic tenets of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 9<sup>th</sup> of January 2005 that is the *One Country- Two Systems*

principle. This is reinforced by the latest political context in the Sudan that the referendum in early 2011 has resulted in the succession of the South from the North by July 2011. Given the context, the final evaluation will be done in the context of two complementary projects funded by the EU in two neighboring countries.

1.3 Each sub-programme of SPCRP has two major components:

**A Capacity Building** project to build human, organisational and physical capacity of public and private institutions, including three sub-components:

- Strengthening key institutions, namely local State and Non-State Actors;
- Pilot development of key agricultural support services;
- Support to programme implementation capacity.

This component is implemented both in the Sudan and South Sudan by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

**B Support to Rural Livelihoods** through financing and implementing investment projects in the selected States and Counties/Localities. That includes<sup>1</sup>:

- 8 model projects, as follows:

In the Sudan: Tokar Delta Rehabilitation Project; South Kordofan Livelihoods Improvement Project; Blue Nile Livelihoods Improvement Project (all three implemented by Euroconsult Mott MacDonald) and Kadugli - Talodi Market Access Project (works contract awarded to the local contractor Manga for Drilling Ltd and supervision services to the engineering company Newtech Consulting Group).

In South Sudan: Aweil Irrigation Rehabilitation Project; Bahr el Ghazal Livestock Production and Marketing Project; Nyal - Shambe - Terekaka Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (all three implemented by GIZ IS-IS) and Wau-Tambura Bo and Busere Bridges Project (design and supervision services awarded to Newtech Consulting Group and work contract awarded to EYAT Group. ).

- Micro Project Programme (it launched only in the Sudan, implemented by Euroconsult Mott MacDonald)

1.4 The direct beneficiaries of the SPCRP are:

- public institutions concerned with agriculture and rural development in around nine selected States and localities (mainly State Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation; Locality/County Agricultural Offices; Area Agricultural Department);
- Community based organizations and other non state actors including the private sector (i.e. farmer unions, water associations, marketing associations, Village Development Committees, trader associations, women groups, etc) in the selected States.
- farmers, livestock owners, fisher-folk, traders and retailers.

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<sup>1</sup> Originally, Micro Project Programme was also foreseen to be implemented but the implementing agency was not determined at the beginning of the programme implementation. A decision was made after the MTE that Micro Project Programme was awarded to Euroconsult Mott MacDonald in the Sudan, while in South Sudan, the Capacity Building component implemented by FAO received additional funding to increase the overall budget.



The indirect beneficiaries of the above will include all those who benefit from the services that the above organizations will deliver during the project and from the improved services that the organizations will be able to deliver after the capacity building has been completed.

1.5 The total funds allocated for the implementation of the two major components of SPCRP, being the Capacity Building Component and the Support to Rural Livelihoods, is €80 million. After a long consultative formulation process, FAO was entrusted by the National Authorizing Officer (NAO), in consultation with the European Commission, to implement the **Capacity Building** component of the SPCRP. The remaining funds for the Support to Rural Livelihoods components was allocated to the Governments and the responsibility for the implementation of these was decided by the SPCRP Steering Committees. For the **Model Project** component in South Sudan concerned, GIZ IS was entrusted by the NAO to implement the component of the SPCRP South sub-programme. In the Sudan, a private consultancy company Euroconsult Mott MacDonald was sub-contracted to implement the Model Project. The Micro-Project Programme (MPP), previously referred to as the Rural Development Fund, was intended to be launched after the Mid-Term Review, to support small projects identified and proposed by the communities in each of the selected States. The management of this Programme was to be decided by the respective Northern and Southern Steering Committees and after the MTE, in the Sudan, it was awarded to Euroconsult Mott MacDoland by the EU Delegation to implement the component, while in South Sudan, it was never implemented.

1.6 The Contribution Agreement for the Capacity Building component of SPCRP was signed by the Government of National Unity (National Authorizing Officer, NAO), European Commission (EC) and **FAO** on 18 August 2007, and endorsed by the Government of Southern Sudan (currently the Government of the Republic of South Sudan). In accordance with the Contribution Agreement, the implementation of the project commenced retroactively on 1 January 2007, and the end date of the project was 31 December 2010. A major programme revision was conducted after the Mid-Term Evaluation taking into account of the MTE recommendations, and the fourth Addendum to the Contribution Agreement was signed by all parties (FAO NAO of the GoS, EU and GRSS<sup>2</sup>) in 28 January 2011, which resulted in the CB programme extension up to 31 December 2012. The total budget of this CB component of €38,144,330 has been equally divided between the Sudan (€19.07 million) and South Sudan (€19.07 million), of which the European Commission contributes with €37 million, equivalent to 97 percent of the total cost while the remaining 3 % were to be co-financed by the different donor. In 2008, Southern Sudan received an additional Euro 1.5 million from the EC to cover extra costs related to the physical capacity building component. In addition, during the course of major revision conducted in 2010, SPCRP South capacity building component was further increased by €2 million, amounting to €22.57 million in total. Consequently, the total capacity building programme budget is €41 644 330, of which the European Commission contributes with €40.5 million.

1.7 The Grant Contract for the Model Projects for South Sudan under the SPCRP was signed by the NAO/GoNU and **GIZ IS** on 28<sup>th</sup> March 2008 for a 48 month period and was extended for six months up to 27 September in 2012. The first pre-financing contribution was received by GIZ IS on 17 July 2008 and activities commenced in May 2008. The Service

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<sup>2</sup> The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) becomes the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) after its independence in July 2011. Hereafter it is referred as either GRSS or RSS.

Contract for the Model Projects in the Sudan was signed by the NAO/GoS and **Euroconsult Mott MacDonald** on July 21, 2008 for a 48 month period. The first pre-financing contribution was received by Euroconsult in December 2008 and activities commenced in September 2008. The total budget of the Model projects component is €9 million (Euroconsult) and €13,200 million (GIZ IS) for the Sudan and South Sudan respectively, of which the European Union contribution is 100%. In addition, the design and supervision contract for the Kadugli Talodi Market Access Project was signed with "Newtech Consulting Group" on 31 December 2008, the contract for the work has been signed on 21 January 2010. The Wau-Tambura Bo and Busere Bridges project design and supervision contract has been awarded to Newtech Consulting Group on 01 December 2009. The works contract was tendered on 11 September 2010 and awarded to Eyat Group on 31 December 2010.

1.8 **SPCRP Steering Committees** have been established: A Northern Sudan Steering Committee (NS SC) and a Southern Sudan Steering Committee (SS SC) provide guidance and supervision of the SPCR implementation for their respective sub-programmes, and between the Capacity Building and Support to Rural Livelihoods components. As per Stabex regulations, the European Union and FAO are members on both Steering Committees. GIZ IS and Mott MacDonald are members in the South and North SC respectively. The originally envisioned overarching National Steering Committee (N SC), which was to provide overall guidance and facilitate linkages and coordination between the Capacity Building and Support to Rural Livelihoods components, and between Northern and Southern sub-programmes, has to date never been convened.

1.9 To technically and operationally support SPCR implementation, two programme coordination units (PCU) have been set up in Khartoum and Juba as well as 9 State level Technical Support Units (TSUs) and six [model] project implementation units (PSU) at decentralized levels in States where activities are being implemented.

1.10 The Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) assessed project performance at midpoint (2010) and made specific recommendations for the remaining duration of the programme. The main conclusions and recommendations are annexed to the ToRs (Annex 5).

## **2. Purpose of the Evaluation**

2.1 A final evaluation is foreseen in the programme document on completion of the programme. This terms of reference has been prepared by the Office of Evaluation at FAO in consultation with key stakeholders involved in the funding, management and implementation of the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP). The terms of reference are prepared with respect to a planned final evaluation which is prescribed within the EU Stabex Implementation Protocol for this Programme. The final evaluation will include all components of the programme (including both the Sudan and South Sudan) and will comply with evaluation good practices as defined by the EU and the Office of Evaluation.

2.2 The overall purpose of this final evaluation is to review project delivery of the expected outputs and achievement of outcomes (purpose and objectives), and provide decision makers in the Governments (GoS and GoSS), and the EU with sufficient information to make an informed judgment about the performance of the programme (its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact) and make decisions about future related interventions and the future

of food security / rural development intervention in the Sudan and South Sudan, acknowledging the recent division into two separate countries.

2.3 In addition, the evaluation is an opportunity to learn from this experience in order to improve the design and implementation of similar interventions in the future that aim to improve food and nutrition security in fragile states. For this reason, it is expected that the evaluation findings will lead to conclusions and recommendations useful for future normative, operational and organization strategies for food and nutrition security programmes/projects.

2.4 Key issues identified by Programme stakeholders a priori include:

- Quality of programme design and appropriacy of redesign efforts during implementation.
- Synergies between components (north/south, and between activities implemented by the different partners with each country);
- implementation of the recommendations from the MTE;
- quality and implementation of the programme exit strategy;
- Quality and effectiveness of steering/oversight (EU/PSC) and management arrangements (GOS, GOSS, FAO, EMM, GIZ);
- Effectiveness of the programme to date in contributing to human capacity development and institutional change;
- Contribution of SPCRP to changes at farmer and community level.
- Lessons learned and good practices

2.5 The principle audience of the evaluation includes mainly governmental authorities in both Sudan (GoS) and South Sudan (GoSS) represented in the PSCs, the EU, and FAO, GIZ IS and Mott MacDonald management and programme staff at country level.

### **3. The Scope of the Evaluation**

3.1 The final evaluation will evaluate the overall SPCRP programme's performance implemented by the various implementing agencies throughout all phases from formulation to handover but with a particular focus on results since the mid term evaluation. This evaluation will have as a reference point the original project log frames but will base itself on the revised consolidated log frame (including both Model Project and Capacity Building components).

3.2 The final evaluation will assess the programme against the standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In addition, the programme will also be assessed in terms of its performance on gender equality, social inclusion and environmental impact.

3.3 Within these criteria, the evaluation will assess the following features of the programme, as appropriate.

- a. Relevance and contribution of the SPCRP programme to national development priorities of the GoS and GRoSS and priority needs in the area of food security;
- b. Comparative advantage of each agency as implementing agency for the programme;
- c. Theory of change underpinning the intervention;
- d. Quality and realism of the project design, including: links and causal relationships between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact (specific and development

objectives) in the Logical Framework and Annual Work Plans; relevance and appropriateness of indicators selected; validity of assumptions and risks; approach and methodology; time frame and resources; institutional set-up; management arrangements; and stakeholders and beneficiaries identification;

- e. Project management and implementation at MAF, MARF and State Ministry levels, including: effectiveness and efficiency of operations management;(including staff quality and quantity) effectiveness of strategic management; efficiency and effectiveness of projects' coordination and steering bodies and mechanisms; set-up, efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring and internal review processes, rate of delivery and financial management; quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by the implementing agencies; and implementation gaps and delays if any, their causes and consequences, between planned and implemented outputs and outcomes; and assessment of any remedial measures taken. Relevance of budget allocations to programme objectives; cost-effectiveness of budget allocations in relation to project objectives.
- f. Programme outputs and outcomes (activities and objectives), in particular including in the analysis the programmes' achievements to date in promoting public investments and institutional reforms and improved service provision and better policies (annex 1. SPCR Implementation Protocol). A complete list of outputs prepared by the implementing agencies will be prepared for the evaluation team and will be included as annex to the evaluation report<sup>3</sup>.
- g. Gender and social equality, including: extent and quality of women's and minority groups' participation in programme activities, their access to programme resources and benefits; analysis of how gender relations, gender equity and processes of social inclusion were and will be affected by the programme in the area/sector of intervention; contribution to women's and minority groups' visibility, participation in local development processes and empowerment; and extent to which gender equality and social inclusion were pursued in programme management; Prospects for improving service provision to the poor/ minority groups; prospects for pro-poor policy development;
- h. Capacity development<sup>4</sup>, including: extent and quality of programme activities, outputs, outcomes and impact in terms of capacity development of agricultural service providers and community level beneficiaries, including of women and minority groups; institutional uptake and mainstreaming of the newly acquired capacities and perspectives for diffusion of newly acquired capacities, if any, beyond programmes' boundaries;
- i. Change in Governance structures / institutional arrangements: extent and quality of programme activities, outputs, outcomes and impact in terms of institutional and organisational change of agricultural service providers, including institutional reform, legislation, decentralisation and privatisation of services; improvements in service provision (e.g. volume and quality service delivery, processes, transaction costs of managing public resources)

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<sup>3</sup> The ToR can suggest a list of particular outputs and outcomes for the evaluation to assess, however the evaluation team should be free to explore in detail other specific outputs and outcomes.

<sup>4</sup> Both "hardware", e.g., the construction of facilities or provision of equipment, and "software" including staff knowledge, skills, and attitudes

- j. The prospects for sustaining and possibly upscaling the programme's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the programme. The assessment of sustainability will include: institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed technologies/innovations/processes; project contribution and/or impact on natural resources in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the natural resource base (environmental sustainability).
- k. The current and foreseeable positive and negative impact or lasting changes produced by the programme, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

More detailed key questions as well as data gathering tools will be prepared by the Team Leader and capture in the inception report.

3.4 Based on the above analysis the final evaluation will draw specific conclusions and make recommendations for any necessary further action by Governments and/or FAO and other key implementing agencies to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-up action. The evaluation will draw attention to any lessons of general interest.

#### **4. Evaluation methodology**

4.1 The final evaluation will draw on existing documentation including but not limited to programme component progress reports, financial reports, reviews of various component outputs (assessments, training reports, etc), internal stakeholder reviews, related evaluation reports, administrative data, etc. Information gathering will also include a field mission with interviews (individual and group) with stakeholders and beneficiaries at national and state levels. Other specific data gathering activities may be undertaken such as trainee tracer studies, expert (desk) reviews of training materials, beneficiary assessments, etc. The specific tools and methods to be used will be defined at the inception phase of the final evaluation which will be reviewed by the PSC and cleared by the OED. The final evaluation will adhere to the following key principles:

4.2 The evaluation will adopt a consultative, iterative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders throughout the whole process. Triangulation will be a key method for validation of information and evidence. A range of tools will be used, including: consultation of existing reports, semi-structured interviews with key informants and stakeholders and focus group discussions supported by check lists and/or protocols, direct observation during field visits, etc. Particular attention will be devoted to ensure that under-privileged groups will be consulted in adequate manner.

4.3 The evaluation will also draw upon the views and perspectives of Governments, EU, FAO, EMM and GiZ staff at country level, as well as those of other key decision maker and partner stakeholders. While ultimate beneficiaries of the programme are households vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition being farmers, livestock owners, fisher-folk, traders and retailers, for the purposes of this evaluation, the primary beneficiaries are considered to be decision makers dealing with food security policy and programming. These are principally the Government(s) of the Sudan and South Sudan, public institutions concerned with agriculture and rural development in around nine selected States and localities (mainly State Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation; Locality/County Agricultural Offices; Area Agricultural Department); and local organizations dealing with food security issues either in emergency or in longer term development contexts such as community based organizations and other non state actors including the private sector (i.e. farmer unions, water associations, marketing associations, Village Development

Committees, trader associations, women groups, etc) in the selected States. Other beneficiaries are the international community (donors, UN, NGOs) and those who benefit from the services that the above organizations will deliver during the project and from the improved services that the organizations will be able to deliver after the capacity building has been completed. Target groups for the overall SPCRП will also include beneficiaries of the model projects, which broadly speaking target rural communities and households.

4.4 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework<sup>5</sup> will be used as the reference for assessing contributions to poverty alleviation, food security, gender mainstreaming, social, economic and environmental sustainability, etc. The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework will be one major analytical tool for assessment of the projects' results<sup>6</sup>.

4.5 The evaluation will strictly adhere to EU and UNEP evaluation norms & standards<sup>7</sup>.

## **5. Consultation process**

5.1 The preparation and finalization of the Terms of Reference is a participative effort involving all main stakeholders to the SPCRП. At the request of the EU and with the endorsement of the NAO (Government of Sudan) and chairpersons of the PSC-NS and PSC-SS the Final Evaluation will be managed by the Office of Evaluation of FAO (OED). This implies that the OED will support the evaluation process in terms of the finalization of the TOR, the selection of the team, provision of essential briefing documentation to team members, and organization of logistical aspects of the field mission. The Office of Evaluation has a quality assurance role on the final report, in terms of presentation, compliance with the ToR, timely delivery, quality of the evidence and analysis done.

5.2 Important roles will be played by other key stakeholders in the Programme including:

- EU Delegation(s) in Sudan/South Sudan – Commissioning agency for the evaluation. Coordinate communication between stakeholder agencies with respect to the evaluation. Identification of qualified national and international independent consultants for consideration for the final evaluation. Providing financing for the evaluation as needed.
- SPCRП Programme Steering Committees (comprising members of relevant government stakeholders and the EU, FAO, GIZ IS and EuroConsult) –Contribute to the definition of the Terms of Reference for the final evaluation. Act as a consultative group for the evaluation, meeting together with the team at least twice during the evaluation mission. Review and provide collective comments on the draft evaluation report. Prepare a management response to the final report.
- FAO SPCRП CB project – provide/organize logistical support for the evaluation mission. All 3 agencies (FAO, GIZ IS, Euroconsult, Newtech) will facilitate ground transportation for the mission.

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<sup>5</sup> The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework identifies five different capitals (human, social, natural, financial, and physical), each including different assets. It helps in improving understanding of livelihoods, in particular of the poor. For more information, among others: [http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance\\_sheets\\_pdfs/section2.pdf](http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_pdfs/section2.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> SWOT is a widely used strategic planning tool, useful also in analysis of projects and interventions, to assess their strengths and weaknesses and perspectives in the future. It is particularly used in focus group, but it can be adapted to individual interviews as well.

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards>

5.3 The Evaluation Team is responsible for conducting the final evaluation, applying the methodology as appropriate and for producing the evaluation report. All team members, including the Team Leader, will participate in briefing and debriefing meetings, discussions, field visits, and will contribute to the evaluation with written inputs for the final draft and final report.

5.4 The Team Leader guides and coordinates the team members in their specific work, discusses their findings, conclusions and recommendations and prepares the final draft and the final report, consolidating the inputs from the team members with his/her own.

5.5 The mission is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government, the EU or other stakeholders. The Office of Evaluation will review the report and ensure its conformity with the terms of reference, but is not entitled to modify its contents.

5.6 While the mission will maintain a close liaison with the FAO Office of Evaluation throughout the evaluation process, the EU Delegation at country level will, as appropriate, liaise with and support the team during the field work, ensuring that all key stakeholders are involved. Although the mission is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor or the implementing agencies (FAO, GIZ IS, EuroConsult). At the end of the data and information gathering phase, the team will present its preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to the key stakeholders, to discuss and obtain feedback from them. The draft evaluation report will be circulated among key stakeholders for comment before finalisation; suggestions will be incorporated as deemed appropriate by the evaluation team.

## **6. The evaluation team**

6.1 The evaluation team shall comprise the best available mix of skills and competences that are required to assess the initiative and the issues at stake; among others, it will include competence and skills in evaluation and preferably, experience in the Sudan, South Sudan and the region; it will be balanced in terms of geographical and gender representation to ensure diversity and complementarity of perspectives.

6.2 The evaluation team will combine among its members the following fields of expertise:

- Institutional change, decentralization and privatization,
- Human capacity development
- Agricultural development (crop production & extension, irrigation, livestock production, fisheries, agricultural marketing, natural resource management and land use).
- Food Security and rural livelihood support (including rural credit and market oriented approaches)
- Gender equity analysis
- Social development and participatory processes
- Public administration and management
- Project management and evaluation

6.3 The OED will take the lead in preparing for the recruitment of independent team members. The EU will utilize its framework agreement to competitively tender for team members to be funded by them. All parties are kindly invited to suggest suitable candidates for national consultant team members. Due to the size of the countries, the high level of activity at State level, the complexity of the programme, a relatively large team will be necessary. The team will be tentatively composed of 6-7 team members, who together will cover all the fields of expertise listed above.

6.4 All team members will have a University Degree and a minimum of 10 years of professional experience in their respective areas of specialization. All will be fluent in English. A working knowledge of Arabic will be a distinct advantage. Mission members will have no previous direct involvement with the Programme either with regard to its formulation, implementation or backstopping. All will have signed the Declaration of Interest form of the FAO Office of Evaluation.

6.5 The final composition of the team will be the responsibility of FAO Office of Evaluation, according to the criteria set out above. The Evaluation Manager from FAO's Office of Evaluation (OED) will oversee the management of the evaluation process to ensure that the evaluation proceeds smoothly and adheres to acceptable evaluation norms and standards.

6.6 The evaluation team is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government(s), EU or of FAO. A final evaluation report is not subject to technical clearance by FAO although OED is responsible for ensuring conformity of the evaluation report with standards for project/programme evaluation in FAO.

6.7 It is understood that Sudan and South Sudan are considered a hardship countries and that travel under difficult conditions will occur and specific security precautions are in place.

## **7. The Evaluation Report**

7.1 The mission is fully responsible for its independent reporting which may not necessarily reflect the views of the government, the donor or FAO. The reports will be written in conformity with the headings and length indicated in Annex 1.

7.2 The evaluation team, lead by the team leader will prepare **two evaluation reports**, one for each of the sub-programmes. Findings, conclusions and recommendations will be disaggregated by implementing agency as well. The draft outline of the report is attached as Annex 1. The Evaluation team leader will agree the final format with the Office of Evaluation and this will be an annex to the Inception Report. The Team Leader will decide on the role of individual team members in report writing early in the evaluation process. The report will be prepared in English with numbered paragraphs. A translation of the final version of the report into Arabic will be undertaken by the Office of Evaluation if it is required.

7.3 In addition, the Team Leader will prepare a brief consolidation report/synthesis, providing a contextual analysis and highlighting the main findings of each report. The draft report will be completed, to the extent possible, in the country and the findings and recommendations fully discussed with all concerned parties during a presentation prior to the departure of the mission.

7.4 Each draft report will be presented by the Team leader to the respective Steering Committee in two workshops, to be organized by the EUD in Juba and Khartoum prior to the departure of the team from Sudan and South Sudan. Members of the Steering Committees should receive the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations before the workshop, so that they can provide informed comments at the workshop. An aide memoir of the feedback session will be prepared. The team leader bears responsibility for submitting an aide memoire to the Programme Committee(s) prior to departure from Sudan/South Sudan.



7.5 The draft report will be submitted to OED within two weeks from the conclusion of each mission. The OED will circulate the draft report for comment and questions of clarification. Comments must be received by OED within two weeks of the drafts' circulation and will be provided to the Team Leader for consideration in the preparation of the final report. The final report is due two weeks after all comments have been received.

7.6 The Team Leader will incorporate comments received from stakeholders as appropriate and prepare one independent **Final Report**, which will include the brief consolidation report as well as the two separate reports for each sub-programme, including conclusions and recommendations for the future similar intervention in the countries. The final report will be submitted to the OED within three weeks of the completion of the second half of the mission. OED will be then responsible to formally disseminate the report to the EU, the NAO and to the members of both (north and south) SPCRPs Steering Committees on behalf of the Evaluation Team.

7.7 After the report has been finalized, to improve the utilization of the evaluation report, Govt/Donor/Implementing Agency Stakeholders will prepare their respective management responses. The final evaluation report will be a public document that should be broadly disseminated to stakeholders and primary beneficiaries (an Arabic version may be required).

7.8 The evaluation report will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation issues and the evaluation criteria listed in the ToR. The report will be as clear and concise as possible and will be a self-standing document. Adequate balance will be given to its different parts, with focus on findings, conclusions and recommendations. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the report when considered important to complement the main report and for future reference. The report should be no longer than 60 pages excluding annexes.

7.9 The structure of the report should facilitate in so far as possible the links between body of evidence, analysis and formulation of recommendations. These will be addressed to the different stakeholders: they may be strategic and/or operational and will have to be evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable.

7.10 Annexes to the final evaluation report will include, through not limited to, the following as relevant:

- Terms of reference for the final evaluation;
- Profile of team members;
- List of documents reviewed;
- List of institutions and stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team;
- List of project outputs;
- Evaluation tools.

## **8. Evaluation budget and timetable**

### **8.1 Evaluation budget**

The cost of the additional data gathering and costs associated with the independent evaluation team work will be covered by the evaluation funds earmarked within FAO SPCRPs project agreements as well as by evaluation funds available directly from the EU.

## 8.2 Evaluation timetable

May-June 2012	Preparation of the draft ToR – feedback from internal and external stakeholders
July/Aug 2012	Finalization of the TOR Selection of the Team Leader EUD FWC – Call for Expressions of Interest Collection of all programme related documentation. TL desk review and development of draft evaluation matrix and tools
September 2012 (20/21)	OED & TL Preparatory Mission to Khartoum 25-28 Sept.
October/Nov 2012	29Sept-14Oct Sudan 16-27 Oct Draft report writing from home  29Oct-12Nov South Sudan 14-28 Nov Draft report writing from home  (preliminary debriefings in Khartoum 14 <sup>th</sup> Oct and Juba 12Nov)
Dec 2012	9 <sup>th</sup> Dec – TL submission of draft report to OED and is circulated for review to EUD, FAO, EMM, GiZ IS and PSC N/S members.
Dec 2012	By 31Dec - Feedback provided to Team Leader.
January 2012	10 Jan - Final report prepared, submitted to OED and circulated 10 Feb - Management response submitted to OED.

