THE ROLE OF NATIONAL FISHERIES ADMINISTRATIONS AND REGIONAL FISHERY BODIES IN ADOPTING AND IMPLEMENTING MEASURES TO COMBAT IUU FISHING (Judith Swan)

Judith Swan
Fisheries Consultant
SwanSea Oceans Environment Inc

Swan, J. The Role of National Fisheries Administrations and Regional Fishery Bodies in Adopting and Implementing Measures to Combat IUU Fishing. Document AUS:IUU/2000/10. 2000. 22p. ABSTRACT This paper reviews the role of national fishery administrations in regional fishery bodies and the consequences when administrations do or do not take action to implement regionally agreed fishery measures. Institutional and policy aspects are assessed for the effective operation of regional fishery bodies, including the need for these bodies to close gaps in the fulfillment of their respective mandates. Measures are proposed to combat IUU fishing that might be strengthened or adopted by regional fishery bodies in order to improve their effectiveness, particularly in light of recent international fishery instruments. This paper concludes that clarification and fulfillment of roles played by national fishery administrations, together with strengthening and coordination of regional fishery bodies is essential for improved fisheries governance generally and in relation to IUU fishing. It proposes text on the roles of national fisheries administrations and regional fishery bodies in combating IUU fishing for the IPOA, with a view to moving towards the realisation of current and future sustainable fishing opportunities.

PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT

This paper has been prepared as one in a series of specialist background papers for the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Organized by the Government of Australia in Cooperation with FAO, Sydney, Australia, 15-19 May 2000. It is expected that this series of papers and the expert consultation will contribute to the elaboration of an international plan of action (IPOA) to deal effectively with all forms of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, the development of which is being undertaken in accordance with a decision of the 1999 FAO Ministerial Meeting on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of FAO or any of its Members.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fourteen regional fishery bodies or arrangements (RFBs) have been established in the period since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982, resulting in almost thirty regional and sub-regional bodies worldwide with a mandate for marine fisheries. The need for all RFBs to be strengthened appropriately to deal with new, additional responsibilities, was recognised at the first historic meeting of FAO and non-FAO RFBs in February, 1999. It was evident at that time that in most cases, present systems of fisheries governance had failed to ensure resource conservation and economic efficiency.

Although important contributions to fisheries governance have already been made by some RFBs in recent years, some key problem areas for RFBs have been identified as: conservation of resources; control of catches and effort; fleet capacity; by-catch and discards; data and information collection, dissemination and distribution; monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS); and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. IUU fishing is not stand-alone in this list; it is related to each of the other problem areas. This underlines the complexities in focusing the action and coordination that is needed to combat it.

It has been widely recognised at international levels that coordination among RFBs is essential for developing and implementing an IPOA to combat IUU fishing In developing such coordination, the roles of national fishery administrations (NFAs) and RFBs should be clear. They are pivotal to the process, and clarification and acceptance of their existing and potential roles is as vital as formulating the IPOA itself. The actions of NFAs, whether members or non-members of RFBs, directly impact on the effectiveness of the RFB. Their legal obligations in relation to RFBs, even as non-members, are increasingly important.

To help close existing gaps in RFBs, NFAs should review and prioritise their roles within RFBs and international law with the objective of combating IUU fishing. To this end, their roles and obligations within the constitutive instrument of the RFB are described, problem areas in discharging their roles in RFBs are identified, as well as the consequences when they do or do not take action to fulfill these roles. Some essential roles of NFAs in RFBs for combating IUU fishing are also presented.

RFBs serve as a gateway between international and national levels. They are well placed to contribute to the global efforts to combat IUU fishing, both in relation to their own convention or regulatory area - which in many cases includes high seas - and in collaboration with NFAs, other RFBs and international bodies. To do this effectively, the institutional and policy aspects of RFBs must be attuned to the task. These are assessed in the context of the global movement towards strengthened fisheries governance by RFBs.

