No free lunches: PES for agobiodiversity conservation



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Payments for agrobiodiversity conservation services (PACS)

Piloted to check out their potential as least-cost and equitable agrobiodiversity conservation governance instrument





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Peru: Northern Altiplano → subsitence-based

Arequipa.

El Alto

Quito


Perú

☆Lima

Bolivia: Southern Altiplano → commercial farming systems



PAYMENT FOR AGROBIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION SERVICES scheme ran over the 2010/2011 agricultural season



In kind payment: -agricultural equipment or inputs -construction or school materials

Qechua and Aymara quinoa farmers cultivating threatened varieties and collectively saving 2% of production as seed for conservation purposes

Remainder maintained by farmers for own consumption, sale or use in following agricultural seasons

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the key players





Key concerns:

- Targeting: what, where?
- Efficiency: least-cost
- Equity: Legitimacy
- Institution: collective action
- motivations for consv?

Pilot PACS shows promise for upscaling into a regional/national scale







A broad conservation strategy would likely require incorporating a mixture of incentive instruments, e.g. a market/value chain development combined with PACS schemes built on governmental funds and private sector funding







Participatory approach appears to be viable

"Good policies are those that support socially valued ends not only by harnessing selfish preferences to public ends but also by evoking, cultivating, and empowering public-spirited motives"

Bowles (2008) . Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments": Evidence from economic experiments. Science, 320, 1605-1609.

Additional material unai.pascual@bc3research.org

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