The Team Leader will have preparation days and receive a two-day briefing in Rome and Addis Ababa prior to traveling to Sudan in order to a) discuss the ToRs for the evaluation with OED evaluation service staff, b) interview the key technical and operational units within FAO responsible for supporting the delivery of the SPCR project, and c) revise the evaluation matrix for the evaluation and prepare data gathering tools during this period. Other team members will have reading and preparation days from home and will be provided with a briefing package of SPCR project and contextual information for the Sudan and South Sudan.

The next phase involves **Field Final Evaluation Mission to the Sudan and South Sudan**. Field work will be carried out in the Sudan/South Sudan during the month of October/November 2012. The entire team should meet in Khartoum the weekend of Sept 29 in order to have a day of team preparation prior to the formal start of the mission on 1<sup>st</sup> October. The team members will have an initial one day country and security brief in Khartoum, meeting with the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) and the EUD. The Team Leader will be responsible for managing the evaluation team, analyzing the relevance of the project in both the Sudan and South Sudan through interviews with senior food security information users/decision-makers in government and partner organizations, and for presenting the main findings and recommendations to Project Steering Committee members in Juba and Khartoum in a debriefing prior to the departure of the mission.



## **Annex 2. Profile of team members**

The evaluation team is composed of team leader Herma Majoor and team members Ian Bartlett, Karl Kaiser, Abdul Hamid Rhametalla, Haroon Sseguya and Willem van den Toorn.

- 1) Herma Majoor is educated as economist as well as nutritionist and works as independent expert in gender, food security and nutrition and monitoring & evaluation in developing countries. She works with international and supranational organisations, governments, universities, international and national NGOs and civil society. She has worked as team leader in various long-term and short-term projects. She has worked over 15 years in Central, and South-East and South Asia, the Middle East and Anglophone and Francophone Africa.
- 2) Ian Bartlett is an economic and financial consultant, who has worked in 28 countries for World Bank, the ADB, the EU, MDF, UNDP and bilateral agencies as team leader and expert in: project appraisal, tariff, local finance and MIS. He has covered areas of policy, agriculture, environment, urban, rural, water resources, water supply, sanitation, drainage, transport, dams, local and central government taxation and finance, industrial development, agro-industry and agricultural marketing. Since 1990, he has concentrated on urban planning, water and sanitation and public utility tariffs.
- 3) Karl Kaiser is an agricultural economist with 36 years experience in rural development. He worked in various countries in Africa and Asia for multi- and bilateral organizations. More than 18 years he worked as team leader in long-term projects in Africa and Asia focused on rural development, sustainable natural resources management and capacity development. He made 2 short-term assignments in Southern Sudan in 2002 (MTR of EU funded PACE project) and in 2009 (German funded bilateral refugee resettlement project in Central and Eastern Equatorial States).
- 4) Abdul Hamid Rhametalla is an independent food security and livelihoods consultant. He has over 23 years of experience in working with government, national and international organizations. He has been involved, along other assignments, in monitoring and evaluation of food security, livelihoods and rural development projects and programmes in both the Sudan and South Sudan.
- 5) Awadia Salih Mohamed is educated in agricultural sciences and has a long term experience in managing complex emergency programs. She has planned and managed emergency programmes and has been involved in livelihood activities and risk reduction management. She has been involved in programme and project management related to agriculture in and outside Sudan for international NGOs and UN organisations.
- 6) Willem van den Toorn is educated as an economist with a mid-career PhD 'Multi-system society and trade-off based planning'. He has worked with all major donor agencies in over 35 countries in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Middle East (including the Sudan and South Sudan), Caribbean Region and Europe. Over the last decade his focus shifted to institutional and organisational development, capacity building and evaluation. He worked as expert, TL, project director, managing director of management consulting firm, professor of sustainable resources planning and development.

### **Annex 3. List of documents reviewed**

#### **Capacity Building Component**

- European Commission - Europeaid Cooperation Office. Final Report. FAO Verification Assignment. Moore Stephens 15 May 2012.
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Six Months Progress and Inception Report July 2008
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Annual Report 2007
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Annual Report 2008
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Annual Report 2009
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Semi-Annual Report. Quarters 1 and 2 2009
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Annual Report 2010
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Semi-Annual Report 1 January – 30 June 2010
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Annual Report 2011
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Semi-Annual Report 1 January – 30 June 2011
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Annual Report 2011 – Financial Section
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Semi-Annual Report 1 January – 30 June 2012
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. OSRO/SUD/622/MUL. Semi-Annual Report 1 January – 30 June 2012 – Financial Section
- SPCRP-CB-North of RAES component (Rural Marketing and Small Business). Prof. Faisal Elgasim Ahmed. May 2012.
- SPCRP-CB-North Baseline Survey Report, River Nile State. Ibrahim G. Sahl.
- SPCRP-CB-North Back to Office Reports (14 since 2009)
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. Assessment of CARDA component. May 2012
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. Situation Assessment of Farmer Field Schools RS, RN, BN and SK states. May 2012
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. Training Report Knowledge/Skills test and Staff Satisfaction Duration: January - December 2009
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. 2010 Trainees' Performance and Competency Assessment. June 2011.
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. Performance and Competency of the Training Courses Conducted 2011: Survey Findings of the Institutional and Human Capacity Building Component. March 2011
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. Assessment of Physical Capacity Building Component Executive Survey Report. River Nile, Red Sea, Blue Nile and South Kordofan States. June 2012
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. Assessment of RAES Component (Rural Marketing and Small Businesses) in Red Sea, River Nile, Blue Nile & SK States. May 2012
- SPCRP-CB-North FAO. Participatory Development of National Agricultural Extension Policy and Strategic Action Plan. August 2012

### **Model Project Component**

- Annex 1 STABEX Terms of Reference Model Projects
- SPCRP - MP. Budgetary Commitment Stabex - SCRP – 10. Programme Estimate 2. First Progress Report. January – March 2010
- SPCRP - MP. Budgetary Commitment Stabex - SCRP – 10. Programme Estimate 2. Second Progress Report. April - June 2010
- SPCRP - MP. Budgetary Commitment Stabex - SCRP – 10. Programme Estimate 2. Third Progress Report. July - September 2010
- SPCRP - MP. Budgetary Commitment Stabex - SCRP – 10. Programme Estimate 2. Fourth Progress Report. October 2010 – January 2011
- SPCRP - MP. Budgetary Commitment Stabex - SCRP – 10. Programme Estimate 2. Final Report. January 2010 – May 2011.
- SPCRP - MP. Budgetary Commitment Stabex - SCRP – 17. Programme Estimate 3. Second Progress Report. June - November 2011
- SPCRP - MP. Budgetary Commitment Stabex - SCRP – 17. Programme Estimate 3. Second Progress Report. December 2011 – February 2012
- SPCRP - MP. Fishery Project. Study of Population Dynamics and Stock Assessment of Lake Rosaries Fishery - in the Context of the Imminent Expansion of the Size of the Reservoir (RDHP). Final report May 2011.
- SPCRP - MP. Institutional Elucidations Mission. February 2010
- SPCRP - MP. Mission Report. The economic potential of Mesquite in Tokar Delta for landless farmers and IDPs and as a source of income for Tokar Delta Agricultural Scheme. December 2012
- SPCRP - MP. Non-Wood Forest Products Assessment Report. April 2011
- SPCRP - MP. Organizational Assessment of: Tokar Delta Agricultural Scheme Administration to Facilitate: Planning for Sustainability of Management of the Scheme. May 2011
- SPCRP - MP. Situational Assessment of RAES component. Assessment of CARDA component. Community Animal Resources Development Associate. Mirghani Iboas, May 2012
- SPCRP - MP. Study of land tenure and land use in Tokar Delta. March 2011
- SPCRP - MP. Study of Pastoralists in Blue Nile State. September 2010
- SPCRP - MP. The development of improved market chains and value addition for production supported by SPCR in Blue Nile State. Conceptual Framework for Processing & Marketing Selected Food Products. April 2011.
- SPCRP - MP. The development of improved market chains and value addition for production supported by SPCR in Red Sea State (II) The Processing & Marketing of Fish & Fish Products, Tomato, Okra, and Mesquite Pods into Fodder. June 2011.
- SPCRP - MP: Model Project Flyers

### **CB&MP**

- SPCRP Programme Steering Committee Meeting Minutes 9 February 2011, 10 April 2011, 1 November 2011 and 8 May 2012.
- SPCRP. Final Report on Exit Strategy. May 2011

## **General**

- ALNAP. Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria. An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies
- European Commission. The Consolidated Framework of Mutual Obligations concerning the Utilisation of STABEX Resources for the Years 1990-1999.
- European Commission/Government of Sudan: Country Strategy paper and National Indicative Programme 2005-2007
- FAO Corporate Strategy for capacity Development 2010
- FAO Office of Evaluation. Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action – North Programme (SIFSIA-N). Final Evaluation Report. March 2012.
- FAO/WFP. Socio-Economic and Gender Analysis. SAEGA – For Emergency and Rehabilitation Programmes
- GFRAS - Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services. Guide to evaluating rural extensions. April 2012
- IASC. Gender marker Kit. May 2011
- M4P. Making markets work better for the poor. A tool book for practitioners of value chain analysis.
- OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation. Evaluating Development Cooperation. Summary of Key Norms and Standards
- UNEG. Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation. March 2008
- UNEG. Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation - Towards UNEG Guidance. 2011 (2)
- UNEG. Norms for Evaluation in the UN System. April 2005
- UNEG. Standards for Evaluation in the UN System. April 2005
- World Bank. Building Competitiveness in Africa's Agriculture. A guide to value chain concepts and applications. 2010

**Annex 4. List of institutions and stakeholders met during the evaluation process**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation/ Department</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
<b>21 September 2012, Rome</b>			
9.00 – 10.00	Kaori Abe Annika Kaipola Enrica D'Agostino	TCEO	FAO
10.00 – 11.00	May Hani Estibalitz Morras	OEKR	FAO
11.00 – 11.45	Friedrick Theodor	AGPM	FAO
11.45– 12:30	Marjon Fredrix Indira Joshi	AGPM TCEO	FAO
12.30 – 13:30	Aurelie Larmoyer	OED	FAO
13.30 – 14.00	Marlo Rankin,	AGS	FAO
14.00 – 15.00	Fallou Gueye Felix Njeumi	AGAS AGAH	FAO
15.00 – 15.45	Joseph Kienzle	AGS	FAO
15.45 – 16.30	Hiramoto Watanabe	FIPI	FAO
16.30 - 17.00	Rodrigue Vinet	TCEO	FAO
<b>23 September 2012, Addis Ababa</b>			
	Lori Bell	Evaluation Officer, OED	FAO
<b>24 September 2012, Addis Ababa</b>			
14:15-14:45	Castro Camarada	Coordinator sub-regional office for eastern office/FAOR	FAO
15:00-16:00	Susan Minae	Agricultural economist	FAO
16:00-17:00	Emanuelle GuerneBleich	Livestock Officer SFE	FAO
<b>25 September 2012, Khartoum</b>			
	Mahmoud Nouman	Programme Manager SPCRP	FAO
	Charles Agobia	CTA SPCRP Sudan	FAO
	Gamal Younis	Survey Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist	FAO
<b>26 September 2012, Khartoum</b>			
8:30-9:30	Adil Othman Idris	Programme National Coordinator	MOAF
10:00-10:45	Isabell Stordeur	Programme Assistant	IFAD
	Mohamed Abdelgadin	Country Programme Officer	IFAD
11:00-11:30	Salah El Din Muddathir Ahmed	Assistant Representative	FAO
11:30-12:00	Sabine Schenk	Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator	FAO
<b>27 September 2012, Khartoum</b>			
9:00-10:00	Mysa Izzeldin	Task Manager	EUD



	Joachim Knoth	Head of Rural Development and Food Security	EUD
	Umberto Ambrosi	Programme Manager - Infrastructure	EUD
	Collette Zoumis		EUD
11:00-13:00	Vinyakhe Eckley Magwaya	Imprest Account Officer	Mott MacDonald
	Saad Ali Babiker	Micro-Project Programme Coordinator	Mott MacDonald
	Elfadil Abdelmalik Elfadil	Office Administrator	Mott MacDonald
	Nahla Idris	Programme Manager South Kordofan	MOAF
<b>29 September 2012, Khartoum</b>			
	Mahmoud Nouman	Programme Manager SPCRP	FAO
	Charles Agobia	CTA SPCRP Sudan	FAO
<b>30 September 2012, Khartoum</b>			
11:00-12:00	Mysa Izzeldin		EUD
	Joachim Knoth	Head of Rural Development and Food Security	EUD
	Umberto Ambrosi	Programme Manager - Infrastructure	EUD
	Nada Mirgani		EUD
14:00-15:00	Moussa Arsabiev	Field Security Coordination Officer	UNDSS
15:15-17:15	Vinyakhe Eckley Magwaya	Imprest Account Officer	Mott MacDonald
	Saad Ali Babiker	Micro-Project Programme Coordinator	Mott MacDonald
<b>1 October 2012, Khartoum</b>			
9:00-14:00	Salah M. Taha	Project Steering Committee	MOA
	Mahmoud Nouman		FAO
	Charles Agobia		FAO
	Vinyakhe Eckley Magwaya		Mott MacDonald
	Mohamed Gorashi Ahmed		MOAAF – Blue Nile State
	Mohamed Dahia		MOAR - South Kordofan
	Abdalla Ibrahim		MOANR - South Kordofan
	Taj eldin Osman		MOA
	Hassan Abdelhay		RNS
	Nahla Idris		MOANR - South Kordofan
	Selma Yousef		MOAI
	Solafa Gay		NAO

	Adil Osman Idris		MOAF
14:30-16:30	Mahmoud Nouman	Programme Manager SPCR	FAO
	Charles Agobia	CTA SPCR Sudan	FAO
	Gamal Younis	Survey Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist	FAO
	Imad Ali Rahal	Rural Markets and Small Business Specialist	FAO
	Izzeldin Eisa Elhassan	Community Animal Health and Production Specialist	FAO
	Mohamed Adam Elnour	Training/Human Development Specialist	FAO
	Omelnisaa Hassan Elfaki	Rural Development Specialist	FAO
	Selma Elsherif	Senior Finance Assistant	FAO
	Marwa Mahgoub	Admin/Logistics	FAO
	Mohamed Faisal	Procurement Clerk	FAO
<b>2 October 2012, Khartoum</b>			
8:30-10:00	Adil Othman Idris	Programme National Coordinator	MOAF
10:00-11:00	Mohammed Hassan Jubara	Undersecretary	MOAI
11:00-12:30	Kamal Tagelsir Elsheikh	Director international Relations	MoAR
14:00-17:00	Buthaina Ahmed	Economist	University of Juba
	Yasir Gasm Elseed Bashir	Researcher	ARC
	Elwasila Mukhtov Mohamed	Head Agricultural Department	University of Khartoum

<b>3-10 October 2012, Blue Nile State</b>	
<b>NAME</b>	<b>POSITION</b>
Dr. Adam Abakar	State Minister SMAARF
Awad Alsamani Elshaikh	Director General SMAARF
Abdallah Abdallah Fadullah	T.T and Extension Manager
Dr. Abdel Seed Abdalla Ahmed	Manager, Vet Extension and Pastoralist Department
Abdurraman Ahmed Hassan	Chairman, Pastoralist Union
Dr Abubakar Altahir Abdalla	Damazine Research Manager
Dr. Adam Alwagee	LAO, Bau
Ahmed Dawood Ibrahim	Chairman, Fruit and Vegetables Union
Ahmed Alawad Abusas	Manager, Range and Pasture Directorate
Alnazeer Osman Ahmed	Fisheries Cooperative Union
Alnour Yagoub Abugusa	Manager, Directorate of Investment and Projects
Alomda Alamin Alkihir	Chairman, State Farmer Union
Alzeen Yousif Alzeen	Chairman, Agricultural and Economic Committee, State Legislation Council
Altayeb Biraini Mohammed Ali	Manager, Plant Protection Directorate
Awad Mohamed Zain	LAO, Geissan

Babikir Ibrahim Babikir	Manager, Horticulture Department
Bannaga Hago Elflaki	Manager, TSU
Eltayeb Salih	Practical Action – NGO
Gadalla Alnadeef	Mubadiroon GO
Hassan Yousif	WFP
Huzyfa Ebrahim Elsaid	FAO-ECU Team Leader
Ishag Esa	Chairman, State Fisheries Union
Karar Yousif Mohamed Ali	Chairman, Small Scale Farmers Union
Mohamed Ali Siralgeldin	CFCI
Mohamed Gorashi	Manager, General Directorate of Planning and Information
Mohamed Mohamed Salih	Manager, Fisheries Department
Mohamed Mergani	LAO Roseires
Sami Ibrahim	Manager, State Forestry Directorate
Dr. Salih Ali Hamid	Manager, Animal Resource Directorate
Usra Ibrahim Adam	Manager, Women Development
Various staff groups	M&E, Data Base, Marketing Information, Training, Agricultural Extension, Animal Production Extension, CARDA, FFS

<b>3-10 October 2012, Red Sea State</b>	
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>
Adam Omer Arbaker	Coordinator FFS
Aball Gader Omar Ohaj	Agricultural Extentionist
Abdell Hazem Idress	Planning Unit SMoAARI
Ahmed Aball Gader	Human Resources
Ahmed Hanafi	ERDP-RSS Rural Development Expert
Alu Abida Abd Al Salam	Training Unit SMoAARI
Asha Hassan Mohamed	Agricultural Information
Badria Abd Alrahim Mohamed	Vet (ARDC)
Bamkar Mohamed Taha	Information and Statistics SMoAARI
Batool Mohamed Saleh	Agricultural Information
CARDA in Tokar Delta	20 ARDG members and 1 CARDA
El Hassan Mohammed El-Hadi	Acting General Director of Animal Resources
El Tag Idress Ali	Fishermen's Union
Esam Eldein Abd Al-raheem Sorkatti	DG Red Sea State MoAARI
Fatema Abir Saleh	Administrator
FFS in KIsaib (25 farmers and 2 FFS Facilitators)	FFS in Khor Arba'at
FFS in Hadwaib (12 women and 1 facilitator)	FFS in Khor Arba'at
FFS in Ghaydaib (15 women, 10 men and 2 facilitator)	FFS in Khor Arba'at
Gamal Mohamed Ali Fadul	Agricultural Researcher

Hadra Idress Moh	FFS Coordinator
Hala Yagoub Haj Ahmed	Agricultural Information
Handi Mahjoub	Planning-Projects Unit SMOAARI
Hassan Eissa Artega	Project Manager, TDAS
Hassan Mohammed Ali	Marine dept-marketing
Hamed Osman Hamad	Project Officer
Huda Idriss Mohammed	Coordinator FFS
Ibrahim Hassan Omer	SMoARRI-Technical Officer
Iman Homeeda Abed Alrhuman	Vet (ARDC)
Khadiga Hassan Khalid	Accountant
Khalda Said Mohamed Saleh	Agricultural Information
Khalida Saed Mohammed	Coordinator FFS
Madani Adroub Malid	Training Unit SMOAARI
Mahmoud Mohid Leab	Fishermen's Union
Majzaub Ali Abu Ali	CBO manager, Umhil
Mohamed Ibrahim Moalla	FFS Coordinator ERDP
Mohamed Saleh Adam	Administrative Manager
Mohamed Saleh Moh Ali	Planning Unit SMOAARI
Nadia Nasir	Deputy Minister of Planning
Nahall Ahmed	M&E Unit SMOAARI
Omar Ali Osman	National Manager MP Tokar
Osman Awad Osman	FFS Supervisor
Ounor Hadab Ali	Financial Monitor
Said Hamd Ahmad	Lands Inspector
Seham Awad Al Kariem	M&E Unit SMOAARI
Sharifa Mohamed	Deputy Planning Minister
Siral Khatim Khalf Alla	Demarcation supervisor
SBG in Tokar Delta	Women Group
Soha Yassin Mohammed	Coordinator FFS
Somia Khider	Computer Operator
Tahani Abdelgdir Satti	Head of Planning Unit,
Tahir Hashim Osman	Lands Inspector
Yousif Abdel Raouf Ibrahim	SMoAARI-Inspector of Plant Protection
Zakaria Osman Mohamed	Mechanic

<b>3-10 October 2012, River Nile State</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation/Department</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Dr Kamal	DG, Planning Directorate	Ministry of Animal and Fisheries



Mohamed Haj Hamed Osman Elawad Hassan Abdel Allah Osman Mohamed Elnour Abd Allah Abdel Fadeel Maysoon Awad Yousif (F) Fawzia Omar Mohamed Elshiehk (Madina Ali Osman (F) Nadia Ahmed Mohamed (F) Fawzia Abdel Mutalab (F) Hala Sirelkahtim (F) Rabeea Abdel Allah (F) Zainab Abdel Rahim (F) Bashria Mohamed Hamza (F) Howida Mohamed Ahmed (F) Ruwaida Abbas	Member Member Member Member Member executive committee Member executive committee Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Coordinator, RM/SBG	SMAARIF
Nafeesa Ali Hamad Ilham Sirelkhatim Awatif Haj Saeed Halima Ali Jubara	Facilitator Facilitator Farmer Farmer	Elfadlab women group FFS Fodder (abu 70)
Khdeega Eltayeb Asma Ahmed Samia Abdel Allah Naila Mohamed Sayda Gorashi Fatima Sulieman Fatima Abdel Allah Khara Elhussien Zuhail Mustafa Husniya Abu Zaid Zhara Abdel Rahman Ishragha Abdel Rahman Fatima Hassan Niemat Mohamed Amna Khalid Manahil Mohamed Badria Elhassan Gawhir Haroon Elshafee Sulieman (M)	Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer	
Sirelkhatim Mohamed Jaafar Elsir Babiker Suleiman Ahmed Osman Ali Dodo Fathel Rahman Ahmad Mustafa Awad Osman Abu Naoaf Osman Abel Wahid Mustafa Abdel Azim Basheer Ahmed Mohamed Babiker Bakhiet Musa Ahmed Awadelsied Amir Mohamed Ahmed	Farmer, Elfadlab FFS Farmer, Elfadlab FFS Facilitator, Umeltiyou FSS Farmer, Elfadlab FFS Farmer, Elfadlab FFS Farmer, Umeltiyou FFS Facilitator, Umeltiyou FSS Facilitator, Elfadlab FFS Farmer, Elfadlab FFS Farmer, Elfadlab FFS	FFS Citrus, Elfadlab and Umeltiyou men groups









Raaida Abdel Rahim Amal Ibrahim Alawyia Ali Abdel Elfatah Mona Abd Allah Adam Hassan Hamid Shahona Abuel Gasim Atayatallah Sumia Elamin Ahmed Nasreldin Mustafa Abdel Rahim Khalda Elmagboul Elgaylani Salah Eldin Osman	FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator FFS Coordinator	SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF
Mohamed Ahmed Eltayeb  Faldel Mula Abdel Wahab  Dr Bdreldin Mohamed Elagib Mohamed Ahmed Abuel Gasim	Director of Horticultural Department  Director, Fisheries Department  CARDA supervisor Accountant Field Officer	SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SPCRP  MPP
Visit to the exhibition of 10 SBGs		
Dr Hassan Khalid Ali Mohamed Ahmed Eltayeb	Researcher Researcher	ARC, Hudaiba ARC, Hudaiba
Nadia Mohamed Abd Allah	Training coordinator	SMAARIF
Hassan Gorashi Ikhlas Bashir Eisa Kalthoum Ali Elfadil Inshirah Medani Elgozoli  Mariam Ahmed Abuelgasim  Dr Attia Mohamed Saeed  Mohamed Ibrahim  Abdel Aziz Warrag	Director General (DG) Deputy DG Director, Rural Marketing Deputy DG, Planning Department Director Admin and Finance and Plant Protection Director of planning, animal resources Director, Horticultural Department RAES Coordinator	SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF SMAARIF  Fed Min of Agric  SMAARIF  SMAARIF  SPCRP

<b>11 October 2012, Khartoum</b>			
9:00-17:00	Stakeholders workshop South Kordofan		
	Ahmed A/Alla Mohamed	Training Officer	Training
	Intesar Adam Ismail	M&E Officer	M&E
	Ahmed Elshafi Mohamed	FFS Facilitator	FFS
	Zakaria Fasher	FFS Facilitator	FFS
	Motasim Elsedig Elamrdi	MOA Marketing officer	Marketing
	Elsadig Idris	MOAW market officer	Marketing
	Rahal Ahmed Hamid	SBG Member	SBG
	Hafiz Ahmed Ibrahim	CARDA Officer	CARDA
	Mohmed Hamd Hamdan	FFS Facilitator	FFS

	Hassan Mohmed Moaza	CARDA	CARDA
	Nahala Idreis Adam	Project Coordinator	MP
	A/Alla Khamis	Planning	SMoA
	Mohamed Dahia	DG/MoARFR	SMoARFR
	Osman Mugadam	Deputy DG	SMoA
	A/Monim Eidam	ARDC	SMoARFR
	Hassan Musa Mahi	Agric. Officer	MP
	Ali Fadeel	D/Planning	SMoARFR
	Bashir A/Magid Mohamed	Community	MP
	Osman Elhassan	Pastoralist Union	MP
	Suliman Mohamed Elhassan	Community	MP
	Hamdan Elbolad	Farmer Union	Farmers Union
<b>12 October 2012, Khartoum</b>			
10:00-11:00	Paul Symonds	Former EU staff member	UNDP
19:00-20:30	Geoff Griffith/ Skype interview	CTA SPCR	EMM
<b>13 October 2012, Khartoum</b>			
9:00-10:15	Idris Musa	DG South Kordofan	SMOA
	Debriefing FAO Office		
	Mahmoud Nouman	Program Manager SPCR	FAO
	Charles Agobia	CTA SPCR	FAO
	Gamal Younis	Survey Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist	FAO
	Izzeldin Eisa Elhassan	Community Animal Health and Production Specialist	FAO
	Mohamed Adam Elnour	Training/Human Development Specialist	FAO
	Omelnisaa Hassan Elfaki	Rural Development Specialist	FAO
<b>14 October 2012, Khartoum</b>			
	Debriefing EUD		
11:00-12:45	Mysa Izzeldin	Task Manager	EUD
	Joachim Knoth	Head of Rural Development and Food Security	EUD
	Umberto Ambrosi	Programme Manager - Infrastructure	EUD
14:00-16:00	Debriefing PSC		
	Adil Osman	SPCR	MoA
	Abd Elatti	NAO	
	Mysa Izzeldin	Task Manager	EUD
	Joachim Knoth	Head of Rural Development and Food Security	EUD