While FAO RFBs have reviewed their institutional aspects, especially in the past decade, there has been no collective systematic approach. It is recommended that as part of such review and adaptation, RFBs consider the institutional and policy aspects which need strengthening to deal with IUU fishing and to implement the IPOA on IUU fishing.

The two levels relevant to consideration of institutional aspects - one being the overall institutional functioning of the RFB, and the second being the institutional mechanisms used to implement policy - are identified and discussed.

It is recognised that, on a global scale, policies to deal specifically with IUU fishing have only begun to emerge due to the relatively recent identification of the concept. They have been adopted for the most part in recent years, on a patchwork basis, to respond to urgent situations. A number of these relate to fishing by non-parties of RFBs, but IUU fishing by members is also a problem. To enhance a coherent approach at this stage, it is recommended that a common playing field be identified. To this end, the basic elements of the ambit of IUU fishing are suggested for consideration.

The policies and measures already adopted by RFBs are described, including: registers and information relating to IUU fishing; inspection and enforcement; VMS, presumptions, landings, port inspection and transhipments, trade measures; cooperation with non-contracting parties; fleet capacity, and resolution calling for action against IUU fishing. Implementation of the recent international instruments has also formed part of the focus for RFBs, but it is noted that while some progress has been made in areas such as adopting resolutions on implementation and development of the precautionary approach, very few RFBs have actually taken concrete steps towards implementing the applicable regimes. To this end, RFBs should adopt, and encourage members and non-members to adopt, provisional measures to implement applicable international instruments, as formal solutions are being developed.

To address policy aspects of IUU fishing, RFBs should cooperate to evaluate existing policies to counter IUU fishing, proactively develop new policies as appropriate and prioritise the implementation of measures in support of such policies.

It is noted that the above measures taken to date by NFAs and RFBs have made a start at deterring IUU fishing, but there is still much work to be done, considering the existing situation: the movement of displaced fleets to other fishing grounds to continue IUU fishing for other species; fleet capacity has not been significantly reduced; many countries where the IUU fleets are based have little enforcement capacity; required inspection and documentation for trade, landings and transhipments of IUU caught fish is not uniformly enforced; fishing vessels operating under open registers do not respect RFBs regulations and still engage in rapid and frequent change-of-flag practices; and the negative effects of IUU fishing can be more economic and social rather than ecological in nature.

The increasing cooperation among RFBs is described, and additional measures which RFBs could consider or build upon to combat problem areas in IUU fishing are presented. It is suggested that these measures could serve in evaluating existing measures and strengthening cooperation and coordination among RFBs.

PROPOSED TEXT FOR THE IPOA

Initiation and achievement of all actions in the proposed text for an IPOA are feasible in the short term, but the duration of the process for some actions could, and should, operate on a continuing basis.

National Fisheries Administrations

National Fisheries Administrations to Adopt or Provisionally Implement Relevant International and Regional Instruments, Measures and Policies to Combat IUU Fishing

It is agreed and accepted that national fisheries administrations have important roles in regional fisheries bodies or arrangements (RFBs), whether or not they are Contracting Parties or members of the RFB, coastal States or flag States. To that end, national fisheries administrations should, as a priority, adopt, or at least provisionally implement and ensure compliance with:

• the objectives, principles and provisions of recent international instruments, including the Code of Conduct, Compliance Agreement and Fish Stocks Agreement;
• the objectives, principles and provisions of the constitutive instrument of any relevant RFB, including those having a mandate over activities in or species relating to waters under national jurisdiction, and those having a mandate over an area where its nationals or vessels fish; and
• the measures and policies adopted by any relevant RFB, including fisheries, MCS, information and trade measures, in cooperation with the RFB and other relevant administrations, including enforcing these measures to the greatest extent possible.