	Umberto Ambrosi	Programme Manager - Infrastructure	EUD
	Idris Musa Aden	DG Kadugli	MoA SK
	Taj Eldin Osman	DG	MoA RSS
	Mohamed Yousef Mohamed		
	Hassan Abdelazeim	DG	MoA RNS
	Abdul Abass	DG	International Cooperation
	Mahmoud Nouman	Program Manager	FAO
	Charles Agobia	CTA SPCR	FAO
	Vinyakhe Eckley Magwaya	Imprest Finance Officer	EMM
	Mohamed Dahia Idris	DG	SMARFR SKS
	Mohamed Gorashi	DG	MoA BNS
	Salma Yousef		MOAI

**Annex 5. List of project outputs achieved**

**BLUE NILE STATE**

<b>Capacity Building outputs</b>		
New Buildings	2009	5
	2010	8
	2011	1
	2012	3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>
Refurbished Buildings	2009	1
	2010	5
	2011	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>
Toyota Hilux Pickups	MOAFI	2
	Kurmuk	1
	Bau	1
	Roseries	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>
	Motorcycles	MOAFI
MOARF		5
Kurmuk		5
Bau		5
Roseries		5
Gissan		5
<b>Total</b>		<b>24</b>
Bicycles		FFS
	CARDA	54
	<b>Total</b>	<b>174</b>
Furniture and Equipment	Office	309
	Computers/printers etc	157
	Generator	4
	Server	1
Training Courses	Staff	61
	NSA	29
	Down Streaming	11
	Coord. with Model Projects	10
	Farmers Facilitators Trained	4 x 124
Farmer Field Schools (FFS)	Farmers	1550
	FFS Coordinators Trained	4 x 30
	Training packages	47
	Facilitator bicycles	124
	Vegetable grower inputs	
	Pumps for irrigation	4
	Units for irrigation	26
	Manuals/leaflets	1154
	Farmers trained	1410

Post FFS	Sheep fattening (10 communities.)	SDG 10,000 for 25 sheep.
FFS Dropout	Now in North Damazine	15
Gender	Farmers and Facilitators	50/50
	Coordinators (need Motor Bike)	All male
CARDA Training Courses	Facilitation, 2010	50 participants
	Health care, nutrition, 2011	50 + 41 = 91 participants
Mobile cell chips	Prod/Proc/Marketing 2012	3 x 43 = 129 participants
2 solar fridges; 21 staff trained;	but now in Damazine and Roseires due to security	
CARDA groups	Functional	14
	Drop out	13
	Replaced	10
CARDA training	TOTs	8
	Participants	41 – 50
Small Business/ Marketing Associations	Drop Out	6 associations
	Functional, Fish, 3 Association	135 +50 + 50 beneficiaries
	Functional, Okra, 1 Association	47 beneficiary groups
	Functional, Water Melon, 1 Ass.	50 beneficiary groups.
CARDA Training Courses - groups	Value Chain	4
	Value Chain, Network	4
	Value Chain, Finance	4
	Evaluation & Planning	4
	Agribusiness using PLA	4
<b>Stock Routes - Model Project, with support from Capacity Building</b>	<p>Both Model Project (MP) and Capacity Building (CB) provided support for stock routes. MP spent SDG 3.3 million, 70.5% of budget, and 47.5% of total Blue Nile MP costs. That includes funding for 480 km of stock routes (World Bank had previously done another 180 km, less comprehensively than the MP), and includes funding for 500 feddan of grazing land. Four of the nine routes in BNS (of a total of around 1,000 kms) requiring rehabilitation were done by the Project.</p> <p>Capacity Building contributed by rehabilitating 10 and constructing 5 new water points. In addition, CB extended CARDA support and training to pastoralists (at 17 villages en route), and trained the Water Users Associations. CB also assisted in drafting rules and regulations in the context of the stock route law.</p>	
<b>Rural Women Development</b>		
Rural Women Development	- Planning and Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluate -	

Unit – Objectives	Project and Program Activities For Women. - Contribution to Increasing Income for women household. - Contribution to awareness Raising in Importance of Gender integration.	
Rural Women Development Unit – Means	Rural Women Agricultural Groups * Local extensions * Women farmers field Schools * Agricultural Development Centers * Field Visits * Forums and video presentation * Seminars and workshops	
Rural Women Development Unit - Training	Training: 1. Food Processing: 14 sessions, 420 women 2. Solar Dryer: 4 sessions, 40 women 3. Improved Stoves: 120 women 4. Handicrafts, 30 women 5. Sewing Machine: Tailoring 6. Agricultural Development Centre (ADC) and Rural Women Development Unit (RWDU): Various 7. Gender Workshop Farms: 8. Winter Session, 6 farms 9. Demonstration, 10 farms 10. Seedlings: 800 distributed 11. Vegetable Varieties: 10 varieties Equipment and materials: 12. Food Processing, 6 societies	
<b>Micro Finance</b>		
- Sorghum Four groups, each with 20 members/households, with 25 feddan each)	4 x 20 members = 80 members 4 x 25 feddan = 2000 feddan SDG 750/member = SDG 15000/group and SDG 60,000 in total 50% from members, 50% from Model Projects Money advanced to be returned after harvest	
- Fishing Eight Production Units (PU), each with two members/ households. One boat per PU. These boats provided by members.	Six fishing bundles per PU @ SDG 1500 Total cost, SDG 12,000 Each PU fishing return split, one third to each of the two fisher and one third to society. When savings enough for 6 bundles, the fishers provide an additional boat and separate from society.	

<p>Sheep Fattening  Eleven Groups, four male and seven women. Each group has 20 members/households. Each household (hh) will rear 5 sheep. Total sheep = 1100</p>	<p>Cost per kid = SDG 150  Cost per hh = SDG 750  Total cost (11 hh) = SDG 8250  Other costs (11 hh) = SDG 2750  Total costs (11 hh) = 11000</p>	<p>Sales price (11 hh) = SDG 16867  Profit = SDC 6560  Household keeps main sheep  Other sales used to fund new beneficiaries</p>
<p>Horticulture  Three PUs, each with two beneficiaries/households</p>	<p>Each PU needs a Honda engine and hoses; cost SDG 1500. Total cost SDG 4500. Contribution 50% beneficiaries; 50% society.</p>	<p>Produce tomato, to be well marketed. Sales one third to each PU HH (2) and one third to society. When society reaches SDG 1500 per PU, buy a new engine and separate</p>



**RED SEA STATE**

<b>Capacity Building outputs</b>		
New Buildings		
	Ministry of Agriculture Reception	1
Refurbished Buildings		
	Extension Department	2
	Planning Directorate	1
	Accounting office	1
	CARDA unit	1
	Soil Department office	1
	Director General Office	1
	Training hall	1
	Research offices	1
	DG office – Tokar	1
	Extension office – Tokar	1
	Training Hall – Tokar	1
	Fencing of Offices - Tokar	1
	Painting of MoAARI office	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>
Toyota Hilux Pickups	Director General - MoAARI	1
	Field Trips (pool)	1
	Tokar Delta Research Station	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>
Motorcycles	FFS Coordinators	2
	Animal Resource Department	1
	Tokar Delta Agric Scheme	5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>
Bicycles	FFS Facilitators	20
	CARDA Facilitators	8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>
Donkeys	CARDAs and FFS Facilitators	60
	<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>
Equipment	Computers	51
	UPS	34
	Printers	30
	Scanners	5
	Photocopiers	8
	Digital Cameras	8
	Projectors	6
	Server	1
Furniture	Office Table	28
	Office chairs	110
	Computer table	15
	Cabinet	2
	Swivel chair	8
	Safe	1
	Office cupboard	12
Training Courses	Various Courses	398 Staff (230 male + 168

		female)
	ToT	8 FFS Coordinators
	FFS Curriculum	64 FFS Facilitators
	IPPM, others	1280 Farmers
Functional FFS	32	27 in Tokar Delta and 5 in Arba'at
Post FFS Activities	14	Grants for water pumps, sheep fattening and other income generating activities.
Training Courses	ToT, CARDA concept manual	5 ARDC
	PHC, nutrition, marketing etc	24 CARDAs
	Animal health and production	240 pastoralists and agro-pastoralists
Inputs	Mobile cell chips	30
	CARDA Kits	24
	Solar fridges	2
	Drugs	Various
Functional CARDAs	24	In Tokar Delta
Rural Marketing and Small Business Groups	Small Business Groups	5 Associations, 30 member each (1 in food processing, 4 dropped out)
	Rural Marketing	4 Associations, 30 members each (3 functional, 1 dropped out)
Training Courses - groups	Value Chain	4 groups (12 beneficiaries)
	Food processing	40 women
	Fishing Gear making	20 (5 women and 15 men)
	Agribusiness using PLA	4 groups

**RIVER NILE STATE**

**Capacity Building Outputs**

New Buildings	2012	8 <sup>1</sup>
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>
Refurbished Buildings	2009	1
	2011	2
	2012	3 <sup>9</sup>
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>
Toyota Hilux Pickups	MOAFI	2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>
Motorcycles	MOAARI	4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>
Bicycles	FFS	76
	CARDA	26
	<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>
Furniture and Equipment	Office	403
	Computers/printers etc	71
	Generator	4
	Server	2
Training Courses	Staff	51
	NSA	19
	Down Streaming	17
	Coordination with Model	7
	Projects	
	Farmers Facilitators Trained	5 x78
Farmer Field Schools (FFS)	Farmers	1064
	FFS Coordinators Trained	2 x 39
	Training packages	47
	Facilitator bicycles	76
	Vegetable grower inputs	4
	Manuals/leaflets	2350
	Farmers trained	1410
Post FFS	inputs for 6 communities	10 improve goat, 1000 chicken + inputs for 42 feddans grown by sorghum and banana.
FFS Dropout	Now in North Damazine	0
Gender	Farmers and Facilitators Coordinators (need Motor Bike)	29/29 All male
CARDA Training Courses	Facilitation, 2010	12 participants
	Health care, nutrition, 2011	26 participants
Mobile cell chips	Prod/Proc/Marketing 2012	26 participants
2 solar fridges; 21 staff trained;	One in Shandi + one in Ed Damer	2
CARDA groups	Functional	13

<sup>8</sup> Shelter for the training center.

<sup>9</sup> 2 offices + training hall.

CARDA training	TOTs	8
	Participants	26
Small Business/ Marketing Associations	Drop Out	1 associations
	Functional, Citrus, 2 Association	31 + 35 = 66 beneficiaries
	Functional Fishermen, 3 Association	35 + 35 + 35 = 105 beneficiaries
	Functional, fodder 2 Ass.	46 + 31 = 77 beneficiaries.
	Functional food processing Ass	50 beneficiaries
	Functional date processing Ass	35 beneficiaries
	Functional chicken raising Ass	96 beneficiaries
SBGs Training Courses - groups	Value Chain	46
	Value Chain, Network	46
	Value Chain, Finance	46
	Evaluation & Planning	6
	Agribusiness using PLA	6

## **SOUTH KORDOFAN**

### **Physical CB:**

- Construction of Agricultural Administrative buildings in Talodi, Kurgi, Lagawa, Muglad, Kadugli, Babanusa
- Refurbishment of Agricultural and Animal Wealth and Natural Resources offices in Lagawa, Kadugli, Abyie
  - TOTAL 2.4 Million SDG.

### **Office equipment and furniture:**

- 71 computers, 48 UPS, 28 Printers, 6 Scanners, 10 Photocopiers, 15 Digital cameras
- 92 Office tables, 111 Office chairs, 14 Computer tables, 21 Cabinets, 3 Meeting tables, 4 Office tables, 48 Swivel chairs.

### **Tractors and other agricultural equipment and inputs:**

- 5 tractors
- Unknown number of other agricultural implements
- 14 sets of pumps and generators
- Shallow well construction – maybe 5
- Certified seed, drugs

### **Farmer Field Schools:**

- 85 FFS established by end of programme, 64 of which accessible and operational.

### **CARDAs, ARDGs, ARDCs:**

- 41 ARDGs, 13 ARDCs, 82 CARDAs established.

### **RM & SBGs:**

- 23 established, 10 dropped (for security reasons), 5 independent + 8 fully functioning.

### **Training:**

- FSS – 2,150 farmers
- CARDA, ARDGs, ARDCs – 2,050 farmers
- MPP and SBG – 500 participants, including in localities / groups dropped
- Ministries of agriculture and animal production – 820 staff
- FSS and CARDA coordinators and facilitators – 170

### **Other outputs:**

- Improved planning procedure – evidence: Strategic Plan based on inclusive consultations across the ministries, intention to roll this over bi-annually
- Establishment of an M&E unit within the planning directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture
- Strengthened Training unit at Ministry of Agriculture – through staff training and training of a number of TOTs
- Discussion to combine the Planning Directorates of the two ministries.

**Annex 6. Evaluation matrix**

<b>FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)</b>				
<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
<b>1. RELEVANCE</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Relevance of SPCRP to country needs</li> <li>•Relevance of SPCRP to government priorities</li> <li>•Relevance of SPCRP to needs of rural communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•What are the most important needs of the country and the rural communities?</li> <li>•Have the needs changed from the beginning of the programme?</li> <li>•How relevant has the SPCRP been to:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The rehabilitation and development needs of rural communities?</li> <li>○ The country needs?</li> <li>○ The strategic priorities of the government?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Background documents on the project and development situation;</li> <li>•Government policies and strategy papers;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents;</li> <li>•Other sources of evidence of government strategies and commitment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Government policy-makers;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Quality of programme design</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses in the programme design? More specifically, regarding:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Logframe (current as compared to first)</li> <li>○ Objectives, results, indicators and activities?</li> <li>○ The institutional, coordination and partnership arrangements</li> <li>○ The resource allocation (technical, human and financial)?</li> <li>○ The risks and assumptions?</li> <li>○ Impact?</li> <li>○ Sustainability?</li> </ul> </li> <li>•Quality of planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project related documents;</li> <li>•Logical frameworks</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents;</li> <li>•Interviews with development actors in similar fields.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Government policy-makers;</li> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> </ul>	

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Timing and quality of concept formulation and endorsement</li> <li>○ Coherence between objectives and with the stated indicators, time frame, activities, responsibilities and budget.</li> </ul>			
•Cross-cutting issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Have relevant cross-cutting issues been adequately mainstreamed in the SPCRCP design? Specifically:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Environment,</li> <li>○ Gender,</li> <li>○ Human rights,</li> <li>○ Governance</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project related documents;</li> <li>•Logical frameworks</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents;</li> <li>•Interviews with development actors in similar fields.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Other development actors</li> </ul>	
•Adaptability/flexibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Which changes have been made based on the MTE recommendations?</li> <li>•What was the effect of these changes?</li> <li>•Has anything been missed?</li> <li>•Was the programme flexible to changing institutional, political and policy contexts?</li> <li>•What changes have been made as a result of changing contexts?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project related documents;</li> <li>•Background documents on country context in the past decade;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> </ul>	
<b>2. EFFECTIVENESS</b>				
•Achievement of specific objectives based on the delivery and use of its outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•How well has the SPCRCP achieved its planned results in the target areas?</li> <li>•How well was the synergy between training under the capacity building component and the implementation of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Training reports;</li> <li>•SPCRP Steering</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured</li> </ul>

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
by the beneficiaries	the model project component? •How far have human, organizational and physical capacities of public and private institutions concerned with agriculture and rural development been built in selected States and counties/localities? •To what extent has the programme management capacity been built at Federal and State level? •Have key agricultural support services been established and what is their quality? • To what degree have rural target populations gained physical and social access to the services provided? •To what extent has the programme increased the capacity of rural communities and their organizations? •Have the establishment of PCUs and TSUs ensured effective and quality implementation of capacity building? •Has the organizational capacity and effectiveness of government and non-governmental actors improved as a result of training? •Have recipients of training used their capacity to good effect in their work/livelihoods? •To what extent have the model projects increased the output in various sectors? •Has there been improvement in food security, incomes and overall productivity of the beneficiaries in the target communities?	Committee minutes; •Logical frameworks; •Interviews with different categories of respondents.	government; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff •(Former) trainees; •Community representatives and beneficiaries	interviews • Focus group discussions • Tracer studies
•Additional unintended	•Have there been any (unplanned) negative or positive	•Project progress reports;	•FAO Task Force;	



**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
effects	effects on the target groups or areas which have affected or contributed to the results? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Changes in state level government structures or local administrative areas?</li> <li>○ Government resources and contributions to the programme?</li> <li>○ Lack of clear authority on agricultural schemes?</li> <li>○ Issues of land ownership/tenure?</li> <li>○ Ethnic conflicts?</li> <li>○ Other project interventions?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Logical frameworks;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents;</li> <li>•SPCRP Steering Committee minutes;</li> <li>•Project correspondence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> </ul>	
<b>3. EFFICIENCY</b>				
•Overall programme efficiency	•Are the number of beneficiaries who have benefited from the capacity building and model projects sufficient in view of the investments made?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Logical frameworks;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents;</li> <li>•SPCRP Steering Committee minutes;</li> <li>•Project correspondence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>
•Technical and procedural quality of implementation	•Have there been delays to programme implementation and if so, what have been the causes and consequences of the delays? •How efficiently have human and technical resources been mobilized and applied?			
•Financial quality of implementation	•What is the current status of expenditure as compared to planning? •How efficiently have financial resources been applied? •Are the costs reasonable for the activities undertaken? •Have funds been committed, transferred and spent in line with the implementation timescale?			

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Organizational quality of implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Has the quality of project management, training and technical services provided by FAO (UNOPS), GTZ and EMM been of sufficient quality to support the efficient implementation of the SPCR?P</li> <li>•Has there been duplication realized between the different SPCR?P components?</li> <li>•What was the quality of cooperation and coordination between the different SPCR?P components?</li> <li>•Has the role of the PSC been appropriate and has it contributed to the overall programme efficiency?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Logical frameworks;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents;</li> <li>•SPCR?P Steering Committee minutes;</li> <li>•Project correspondence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCR?P project staff</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Management of implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Has the (after MTE) logframe been used as a management tool?</li> <li>•Have the MTE recommendations been appropriately followed up?</li> <li>•Have work plans been developed and used by project management?</li> <li>•How well have activities been monitored by the various project components and have adaptations been made based upon the results?</li> <li>• Have monitoring results from various components been adequately collated?</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCR?P project staff</li> </ul>	
<b>4. IMPACT</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Wider and long-term effects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•What impacts are have been achieved in the area of:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Institutional strengthening of government at State level?</li> <li>○ Capacity building and training?</li> <li>○ Output production in the agriculture, livestock or</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Project progress reports</li> <li>•Impact assessments;</li> <li>•Interviews with different</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
	fisheries sectors? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Food security of target communities?</li> <li>o Livelihoods of target households?</li> </ul>	categories of respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus group discussions</li> </ul>
•Extent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•What has been the coverage (institutional, geographical and estimated numbers) of the impact?</li> <li>•Are their gaps, that have not been addressed?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Project progress reports</li> <li>•Impact assessments;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Community representatives and beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>
•Measurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Have OVIs been regularly monitored and reported upon?</li> <li>•Have OVIs as reflected in the last logframe been achieved?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Logical framework</li> <li>•Monitoring framework</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>
•Crosscutting issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Has the programme had any impact on gender equality?</li> <li>•Are there clear impacts on environment?</li> <li>•Are their impacts to be reported on other issues including but not limited to human rights, rights of minorities and conflict management?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Project progress reports</li> <li>•Impact assessments;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•PSC members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Community and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> <li>• Focus group</li> </ul>

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
			beneficiaries	discussions
<b>5. SUSTAINABILITY</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Continuation of results and effects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Are funds budgeted and available to continue services?</li> <li>•Will services/results be affordable for the target group?</li> <li>•Can the services be maintained if economic factors change?</li> <li>•Are the beneficiaries and/or relevant authorities/institutions able to use and afford maintenance/replacement of the technologies/services now that the programme is ending?</li> <li>•Has a financial/economic phase-out strategy been implemented?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Financial data on government’s budgetary contribution to the sector;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Community representatives and beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> <li>• Focus group discussions</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Ownership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•How far is the programme embedded in local structures?</li> <li>•What is the likelihood that target groups will continue to make use of the SPCRPP results?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Financial data on government’s budgetary contribution to the sector;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•Project Managers;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Community representatives and beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> <li>• Focus group discussions</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Institutional sustainability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•How far has the project been embedded institutionally?</li> <li>•How will the input and function of PCUs and TSUs be taken over by government?</li> <li>•Has the capacity-building component been appropriate to keep ensuring the delivery of services/benefits?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Government’s policy and strategy papers;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Government policy-makers;</li> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	members; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Project Managers.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Sustainability at policy level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Is the normative guidance that has been developed relevant and useful to the target groups in the longer term?</li> <li>•What policy and strategic papers are available at government level demonstrating continuation of the programme?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Government’s policy and strategy papers;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Government policy-makers;</li> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Project Managers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>
<b>6. SYNERGY</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Cooperation and coordination between partners, connections and synergy between components</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•How effective have been the working relationships between FAO-GoS/GRSS, FAO-EMM/GIZ and EMM/GIZ and GoS/GRSS at federal and state levels in support of the overall SPCRCP objectives?</li> <li>•How has been the compliance with EC conditions and procedures and coordination between these and FAO rules and procedures?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Project Managers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Implementing partners’ contribution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•What has been the specific added value of the FAO technical task force (Rome and Addis Ababa)?</li> <li>•What has been the specific added value of the GIZ and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-</li> </ul>

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)**

<b>Key Issues</b>	<b>Key Questions</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Data collection method</b>
	<p>EMM technical services?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•What are the complementarities of SPCRCP with other programmes and projects in the area?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<p>members;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Project Managers.</li> </ul>	<p>structured interviews</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Synergy between Sudan and South Sudan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•To what extent have project stakeholders in Sudan and South Sudan exchanged experience and learning?</li> <li>•To what extent have they shared methodologies, information and analysis?</li> <li>•Has the recent official division by the two counties influenced this process?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Project progress reports;</li> <li>•Project documents;</li> <li>•PSC minutes;</li> <li>•Monitoring reports;</li> <li>•Interviews with different categories of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force;</li> <li>•Steering Committee members;</li> <li>•State level government;</li> <li>•SPCRP project staff</li> <li>•Project Managers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• Semi-structured interviews</li> </ul>

Annex 7. Evaluation against DAC criteria

Overall rating of project design and activities in Blue Nile State against DAC Criteria\*

Key elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	B	B	B	B	B-D
Human CB	B	B	B	B	B-D
FFS	A	A	A	A-D	A-D
CARDA	A	A	A	A-D	A-D
RM-SB	B	B-C	B-C	B-C	B-D
Micro-Projects	B-C	B-D	B-D	B-D	B-D
<b>OVERALL</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>eC</b>	<b>B-C</b>	<b>B-C</b>

Overall rating of project design and activities in Red Sea State against DAC Criteria\*

Key elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	B	C	C	B	C
Human CB	B	C	C	C	C
FFS	B	C	C	B	B
CARDA	B	C	B	B	B
RM-SB	C	C	C	C	C
Micro-Projects	B	C	C	B	B
<b>OVERALL</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>B-C</b>	<b>B-C</b>

**Overall rating of project design and activities in River Nile State against DAC Criteria\***

Key elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	B	C	C	B	C
Human CB	A	B	C	C	C
FFS	B	C	C	B	B
CARDA	B	C	B	B	B
RM-SB	C	C	C	C	C
Micro-Projects	B	B	B	B	B
<b>OVERALL</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>B-C</b>	<b>B-C</b>

**Overall rating of project design and activities in South Kordofan against DAC Criteria\***

Key elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	B-C	C	C	B-C	B-D
Human CB	A	B-C	B-C	B-C	B-D
FFS	A	A	A	A-B	B
CARDA	A	A	A	A-B	B
RM-SB	B	C	C	C-D	C-D
Micro-Projects	B	D	C-D	D	D
Project management	B-D	B-D	B-D	B-D	B-D
<b>OVERALL</b>	<b>B-D</b>	<b>B-D</b>	<b>B-D</b>	<b>B-D</b>	<b>B-D</b>

\* DAC terms score: A 'very good', B 'good', C 'problems' and D 'serious deficiencies'



## Annex 8. Evaluation Questions/Topics Matrices per State

### EQM SPCRP GENERAL

<b>OVERALL PROJECT DESIGN</b>					
<b>QUESTIONS- TOPICS</b>	<b>RELEVANCE</b>	<b>EFFICIENCY</b>	<b>EFFECTIVENESS</b>	<b>IMPACT</b>	<b>SUSTAINABILITY</b>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>OVERALL PROJECT DESIGN</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>SUMMARY FROM MAIN REPORT</b></p>	<p><b>Purposes and expected results:</b></p> <p>1. Purpose: Human, organizational and physical capacity of key public and private institutions built in the selected states and localities / counties to provide administrative, advisory and capacitating services to the rural areas.</p> <p>2. First result: Capacities built in public administration, policies and strategies.</p> <p>3. Second result: Key agricultural support services in place.</p> <p>4. Basic components: 1) Capacity Building (physical, institutional / organisational / human resources); 2) Support to Rural Livelihoods (in River Nile State: only Model Project Programme).</p> <p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Good fit with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sudan institutional, organisational and HR capacity situation at State level;</li> <li>• Sudan Agricultural Revival Programme (ARP) and policy;</li> <li>• EU strategy and policy as laid down in Country Strategy Paper (CSP).</li> </ul> <p>2. Intervention needed and welcome at Federal and State</p>	<p><b>Was the design efficient?</b></p> <p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The design implicitly and explicitly co-opts communities, state and local public bodies, NSAs / NGOs, and is therefore geared to leverage project resources and create 'good value for money'.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. No allowance was made for disturbances and conflicts though these were to be expected.</p> <p>2. The split between CB (FAO) and MP and MPP (both EMM) without a mechanism for coordination was bound to lead to delays, duplication, and uncoordinated action.</p>	<p><b>Was the design effective?</b></p> <p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The design planned for the effective undertaking and completion of many activities and delivery of outputs.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The design did not explicitly plan for the effective delivery of institutional and organizational capacity.</p> <p>2. The design did not plan for effective consultation and coordination between the two principal contractors FAO and EMM.</p>	<p><b>Was the design geared to deliver impact?</b></p> <p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The design aimed at positive and considerable impact in three main areas: <b>a.</b> Support to 'peace' and 'conflict reduction', <b>b.</b> Tangible support to people in need by helping them to improve their livelihood conditions, and <b>c.</b> Strengthening 'structure' of public bodies.</p> <p><b>Negative</b></p> <p>1. The design was geared to deliver the first two impacts / results, but less so regarding the third impact.</p>	<p><b>Was the design tailored to ensuring sustainability?</b></p> <p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Largely implicitly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Through seeking to involve the communities and NSAs / NGOs, get acceptance, and an 'implicit' intention to support the project's results upon termination;</li> <li>• Through seeking the active involvement of women who are more used than men to the cash and development side of the households.</li> </ul> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Comprising the ecological, financial, cultural and organisational dimensions is a complex matter including e.g. ownership, competence, resource availability, political and communities' will to continue, selection of the 'subjects' of sustainability – does not feature explicitly in the design of the project. An appropriate exit strategy is absent.</p> <p>2. The design largely neglects components/activities that are necessary to generate robust institutional and organizational 'structure' which after all are primary conditions to ensuring</p>

	<p>levels and the beneficiaries at Locality and village level.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Design is activities / output oriented.</li> <li>2. Non-physical CB purpose insufficiently translated into activities embedded in clearly formulated strategies for FSS, CAHW/CARDA and RM-SBG at State level, and very much focused on a large number of training activities.</li> <li>3. In addition to the design split between CB and MP, the design does not include a consultative or coordination mechanism between the components and implementing organisations.</li> <li>4. Sustainability does not explicitly feature in the design, nor did an appropriate exit strategy.</li> <li>5. Although risks and assumptions are paid attention to in the project document, the design does not explicitly cater for disturbances, uncertainties and conflicts.</li> <li>6. In due recognition of the actual/existing capacities, the combination of 'many' activities, high ambitions for lasting positive impacts, and the delays encountered particularly during the start-up phase, the four-year time frame of the project was unrealistic and bound to disappoint in terms of achievable 'sustainability'.</li> </ol>				<p>sustainability. It seems to take for granted that elements such as strategic planning, effective M&amp;E, HRD, inclusive and effective management practices can be established and kept going without comprehensive institutional and organizational development.</p> <p>3. Important factors that do not feature in the design in this regard are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Organisation:</b> <b>a.</b> Mandate and functional analysis of key public agencies, and follow-up; <b>b.</b> Review of organizational structure and procedures in light of results of the previous step, and follow-up; <b>c.</b> Review of departmental and other units' responsibilities and operational Terms of Reference, and follow-up; <b>d.</b> review of staffing requirements / job descriptions and of tools and techniques; <b>e.</b> HRD fully responsive to the previous Organisation Development steps.</li> <li>• <b>Planning:</b> <b>a.</b> review and strengthening of planning processes; <b>b.</b> review and strengthening of planning tools and techniques; and <b>c.</b> HRD.</li> </ul> <p><b>Budget:</b> <b>a.</b> review and strengthening of budgetary arrangements and procedures; <b>b.</b> review and strengthening of connections between budgetary and financial management on the one hand and substantive planning and resource allocation on the other.</p>
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## EQM Blue Nile State

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<p><b>ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC DESIGN / PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR BLUE NILE STATE</b></p>	<p><b>Undetermined:</b> 1. The positive and negative connotations, above, for the ‘Overall Project’, equally apply to the selected States including Blue Nile State. The project is implemented in the States and at State and rural communities’ levels. The project bodies located in Khartoum provide supportive services and administrative management.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. No specific Project Document, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared at State level, including Blue Nile State. There is therefore no State-specific design. 2. Instead, the project operates through Annual Work Plans to be approved at the central level. This applies to the CB as well as the MP components. 3. The Blue Nile State Evaluation Mission could therefore not evaluate the project at State level against a comprehensive framework specific to Blue Nile State. This also applies to Project Management at both State and Central levels, and to the evaluation of the Overall Project. The Blue Nile State</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b> 1. In addition to the connotations, above, for the Overall Project, the project’s efficiency suffered from the uncertainties and other constraints mentioned under ‘relevance’. 2. Had there been a robust state-specific project framework, the constraints could probably have been dealt with more efficiently.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The absence of a state-specific project framework, and the adverse conditions mentioned under ‘relevance’ reduced the effectiveness of the project. 2. Communities could not be reached, could not be started or late, other activities had to be abandoned, decisions on replacement action came late in the project ‘life’, communities hesitated to get fully engaged with the project, staff became less motivated.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b> 1. As for ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’, the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints reduced the impact of the project. 2. To some degree, this affects ‘sustainability’ perhaps more than ‘delivery’.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b> 1. In spite of its otherwise good achievements in the face of considerable constraints, ‘sustainability’ suffered from the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints’. 2. Roughly speaking, the project managed to establish a foundation for the restoration of productive capacity in Blue Nile State. With the exception of achievements discussed later in this EQM, it must be feared that without further support of money and human resources, many achievements will merely survive, others will slowly erode, some will quickly discontinue, and expansion of productive ‘successes’ attributable to the project may not be achieved.</p>

	<p>Evaluation Mission has evaluated achievements, both in their own right and against the overall objectives and purposes of the project.</p> <p>4. The absence of a state-specific project framework implied that a number of state-specific uncertainties and other adverse conditions were and could only find their way into the AWP in an ad-hoc fashion. Factors to be mentioned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly problematic security situation in the State;</li> <li>• Raising of the Roseires Dam and evacuation of fishermen and farmers to places they do not consider appropriate;</li> <li>• Frequent change of ministers (4) and DGs (5);</li> <li>• Three different organisation structures of the ministries of agriculture and animal production – single ministry in 2008, 2 separate ministries in 2011, re-united in 2012;</li> </ul> <p>Late start of several project activities due to late project staff mobilization and security considerations.</p>				
<b>OVERALL PERFORMANCE</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project has performed well in line with needs as identified in the CBNA, perceived by the target communities and public bodies, and in line with the AWP.</p> <p>2. The overall performance of</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB and MP components worked well together.</p> <p>2. Management on site has been reasonably inclusive and communicative, and so contributed</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The achievements and outputs are listed and presented in Annex --- to this report. It is as said under ‘relevance’ a remarkable performance by the project.</p> <p>2. The achievements do</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project helped build a foundation for further development the various levels, e.g. public bodies and central and field level, farmers’ and herders’ communities, personal human capacities</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB achievements that can be attributed to FFS, CARDAs, Stock Routes Rehabilitation, and CB of public bodies are generally ‘sturdy’ and entrenched. Most of them will probably prove sustainable to a fair degree</p>

	<p>the project has been good. If the adverse conditions mentioned earlier are taken into account, the performance is remarkable.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. Upon visiting a fair number of physical CB situations, the level of visible activity using the CB s disappointing – one explanation was that much of the work was done in the field, but that will only be partly explanatory.</p>	<p>to efficient rations between resources and achievements.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The project would have benefited from an effective inclusive Communication Strategy. The use of audio-visual was ad-hoc, not deliberately or strategically intended to support the project.</p>	<p>contribute to the project’s overall goal, purposes and expected results.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The absence of a comprehensive plan, TOR and Inception Report for Blue Nile State render a formal evaluation of project performance against the plan impossible. 2. All that can be said is that the AWP have generally been met, taking into account adjustments as a result of adverse developments outside the control of project management at State level.</p>	<p>/ skills / knowledge. 2. Mind sets changed, self-confidence increased, vocabularies changed – towards a ‘can-do’ attitude. 3. The project has positively and directly impacted on about 4,000 families, 1,600 of which being nomad families, of a total of around 110,000 rural families in the Blue Nile State.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The project has an enclave nature, like most projects though. Literature says that the weight of the 96% of the population not reached may drag project performance down, and may also give rise social unrest. Replies to questions raised by the evaluators in this respect though rate these risks as very low. 2. The project did not pay attention to the people evacuated from the Roseires area due to the raising of the dam by some 10 meters. They lost their livelihood systems and sense of community, yet were not targeted for support under the project.</p>	<p>without much further support. 2. The same applies to perhaps half of the physical CB achieved.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The Micro- and Micro-finance projects started late, late 2010 and 2011. Their achievements are in their infancy. It must be doubted that they will prove sustainable without substantial further support 2. The project helped build a ‘foundation’. Even a foundation needs maintenance and satisfactory budgetary and human resource arrangements must be concluded to avoid erosion. 3. The Exit Strategy for the SPCRP, and its corollary at Blue Nile State level, holds little promise and is not a strategy but rather a wish list for which there is little resource support. 4. The FFS, CARDA and Stock Routes rehabilitation experience would lend themselves very well to further expansion. If no budgetary and other resource support is extended, the potential will largely fade out. 5. The CB at the ministry needs support to conduct a thorough Organisational Review and follow-up action. Without this, further gains in effectiveness will be hard to achieve and many of the</p>
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<b>PUBLIC BODIES</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with agriculture, forestry, animal production, range land and fisheries for institutional, organisational and human resource capacity building. The ministries are the backbone of the public administration dealing with the state's agricultural and animal production capacity which is the heart of Blue Nile State's economy and society.  2. The project rightly seeks capacity building for both Blue Nile State central organization as well as the field offices. The complexities of the state and the dispersed and partly nomadic population demand de-concentrated yet coherent policies and policy implementation.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1 .The TSU jointly with the ministries and departments concerned worked well together and established coordination procedures early in the project.  2. The functional combination, in one single person, of project manager MP, PSC Member for the state, de facto member of the TSU, Director Planning and Acting DG in the absence of the DG proved an efficient vehicle to bring the various activities and parties together when needed.  3. The TSU and the Administration, managed to secure complementarity between the MP and the CB components of the project which resulted in efficient and synergetic deployment of resources.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The project's effectiveness on human, institutional and organisational CB of public bodies can be summarised as follows::  •The ministry established: M&amp;E Unit, Data Base Unit, Training Unit, IT Training Unit and Marketing Unit at the Directorate of Planning, and strengthened several other public bodies at central and de-concentrated levels;  •Competent staff was recruited and (young) staff trained in relevant subjects – some of a generic and others of specialized subject matter nature;  •Efficient and inclusive procedures were established for strategic and annual planning;  •The organisational structure of the re-unified ministry of agriculture and animal production was based on inclusive procedures aimed at structure and procedures on the basis of organizational and substantive logic;  •Through the Training Unit, training is aimed at systematic CB of directorates, departments</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The re-united ministry of agriculture and animal production has surely benefited from the project, from both the physical and non-physical CB.  2. The project helped the ministry to be stronger today than before the project. There is self-confidence and a 'can-do' attitude which according to various sources and documents was absent before the project.  3. Mind-sets and the vocabulary have changed and have become more professional and analysis minded.  4. The new organisational units established during the project are seen as contributing to the ministry's competence and reach.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b>  1. The absence of a thorough organisation review and systematic follow-up action leaves the ministry 'un-balanced', and some respondents mention that. A number of areas have been strengthened, others have not. This threatens the cohesion and collective strength of the ministry. Without a robust</p>	<p>achievements risk erosion.</p> <p><b>Positive:</b>  1. Widely across the ministry, at both central and field offices, human capacity has been positively affected by the project. Targeted training has been extended in generic subjects such as report writing and basic computer skills, and in a range of specialized subjects such as research methods, statistical analysis (e.g. SPSS), data base management (e.g. Oracle), evaluation methods, plant and veterinary practices, and others.  2. Most of that will be of value to the ministry as long as it is supported by management at the various levels concerned, and included in staff performance assessment.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b>  1. HD and targeted training need continuous attention: staff transfers, promotions, staff leaving, keeping up to date, special attention to field staff who tend to be somewhat 'neglected'. It is unclear if the resources to maintain the HD strength reached with the support of the project will continue in future. If not, such 'strength' will gradually erode.  2. It is unclear if staff performance assessment is sufficiently deeply entrenched in the organisation to support</p>

			<p>and units of the re-united ministry based on needs and results assessment.</p> <p>2. Physical CB has been provided by the project, in conjunctive efforts of the CB and MP components, based largely on needs analysis.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Training results evaluation and performance assessment are undertaken but have no further implications. It is unclear to which degree staff performance assessment is fully professionally done.</p> <p>2. An organisational review took place in 2011. It was narrow and superficial, insufficiently penetrating and not seriously professional. It is doubtful whether the ministry has taken any benefit from it. The review was too limited to lead to recommendations for procedures, protocols, structure, HD needs quantitatively and qualitatively, and for 'training' – TNA, results assessment.</p>	<p>organisational review and analysis, it is hard to identify duplications, ambiguity of authority, omissions, potential sources of conflict and mal-performance, at central and field levels and on the cross-lines of the organization. This has become more urgent in the aftermath of the re-unification of the ministries of agriculture and animal production.</p>	<p>ensuring fully professional staff capabilities.</p> <p>3. The 'un-balance', discussed under 'Impact', above, will if not addressed weaken the ministry – organisational cohesion, staff motivation, effectiveness.</p> <p>4. Generally, the increased strength of the ministry will weaken if the budgetary resources cannot be secured that are minimally required for directorates, departments, units and staff to fulfil their mandatory tasks. Equally, physical facilities and equipment must be adequately maintained insofar required for the organisation's mandatory tasks.</p>
<b>FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. FFS is a proven and successful national and international approach to raise farmers' productivity. FFS is targeted and works with</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The FFSs deliver value for money. At limited cost, the FFS assist farmers to increase their</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project has established 47 operating FFSs. Another 15 were established but had to be abandoned for security</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The currently operating FFSs have lasting positive impact. This concerns not only what they have learned 'directly'.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The post-FFS farming communities will continue to practice what they have learned. Most of the changes in farming in farming</p>

	<p>selected willing farming communities.</p> <p>2. Some 85% of the population of Blue Nile State consists of farmers and farming communities. The FFS concept and practice can be fully tailored to the local conditions and are expected to serve the farming communities and their members well.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. FFS is a targeted approach. It does not provide a ‘blanket’ approach aimed at generically raising agricultural productivity in Blue Nile State.</p> <p>2. To be successfully applied, FFS requires commitment from the ministry and support and encouragement of its field staff.</p>	<p>productivity across a full range of farming practices and gain knowledge and understanding.</p> <p>2. The FFS concept and practice train coordinators and facilitators while doing the work, with selected specific subject training. FFS so prepares the ground to expand the FFS to other communities.</p>	<p>reasons. The project trained 2 coordinators per school and a varying number of facilitators.</p> <p>2. The FFSs operate to full satisfaction of the farming communities and the individual farmers. Net production values have gone up, and farmers and the farmers union report lasting increases in knowledge and improvement of farming practices. Net production values reportedly go up by 30-70% in the communities under the project after one full FFS cycle.</p> <p>3. The FFSs and the farming communities report rewarding communication with the ministry’s research and extension services, which was not really there before the project.</p>	<p>2. An increasing number of ex-FFS communities, organize themselves and keep doing what they did during the FFS, e.g.: analysis of each other’s practices and productivity, calling in the extensive services for specific discussion and advice, buying certified seed (often at the Information Shops).</p> <p>3. In a number of cases, community facilitators and individual farmers ‘talk’ with outside farmers and communities and so spread the FSS message.</p>	<p>practices and community approach to farming is well entrenched.</p> <p>2. The ministry’s extension service has adopted FFS as an effective and efficient way to raise agricultural productivity.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The interaction between the post-FFS farmers, extension services, agricultural research and plant protection services is important. It is unclear to what degree the interaction will continue in future and enhance further improvement of farming practices and productivity.</p> <p>2. The FFS helped build a ‘foundation’ and created a potential for expanding the improvements, either through new FFSs or through other approaches yet using the trained coordinators, facilitators and ‘advanced’ farmers. Without further support, this achievement, will not be realized.</p>
<p><b>CARDA</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA was initiated by the project, based on ‘best’ international practice regarding animal productivity.</p> <p>2. It is gradually replacing CAWD, certainly in the areas covered by the CARDA approach. More than CAWD which is focused on ‘health’, CARDA considers all aspects of animal productivity and is an inclusive and superior</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA operates with farming communities rather than individual farmers, rather similar to FFS.</p> <p>2. The CARDA concept and practice trains coordinators and facilitators while doing the work, with selected</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project has established 25 CARDA supported communities. A number of them coincide with FFS communities, about half of do not.</p> <p>2. No precise data could be obtained on productivity gains through CARDA. Reportedly though, livestock healthy life and, generally, the productivity</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA impact on the groups interacted with is positive. The changes due to CARDA are easily absorbed and entrenched in more inclusive practices of animal husbandry.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The strong focus of CARDA on ‘farmers’ prevent paying attention to</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Livestock farmers reportedly value CARDA and appreciate that it is more inclusive than CAHW, and positively affects household income. When asked, farmers reply that they will continue to practice the changes in animal husbandry CARDA taught them.</p> <p>2. The ministry’s animal production directorate and</p>



	<p>approach. 3. Most farmers in the state keep livestock.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. CARDA, so far, supports resident farmers, not nomads. This in spite of the fact that livestock in Blue Nile State is ‘dominated’ by herders rather than farmers. Of the estimated 5 million heads of livestock, only about 10% belongs to farming communities, the rest to herders.</p>	<p>specific subject training.</p>	<p>increase considerably. Net animal husbandry revenues increase approximately by the same proportion as net agricultural production values under FSS, i.e. by 30-70%. The time though to reach that point is longer, up to perhaps 2-3 years. 3. CARDA is also reaching out, modestly so far, to herders in connection with the rehabilitation of Stock Routes at the villages involved and the water points.</p>	<p>aspects of livestock keeping that transgress the boundary of farm livestock.</p>	<p>departments concerned have adopted CARDA as the leading principle of their extension operations.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The interaction between the various actors in CARDA is critical to the success of the ‘formula’. It is unclear to what degree the interaction will continue in future and enhance further improvement of animal husbandry and productivity. 2. CARDA helped build a ‘foundation’ and created a potential for expanding the improvements, to other livestock farmers and herders. Without support, this potential is unlikely to be realised.</p>
<p><b>CATTLE / STOCK ROUTES</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. Blue Nile State is home to approximately 4,000 nomadic families together keeping herds of around 5 million camels, cattle, sheep and goats. 2. About twice annually, the herds move across the state. The traditional; stock routes have deteriorated – demarcations, water points, resting areas, quality of grazing areas, service areas. With deterioration came increasing conflicts between herders and farmers, and further degradation of the state’s natural resources. 3. Stock Route Rehabilitation as conceived in the project is multi-faceted and contributes</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The efficiency of Stock Route Rehabilitation lies in the simultaneous address of resources conservation, conflict reduction between herders and farmers, increases in productivity. 2. The CB and MP components of SPCR worked well together in this major activity which proceeded fast, efficiently and effectively without delays, confusion and conflicts. 3. At around 40% of</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The project rehabilitated 480 kms of stock route, and the World Bank another 180 kms, out of a total of 1,000 kms state-wide. 2. 10 water points were rehabilitated and 5 newly constructed, range lands along the routes were upgraded, resting grounds were demarcated and upgraded, ground cover increased by 23%, forage production along the routes by 600 kg per feddan, crop residues were baled for animal feed (5000 bales). 3. Water Users Associations (WUA, 14)</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The objectives of Stock Route Rehabilitation were met, and positively impacted on farmers, herders, villages, natural resources. 2. Most of the impact is of long term nature. Farmers and herders are led to reduce conflict and benefit from various synergies.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The understanding reached between and amongst the stakeholders, and realised in tangible terms, is of value to all of them. 2. Regulations are in place to arbitrate in conflicts should they arise, and the WUAs have been well trained in effective and respectful management of the water points.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The rehabilitated stock routes must be maintained which requires matching human and budgetary resources. Human resources are there, but mobilization as needed required budget</p>

	<p>to a number of objectives simultaneously. It was also long overdue.</p>	<p>the total expenditure on the Blue Nile State Model Project, the Stock Routes Rehabilitation was costly. Yet, it created a wide and important array of economic, and social benefits. It also, had a significant positive impact on the state's natural resources. Finally, it facilitated extending CARDA services to herders, and integrating a range of services through the WUAs.</p>	<p>were formed and trained to manage the water points, herders were 'trained' to pay for the WUA services and water point conservation, CARDA was extended to render services to herders and facilitators were trained to do so. 4. A law was passed to guide the 'smooth' operations of the stock routes, and downstream regulations have been formulated and institutionalized.</p>		<p>additional to what the state is used. It is unclear if resources will be made available though all stakeholders see the need. 2. There is some 400 kms of stock route still to be rehabilitated. Although what has been achieved positively impacts on peace and quiet, the remainder may still pose problems. 3. The herds are growing, reportedly by 1-2%. This needs to be well monitored to ensure sufficient stock route capacity.</p>
<p><b>MICRO PROJECTS, MICRO-FINANCE PROJECTS SMALL BUSINESS GROUPS</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. These project activities are 'naturally' complementary to, particularly, FSS and CARDA which are directly focused on farmers and stock route rehabilitation serving herders. They are intended to provide on- and off-farm employment as well as entrepreneurship and incomes outside, yet often connected with, regular agricultural and animal husbandry.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The projects started late, mostly in 2011 and have been around for a short time and not far from the date of termination of SPCRP. 2. They are still in their infancy and have not had the</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b> 1. The projects have not matured enough at this point in time to allow efficiency evaluation. 2. The approach is through working with groups. This may be more efficient than when targeting individual, entrepreneurs, but perhaps also less penetrating, particularly so in the micro-finance and small business activities.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b> 1. Relatively large numbers of groups have been enlisted, e.g. 26 groups for micro-finance and comparable numbers for SBG and micro-projects. 2. The activities are too 'fresh' yet, to assess repayment rates in the micro-finance projects.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b> 1. The activities are too 'fresh' to allow an assessment of their impact or their potential impact. 2. The interest from groups and individuals to join the activities has been substantial, indicating demand for this kind of support.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined / negative</b> 1. The state of infancy of the project activities renders it doubtful that they can survive with project support. Exceptions may occur where new 'mind sets' have taken root.</p>

	time to mature and get entrenched.				
<b>GENDER</b>	<p><b>Undetermined / Positive</b></p> <p>1. The project has articulated gender as an issue to be explicitly incorporated in the various project activities, to the extent possible and meaningful.</p> <p>2. In the communities, men and women have traditional roles with the women normally more involved than men in the cash and nutritional side of the household.</p>	<b>Undetermined</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Both FSS and CARDA services under the project have addressed groups without specific gender bias and where women are sometimes the majority of the participants.</p> <p>2. In the Micro-projects, micro-finance projects and small business groups, women form the majority. In addition, there are special women groups.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The FSS and CARDA groups have very few female coordinators and facilitators. The reason mostly given is that that work is heavy, requires mobility and riding motor bikes which the communities do not encourage or even permit.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The traditional role of women in the communities and families, particularly ‘cash’ and ‘nutrition’, make the women a good repository for changes in the mind sets, attitude and activities regarding marketing, cash economy and nutrition / health issues.</p> <p>2. Reportedly, from our meetings and discussions, the above is actually the case and the project has had an identifiable and clear impact in this respect.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. As said earlier, the project has helped build a foundation. It is too early days to judge the project’s real impact on raising role and voice of the women.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. The project has helped build a foundation aimed at raising agricultural and animal husbandry / livestock productivity. This has received the main attention, irrespective of gender. Gender has been specifically ‘targeted’ in project activities that, most of them, started late – micro-finance projects, micro-projects, small business groups. As argued before, it is doubtful that these will prove sustainable without specific project support.</p> <p>2. The traditional role of women discussed under ‘impact’ renders it probable that where ‘impact’ is assessed as positive, the women will form a lasting repository of change with a potential to gradually see change and raised productivity gain ground and, with that, see their role and voice expanding.</p>
<b>TRAINING</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Levels of skills in the state – public bodies, NSAs, families, private sector – were low at the time the project was conceived. The project’s strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore fully relevant.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Training has been prepared, conducted and followed up efficiently. Proper procedures were followed and the required coordinating infrastructure at</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project delivered massive training, e.g.: 1,550 farmers (FSS), 500 farmers (CARDA), 500 MPP/SBG participants 60 ministry staff, 150 coordinators/facilitators (FSS/CARDA), 14 WUAs.</p> <p>2. For the ministry staff, a specific TNA was done;</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. For the ministry staff, the training went through post-training evaluation and later performance evaluation.</p> <p>2. See also under ‘Public Bodies’, above.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The assessments, above, were generally ‘light’;</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The ministry is professionally stronger today than it was before the project, due to the project and the training provided through the project, as discussed under ‘public bodies’, above.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The TNA needs to be rolled over at least once every 2</p>