National Fisheries Administrations to Fulfill non-Party Obligations in International Instruments and Regional Fishery Bodies

Considering that the roles of non-party national fisheries administrations in RFBs are expanding due to non-party obligations under recent international instruments and as appropriate the constitutive instrument of the RFB, relevant national fisheries administrations should, as a priority, cooperate with RFBs by joining, attending, observing, reporting, and adopting, or provisionally applying, the measures agreed in relevant RFBs.

National Fisheries Administrations should ensure National Implementation of Sanctions Against IUU Fishing to Fullest Possible Extent

NFAs should ensure, as a priority, that sanctions against IUU fishing, as agreed by an RFB or at national level, are implemented to the fullest extent possible at national level, and that effective cooperation takes place to promote full implementation on a regional or international basis.

National Fisheries Administrations should Cooperation with each other, applicable RFBs, to Develop and Implement Action Plan which Identifies and Prioritises their Essential Roles, including Consequences of Failure to Fulfil Roles

To avoid the consequences of unchecked IUU fishing, NFAs should cooperate with each other and any applicable RFB in developing an action plan which identifies and prioritises their essential roles, and in implementing the action plan on an urgent basis. The consequences of a NFA’s failure to fulfil its roles should be included in such action plan.

National Fisheries Administrations should, as Action Plans on their Essential Roles are being developed, Cooperate in Taking Immediate Action to Strengthen their Roles

As action plans are being developed which identify and prioritise essential roles of national fisheries administrations, they should cooperate in taking immediate action to strengthen their roles relating to, inter alia, information and data provision, flag State control, enforcement, acceptance of international instruments and political will.

National Fisheries Administrations should, on Immediate Basis, Ensure Reports are Submitted to RFB as Required on Implementation of Measures to combat IUU Fishing

In particular, national fisheries administrations should, on an immediate basis, ensure that complete, accurate and timely reports are submitted to the RFB as required on the implementation of measures regarding IUU fishing adopted by the RFB.

National Fisheries Administrations should Proactively Cooperation in Taking Harmonised Steps at National Level and Strengthening the Relevant RFB

National fisheries administrations should proactively cooperate in closing existing gaps in governance over IUU fishing by taking harmonised steps at national level to strengthen their institutional, legal and policy bases, and to strengthen the relevant RFB, including delegating more decision making and enforcement authority as appropriate to the RFB, and reviewing and strengthening the process and information systems over, inter alia, port State responsibilities and trade information.

Regional Fisheries Bodies or Arrangements

Agreement on Ambit of IUU Fishing

To ensure a coherent approach and maximum scope of action by RFBs and national fisheries administrations, as well as at the international level, it is recognised that the ambit of IUU fishing, applicable to members and non-members of RFBs, includes:

• fishing, fishing operations in support of fishing, or activities related to fishing;
• areas under national jurisdiction and the high seas;
• contravention or undermining of applicable conservation and management measures or related measures officially adopted by an RFB or implemented by a coastal State;
• failure to effectively exercise the required jurisdiction or control over nationals and vessels; and
• failure to fully meet reporting requirements.

Cooperation among RFBs through agreed Action Plans to Regularise and Institutionalise Coordination with Like-minded RFBs, including Information Systems, Meetings, etc.

Cooperation among RFBs in the development, coordination and implementation of policies and measures, as well as internal review and strengthening, is essential to developing a proactive strategy to close existing gaps in combating IUU fishing. Action plans among RFBs should be agreed to regularise or institutionalise such cooperation. To this end, RFBs should regularise meetings with other like-minded RFBs, agree on information provision and systems and take an active part in planning and participating in the meetings of FAO and non-FAO RFBs.

General Institutional Review and Strengthening of RFBs should include Aspects Relating to IUU Fishing

Noting that FAO RFBs have recently carried out internal reviews and reform, it is acknowledged that there has been no such collective systematic approach among RFBs as a whole. Taking into account the need for such approach, and the movement towards development of performance indicators for use by RFBs as a basis for internal review and strengthening, RFBs should, as part of such review or as a preliminary review carried out on an immediate basis, focus on the institutional strengthening needed to deal with IUU fishing and implementation of an IPOA on IUU fishing. The general institutional aspects which would need to be included in such a review concerning IUU fishing should include the following: mandate and functions; institutional and capacity building measures; decision making powers and procedures; budget and finance; procedures and requirements for data and information collection, analysis and dissemination; enforcement mechanisms, membership, and dispute settlement mechanisms.