		<p>project level was provided.</p> <p>2. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at state level, the decision to acquire trainers and curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU for that purpose, was efficient and to the point.</p>	<p>the coordinators / facilitators were carefully selected, and so were the WUA staff. The other trainees came from the 'groups'.</p>	<p>based on participants' satisfaction and 'easy to answer' questions about the application of the newly acquired skills.</p> <p>2. The structure changes of the ministry / ministries (3 times) were not reflected in the TNA or the post-training assessments.</p>	<p>years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed, new staff entered needing training. The Training Unit at the ministry should see to that, and ensure that they themselves are an up to standard HRD unit. It is unclear if they have that mandate and budget.</p>
<p><b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The 'split' between the CB and MP components has not harmed the management of the project at state level, due to the 'cast of characters'.</p> <p>2. The two components were often well coordinated and complementary.</p> <p>3. The connections between state level and central SPCRP management have been good. There has been no undue need for central management to interfere. Central management includes the tripartite construction of FAO Khartoum, EMM Khartoum and the Project Steering Committee. The latter met frequently (15 sessions so far), was generally well prepared, focused on operational rather than strategic issues and was instrumental to getting some uneasy issues solved / managed.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The effective coordination and communication at state level allowed the efficient implementation of project activities. Duplication and omissions were avoided, synergy was sought and realised.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The AWP were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, project activities were largely implemented on time and progressed generally as planned.</p> <p>2. The TSU and the leaders of the CB and MP components proved capable of handling the significant constraints where and when they exercised their influence (see sections on Blue Nile design and overall performance, above)</p> <p>3. The TSU managed to ensure the necessary cooperation of the many stakeholders in the complex Stock Routes Rehabilitation as result of which that activity (a major project in itself) progressed efficiently and effectively.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The impact of the effective and efficient management at state level, including the coordination between the CB and MP components is positive and cannot be overrated.</p> <p>2. The many activities, the constraints in the state, the split between the basic components, the multiple stakeholders, they were all well handled by state level management.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. The SPCRP is terminated and about to close the books. Management of the project activities and their sustainability is no longer in the hands of the state level project management.</p>

	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Project management at state level operated through AWP's to be approved at central level. While implementing, specific activities required additional approval from central level</li> <li>2. From central point of view, this operating mode makes sense – ensuring a tightly run operation. From state point of view and management at that level, less so.</li> <li>3. The project at state level became necessarily output and not results oriented. It had no specific overall framework within which to work. 'Strategic oversight' at state level did not exist due to the absence of an overall state-specific project document. In fact, at state level, the goal, purposes, specific objectives and expected results of the SPCRP were no matter of concern.</li> </ol>		<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. State level management allowed late implementation of the MPP and similar project activities. The SPCRP Project Document 'wanted' that, but the late start was a recipe for unsustainability of these activities. State level management could have drawn attention to this, but may not have done so at least partly due to the absence of a state level plan (see other instances in this EQM where this has been discussed).</li> </ol>		
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## EQM Red Sea State

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<b>DESIGN / PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR RED SEA STATE</b>	<p><b>Undetermined:</b></p> <p>1. The project bodies located in Khartoum (PCU and PSC) provide supportive services and administrative management.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Late start of several project activities due to late project staff mobilization and inaccessibility of Tokar Delta three months of the year due to weather conditions, which were not considered in planning of the project. This has reduced the project live span by almost one year.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The project's efficiency suffered from the delays in start up, staff turnover and other constraints mentioned under 'relevance'.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The project is confined to two communities in Arbaat (primarily farming, FSS) and Tokar Delta leaving a huge gap in uncovered areas of Red Sea State.</p> <p>2. Other projects are working in the state e.g. ERDP (EU Funded) but cooperation is limited</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The absence of complimentary between CB and MP at state level is bound to reduce the impact of the project.</p> <p>2. To a degree, this affects 'sustainability' perhaps more than 'delivery'.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The project managed to establish a foundation for the restoration of productive capacity in Red Sea State. It must be feared that without further support of money and human resources, many achievements will merely survive (FFS and CARDAs), others will slowly erode (RM &amp; SB), some will quickly discontinue (Research Station in Tokar Delta), and expansion of productive 'successes' attributable to the project may not be achieved.</p>
<b>OVERALL PERFORMANCE</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project has performed well in line with needs as identified in the CBNA, perceived by the communities and public bodies, and in line with the AWP.</p> <p>2. The overall performance of the project has been in line with State strategic plans.</p> <p>3. In RSS CB is very visible and is difficult to miss</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Management on site has been reasonably inclusive and communicative, and so contributed to efficient rations between resources and achievements.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The CB and MP components did not work well together.</p> <p>2. The project would have benefited from an effective inclusive Communication Strategy. The use of audio-visual material, even</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The achievements contribute to the project's overall goal, purposes and expected results.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The AWP have generally been met, taking into account adjustments as a result of adverse developments outside the control of project management at State level.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project helped build a foundation for further development the various levels, e.g. public bodies and central and field level, farmers' and herders' communities, personal human capacities / skills / knowledge.</p> <p>2. Mind sets changed, self-confidence increased, vocabularies changed – towards a 'can-do' attitude.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. It has proved difficult to estimate the numbers of households benefited from the project. The small number of people reached</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB achievements that can be attributed to FFS, CARDAs, and CB of public bodies are generally 'sturdy' and entrenched. Most of them will probably prove sustainable provided funding made available.</p> <p>2. The same applies to perhaps half of the physical CB achieved.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The Micro- and Micro-finance projects started late, late 2010 and 2011. Their achievements are in their infancy and will not be sustainable without substantial further support</p> <p>2. The project helped build a</p>

		<p>though ad hoc, was slightly better organized than in other states. Most materials for FSS are all literacy oriented.</p>		<p>may drag project performance down, and may also give rise social unrest. Replies to questions raised by the evaluators in this respect though rate these risks as very low.</p> <p>2. The project did not adequately address the land issues in Tokar delta which is key pillar of the MP.</p>	<p>‘foundation’. Even a foundation needs maintenance and satisfactory budgetary and human resource arrangements must be concluded to avoid erosion.</p> <p>3. The Exit Strategy for the SPCRP, and its corollary at Red Sea State level, holds little promise and is not a strategy but rather a wish list for which there is little resource support.</p> <p>4. The CB at the ministry need support to conduct a thorough Organisational Review and follow-up action. Without this, further gains in effectiveness will be hard to achieve and much of the achievements by the project risk erosion.</p>
<p><b>PUBLIC BODIES</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with agriculture, animal resources, and fisheries for institutional, organisational and human resource capacity building. The ministries are the backbone of the public administration dealing with the state’s agricultural and animal production capacity.</p> <p>2. The project rightly seeks capacity building for both Red Sea State central organization as well as the field offices. The huge area of the state and the dispersed population demand de-concentrated yet coherent policies and policy implementation.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1 The TSU jointly with the ministries and departments concerned worked well together and established coordination procedures early in the project.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The TSU and the Administration, did not manage to secure complementarity between the MP and the CB components of the project which resulted in inefficient and</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project’s effectiveness on human, institutional and organisational CB of public bodies can be summarized as follows::</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•The ministry established: M&amp;E Unit, Data Base Unit, Training Unit, IT Training Unit and Marketing Unit at the Directorate of Planning, and strengthened several other public bodies at central and de-concentrated levels;</li> <li>•Competent staff was recruited and (young) staff trained in relevant subjects – some of a</li> </ul>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project helped the ministry to be stronger today than before the project. There is self-confidence and a ‘can-do’ attitude which according to various sources and documents was absent before the project.</p> <p>2. Mind-sets and the vocabulary have changed and have become more professional and analysis minded.</p> <p>3. The new organisational units established during the project are seen as contributing to the ministry’s competence and reach.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Widely across the ministry, at both central and field offices, human capacity has been positively affected by the project. Targeted training has been extended in generic subjects such as report writing and basic computer skills, and in a range of specialized subjects such as research methods, statistical analysis (e.g. SPSS), database management (e.g. Oracle), evaluation methods, plant and veterinary practices, and others.</p> <p>2. Most of that will be of value to the ministry as long as it is supported by management at the various levels concerned, and included in staff</p>

		<p>deployment of resources.</p>	<p>generic and others of specialized subject matter nature;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Efficient and inclusive procedures were established for strategic and annual planning;</li> <li>•Through the Training Unit, training is aimed at systematic CB of directorates, departments and units of the re-united ministry based on needs and results assessment.</li> </ul> <p>2. Physical CB has been provided by the project, in conjunctive efforts of the CB and MP components, based largely on needs analysis.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Training results evaluation and performance assessment are undertaken but have no further implications. It is unclear to which degree staff performance assessment is fully professionally done.</p> <p>2. An organisational review took place in 2011. It was narrow and superficial, insufficiently penetrating and not seriously professional. It is doubtful whether the ministry has taken any benefit from it. The review was too limited to lead to recommendations</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The absence of a thorough organisation review and systematic follow-up action leaves the ministry ‘un-balanced’, and some respondents mention that. A number of areas have been strengthened. Others have not. This threatens the cohesion and collective strength of the ministry. Without a robust organisational review and analysis, it is hard to identify duplications, ambiguity of authority, omissions, potential sources of conflict and mal-performance, at central and field levels and on the cross-lines of the organization.</p>	<p>performance assessment.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. HD and targeted training need continuous attention: staff transfers, promotions, staff leaving, keeping up to date, special attention to field staff who tend to be somewhat ‘neglected’. It is unclear if the resources to maintain the HD strength reached with the support of the project will continue in future. If not, such ‘strength’ will gradually erode.</p> <p>2. It is unclear if staff performance assessment is sufficiently deeply entrenched in the organisation to support ensuring fully professional staff capabilities.</p> <p>3. The ‘un-balance’, discussed under ‘Impact’, above, will weaken the ministry – organisational cohesion, staff motivation and effectiveness.</p> <p>4. Generally, the increased strength of the ministry will weaken if the budgetary resources cannot be secured that are minimally required for directorates, departments, units and staff to fulfil their mandatory tasks. Equally, physical facilities and equipment must be adequately maintained insofar required for the organisation’s mandatory tasks.</p>
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			for procedures, protocols, structure, HD needs quantitatively and qualitatively, and for 'training' – TNA, results assessment.		
<b>FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. FFS is a proven and successful approach to raise farmers' production and productivity. FFS is targeted and works with selected willing farming communities. The FFS concept and practice can be fully tailored to the local conditions and are expected to serve the farming communities and their members well.</p> <p>2. The FFS concept is fully embraced by the Ministry staff at all level. The commitment and enthusiasm to the approach is noteworthy.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The FFSs is community based and deliver value for money. At limited cost, the FFS assist farmers to increase their production and productivity across a full range of farming practices and gain knowledge and understanding.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project has established 32 operating FFSs in Tokar and Arbaat (5 women and 27 men), covering 640 farmers. FFS are facilitated by 64 facilitators selected from the communities according to certain criteria. The facilitators are supported by 8 coordinators from the MoAARI (2 in Port Sudan and 6 in Tokar).</p> <p>2. All 27 FFS are nascent, only 12 completed a full production cycle and can be considered at a graduation stage. Other FFS are at operating stage and are yet to put learning into practice.</p> <p>3. Field experiments results are promising indicating increased in production.</p> <p>4. The FFSs operate to full satisfaction of the farming communities and the individual farmers. Farmers and the farmers' union report lasting increases in knowledge and improvement of</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The currently operating FFSs have lasting positive impact. This concerns not only what they have learned 'directly'.</p> <p>2. An increasing number of graduated FFS communities, organize themselves and keep doing what they did during the FFS, e.g.: analysis of each other's practices and productivity, calling in the extension services and researchers for specific discussion and advice, buying inputs.</p> <p>3. In a number of cases, community facilitators and individual farmers 'talk' with outside farmers and communities and so spread the FSS message.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The graduated FFS farming communities will continue to practice what they have learned. Most of the changes in farming practices and community approach to farming is well entrenched.</p> <p>2. The ministry's extension service has adopted FFS as an effective and efficient approach to raise agricultural productivity. The ministry plans to implement 6 FFS this year using government resources.</p> <p>3. The grants provided to FFS have the potential to contribute to sustainability if properly managed</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. FFS requires sustained interaction between extension services and agricultural research. This is bound to discontinue in the absence of clear plans to maintain this interaction to enhance further improvement of farming practices and productivity.</p> <p>2. Grants provided to FFS have the potential to ensure continuity. However, no clear advice and support is provided in grants management. The marketing training provided is</p>

			<p>farming practices.</p> <p>5. A research station has been established in RSS through a tri-partite agreement including State Government, SPCRP CB and the national Agricultural Research Corporation.</p> <p>6. The FFSs and the farming communities report rewarding communication with the ministry's research and extension services, which was not really there before the project.</p> <p>7. On farm research is very promising and well appreciated by farmers.</p> <p>8. Grants have been provided by CBC to FFS to start post school activities.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Extension message and ICE materials produced are geared towards literate farmers.</p> <p>2. The research Station in Tokar is likely to discontinue.</p>		<p>necessary but not sufficient to aid management.</p>
<p><b>CARDA</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA was initiated by the project, based on 'best' international practice regarding animal productivity.</p> <p>2. It is gradually replacing the CAHW approach which is, putting more emphasis on animal health (emergency focused). CARDA considers</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CARDA concept and practice involve training Animal Resource Development Coordinators (ARDC) who in turn train and support community</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project is supporting 12 communities each of 20 - 30 members. 24 CARDAs have been selected has established (two per community). 2 ARDCs are providing</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA impact on the groups with which it worked is positive. The changes due to CARDA are easily absorbed and entrenched in more inclusive practices of animal husbandry.</p> <p>2. The free mobile phone</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Livestock farmers reportedly value CARDA and appreciate that it is more inclusive than CAHW, and positively affects household income. When asked, herders reply that they will continue to practice the changes in animal husbandry CARDA taught</p>

	<p>all aspects of animal productivity and is an inclusive and superior approach.</p> <p>3. The population of herders in the Red Sea State is small compared to farmers, 10%.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA, so far, supports mostly resident livestock keepers, not nomads. This in spite of the fact that in Red Sea State there are more nomads rather than farmers. The concept has only been implemented in Tokar delta whereby the majority of herders are outside the delta scheme.</p>	<p>selected facilitators. Each CARDA will work with a community (Animal Resource Development Group (ARDG)). The approach is similar to FFS in this regard.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. In Red Sea State CARDA operates with sedentary agro-pastoralist communities rather than nomadic communities. It is confined to Tokar delta.</p>	<p>follow up and technical support to the CARDA facilitators.</p> <p>2. No data could be obtained on productivity gains through CARDA. Reportedly though, livestock healthy life and, generally, the productivity increase considerably. Net animal husbandry revenues increase approximately by the same proportion as net agricultural production values under FSS, i.e. by 30-70%. The time though to reach that point is longer, up to perhaps 2-3 years.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>Though CARDAs and FFS are establish in the same communities in Red Sea State, they hardly interact with each other.</p>	<p>network services provided to connect CARDAS, ARDC across the country is a remarkable achievement. It helps maintaining the link between the government as service providers and pastoral in different locations.</p>	<p>them.</p> <p>2. The animal resource directorate and departments concerned have adopted CARDA as the leading principle of their extension operations.</p> <p><b>Negative</b></p> <p>1. CARDA helped build a 'foundation' and created a potential for expanding the improvements, to other livestock farmers and herders. Without further support, this potential is unlikely to be realised.</p>
<p><b>Rural Marketing and Small Business</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. These project activities are 'naturally' complementary to, particularly, FSS and CARDA which are directly focused on farmers and herders. They are intended to provide on- and off-farm employment as well as entrepreneurship and incomes outside, yet often connected with, regular agricultural and animal husbandry.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. The projects have not matured enough at this point in time to allow efficiency evaluation.</p> <p>2. The approach is through working with groups. This may be more efficient than when targeting individual, entrepreneurs, but perhaps also less penetrating,</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. In total 8 groups were established (5 SBG and 3 Rural Marketing Groups). However, 3 RMG and 1 SBG officially registered and formalized as CBOs.</p> <p>2. The activities are too 'fresh' yet, to assess repayment rates in the micro-finance projects.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. The establishment and staffing of a marketing unit within the MoAARI and training of four staff is a good achievement</p> <p>2. The activities are too 'fresh' to allow an assessment of their impact or their potential impact.</p> <p>3. The interest from groups and individuals to join the activities has been substantial, indicating demand for this kind of</p>	<p><b>Undetermined / negative</b></p> <p>1. The state of infancy of the project activities renders it doubtful that they can survive with project support. Exceptions may occur where new 'mind sets' have taken root.</p> <p>2. Knowledge acquired will have a lasting impact at household level.</p>

	<p>1. The projects started late, mostly in 2011 and have been around for a short time and not far from the date of termination of SPCRP.</p> <p>2. The projects, unlike FFS and CARDA, suffered from limited technical backstopping resulted in lack of focus and implementation flaws.</p> <p>3. The activities are still in their infancy and have not had the time to mature and get entrenched.</p>	<p>particularly so in the small business groups.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> The CB and MP components of SPCRP did not work well together in this sub-component despite being present in the same area.</p>		<p>support.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> The link between SBGs and the food processing plant in Tokar Delta is unclear.</p>	
<p><b>MP and MPP TOKAR DELTA AGRICULTURAL SCHEME</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The project has well articulated interconnected result areas which all have the potential to contribute to improving food security and livelihoods of rural small farmers.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> Project duration too short. Tokar Delta is inaccessible for 3 months of the year. This has further shortened the project implementation period.</p> <p>2. Though the government has a major role to play in the project (implementation of management structure, land registration, etc..). An MoU has not been written stipulating role and responsibility of each partner (Government, MP and NSAs)</p> <p>3. Difficulty in distinguishing between MP and MPP interventions in TDAS</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. Targeted direct and indirect beneficiaries well defined and reached.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> A number of studies have been conducted to inform planning and implementation of project. Recommendations of these are hardly implemented</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. Completion of the review of the overall organization, structure, staffing and capacity building requirements.</p> <p>2. Data base to determine government owned land in place and used satisfactorily. Fireproof safe for storing historical records installed.</p> <p>3. The project has developed a business plan which has been agreed</p> <p>4. Land tenure system described and analyzed, and recommendations for mode for providing tenancy security formulated</p> <p>5. The project cleared 15,000 feddan of mesquite to be cultivated by farmers</p> <p>6. Strategies elaborated for ways to generate income from mesquite</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. All project historical data and government records are protected, available and accessible to be put for different uses.</p> <p>2. Sharecroppers and low income farmers have access to over 15,000 feddans of land for food production to enhance food security.</p> <p>3. free crossing of people and goods across Aheddin Rock will provide better socio-economic opportunities</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The new organizational structure which will contribute to enhance TDAS competence and efficiency yet to be implemented.</p> <p>2. The studies conducted and subsequent plans developed have not been put into action, e.g. land</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The project support to TDAS infrastructure is outstanding and long lasting investment. Commitment from both state government and project management should be secure to provide for regular repair and maintenance.</p> <p>2. The database established for data storage is sustainable. Training provided to staff will likely be put in use to maintain the system.</p> <p>3. Rural small farmers access to cultivable land is a good step to improve food security and the approach adopted for land clearance has the potential to be adapted and used in the future.</p> <p>4. Knowledge acquire will have a lasting impact at households level.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The implementation of the new organizational structure elaborated is a prerequisite for</p>

			<p>exploitations</p> <p>7. The project constructed Ford Crossing at Sheddin Rock</p> <p>8. The project completed construction of pipe outlets structure at Mekteff bund</p> <p>9. Hydrological station established at Sheddin Rock</p> <p>10. 60 km embankments of irrigation installations rehabilitated</p> <p>11. Over 500 women trained in food processing and marketing and food processing plant established</p>	<p>tenure and business plans.</p> <p>3. Involvement of NSAs in the project unclear e.g. Umhill Society and role of women SBGs in the food processing plant.</p> <p><b>Undetermined:</b></p> <p>1. It is too early to assess the impact of Ford Crossing in making more water available for irrigation in the Delta as a result of the free flow of water.</p> <p>2. The discussion on the plans to change the location of the bund will influence the pipe outlets constructed.</p> <p>3. Likely improvement in children nutrition and household income as a result of women training in food processing.</p>	<p>the sustainability of the project. It will allow finding a balance of forces and minimize negative impacts and risks in implementing process of sustainable development</p> <p>2. The delays experienced by the project consequently make achievements nascent. It is doubtful that they will prove sustainable without substantial further support</p> <p>3. In the absence of a clear strategy for operating the food processing plant, it is doubtful it will be sustainable</p>
<p><b>GENDER</b></p>	<p><b>Undetermined / Positive</b></p> <p>1. The project has articulated gender as an issue to be explicitly incorporated in the various project activities, to the extent possible and meaningful.</p> <p>2. In the communities, women and women have traditional roles with the men normally more involved than men in the cash and nutritional side of the household.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Both FSS and CARDA services under the project have addressed groups with little specific gender bias. Joint and women specific groups were formed as part of the projects.</p> <p>2. In the Micro-projects, micro-finance projects and small business groups, women form the majority. In addition, there are special women groups.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The traditional role of women in the communities and families, particularly 'cash' and 'nutrition', make the women a good repository for changes in the mind sets, attitude and activities regarding marketing, cash economy and nutrition / health issues.</p> <p>2. Reportedly, from our meetings and discussions, the above is actually the case and the project has had an identifiable and clear impact in this</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. The project has helped build a foundation aimed at raising agricultural and animal husbandry / livestock productivity. This has received the main attention, irrespective of gender. Gender has been specifically 'targeted' in project activities that, most of them, started late – micro-finance projects, micro-projects, small business groups. As argued before, it is doubtful that these will prove sustainable without specific project support.</p> <p>2. The traditional role of</p>

			<p>1. The FSS and CARDA groups have very few women coordinators and facilitators. 6 coordinators in Tokar delta are men (1:7). The reason mostly given is that that work is heavy, requires mobility and riding motor bikes which the communities do not encourage or even permit for women.</p>	<p>respect.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1 As said earlier, the project has helped build a foundation. It is too early days to judge the project's real impact on raising role and voice of the women.</p>	<p>women discussed under 'impact' renders it probable that where 'impact' is assessed as positive, the women will form a lasting repository of change with a potential to gradually see change and raised productivity gain ground and, with that, see their role and voice expanding.</p>
<b>TRAINING</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. Levels of skills in the state – public bodies, NSAs, families, private sector – were low at the time the project was conceived. The project's strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore fully relevant.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. Training has been prepared, conducted and followed up efficiently. Proper procedures were followed and the required coordinating infrastructure at project level was provided. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at state level, the decision to acquire trainers and curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU, was efficient.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The project delivered massive training, e.g.: 32 FSS facilitators, 24 CARDAs and 8 small business groups. 2. For the ministry staff, a specific TNA was done; 103 staff member received training in various subjects.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> Training focused on ministry staff at state level 78% while only 13% of locality staff were trained</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. For the ministry staff, the training went through post-training evaluation and later performance evaluation. 2. See also under 'Public Bodies', above.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The assessments, above, were generally 'light', based on participants' satisfaction and 'easy to answer' questions about the application of the newly acquired skills.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1.The ministry is professionally stronger today than it was before the project, due to the project and the training provided through the project, as discussed under 'public bodies', above.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The TNA needs to be rolled over at least once every 2 years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed, new staff entered needing training. The Training Unit at the ministry should see to that, and ensure that they themselves are an up to standard HD unit. It is unclear if they have that mandate and budget.</p>
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The connections between state level and central SPCRP management have been good. There has been no undue need for central management to interfere. Central management</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The two projects CBC and MP both work in Tokar Delta Agricultural Scheme. This facilitated</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The AWP were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, project activities were largely implemented on</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The many activities, the constraints in the state, the split between the basic components, the multiple stakeholders, they were all well handled by state level</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b> 1. The SPCRP is terminated and about to close the books. Management of the project activities and their sustainability is no longer in the hands of the state level</p>

	<p>includes the tripartite construction of FAO Khartoum, EMM Khartoum and the Project Steering Committee. The latter met frequently (15 sessions so far), was generally well prepared, focused on operational rather than strategic issues and was instrumental to getting some uneasy issues solved / managed.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Project management at state level operated through AWPs to be approved at central level. While implementing, specific activities required additional approval from central.</li> <li>2. From central point of view, this operating mode makes sense – ensuring a tightly run operation. From state point of view and management at that level less so.</li> <li>3. The project at state level became necessarily output and not results oriented. It had no specific overall framework within which to work. ‘Strategic oversight’ at state level did not exist due to the absence of an overall state-specific project document. In fact, at state level, the goal, purposes, specific objectives and expected results of the SPCR were no matter of concern.</li> </ol>	<p>coordination and smooth implementation of FFS and CARDA. However, little or no coordination has been achieved in Rural Marketing and SBGs</p>	<p>time and progressed generally as planned.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. State level management allowed late implementation of the MPP and similar project activities. The SPCR Project Document ‘wanted’ that, but the late start was a recipe for unsustainability of these activities. State level management could have drawn attention to this, but may not have done so at least partly due to the absence of a state level plan (see other instances in this EQM where this has been discussed).</li> </ol>	<p>management.</p>	<p>project management.</p>
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## EQM River Nile State

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<b>ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC DESIGN / PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR RIVER NILE STATE</b>	<p><b>Undetermined:</b></p> <p>1. The positive and negative connotations, above, for the ‘Overall Project’, equally apply to the selected States including River Nile State. The project is implemented in four States at State and rural communities’ levels. The project bodies located in Khartoum provide supportive services and administrative management.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. No specific Project Document, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared at State level, including River Nile State. There is no State-specific design nor a state-specific logframe and indicators against which the project’s performance could be evaluated.</p> <p>2. Instead, the project operates through Annual Work Plans to be approved at the central level. This applies to the CB as well as the MP and MPP components.</p> <p>3. The River Nile State Evaluation Mission could therefore not evaluate the project at State level against a River Nile specific logframe and indicators. This also applies to Project Management at both State and Central levels (PCU and TSUs, respectively), and to the evaluation of the Overall Project. The River Nile State Evaluation Mission has</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. For the Overall Project, the project’s efficiency suffered from the uncertainties and other constraints mentioned under ‘relevance’.</p> <p>2. Had there been a robust state-specific project framework, including budget and accounting system, the constraints could most likely have been dealt with more efficiently.</p> <p>3. The decision making power of the TSU was rather restricted and most decisions needed the prior approval from at least the PCU, in many cases also from FAO Rome.</p> <p>4. As in the case of the grants for FFS, PCU and FAO Rome did not clearly state from the beginning of this debate of what is permitted under FAO rules and regulations and what not. As it was the case in River Nile State, the Extension department, the coordinators and the FFS prepared over months proposals as requested, only to be finally told that FAO’s rules and regulations did not allow the funding of many of their proposals.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The absence of a state-specific project framework, and the adverse conditions mentioned under ‘Relevance’ and ‘Efficiency’ reduced the Effectiveness of the project.</p> <p>2. Activities could not be started or late, other activities had to be abandoned, often for procedural reasons, decisions on replacement action came late in the project ‘life’ or too late to be implemented, communities hesitated to get fully engaged with the project, and staff became less motivated.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. As for ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Effectiveness’, the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints reduced the impact of the project.</p> <p>2. Late start of activities and lack of clarity of implementation and exit strategies for all 3 RAES sub-components reduced significantly the level of potential and actual achievements.</p> <p>3. To a degree, this affects ‘Sustainability’ perhaps more than ‘delivery’.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. In spite of its otherwise good achievements in the face of considerable constraints, ‘Sustainability’ suffered from the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints’.</p> <p>2. Roughly speaking, the project managed to establish a foundation for the restoration of productive capacity in River Nile State. With the exception of achievements discussed later in this EQM, it must be feared that without further support of money and human resources, many achievements will merely survive, others will slowly erode, some will quickly discontinue, and expansion of productive ‘successes’ attributable to the project may not be achieved.</p>



	<p>evaluated achievements, both in their own right and against the project objectives and purposes</p> <p>4. The absence of a state-specific project framework implied that a number of state-specific uncertainties and other adverse condition were and could only find their way into the AWP's in an ad-hoc fashion. Factors to be mentioned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raising of the waters of the river Nile in 2008 after the completion of the Merowe Dam and evacuation of fishermen and farmers to places they do not consider appropriate;</li> <li>• During the project's implementation, frequent change of ministers (3x), DGs (3x) and TAs for the TSU (4x);</li> <li>• Three different organisation structures of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation – single Ministry from 2008 to 2011, separated in October 2011 into the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Irrigation and the Ministry of Animal Resources and Rangeland, and then in June 2012, reunited again into the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation based on the Governor's Resolution No. 9 for 2012.</li> </ul> <p>Late start of several project activities due to late project staff mobilization.</p>				
<p><b>OVERALL PERFORMANCE</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project has performed well in line with needs as identified in</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB and MPP sub-component worked very well</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The achievements and outputs are listed and presented in more</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project helped build a relevant foundation for further</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The most relevant CB achievements that can be</p>

	<p>the CBNA, perceived by the target communities and public bodies, and in line with the AWP.</p> <p>2. The overall performance of the project has been good. If the adverse conditions mentioned earlier are taken into account, the performance is remarkable.</p>	<p>together.</p> <p>2. Management on site has been reasonably inclusive and communicative, and so contributed to efficient rations between resources and achievements.</p> <p>3. By end of June 2012, the CB component had spent €15.611.578, equivalent to 81.9% of its total budget of €19.072.165 according to Addendum 5.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The total amount spent for all RAES activities in all 4 States – the breakdown of expenditures by State was not directly available – is €3,532,483, equivalent to 70.0% of the total RAES budget of €5.049.580 and 22.6% of total expenditures. For the sub-budgets allocated to FFS, CARDA and RM-SBG, the project had spent 66.8%, 48.6% and 57.4% of the allocated respective sub-budgets of €1,972,585 (FFS), €903.118 (CARDA) and €596.430 (RM-SBG).</p> <p>2. The project would have benefited from an effective inclusive Communication Strategy. The use of audio-visual was ad-hoc, not deliberately or strategically intended to support the project. Many of the extension materials produced consist largely of text written in Arabic which is of limited</p>	<p>detail under the subsequent headings in this table. As said under ‘Relevance’ the project’s performance is rated remarkable.</p> <p>2. The achievements do contribute to the project’s overall goal, purposes and expected results.</p> <p>3. The target of training 26 CARDAs as indicated in the Baseline Study of December 2010, has been 100% achieved; two CARDAs are women.</p> <p>4. In total, 10 SBGs were established, 1 SBG above the target of 9 SBGs, as indicated in the Baseline Survey Report of December 2010. These 10 SBGs have a total membership of 233, with 156 men and 77 women. 1 SBG is a women-only group, 2 SBGs are men-only groups, and 7 SBGs have mixed memberships.</p> <p><b>Negative</b></p> <p>1. The absence of a comprehensive plan, TOR and Inception Report for River Nile State render a formal evaluation of project performance against the plan impossible.</p> <p>2. All that can be said is that the stated outputs of the AWP have generally been met, taking into account adjustments as a result of adverse developments outside the control of project management at State level.</p> <p>3. Of the 68 FFS, as indicated in the Baseline Survey Report of December 2010, only 50% (39 FFS) has been achieved, partly because after the MTR a clear</p>	<p>development of the various levels, e.g. public bodies and central and field level, farmers’ and herders’ communities, personal human capacities / skills / knowledge.</p> <p>2. The evaluation team observed, mind sets are beginning to change, self-confidence is increasing, and vocabularies are changing – towards more self-confidence among ministerial staff and group members.</p> <p>3. The project has positively and directly impacted on about 2.255 families, 1,064 of which are participating in FFS, 233 in SBGs, 590 in 7 societies established under the MPP in El Buhaira, and 383 in 13 ARDGs set up with the help of 26 CARDAs. Before the MTR, 71 CAHWs received support and some training benefiting indirectly approximately 3,550 livestock owners and families (50 livestock owning households per CAHW as assumed in the Baseline Survey Report of December 2010). Assuming a total of around 200,000 rural families in the River Nile State (Baseline Survey Report December 2010, p. 5), about 2.9% of all households in River Nile State benefited directly from SPCRP’s RAES field activities.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Upon enquiries by the evaluators, the high percentage</p>	<p>attributed to FFS, CARDA, and CB of public bodies are considered ‘sturdy’ and entrenched, and will probably prove sustainable to a fair degree if government and/or NSAs will provide further external support.</p> <p>2. CARDA and CAHW are well understood in MoAARI and integrated in the overall animal health services concept of the State government. MoAARI. Furthermore, the Animal Resources Department plans to request sufficient budgets in 2013 for training another 80 CARDAs and upgrade the CAHWs through further complementary training particularly in animal nutrition.</p> <p>3. The same applies to perhaps half of the physical CB achieved.</p> <p>4. Though the Micro-Project activities started late in June 2011, their likelihood to become sustainable is considered high because of the high ownership by the beneficiaries of all three activities promoted, and the very good coordination and cooperation between the CB component and the MPP sub-component.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The project helped build a ‘foundation’. Even a foundation needs maintenance</p>
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		<p>use for mostly illiterate farmers and livestock owners.</p>	<p>emphasis was put on quality of training and model development resp. adjustment instead of quantity/number of FFS established.</p> <p>4. The target of training 26 ARDGs with 1,700 livestock owners as members and direct beneficiaries, as indicated in the Baseline Survey Report of December 2010, has only 50% been achieved, i.e. 13 ARDGs with a total membership of 383, of which 265 are men and 118 are women; 11 ARDGs are mixed groups, and only 2 ARDGs (El Zaidab [28] in Ed Damer Locality and Kabna [27] in Al Buhaira Locality) are a male-only groups.</p>	<p>of the population not reached by the project may give rise to social tensions under unfavourable conditions.</p> <p>2. In 2012, 13 FFS, all ARDGs and 2 SBGs were set up, giving these groups and their members not enough time to master practicing the basic recommendations given to their members while being directly assisted by the project. The impact the project could achieve with these groups and members has to be assumed as rather limited.</p> <p>3. Upon 3 FFS testing glyphosate commonly known as Roundup on-farm with the help of the Hudeiba Research Station and reporting the results (see Farmers Field Schools Case Studies, June 2012, p. 23), the project and research staff were unaware and did not create awareness among the Coordinators and farmers about the immediate and long-time dangers of this herbicide.</p>	<p>and satisfactory budgetary and human resource arrangements must be concluded and the required support provided regularly to avoid erosion.</p> <p>2. The Exit Strategy for the SPCRP, and its corollary at River Nile State level, holds little promise and is not a strategy but rather a wish list; the State government need to provide the funds required from 2013 onwards to make the Technical Coordination Unit set up in the MoAARI operational. To this end MoAARI may approach the federal level with regard to obtaining funds, e.g. from the national Agriculture Revival Programme.</p> <p>3. The CB at the ministry would need support to conduct a thorough Organisational Review and follow-up action. Without this, further gains in effectiveness will be hard to achieve and much of the achievements by the project risk erosion.</p> <p>4. The current FFS concept is still too narrowly focused on integrated production and pest management and lacks the dimensions input supply, credit and marketing urgently needed by farmers in River Nile State, and pre-conditional for rolling out the FFS concept on the large scale intended.</p>
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<b>PUBLIC BODIES</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project rightly targeted the MoAARI dealing with agriculture including vegetable and fruit trees, animal production including fisheries, and irrigation for institutional, organisational, physical and human resource capacity building. The MoAARI comprises all sectors of public administration dealing with the heart of River Nile State's economy and society.</p> <p>2. The project rightly seeks capacity building for the MoAARI central organization and staff and facilities at Locality and village level. The complexities of the state and the dispersed population demand de-concentrated yet coherent policies and policy implementation.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The TSU jointly with the MoAARI, the departments concerned and the MPP worked well together, and TSU and MoAARI established coordination procedures early in the project.</p> <p>2. The project helped MoAARI to carry out 96 training courses with 1,801 trainees from the State and locality level, and held 19 workshops with 411 participants.</p> <p>3. In total, 1,801 trainees had participated in training courses at State level, Of the 1,801 trainees, 1,198 comprised staff based at the Localities, and 603 at State level. Of the 603 trainees at State level, 363 trainees attended one time and 276 more than one time.</p> <p>4. The project trained 25 Coordinators for FFS (11 men and 14 women), x</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project's effectiveness on physical, human, institutional and organisational CB of public bodies can be summarised as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project refurbished the building of the Animal Resources Department and the Training Centre, provided the equipment for the Electronic Library, provided office equipment, furniture and materials, 3 vehicles, 26 CARDA tool kits and 2 solar-powered refrigerators for safe-keeping temperature-sensitive veterinary supplies.</li> <li>• The MoAARI established: M&amp;E Unit, Data Base Unit, Training Unit, IT Training Unit and Marketing Unit at the Directorate of Planning, and strengthened several other public bodies at central and de-concentrated levels;</li> <li>• Competent staff was recruited and (mostly young) staff trained in relevant subjects – some of a generic and others of</li> </ul>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The MoAARI, split in October 2011 and re-united again in June 2012, has surely benefited from the project, from both the physical and non-physical CB.</p> <p>2. The new organisational units established during the project are uniformly seen as contributing to MoAARI's competence and reach.</p> <p>3. The project supported the development of the five-year Agricultural Strategic Plan, the Extension Policy and Strategies, and Agri-business Policies for the River Nile State.</p> <p>4. The project helped the Animal Resources Department developing a concise and realistic plan containing an assessment of the number of CARDAs as well as government veterinary doctors and auxiliary staff needed to cover the livestock sector (both livestock and livestock</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Widely across MoAARI, at both State and Locality offices, human capacity has been positively affected by the project. Targeted training has been extended in generic subjects such as report writing and basic computer skills, and in a range of specialized subjects such as research methods, statistical analysis (e.g. SPSS), data base management (e.g. Oracle), evaluation methods, and extension specific knowledge and skills in the field of plant production and protection and animal health and others.</p> <p>2. Most of these capacities built will be of value to the ministry as long as it is supported by the provision of a minimum level of equipment needed to carry out and apply the acquired skills and knowledge, and included in staff performance</p>

	<p>Coordinators for CARDAs, and 5 Coordinators for RM-SBG (all women). 5. The TSU and the Administration managed to secure complementarity between the CB component and MPP sub-component of the project which resulted in highly efficient and synergetic deployment of resources.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The high turn-over of TSU's management staff slowed down the coordination and implementation of the planned activities. 2. The often highly bureaucratic procedures of both MoAARI and FAO reduced significantly the Efficiency of project implementation.</p>	<p>specialized subject matter nature;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Efficient and inclusive procedures were established for strategic and annual planning;</li> <li>• Through the Training Unit, training is aimed at systematic CB of directorates, departments and units of the re-united MoAARI based on needs and results assessment.</li> </ul> <p>2. Physical CB has been provided by the project, including one Electronic Library used for computer training and one new training centre. Providing equipment, buildings and materials to the communities in El Buhaira was closely coordinated between the CB component and MPP sub-component, based largely on CB's prior needs analysis.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. Training results evaluation and performance assessment are regularly undertaken soon after the training has been administered but have no further implications. Staff performance is done rather soon after the completion of a training course, and relevance of the information gained is doubtful. 2. An assessment of the 1,801 training chances (one training chance is defined as one person trained at a time) carried out since the start of CB in River Nile State revealed that two thirds (383) of these chances comprised staff members who participated in only 1 training course, while only one third (276) had participated in two</p>	<p>owners), and a time schedule for training expanding the number of CARDAs and government paid staff.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. In the course of the project, particularly the Agriculture Department and the Animal Resources Department of the MoAARI have been strengthened while others have not. 2. According to the Training Unit about two thirds of all 1,801 trainees were Animal Resources staff. Nevertheless, the Department of Animal Resources feels of having been inadequately served by the project. This threatens the cohesion and collective strength of MoAARI. 3. More staff in MoAARI was trained only once, while fewer staff were trained more than one time. The impact of just one training over 4 years on the performance of the staff is assumed to have limited impact. This observation may indicate that the project may have built relatively little lasting capacity. The high staff turn-over might be one reason for the limited effectiveness of CB in MoAARI. 4. Without a robust organisational review and analysis, it is hard to identify duplications, ambiguity of authority, omissions, potential sources of conflict and mal-</p>	<p>assessment.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> . HD and targeted training need continuous attention: staff transfers, promotions, staff leaving, keeping up to date, special attention to field staff who tend to be somewhat 'neglected'. It is doubtful if the resources to maintain the HD strength reached with the support of the project will continue in future. If not, such 'strength' will gradually erode. 2. It is unclear if staff performance assessment is sufficiently deeply entrenched in the organisation to support ensuring fully professional staff capabilities. 3. The misbalance discussed under 'Impact', above, will weaken the ministry – organisational cohesion, staff motivation, effectiveness. 4. The high staff turn-over experienced during the project's implementation period and anticipated to continue in the future reduced and will further reduce significantly the sustainability (and impact) of all CB effort carried out by the project. 5. Generally, the increased strength of the ministry will weaken if the budgetary resources cannot be secured that are minimally required for directorates, departments, units and staff to fulfil their</p>
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			<p>or more training courses.</p> <p>3. An organisational review took place in 2011. It was narrow and superficial, insufficiently penetrating and not seriously professional. It is doubtful whether the ministry has taken any benefit from it. The review was too limited to lead to recommendations for procedures, protocols, structure, HD needs quantitatively and qualitatively, and for 'training' – TNA, results assessment.</p>	<p>performance, at central and Locality levels and on the cross-lines of the organization. This issue has become more urgent in the aftermath of the re-unification of the ministries of agriculture and animal production.</p> <p>5. The Department of Agricultural Extension's lack of consistent planning for maintaining and extending the FFS beyond 2012 threatens the impact and sustainability of this appropriate extension approach.</p> <p>6. The high staff turn-over reduced significantly the impact (and sustainability) of all CB effort. 6 of the 25 FFS Coordinators (3 men and 3 women) had at the time of the ex-post evaluation already resigned from MoAARI.</p>	<p>mandatory tasks. Equally, physical facilities and equipment must be adequately maintained insofar required for the organisation's mandatory tasks.</p>
<b>FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The FFS approach was developed in the late 1980-ties by FAO in Indonesia in and for irrigated rice with the aim to solve two major problems: reduce simultaneously the high crop losses from insects and the high use of pesticides. Since its success in Indonesia, the FFS has been proven as an appropriate and highly successful approach to raise agricultural production and productivity of particularly smallholder farmers in many countries of the whole world.</p> <p>2. The strength of the FFS approach is based on the participatory approach and focusing on a single commodity</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB component supported the Extension Department in establishing in total 41 FFS – 14, 14 and 13 FFS in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively, with 2 FFS established in 2012 being inactive; as well as 21 and 18 FFS in Ed Damer Locality and Atbara Locality, respectively.</p> <p>2. The project trained 2 Supervisors, 25 Coordinators (11 men/14 women) and 78 Facilitators (56 men/22 women).</p> <p>3. The well-structured and tested methodology allowed Coordinators to quickly</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project trained 2 Supervisors, 25 Coordinators and 78 Facilitators both in formation and management of FFS and in technical issues, and assisted farming communities in establishing 41 FFSs of which in October 2012 39 FFS were operating in 2 Localities.</p> <p>2. The project developed recommended practices, recommendations and some training materials for the following selected by FFS: broad beans, citrus, fodder, sorghum, Sudan grass, vegetables (mainly okra), and (winter) wheat.</p> <p>3. Members of 26 FFS acquired new knowledge and learned new</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The FFS approach has gained a very high level of acceptance at all levels of State (and federal) governments, as well as with the farming communities, which is considered as the most important impact.</p> <p>2. Having throughout implementation consequently followed and applied participatory approaches is considered as the main factor for the achieved high level of acceptance and impact at all levels.</p> <p>3. The project created capacity within MoAARI by having trained 2 Supervisors and 25</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The high commitment by State and federal governments at all levels is the solid foundation on which the sustainability of the FFS concept rests.</p> <p>2. Another important factor guaranteeing the sustainability of the FFS approach is the sustainable use of natural resources built-into and promoted by the FFSs concept and its positive effects experienced by FFSs stakeholders – though tangible results may be achievable and recognizable in the medium to long run only.</p>

	<p>approach in working with selected and motivated farming communities and crop farmers/households.</p> <p>3. Since the MTR and two backstopping missions from FAO Rome, the approach was adjusted to its genuine strengths.</p> <p>4. The FFS follows a clear methodology in training Supervisors and Coordinators as well as facilitators and the FFS members/farmers.</p> <p>5. Since 2009, the CB component introduced the FFS approach into the two Localities Ed Damer and Atbara comprising the greatest potential for farming in River Nile State.</p> <p>5. The conditions encountered by the resettled farmers in El Manasir, Ed Damer Locality - having relatively good access to inputs, a comparatively strong extension service and access to marketing of their produce provided by the Merowe Electricity Company - resemble closest the conditions under which the FFS approach has proven to work best.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Until the MTR and after technical backstopping missions from FAO Rome the project followed an unfocused FFS approach by tolerating FFS to deal simultaneously with several crops and related problems.</p> <p>2. Both PCU and TSU allowed a high number of different crops to be promoted through FFS in River</p>	<p>organize, expose and train farmers in a full range of new knowledge, skills and farming practices; the benefits reaped after 1 year from the demonstration area were visible to and observed by all members though were of a very small scale.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Compared to the reduced target of 400 FFS in all 4 States, and 68 for River Nile State, the number of FFS established in River Nile State by the project over 4 years is considered rather low.</p> <p>2. The late technical backstopping resp. intervention by FAO Rome for adjusting the FFS approach resulted in the delayed formation of FFS and reduced the number of FFS considerably – i.e. of the 39 FFS, 13 FFS (7 men and 6 women only FSS) were formed just in early 2012, the last year of operation.</p> <p>3. In due recognition of the advanced stage of the growing season and the availability of improved seed in 2012, allowed up to 12 newly formed FFS to select and grow sorghum as forage crop only.</p> <p>4. The lack of a thorough understanding, planning and backstopping particularly of the Post FFS phase had resulted by mid October 2012</p>	<p>farming practices and skills for two growing seasons, and members of 13 FFS for one growing season.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The late technical backstopping leading to the adjustment of the FFS approach in 2010 resulted in the reorientation of the existing 11 FFS and the delayed formation of the other 28 FFS (particularly the 13 FFS formed in 2012); and reduced the final number of FFS to 39 as reached at project's end.</p> <p>2. Having started 13 new FFS in 2012 did not give these 353 new farmers enough time to master the new technologies being introduced; this applies particularly to the 161 women of the 6 women-only FFS formed in 2012, of which all 6 were specializing in fodder production.</p> <p>3. Most FFS members had no opportunity yet nor enough time to apply and practice the new and recommended technologies on their own fields, i.e. because: the project provided only small amount of inputs to each FFS, and farmers could not avail the required inputs from somewhere else because there were generally not available in the market.</p> <p>4. Sudan grass and broad beans, having been selected by only 1 and 3 FFS as their crop of choice, resulted in relative high costs for developing extension messages and training Coordinators and Facilitators in these techniques.</p>	<p>Coordinators in the formation and management of FFS, in the agronomy of the crops selected by the different FFS, and by Supervisors and Coordinators having gained and accumulated practical experience in how to implement the FFS approach.</p> <p>4. The project was able to involve women actively in the development process by having assisted women in forming 11 women-only FSS with a total membership of 286 and by having trained 22 female Facilitators, with fodder (7/186) and vegetables (4/100) as their selected crops; no mixed FFSs were formed in River Nile State.</p> <p>5. In total the project succeeded in reaching and training through 39 FFS 1,049 farmers new farming practices and increase production – mostly on a test plot - from broad beans (3/75, men only), citrus (6/170, men only), fodder (9/239 all, 7/186 women, 2/53 men), sorghum (6/159, men only), vegetables (5/130, 4/100 women, 1/30 men) and wheat (10/270, all men).</p> <p>6. The project was able to improve significantly the relationship between research, extension and farmers/the farming community.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The lack of cash of participating farmer households on one side, and the small</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The concept and approach has not yet been and must be adapted to Sudan's conditions and requirements asap by taking into due account the constraints faced by farmers related to inputs, credits and marketing. Without providing appropriate solutions in these three areas, farmers will soon loose ability and interest to continue boosting production, and the FFS approach is doomed to fade out.</p> <p>2. The high commitment by government could be demonstrated best by incorporating the FFS into national and State programmes, e.g. the Agriculture Revival Programme and the Agriculture Crash programme; so far, this has practically not happened yet.</p> <p>3. Introducing FFS impacts group related and technical knowledge and skills, and needs initially much time and resources. After a FFS has graduated/reached Post FFS stage, many FFS and members want to continue learning improved production methods for a different crop. For such an exercise no full FFS course with all training modules will be needed. To utilize the limited resources more effectively, the implementation strategy needs</p>
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	<p>Nile State, possibly because introducing FFS was considered to be still at the pilot stage in River Nile State. For each crop ARC had to develop separate recommendations, and Coordinators had to be trained in the technical recommendations for each crop. The more crops the FFS had selected and the PCU/TSU permitted, the less focused the extension became. In total, 7-8 crops were selected, with broad beans and Sudan grass just by 1 FFS each.</p> <p>3. In most villages of River Nile State farmers face constraints such as lack of access to inputs, credit and marketing their surplus produce. So far, the FFS approach and strategy is wholly production oriented and does not address access to inputs, credit and marketing.</p> <p>4. The current FFS approach and strategy does not adequately integrate livestock into crop production, particularly with regard to utilizing effectively the manure as a replacement to commercial fertilizer.</p> <p>5. The current FFS implementation strategy is not tied into resp. amalgamated with approach and strategy of the Rural Marketing - the Small Business Group sub-component.</p> <p>6. So far, the Post FFS phase is not well understood and planned and poorly managed.</p> <p>7. The organizational set-up of Extension concentrates decision making at the State level and gives</p>	<p>to the following situation: only 6 of the 11 FFS who had submitted earlier a grant proposal have received the grants as promised to the FFS; the remaining 5 FFS whose proposal had been accepted are said to receive their grant in the form of inputs to be used for winter cropping. At the time of this ex-post evaluation, it is still unclear if these 5 FFS with approved grants and the other 28 FFS will receive each a standard grant in the form of a certain quantity of fertilizer; also this quantity of fertilizer is unknown/not yet decided.</p> <p>5. Both the Extension Department and the Planning Department of MoAARI nor the project' PCU/TSU promoted closer ties between FFS and RM-SBG, nor the synergies which could have been realized through closer cooperation between the two government organisations and the project.</p>	<p>5. So far most of the training materials produced are in writing/text form with few pictures and drawings which is of little practical value to the mostly illiterate members of the FFS.</p> <p>6. The different FFS achieved increases in production and productivity from 30% to more than 100% though on a very small scale depending on the area of their on-farm research plot.</p> <p>7. The limited coordination and cooperation between FFS/ Extension and RM-SBG prevented the project from addressing the problems FFS members and farmers in general face re inputs, credit and marketing by adjusting the RM-SBG model to the needs and requirements of the FFS re inputs, credits and marketing.</p> <p>8. Despite all major stakeholders in FFS having participated, including backstoppers from FAO Rome, the workshop on grants and grant management in early 2012, a follow-up workshop in June and a final workshop held on September 24, 2012 in Khartoum, PCU, TSU and the Ministry could still not agree to and formulate clear guidelines and procedures for the grants which would have been acceptable and accepted by all stakeholders. To provide as grant each FFS with approximately 50 bags of fertilizer - as proposed at last by the TSU and the Extension Department of River Nile State, this proposal seems to have been rejected by the PCU as too expensive and sending the wrong</p>	<p>quantities of inputs provided by the project to FFS limited the extent to which the member farmers of FFS could apply and practice on their own fields promoted techniques and technologies. This also limited the potential impact FFS had in terms of increase in production, productivity and income to the participating farmer households; and in the ability of other farmers to try and adopt the recommended farming practices.</p> <p>2. Having by project's end not adapted the standard FFS model to the more complex situation and requirements of River Nile State/the Sudan and utilized the potential synergies the RM-SBG sub-component offered with regard to inputs, credit and marketing, the potential impact of the FFS approach was curtailed resp. only partially realized.</p> <p>3. The impact of the project's support towards entrenching the FFS model is reduced by the fact that at the time of the ex-post evaluation already 6 of the 25 trained Coordinators have left the Extension Department of MoAARI.</p> <p>4. There is strong indication that having participated for only 1 season in a FFS, the majority of these farmers will most likely be unable to pass their knowledge and skills on to other farmers.</p>	<p>to be reviewed and adjusted so as to maintain momentum resp. increase the FFS' impact and sustainability.</p> <p>3. For the budget and work plan 2012, the extension Department had allocated funds for setting up 12 new FFS with government funds. However, these funds were not made available and no government funded FFS have been established.</p> <p>4. So far, the Extension Department has compiled some of the costs incurred in implementing the FFS approach, and is in the process of preparing a plan and budget for maintaining and expanding the FFS activities in 2013. Without submitting in time the plan and budget request based on a full cost analysis the continuation and sustainability of the FFS approach in River Nile State is in doubt.</p> <p>5. Carrying extension work requires time and some minimum resources. Because facilitators trained by the project lack these resources, and have to work for their own farms when extension advise is needed most urgently. Therefore and realistically, it cannot be expected that trained facilitators will carry on extension work on a systematic and relevant scale</p>
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	the Locality no role to play.		signal to FFS present and future. 9. The highly bureaucratic procedures of FAO in combination with those of MoAARI reduced the effectiveness of most capacity building activities considerably.		on their own – i.e. without external support, after the project has ended. If this minimum support is not forthcoming, the trained facilitators will give up extension work, and the FFS approach is doomed to fade out rather sooner than later. 6. To conclude: the actual sustainability of the FFS approach depends to a large extent on: the ability and willingness of MoAARI to adapt the introduced and applied standard FFS approach to the concrete requirements of the socio-economic environment prevailing in River Nile State resp. the Sudan; the actual allocation of funds to consolidate and expand the FFS approach in River Nile State/the Sudan; and an enabling socio-economic environment providing farmers access to inputs, credit and marketing services.
<b>CARDA</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The concept of CARDA (Community Animal Resources Development Associates) evolved from the CAHW (Community Animal Health Worker) concept rooted in the emergency modus in a participatory process involving all major stakeholders of the livestock sector.</p> <p>2. The CARDA concept was endorsed at federal and state level as the official model for dealing with livestock and animal health</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project assisted the Animal Resources Department in training 11 CARDA Coordinators (6 male/5 female). The main subjects trained were: communication and facilitation skills, primary animal health care, animal nutrition, reproductive health care, and animal product processing and marketing.</p> <p>2. Since the release of the</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project assisted the Animal Resources Department and the CARDAs in setting up 13 ARDGs with 383 members.</p> <p><b>Negative</b></p> <p>1. Before the project's end, no meaningful experience will have been gained with CARDAs performance in delivering the expected services to livestock owners and communities, particularly in working with and</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project and MoAARI, particularly the Animal Resources Department, succeeded in getting the CARDA cum ARDG concept fully accepted at the national and State level as well as among and by sedentary farmer and pastoralist livestock communities.</p> <p>2. The CARDA Training manual endorsed and published in November 2011 by SPCRP-</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The Animal Resources Department of the MoAARI has already arrived at a clear understanding and concept of how to utilize in the future simultaneously both CAHWs and CARDAs.</p> <p>2. The Animal Resources Department has already arrived at a clear understanding that in order to boost the livestock sector sustainably, all livestock and</p>

	<p>related matters below the existing government services, shortly after the project had organised and held an international workshop in April 2010 on the new CARDA concept with participants from 8 African countries. Sudan is the first country which endorsed and is promoting the CARDA concept.</p> <p>3. The CARDA concept is well adjusted to the development modus and is more holistic than CAHW by complementing the basic animal health issues (the focus of CAHW) with animal nutrition, reproductive care of farm animals, and animal products processing &amp; livestock marketing.</p> <p>4. The CARDA concept is applicable to both sedentary farmers and livestock owners as well as to pastoralists.</p> <p>5. The CARDA approach is complemented by CARDAs operating a Drug Revolving Fund (DRF) and forming complementary Animal Resources Development Groups/ARDG with interested and motivated livestock producers in their constituencies.</p> <p>6. Against the official guidelines to concentrate animal resources health and development activities on CARDAs, the Animal Resources Department of MoAARI will maintain and utilize the trained CAHWs in a complementary fashion to the CARDAs. Animal Resources plans to upgrade the previously trained 71 CAHWs (plus the 29 CAHWs trained by IFAD) by training them further on nutrition</p>	<p>CARDA Training Manual in November 2011, the 11 Coordinators of the Animal Resources Department selected together with livestock owners of interested communities 26 candidates and until August 2012, trained them in the four major subjects of the CARDA Manual.</p> <p>3. The 26 CARDAs established 13 ARDGs in 6 out of 7 Localities with a total membership of 383 livestock owners; 265 and 118 group members are men and women, respectively. 2 ARDG have only male members (El Zaidab in Ed Damer, 28 men; and Kabna in El Buhaira, 27 men). The other 11 ARDGs have mixed membership with about two third male and one third female members.</p> <p>4. The project provided each CARDA with a basic tool kit and procured a set of drugs, though these drugs have still to be issued to each CARDA.</p> <p>5. The drugs given by the government to CARDAs is to be utilized and replaced as Drug Revolving Fund (DRF). The basic modalities of this DRF are agreed to by government; the CARDAs have been trained in using these drugs, and in following the modalities for operating the DRF, while the government veterinarians</p>	<p>through ARDGs, including operating the DRF, for increasing production and productivity of the livestock sector of the River Nile State and Sudan.</p> <p>2. In particular, experiences will have to be gained if and how CARDAs will be able to charge and being paid fees for their services from livestock owners.</p> <p>3. Before the project's end, no practical and meaningful experience will have been gained in operating simultaneously in a complementary fashion and geographically adjacent both CARDAs and ARDGs on the one side, and CAHWs on the other.</p> <p>4. Before the project's end, the government will have gained insufficient experience in supervising effectively both CARDAs, ARDGs and the operation of the DRF on the one side, and CAHWs on the other.</p>	<p>CB is expected to have the greatest impact among all of the project's interventions in the livestock sector.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The short time since the launching of the CARDA cum ARDG concept did not allow creating any tangible impact of this new model up to the project's end.</p> <p>2. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, of the 11 Coordinators 4 Coordinators (3 male/1 female) had already resigned or had been transferred.</p>	<p>livestock owners have to be covered by livestock related services; and to provide these services, the River Nile State will need in total approximately 350 CARDAs in addition to the already trained 26 CARDAs, 100 CAHWs and the present government staff at State and Locality level of the Animal Resources Department.</p> <p>3. The Animal Resources Department proposes further that for properly supervising all future CARDAs, their operation of the DRFs as well as all present CAHWs, an additional 100 veterinary doctors plus additional support staff will be needed in the River Nile State.</p> <p>4. For the budget 2013, the Animal Resources Department plans to request sufficient budget (possibly SDG 200,000) for training a batch of 80 new CARDAs and retraining the 100 CAHWs in key areas.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The high staff turn-over already experienced is eroding the implementation of the CARDA model from the very start of its implementation. Loss of staff is anticipated to continue in the future, and if MoAARI does not take appropriate counter measures soon, the whole CARDA approach may disappear from</p>
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	<p>and other aspects similar to the CARDAs while taking into due account the CAHWs lower level of formal education.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The process until CARDA was finally adopted and the manual for training CARDAs drafted and endorsed was for the time frame of the project too long, allowing the project to train only 26 CARDAs up to October 2012 in RNS.</li> <li>2. The CARDAs require a certain minimum level of formal education which is higher than most CAHWs possess.</li> <li>3. CARDAs do not receive a fee but have to obtain their income from fees being paid by the livestock owners for treating their animals. It is doubtful if the CARDAs will be able to earn sufficient income from treating animals against a fee and the mark-up they can obtain from selling/administering drugs, because in the past CAHWs, living together with their extended families were culturally and traditionally unable to change relatives for their services.</li> <li>4. Concentrating in the future all resources on CARDAs and neglecting the CAHWs, as officially stipulated would disregard all previous investments made in building up capacities and strengthening the livestock sector.</li> </ol>	<p>and/or private veterinary doctors supervise the CARDAs in their operations and in replenishing the used and/or expired drugs of their tool box.</p> <p><b>Negative</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Developing and starting to implement the CARDA concept took nearly three quarters of the project's duration, leaving nearly no time to gain experience in how to make best use of the CARDAs and the ARDGs for developing the livestock sector in River Nile State and of the whole country.</li> <li>2. Due to the little experience gained so far with CARDAs and ARDGs, special attention will have to be paid to the proper implementation and supervision of the DRF as well as the timely replacement of the used with new drugs.</li> <li>3. From the very start of operating the DRF, highest attention will have to be given to the timely replacement of the used drugs, not least so because several drugs included in the tool box and the DRF may be imported materials and therefore, need foreign exchange for their replacement.</li> </ol>			<p>River Nile State.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. So far, budget allocations required to upscale the CARDA cum ARDG concept and to maintain resp. retrain CAHWs, including proper government supervision is not assured.</li> <li>3. According to the endorsed CARDA concept, CARDAs do not receive a fee but have to obtain their income from fees being paid by the livestock owners for treating their animals. It is far from proven and assured that contrary to the experience CAHWs had to make, CARDAs will be able to charge and obtain from their family members and relatives fees for treating their livestock.</li> </ol>
<p><b>RURAL MARKETING - SMALL BUSINESS</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Since 2011, the RM-SG introduced the value chain approach replacing the previous</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. At its end the project had facilitated the setting up of 10 Small Business Group (SBGs)</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The equipment and materials the project provided to the SBG created the backbone on which the</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The positive effects of regularly compiling and disseminating information on</li> </ol>	<p><b>Undetermined / Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. It is doubtful if the government will make the allocation in the budget of the</li> </ol>

<p><b>GROUPS</b></p>	<p>changing recommendations received under the umbrella of the Participatory Agro-Enterprise development approach.</p> <p>2. The RM-SB sub-component assisted and trained staff of the Planning Department in regularly collecting prices and quantities of major agricultural commodities and disseminating this information through mass media.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. There was lack of continuity as the project changed 2-3 times the actual approach.</p> <p>2. The new value chain approach came too late for being implemented on a meaningful basis and becoming entrenched.</p> <p>3. Also the latest value chain approach is a stand-alone approach within RAES because it does not attempt to connect this approach with the Micro Project and the FFS as well as the CARDA model approaches.</p>	<p>– 3 in 2010, 5 in 2011 and 2 in early 2012. All 10 SBGs had been registered with the Humanitarian Aid Committee, thus making them a legal and eligible body for obtaining bank loans.</p> <p>2. The businesses of the 10 SBGs are focused on: food and food processing (3), fish catching and/or processing (3) poultry production and processing (1), and fodder and alfalfa seed production (2). Of the ten SBGs, 4 SBGs were men-only, 1 women-only and 5 SBGs were mixed. The total membership is 233, of whom 156 are men and 77 are women.</p> <p>3. The project had trained the SBG members in group management, community resources management, book-keeping, value chain approach, including networking, processing of different types of vegetables and fruits (citrus, dates); the catching and processing of fish, raising, the production and processing of poultry, and the production of fodder and alfalfa seeds.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Many of the 10 SBGs were already existing often as family-based groups prior to the start of SPCRP-CB and therefore and in the narrow sense, cannot be counted as direct achievement under the</p>	<p>SBGs developed their small businesses.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The business plan, if they exist, are rudimentary and lack detail, particularly re credit and marketing strategy.</p> <p>2. Relatively little is known about the income the different SBGs were able to generate and still generate with the training and the equipment the group members had received.</p> <p>3. In River Nile State, all SBGs received the same type of grant consisting of 1 large freezer, 1 large electric fan, and various office equipment and materials.</p> <p>4. The business plan developed by two SBGs visited during the field visits of the evaluation team in River Nile State were not followed up by the project. Instead of being provided equipment for the date processing and harvesting and baling of berseem (alfalfa) as proposed, these two SBG received in August 2012 the standard package mentioned above.</p>	<p>prices and quantities of major commodities to the farming community and the public in general are assumed to be substantial, though they cannot be quantified.</p> <p>2. The training all SBGs received in the subjects mentioned above under 'Efficiency'</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The project was unable to make much use of the potential interest, willingness and capacities from groups and individuals to develop viable business activities.</p> <p>2. The impact on the livelihood of the beneficiaries/members of the 10 SBGs from the project's support is little documented and therefore, difficult to assess.</p> <p>3. Little efforts were undertaken to link the different groups with each other, and/or to link the SBGs with banks. Similarly, the project did not initiate coordinated marketing efforts.</p>	<p>coming years required to continue with the compilation and dissemination of marketing information as started under the project.</p> <p>2. At the project's end it is difficult to know how many of the 10 SBGs will continue without external support, resp. how many groups will be able to survive on their own and/or secure themselves new funds.</p>
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		<p>project.</p> <p>2. The project did not (attempt to) coordinate and combine the SBG with the FSS and possibly the Micro-Project and the CARDA approach, thus eliminating any chance to realize synergistic effects between different project components and sub-components.</p> <p>3. It is not evident to what extent the 10 SBGs exchanged visits and experiences and if intra-state SBG visits were supported.</p>			
<p><b>MICRO PROJECTS</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. In River Nile State, the Micro-Projects Programme interventions were implemented through Euroconsult-Mott MacDonald (EMM) which also implemented in the other three States the Model Projects. All its activities were implemented at El Buhaira so as to address a political problem which had developed as result of the building of the Merowe hydro-electric dam and the subsequent flooding in 2008 of the land of those people living along the river banks of the Nile up to 175 km above the dam.</p> <p>2. The cooperation and coordination between the CB and MP components was exceptionally good in River Nile State, resulting in the coordinated approach and logical sequencing of interventions as had been indicated in the Project Document, starting with the CBC training the communities and building the organizational</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Within less than 9 months after the start of the CB activities, MPP had firmly established in two villages (Khab and Twaina) 3 societies for agriculture, 2 societies for livestock (restocking of goats and sheep), and 2 societies for fisheries had been set up. All societies have both men and women as members, with 590 persons (511 men/79 women) in total. The membership of the societies is as follows: 3 horticulture societies 400 members (360 men/40 women), 2 livestock societies 100 members (75 men/25 women), and 2 fisheries societies 90 members (76 men/14 women).</p> <p>2. The MPP provided the following training courses: small business management and fund raising; cage fish culture for the members of</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. After less than a year since the start of the MP activities in June 2011, the livestock groups had distributed the first round of female goat and sheep off-springs to new families, were fishing with the gear since the project had provided it; had nearly/to 80% completed the construction of 2 fruit tree nurseries and had planted all fruit tree seedlings except those to be planted for mother trees in the nurseries; and had completed the construction of 4 hatcheries for raising (mainly) Tilapia fingerlings.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Both nurseries had not yet been fully completed, thus delaying the planting of the seedlings for the future mother trees.</p> <p>2. The MPP did not keep its</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Already after less than 1 year since the societies had been formed, impact is visible and tangible from all three types of societies.</p> <p>2. The impact of the livestock and fisheries interventions are directly visible, while the fruit trees just planted need a few years until they will bear fruits for their first time. Te impact of all three activities is expected to be lasting for many years to come, subject the communities will not be struck by any form of a potential disaster.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. All three interventions were well selected, planned and introduced into as well as received by the communities, enjoyed and still enjoy a very high level of acceptance by the El Buhaira communities and therefore, are anticipated to have a long-lasting effect and are considered as sustainable.</p> <p>2. A good indicator for the degree of sustainability of the fisheries societies is their reaction of not receiving promised ice-making equipment: these two groups organised both transport and obtaining ice made in Khartoum, and market their fish regularly to Khartoum where they obtain double the price at El Buhaira and make a considerable profit after having deducted all transport costs.</p>

	<p>structures, and after having completed all CB activities, MP delivering the materials and goods in the areas of livestock, fisheries and horticulture to the communities.</p> <p>3. All 3 interventions identified jointly between villagers and government and with the facilitation by mainly CB staff addressed major constraints experienced by these communities as result of the flooding and the loss of land livestock. These interventions are in 1) livestock (restocking scheme for goats and sheep), 2) fisheries (provision of fishing gear and equipment), and 3) horticulture (provision of fruit tree seedlings to both households for immediate planting as well as provision of seedlings to nurseries for raising mother trees, and building 2 nurseries for producing fruit tree seedlings).</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. No efforts had been made to coordinate and integrate the SBG approach pursuit under the CB with the society model as being implemented under MPP by EMM.</p>	<p>fishermen/the members of the 2 fisheries societies; and advanced cage fish culture for fisheries staff and one fisherman.</p> <p>3. MPP rehabilitated 2 offices in El Buhaira and 1 office in the MoAARI in Ed Damer, overhauled 2 double-cab pickups, 110 small pump sets (1 small Chinese made diesel engine plus 1 Indian made water pump plus water hoses) to both households and the 2 nurseries; built 2 nurseries for fruit trees, including office and storage facilities; provided 6,750 fruit tree seedlings and other planting materials (alfalfa seed) and equipment (each household received for immediate planting 14 fruit tree seedlings (6 orange, 5 lemons, 2 Mango and 1 tissue-culture produced date palm saplings, and 5 kg alfalfa seed); 90 she plus 2 he-Sahnen goats and 60 she plus 2 he sheep; 3 fibre glass and 2 steel fishing boats and 5 engines plus various fishing gear, fishing nets of different mesh sizes, built 3 concrete hatcheries and 1 earthen hatchery, and 20 cages for controlled raising of mainly Tilapia plus 6 t fish feed.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Some fishing gear was unsuitable and was replaced by MP with the suitable one.</p>	<p>promises of providing ice making equipment.</p>		<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The quantities of fish caught has to be closely observed by MoAARI. In the medium to long run, the modern fishing gear provided by the project resp. available in the market might turn out as too successful latest when it will lead to over-fishing and depletion of the fish stocks behind the Merowe dam.</p>
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<p><b>GENDER</b></p>	<p><b>Undetermined / Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The project has articulated gender as an issue to be explicitly incorporated in the various project activities, to the extent possible and meaningful.</li> <li>2. In the communities, men and women have traditional roles with the women normally more involved than men in the cash and nutritional side of the household.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The project trained a total of 25 Coordinators for FFS of whom 14 are women. For CARDA, in total 11 Coordinators were trained, 6 men and 5 women; and all 5 RM-SBG Coordinators are women.</li> <li>2. The project was able to involve of 1,049 members in 39 FFS of which 11 are women-only FFS with a total membership of 286 women and 22 trained female facilitators, all of them are now actively participating in the development process, with fodder (7/186) and vegetables (4/100) as their selected crops; no mixed groups were formed in River Nile State.</li> <li>3. Out of the 26 CARDAs trained, 2 are women from Nadi village, Abu Hamad Locality.</li> <li>4. Of the ten SBGs, 4 SBGs were men-only, 1 women-only and 5 SBGs were mixed. The total membership is 233, of whom 156 are men and 77 are women.</li> <li>5. In total, the project assisted in setting up 62 groups and 7 societies with a total membership of 2,255 persons, of whom 1,695 (75%) are men and 560 (25%) are women.</li> </ol> <p><b>Undetermined/Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More than one of the SBGs had already been</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Both FSS and CARDA services under the project have addressed groups without specific gender bias. Particularly under FFS there are 11 women only groups and no mixed groups while in SBGs there is only 1 women-only but five mixed groups with about one third female members of the total membership.</li> <li>2. The Micro-Projects in Kaba and Twaina villages of El Buhaira Locality established 7 societies with both men and women as members; the total membership comprises 590 persons, with 511 being men and 79 women.</li> </ol> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. One women-only SBG received office equipment, including one computer with accessories, but so far no member of the SBG was trained in using this computer.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The traditional role of women in the communities and families, particularly ‘cash’ and ‘nutrition’, make the women a good repository for changes in the mind sets, attitude and activities regarding marketing, cash economy and nutrition / health issues.</li> <li>2. Reportedly, from our meetings and discussions, the above is actually the case and the project has had an identifiable and clear impact in this respect.</li> </ol> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. As said earlier, the project has helped build a foundation. It is too early days to judge the project’s real impact on raising role and voice of the women.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Undetermined:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The project has helped build a foundation aimed at raising agricultural and animal husbandry / livestock productivity. This has received the main attention, irrespective of gender. Gender has been specifically ‘targeted’ in the groups which were established particularly in 2012 and less so in 2011. As argued before, it is doubtful that these will prove sustainable in the future without specific project support.</li> <li>2. The traditional role of women discussed under ‘impact’ renders it probable that where ‘impact’ is assessed as positive, the women will form a lasting repository of change with a potential to gradually see change and raised productivity gain ground and, with that, see their role and voice expanding.</li> </ol>
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		formed with the support of another project existed before SPCRP-CB had started in River Nile State.			
<b>TRAINING</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Levels of skills in the state – public bodies, NSAs, families, private sector – were low at the time the project was conceived. The project’s strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore fully relevant.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Training has been prepared, conducted and followed up efficiently. Proper procedures were followed and the required coordinating infrastructure at project level was provided.</p> <p>2. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at state level, the decision to acquire trainers and curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU for that purpose, was efficient and to the point.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project delivered massive training, e.g.: 1,049 farmers (FSS), 383 livestock owners (CARDAs), 233 members of 10 SBGs, 590 members of 7 societies established under the Micro-Project in El Buhaira; 78 Facilitators for FFS, 26 Facilitators for the 13 ARDGs and more than 30 management staff of the 10 SBGs and 7 societies; 25 Coordinators for FFS, 11 Coordinators for CARDAs, and 5 Coordinators for SBGs.</p> <p>2. For the MoAARI staff, a specific TNA was done; and FFS, CARDAs and SBG Coordinators and group Facilitators were carefully selected.</p> <p>3. In total, 1,801 trainees had participated in training courses at State level, of which 1,198 comprised staff based at the Localities, and 603 at State level. Of the 1,198 trainees at Locality level, including FFS, CARDAs and SBGs, 772 trainees attended one time and 426 more than one time. Of the 603 trainees at State level, 363 trainees attended one time and 276 more than one time.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The high staff turn-over is assumed to be one important factor having contributed to the low percentage of staff having attended more than 1 training</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The annual training programmes were developed in a participatory approach by involving all departments and units of MoAARI.</p> <p>2. For the ministry staff, the training went through post-training evaluation and later performance evaluation.</p> <p>3. Based on the training data of the M&amp;E Unit, the distribution of staff trained between Agriculture and Animal Resources is as follows: Agriculture 206 (34%) and Animal Resources 397 (66%) of the total 603 trainees.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. About 60% staff in MoAARI was trained only once, while about 40% of the staff were trained more than one time. The impact of participating in just one training course over a period of 4 years on the performance of the staff is assumed to have at best limited impact.</p> <p>2. It is proposed that having identified and selected fewer key areas for training and having trained fewer staff members but more intensively would have had a bigger and longer lasting impact than the CB strategy actually implemented.</p> <p>3. The high staff turn-over</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The ministry is professionally stronger today than it was before the project, due to the project and the training provided through the project, as discussed under ‘Public Bodies’, above.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The TNA needs to be rolled over at least once every 2 years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed, new staff entered needing training. The Training Unit at MoAARI should see to that, and ensure that they themselves are an up to standard HD unit. It is unclear if they have that mandate and budget.</p>



			activity, and thus reduced the potential impact of the project's training activities.	might have been an important factor contributing to the low number of staff participating in more than one training activity. 4. The organisational and structural changes resulting from the reorganisation of the MoAARI in 2011 and 2012 were not reflected in the TNA or the post-training assessments.	
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The 'split' between the CBC and Micro-Project sub-component has not harmed the management of the project at River Nile State, at least partly due to the 'cast of characters'.</li> <li>2. In River Nile State the two components were very well coordinated and highly complementary to each other.</li> <li>3. The connections between state level and central SPCRP management have been good. There has been no undue need for central management resp. the PCU to interfere. Central management includes the tripartite construction of FAO Khartoum, EMM Khartoum and the Project Steering Committee. The latter met frequently (15 sessions so far), was generally well prepared, focused on operational rather than strategic issues and was instrumental to getting some uneasy issues solved / managed.</li> </ol> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Project management at state level operated through overall AWP and Budgets to be approved</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The overall coordination and communication at state level was effective and allowed the generally efficient implementation of project activities.</li> <li>2. Decision making in the Micro-Project sub-component was not bureaucratic and very quick.</li> </ol> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The decision making process of the TSU was generally delayed because of having always to involve in decision making at activity level the PCU and often even FAO Rome.</li> <li>2. The late backstopping from FAO Rome on the concept and strategy of FFS had a seriously negative impact on the overall number of FFS established and fully trained.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The AWP were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, project activities were largely implemented on time and progressed generally as planned.</li> <li>2. The TSU and the leaders of the CB and Micro-Project components proved capable of handling constraints where and when they arose.</li> </ol> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. State level management allowed setting up 13 new FFS on the written assurance by MoAARI that after project closure the Ministry would continue assisting these FFS.</li> <li>2. Despite having started in a national workshops in January 2012 discussing the issue of grants to FFS, and after having dealt with this issue in two follow-up workshops in June and September 2012, at the time of the ex-post evaluation no decision has been reached yet of how to fulfil the project's promise to provide each FFS a grant during the Post-FFS phase respectively those FFSs</li> </ol>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The impact of the generally good relationship between TSU and MoAARI management including the coordination between the TSU and Micro-Project components is positive and cannot be overrated.</li> <li>2. The many activities, the constraints in the State, the split between the basic components, the multiple stakeholders, they were all well handled by State level management.</li> <li>3. To a large extent the exceptionally good acceptance of the Micro-Projects in El Buhaira can be attributed to the solid foundation CB had laid through its group formation process.</li> </ol> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The complicated and slow decision making process re grants to FFS may prevent making this decision in due time and allowing the project to procure the items for the grants before the project's closure.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Undetermined:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The SPCRP is terminated and about to close the books. Management of the project activities and their sustainability is no longer in the hands of the State level project management.</li> </ol> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Should MoAARI, TSU and PCU not come in due time before project closure meeting the expectations raised with the promises made earlier, the overall positive impression of project management will certainly be negatively affected.</li> </ol>

	<p>at central level. From the existing overall annual CB budgets the amount of budget allocated to the different States is not stipulated. Managing the budget and implementing activities at State level is under this condition extremely cumbersome and time-consuming.</p> <p>2. From central point of view, this operating mode makes sense – ensuring a tightly run operation. From state point of view and management at that level, less so.</p> <p>3. The project at state level became necessarily output and not results oriented. It had no specific overall framework within which to work. ‘Strategic oversight’ at state level did and could not exist due to the absence of an overall state-specific project document. In fact, at state level, the goal, purposes, specific objectives and expected results of the SPCRP were not specifically formulated and therefore, no matter of concern.</p>		<p>which had not yet received a grant at the end of the project.</p>		
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## EQM South Kordofan

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<p><b>ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC DESIGN / PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH KORDOFAN STATE</b></p>	<p><b>Undetermined:</b></p> <p>1. The positive and negative connotations for the 'Overall Project' discussed in Section 1-Chapter 3 of this report, equally apply to the selected States including South Kordofan State. The project is implemented in the States, at State and rural communities' levels. The project bodies located in Khartoum provide supportive services and administrative management.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. No specific Project Document, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared at State level. There is therefore no State-specific design.</p> <p>2. Instead, the project operates through Annual Work Plans to be approved at the central level. This applies to both the CB and the MP components.</p> <p>3. The Evaluation Mission could therefore not evaluate the project at State level against a comprehensive framework specific to South Kordofan State. This also applies to Project Management at both State and Central levels, and to the evaluation of the Overall Project. The Evaluation Mission has evaluated</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. In addition to the connotations, Section 1 of this report, for the Overall Project, the project's efficiency suffered from the uncertainties and other constraints mentioned under 'relevance'.</p> <p>2. Had there been a robust state-specific project framework, the constraints could probably have been dealt with more efficiently.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The absence of a state-specific framework for the project, and the constraints mentioned above under 'relevance' reduced the effectiveness of the project.</p> <p>2. Communities could not be reached, could not be started or late, other activities had to be abandoned, decisions on replacement action came late in the project 'life', communities hesitated to get fully engaged with the project, staff became less motivated.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. As for 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness', absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints reduced the impact of the project.</p> <p>2. To some degree, this affects 'sustainability' perhaps more than 'delivery'.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. 'Sustainability' suffered from the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints'.</p> <p>2. Roughly speaking, particularly the CB component project managed to establish a foundation for the restoration of productive capacity in the state. Yet, it must be feared that without further support of money and human resources, many achievements may merely survive, others may slowly erode, some may quickly discontinue, and expansion of productive 'successes' attributable to the project may not be achieved.</p> <p>3. The Model Project activities were seriously and negatively affected by the security problems and it must be feared that very little of the efforts will survive.</p>

	<p>achievements, both in their own right and against the overall objectives and purposes of the project.</p> <p>4. The absence of a state-specific project framework implied that a number of state-specific uncertainties and other adverse condition were and could only find their way into the AWP in an ad-hoc fashion. Factors to be mentioned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly problematic security situation in the State;</li> <li>• Frequent change of ministers, DGs, other staff and organisational structures</li> </ul> <p>5. Late start of several project activities due to late project staff mobilization and security considerations, and, particularly for the MP component, as a result of replacement of activities due to the security situation.</p> <p>6. Micro project started late largely as per project design.</p>				
<p><b>OVERALL PERFORMANCE</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB component of the project has performed in line with needs as identified in the CBNA, perceived by the target communities and public bodies, and in line with the AWP.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The MP component of the project suffer considerably</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Management of the CB component on site has been reasonably inclusive and communicative, and so contributed to efficient ratios between resources and achievements.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The achievements by the CB component are commendable and do contribute to the project's overall goal, purposes and expected results.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The absence of a comprehensive plan, TOR and Inception Report for</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB component of the project helped build a foundation for further development at various levels, e.g. public bodies at central and field level, farming communities, personal capacities / skills / knowledge.</p> <p>2. Mind sets changed, self-confidence</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB achievements that can be attributed to FFS, CARDAs, and CB of public bodies are generally 'sturdy' and entrenched. Most of them will probably prove sustainable to a fair degree without much further support other than regular government budget.</p>

	<p>from the security problems in the state, had to replace most of its activities, chose to do so in areas other than those under the CB component, and ‘restarted’ 2 years into the project .</p> <p>3. Micro-projects started late and, though they may have been potentially relevant, started too late to have much lasting positive effect.</p> <p>4. Though understandable, the fact that the project (MP, CB) did not include stock route rehabilitation is viewed as a missed opportunity. The truncated stock routes and the large herds in the state impact negatively on tension reduction between farmers and herders, environmental damage reduction and animal health enhancement.</p>	<p>1. The MP component suffered from the security problems, had to restart activities in new places, chose to do so outside the location of the CB component, all of this leading to low efficiencies. and</p> <p>2. The project would have benefited from a comprehensive Communication Strategy. The use of audio-visual was ad-hoc, not deliberately intended to support the project.</p> <p>3. The efficiency of the Micro-projects has been low, largely due to their late start and the impossibility to lasting positive effect in less than 2 years of effective project life.</p>	<p>the state render a formal evaluation of project performance against the plan impossible.</p> <p>2. All that can be said is that the AWP for the CB component have generally been met, taking into account adjustments as a result of adverse developments outside the control of project management at State level.</p> <p>3. The MP component has achieved only modestly in spite of considerable effort. This is due to the security problems but also to the choice apparently made by MP management not to team up with the CB component. As a result, little lasting was achieved.</p>	<p>increased, vocabularies changed – towards a ‘can-do’ attitude.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The project has an enclave nature, like most projects though. Literature says that the weight of the 96% of the population not reached may drag project performance down, and may also give rise social unrest. Replies to questions raised by the evaluators in this respect though rate these risks as very low.</p> <p>2. Neither the MP component nor the Micro-projects it must be feared have had little lasting impact though they reportedly were quite welcome when started; their effective life of less than 2 years has simply been too short.</p>	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The Micro- and Micro-finance projects started late, late 2010, 2011 and 2012. Their achievements are in their infancy. It must be doubted that they will prove sustainable without substantial further support.</p> <p>2. This equally applies to the MP component.</p> <p>3. The CB component of the project helped build a ‘foundation’. Even a foundation though needs satisfactory budgetary and human resource arrangements to avoid erosion.</p> <p>4. The Exit Strategy for the SPCR, and its corollary at South Kordofan State level, holds little promise for the future and is not a strategy but rather a wish list for which there is little resource support.</p> <p>5. The FFS, CARDA and experience would lend themselves very well to further expansion. If no further budgetary and other resource support is extended, this potential will largely fade out.</p> <p>6. The CB at the ministry would need support to conduct a thorough Organisational Review and follow-up action. Without this, further gains in effectiveness will be hard to achieve and most</p>
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					achievements by the project risk erosion.
<b>PUBLIC BODIES</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with agriculture, forestry, animal production, range land and fisheries for institutional, organisational and human resource capacity building. The ministries are the backbone of the public administration dealing with the state's agricultural and animal production capacity which is the heart of South Kordofan State's economy and society.</p> <p>2. The project rightly seeks capacity building at central organization as well as field offices levels.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The complexities of the state and the dispersed and partly nomadic population demand de-concentrated yet coherent policies and policy implementation. A more explicit and expanded effort to enhance capacity in policy and strategy formulation at field offices and other on-field services would have been of considerable benefit.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Reportedly, the TNA, Training Plan and TP implementation were conducted fast, conscientiously and efficiently, and the public bodies saw capacity enhanced fast and relevant.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The decisions by MP management not to team up with already established working patterns in CB has led to inefficient use of MP resources and did not produce value for money.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The TNA was conducted in accordance with best practice approach, and took duly into account a range of other projects which also provided training. Subsequently, the Training Plan was formulated and actual training conducted through a careful mixture of trainers from inside and outside the South Kordofan public bodies. Altogether, around 820 people were trained in 2 ministries at both central and field office levels.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. An organisational review took place in 2011. It was narrow and superficial, insufficiently penetrating and not seriously professional. It is doubtful whether the ministries concerned have benefited from it. The review was too limited to lead to recommendations for procedures, protocols, and structure,</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project helped the ministry to be stronger today than before the project. There is self-confidence and a 'can-do' attitude which reportedly was absent before the project.</p> <p>2. Mind-sets and the vocabulary have changed and have become more professional and analysis minded.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The absence of a thorough organisation review and systematic follow-up action leaves the ministries 'unbalanced'.</p> <p>2. A number of areas may have been strengthened, and new units have been established, often though in 'isolation'.</p> <p>3. The ministries as a whole have not gone through a robust Organisation Review &amp; Development. Without such an effort, duplications, ambiguity of authority, omissions, potential sources of conflict and mal-performance, at central and field levels and on the cross-lines of the</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Human capacity has been positively affected by the project. Targeted training has been extended in generic subjects such as report writing and basic computer skills, and in a range of specialized subjects.</p> <p>2. This will be of value to the ministry if supported by management and necessary budgetary resources.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. HD and targeted training need continuous attention: staff transfers, promotions, staff leaving, keeping up to date, special attention to field staff who tend to be somewhat 'neglected'. It is unclear if the resources to maintain the HD strength built up with support of the project will be available in future. If not, such 'strength' will gradually erode.</p> <p>2. Staff performance assessment is not yet sufficiently entrenched in the ministries to ensure long term fully professional staff capabilities.</p> <p>3. The 'negative' discussion under 'Impact' will if not addressed weaken the ministry – reducing organisational cohesion</p>

				<p>organization cannot be properly identified and resolved.</p>	<p>motivation of staff and management,, effectiveness.  4. The two ministries – agriculture and livestock – do not always operate in coordination. The Workshop raised the issue of a need to bring the two planning departments together as a bridge between the two organisations. It is unclear if this can be done.  5. Generally, the increased knowledge and skills of the ministry will weaken if the budgetary resources cannot be secured that are minimally required for directorates, departments, units and staff to fulfill their mandatory tasks. Equally, physical facilities and equipment must be adequately maintained.</p>
<p><b>FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. FFS is a proven and successful national and international approach to raise farmers’ productivity. FFS is targeted and works with selected willing farming communities.  2. Some two-thirds of the population of South Kordofan State consists of farmers and farming communities. The FFS concept and practice can be fully tailored to the local conditions and are expected to serve farming communities and their members well in the near and longer term</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The FFSs deliver value for money. At limited cost, the FFS assist farmers to increase their productivity across a full range of farming practices and gain knowledge and understanding.  2. The FFS concept and practice trains coordinators and facilitators while doing the work, with selected subject</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The project has established 85 FFSs, 64 of which accessible by September, 2012. Guidelines and other materials were prepared and distributed and coordinators and facilitators were trained.  2. In addition to FFS established under the project, another 100 FFS were established in the state from other funding sources. It is estimated to today approximately 175 FFS are active in the state.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The FFSs currently operating have lasting positive impact. This concerns not only what they have learned ‘directly’.  2. An increasing number of ex-FFS communities, organize themselves and keep doing what they did during the FFS, e.g.: analysis of each other’s practices and productivity, calling in the extensive services for specific discussion and advice, buying certified</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The post-FFS farming communities will continue to practice what they have learned. Most of the changes in farming practices and the FFS community approach to farming is well entrenched.  2. The ministry’s extension service has adopted FFS as an effective and efficient way to raise agricultural productivity.   <b>Negative:</b>  1. The interaction between the post-FFS farmers,</p>

	<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. FFS is a targeted approach. It does not provide a 'blanket' approach aimed at raising agricultural productivity throughout South Kordofan State.</p> <p>2. To be successfully applied, and expanded throughout the state, the FFS approach requires FFS policy and strategy formulation, implementation commitment from the ministry, and support to and encouragement of its field staff.</p> <p>3. Much of the material is currently in written format, while most farmers cannot read or write. A comprehensive audio-visual strategy should be formulated and implemented.</p>	<p>training. FFS so prepares the ground to expand the FFS to other farming communities.</p>	<p>3. The project has contributed to building 4 'master training groups' in the state to support FFS interventions wherever in the state. Another 15 were established but had to be abandoned for security reasons. The project trained 2 coordinators per school and a varying number of facilitators.</p> <p>4. The FFSs operate to full satisfaction of the farming communities and the individual farmers. Net production values have gone up, and farmers and the farmers union report lasting increases in knowledge and improvement of farming practices. Net production values reportedly go up by 30-70% in the communities under the project after one full FFS cycle.</p> <p>5. The FFSs and the farming communities report rewarding communication with the ministry's research and extension services, which was not really there before the project.</p>	<p>seed (often at the Information Shops).</p> <p>3. In a number of cases, community facilitators and individual farmers 'talk' with outside farmers and communities and so spread the FFS message.</p>	<p>extension services, agricultural research and plant protection services is important. It is unclear to what degree the interaction will continue in future and enhance further improvement of farming practices and productivity.</p> <p>2. The FFS helped build a 'foundation' and created a potential for expanding the improvements, either through new FFSs or through other approaches yet using the trained coordinators, facilitators and 'advanced' farmers. Without further support, this achievement, will not be realized.</p> <p>3. Missing at this stage are a state-wide formal FFS policy and implementation strategy, and supporting budgetary arrangements.</p>
<p><b>CARDA</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA was initiated by the project, based on 'best' international practice regarding animal productivity.</p> <p>2. Most farmers in the state keep livestock, and CARDA</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA operates with farming communities, not with individual farmers, similar to FFS.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The project has established 82 CARDAs, 13 ARDCs and 41 ARDGs. A number of them coincide with FFS communities (estimated at</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA impact on the groups interacted with is positive. The changes due to CARDA are easily absorbed and entrenched, and are considered</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Livestock farmers reportedly value CARDA and appreciate that it is more inclusive than CAWD, and positively affects household income.</p>




	<p>is considered a more comprehensive to animal health than the CAWH approach</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. CARDA, so far, supports resident farmers, not nomads. This in spite of the fact that livestock in South Kordofan State is ‘dominated’ by herders rather than farmers. Of the estimated 20 million heads of livestock, only about 5-10% belongs to farming communities.</p> <p>2. A weak point is that much material is in written form although most farms cannot read or write – a more imaginative comprehensive audio-visual approach would have had considerable benefit.</p>	<p>2. In the CARDA concept and practice coordinators and facilitators are trained while doing the work, with selected specific subject training.</p>	<p>about 50%).</p> <p>2. No precise data could be obtained on CARDA productivity gains. Reportedly, net animal husbandry revenues increase approximately by 30-70%. The time to reach that point is longer, up to perhaps 2-3 years.</p> <p>3. CARDA works in parallel with CAWH, and the ministry is of the opinion that the two programmes serve different customers and could / should both continue. A number of CARDA coordinators / facilitators are former CAWH operators</p>	<p>beneficial by farming communities.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The strong focus of CARDA on ‘farmers’ prevent paying attention to aspects of livestock keeping that transgress the boundary of farm livestock. At this point in time, CARDA does not reach out to nomadic communities in South Kordofan State</p>	<p>There is yet a specific role for CAWH</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The interaction between the various actors in CARDA is critical to the success of the ‘formula’. It is unclear to what degree the interaction will continue in future and enhance further improvement of animal husbandry and productivity.</p> <p>2. CARDA helped build a ‘foundation’ and created a potential for expanding the improvements, to other livestock farmers and herders. Without further support, this potential is unlikely to be realised.</p> <p>3. Missing at this stage are formal and state-wide policy and strategy, which include both CARDA and CAWH. Such policy and strategy should also address the nomadic communities and the extent to which CARDA / CAWH can be extended to serve them.</p>
<p><b>MICRO PROJECTS, MICRO-FINANCE PROJECTS, SMALL BUSINESS GROUPS</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. These project activities are ‘naturally’ complementary to, particularly, FSS and CARDA activities. They are intended to provide on- and off-farm employment as well as entrepreneurship and incomes outside yet often connected with, regular agricultural and animal husbandry.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. The projects have not matured enough at this point in time to allow efficiency evaluation.</p> <p>2. The project approach is working with groups. This is considered more efficient than when</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. In rural marketing and small business, 23 groups were set up of which 10 had to be dropped for security reasons; 13 groups are currently operational,</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b></p> <p>1. The activities are too ‘fresh’ to allow an assessment of their impact or their potential impact.</p> <p>2. Reportedly, the interest from groups and individuals to join the activities has been substantial, indicating</p>	<p><b>Undetermined / negative</b></p> <p>1. The state of infancy of the project activities renders it doubtful that they can survive without substantial project support. Exceptions may occur where new ‘mind sets’ have taken root.</p>

	<p><b>Negative:</b>  1. The projects started late, mostly in 2011 and some in 2012. They have been around for a short time, not far from the date of termination of SPCRP.  2. They are still in their infancy and have not had the time to mature and get entrenched.</p>	targeting individual, entrepreneurs, but perhaps less incisive, particularly in the micro-finance and small business activities.		demand for this kind of support.	
<b>GENDER</b>	<p><b>Undetermined / Positive</b>  1. The project has articulated gender as an issue to be explicitly incorporated in the various project activities, to the extent possible and meaningful.  2. In th communities, men and women have traditional roles with the women normally more involved than men in the cash and nutritional side of the household.</p>	<b>Undetermined</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. Both FSS and CARDA services under the project address groups without specific gender bias and women are sometimes the majority of the participants.  2. In the Micro-projects, micro-finance projects and small business groups, women form the majority. In addition, there are special women groups.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b>  1. The FSS and CARDA groups have very few female coordinators and facilitators. The reason mostly given is that that work is heavy, requires considerable mobility and riding motor bikes which the communities do not encourage..</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1.The traditional role of women and their involvement with ‘cash’ and ‘nutrition’ make the women a good repository for changes in mind sets, attitude and activities regarding marketing, cash economy and nutrition / health issues.  2. Reportedly, the project has had an identifiable and clear impact in this respect.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b>  1 .As said earlier, the project has helped build a foundation. It is too early days to judge the project’s potential impact on raising role and voice of the women.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b>  1. The project has helped build a foundation aimed at raising agricultural and animal husbandry / livestock productivity. Though this has been done large without any gender bias, women are very much involved.  2. Gender has been specifically ‘targeted’ in micro-finance projects, micro-projects, small business groups.  3. The traditional role of women discussed under ‘impact’ renders it probable that where ‘impact’ is assessed as positive, the women will potentially form a lasting repository of change with a potential to gradually see change and raised productivity gain ground and, with that, see their role and voice expanding.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b>  1. The micro-finance and</p>

					small business groups started late and had to be restarted in other localities for security reasons. Without considerable specific project support, these activities will not prove sustainable.
<b>TRAINING</b>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Levels of skills in the state – public bodies, NSAs, families, private sector – were low at the time the project was conceived. The project’s strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore fully relevant.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Training has been prepared, conducted and followed up efficiently. Proper procedures were followed and the required coordinating infrastructure at project level was provided.</p> <p>2. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at state level, the decision to acquire trainers and curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU for that purpose, was efficient and to the point.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. The CB component of the project delivered massive training, e.g.: 2,150 farmers (FSS), 2,050 farmers (CARDA), 500 MPP/SBG participants, 820 ministry staff (reportedly 85% agriculture staff, 15% animal production staff), 170 FFS and CARDA coordinators/facilitators.</p> <p>2. For the ministry staff, a specific TNA was completed; the FFS and CARDA coordinators / facilitators were carefully selected. The other trainees came from FFS, CARDA and MPP ‘groups’.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The MP component also trained a considerable number of farmers, MPP, SBG and public body staff. However, partly due to the emerging conflict and partly to unfortunate management decisions, the effective life of most MP, MPP and SBG activities was too short to produce effective results.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. For the ministry staff, see also under ‘Public Bodies’, above.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. Assessments of training effectiveness were generally ‘light’, based on participants’ satisfaction and ‘easy to answer’ questions about the application of the newly acquired skills.</p> <p>2. The lack of Organisation Review and Development is not conducive to train the right people in the right skills, or to get the best out of the newly acquired skills and knowledge.</p> <p>3. Training of ‘animal production’ staff took place at much smaller numbers than agriculture staff, not substantiated in the TNA.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <p>1. Due to the project, the ministry of agriculture is professionally stronger today than it was before the project, due to the training provided through the project, as discussed under ‘public bodies’, above.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b></p> <p>1. The ‘animal production’ staff were reportedly neglected by the project.</p> <p>2. The TNA needs to be rolled over at least once every 2 years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed, new staff entered needing training. The Training Unit at the ministry should see to that. It is unclear if they have that mandate and budget..</p> <p>3. To comprehensively benefit from training, the two ministries should launch comprehensive Organisation Review and Development. To embed training organically in the organisation.</p>

<p><b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b></p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The CB component of the project seems to have been managed properly and effectively, and fitted in well with the conditions in South Kordofan State.</p> <p><b>Negative</b> 1. The ‘split’ between the CB and MP components has harmed the management of the project at state level. 2. The decision by the MP component to focus geographically different from the CB activities ill fitted the project, and undermined the MP activities. 3. The Project Steering Committee could and should have stepped in to ensure coordination between the two components. 4. Project management at state level operated through AWPs to be approved at central level, and, in addition, implementing, specific activities required additional approval from central. This was unduly cumbersome. 5. From central point of view, this operating mode makes sense – ensuring a tightly run operation. From state point of view and management at that level, less so. 6. The project at state level became necessarily output and not results oriented. It had no specific overall framework within which to work.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. The CB component has been managed efficiently; activities resulted in outputs as planned.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. As a result of the decision by the MP component to operate separately from CB activities, the resources spent on the MP component and the connected MPP activities were largely wasted from the point of view of value for money.</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. AWPs for the CB component were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, project activities were largely implemented on time and progressed generally as planned.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. The MP component management faced considerable challenges from security issues but also from inadequacies in management itself. 2. Little lasting results were achieved by the MP component of the project. 3. State as well as central level management of the project allowed late implementation of the MPP and similar project activities. The SPCR Project Document ‘wanted’ that, but the late start was a recipe for unsustainability of these activities. State level management could have drawn attention to this, but may not have done so at least partly due to the absence of a state level plan (see other instances in this EQM where this has been discussed).</p>	<p><b>Positive:</b> 1. Project management of the CB component of the project has been adequate and led to positive achievements and outputs.</p> <p><b>Negative:</b> 1. Project management of the MP component had to face the emerging security issues, rather more so than the CB component due to geographical choice and other considerations. 2. When the conflict broke out, MP management chose to relocate to areas outside the direct influence of the conflict and outside the areas served by the CB component. The latter made meeting the project objectives challenging and, overall, led to disappointing results and impact.</p>	<p><b>Undetermined</b> 1. The SPCR is about to close the books. Management of the project activities and their sustainability is no longer in the hands of project management.</p>
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	<p>'Strategic oversight' at state level did not exist due to the absence of an overall state-specific project document. In fact, at state level, the goal, purposes, specific objectives and expected results of the SPCRP were no matter of concern.</p>				
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**Annex 9. Report of findings per State**

Will be submitted separately..