Objectives of Institutional and Policy Strengthening for RFBs in relation to IUU Fishing

Objectives of institutional and policy strengthening in relation to IUU fishing should include enabling RFBs to:

• determine policy objectives regarding IUU fishing internally and in cooperation with other RFBs;
• strengthen institutional mechanisms as appropriate for optimum implementation of policies against IUU fishing;
• regularise coordination with institutional mechanisms of other RFBs as far as possible regarding IUU fishing, in particular information, enforcement and trade aspects; and
• ensure timely and effective implementation of policies internally, and in cooperation with other RFBs.

General Institutional Review and Strengthening and Policy Development of RFBs should include Existing Regional and International Policies and Measures in relation to IUU Fishing

In the context of internal institutional strengthening and policy development, as well as taking coordinated action with other RFBs and national fisheries administrations, and agreeing on an IPOA on IUU fishing, RFBs should take into account, and evaluate the effectiveness of, existing regional and international policies and measures in relation to IUU fishing, including those set out in Annex 1. In particular, this should embrace the following areas, recognising that existing measures have been taken in response to specific compelling situations, and that there is an urgent need for a proactive, coherent and coordinated approach approach:

• the institutional capacity for establishment and maintenance of registers and other information systems or cooperation with international information systems, and timely and effective dissemination of information;
• the coordination or standardisation of schemes, reports and measures in relation to IUU fishing;
• inspection and enforcement;
• implementation and monitoring of programmes on landings, port State controls, transhipments and trade; and
• coordination/cooperation with all involved in deterring and controlling IUU fishing.

RFBs should cooperate on Framework for Policies and Measures to Counter IUU Fishing, including Strengthening RFBs’ Mandate over IUU Fishing, and Prioritise Implementation

RFBs should cooperate on an urgent basis to proactively develop new policies and measures as appropriate to counter IUU fishing and prioritise the implementation of measures in support of such policies. A comprehensive framework for new measures should be developed by FAO in consultation with RFBs to facilitate coordinated action, and should include elements to strengthen RFBs’ mandate over IUU fishing, including determination of whether fishing is illegal, independent inspection and capacity to determine and proceed against violations. Such a framework could include measures recommended in Part 4 of this paper, and appropriate action otherwise identified under the IPOA.

Pending Reform, Existing Policies and Measures to Combat IUU Fishing should be Implemented on a Priority Basis

While reform is being carried out by national fisheries administrations and RFBs to combat IUU fishing, they should proceed on a priority basis to implement existing policies and measures against IUU fishing, including the adoption, and encouragement of other RFB members and non-members to adopt, provisional measures to implement applicable international instruments, as well as measures relating to: registers/data/information relating to IUU fishing; inspection and enforcement; VMS, presumptions, landings, port inspection and transhipments, trade measures; cooperation with non-contracting parties; fleet capacity, and resolutions calling for action against IUU fishing.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

APFIC	Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission
ACFR	Advisory Committee on Fishery Research
CCAMLR	Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
CCSBT	Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
CECAF	Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic
COFI	Committee on Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organization
CWP	Coordinating Working Party on Fishery Statistics of the FAO
FIGIS	Fisheries Global Information Service
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFA	South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
GFCM	General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean
IATTC	Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
IBSFC	International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission
ICCAT	International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna
ICES	International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
IOTC	Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
IPHC	International Pacific Halibut Commission
IPOA	International Plan of Action
ISOFISH	The International Southern Oceans Longline Fisheries Information Clearing House
IUU	Illegal, unreported and unregulated
MCS	Monitoring, control and surveillance
MHLC	Multilateral High Level Conference
NAFO	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
NASCO	North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization
NFA	National Fishery Administration
NEAFC	North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
NPAFC	North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission
PICES	North Pacific Marine Science Organization
RFB	Regional Fishery Body or Arrangement
SEAFO	South East Atlantic Fishery Organization
SPC	South Pacific Commission
UNCLOS	The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
VMS	Vessel Monitoring System
WECAFC	Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission

1. INTRODUCTION

1. It is common knowledge that a new era of fisheries conservation and management was heralded by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It inspired energetic, forward-looking reform: the adoption and implementation of new zones of national jurisdiction, laws, policies, science and fisheries management regimes.

2. National laws were eagerly revised, and existing regional fishery bodies (RFBs) modernised their constitutions. Fourteen RFBs have been established in the period since UNCLOS was adopted, resulting in almost thirty regional and sub-regional bodies worldwide with a mandate for marine fisheries.[179]

3. Technology, subsidies and a race for profits and food security also made giant strides, outpacing the resources - and political will - available to control overfishing. Recognition in the mid-1990s that most of the world’s fish stocks were in serious trouble[180] was accompanied by a series of new international instruments[181]. These, in turn, prompted new approaches towards more comprehensive and responsible fisheries management by an increasing number of RFBs, States and other entities.

4. The need for all RFBs to be strengthened appropriately to deal with new, additional responsibilities, was recognised at the first historic meeting of FAO and non-FAO RFBs in February, 1999[182]. It was evident at that time that in most cases, present systems of fisheries governance had failed to ensure resource conservation and economic efficiency.[183]

5. Although important contributions to fisheries governance have already been made by some RFBs in recent years[184], some key problem areas for RFBs have been identified as: conservation of resources; control of catches and effort; fleet capacity; by-catch and discards; data and information collection, dissemination and distribution; monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS); and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing[185]. IUU fishing is not stand-alone in this list; it is related to each of the other problem areas. This underlines the complexities in focusing the action and coordination that is needed to combat it.

6. The importance of the role of RFBs in combating IUU fishing was emphasised by the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI). At its Twenty-third Session in 1999, COFI urged FAO to review the activities that had been undertaken by regional fishery management organisations to deal with IUU fishing problems[186]. Discussion was based on a paper made available by Australia[187], which noted that an IPOA should consist of practical management and enforcement options covering both fisheries production and trade; this would assist coastal States and regional fishery management organisations to reduce or eliminate IUU fishing.

7. A focus on the coordination essential for developing an IPOA was echoed by the 1999 FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries[188] and the 1999 Session of the Commission for Sustainable Development[189]. They each recognised that an IPOA on IUU fishing must be developed through coordinated efforts by States, FAO, regional fisheries management bodies and other relevant international agencies as provided in Article V of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.

8. In developing such coordination, the roles of States and RFBs in adopting - and implementing - measures to combat IUU fishing should be clear. They are pivotal to the process, and clarification and acceptance of their existing and potential roles is as vital as formulating the IPOA itself. This paper addresses their respective roles, but acknowledges the pitfalls of taking a one-size-fits-all approach. The differences among States and RFBs are considerable, including the level of their current attention to IUU fishing.

9. A diversity of interests among States are evidenced by: developed and developing States; coastal and distant water fishing States; small island and densely populated States; and among States with a range of political agendas.

10. There are also diversities in the RFBs that deal with marine fisheries, including their mandates, functions, structures and financial resources[190]. Major differences are evident among RFBs which: are FAO or non-FAO; have regulatory or advisory functions; consist mainly of developed or developing countries; have a geographical area covering high seas and/or members’ zones of national jurisdiction.

11. This paper endeavours to steer a course which is applicable to all States and RFBs in the spirit of the times, as globalization, new international instruments and patterns of dwindling resources extend fisheries management responsibilities to the high seas, flag States and non parties, and as information technology allows closer cooperation and collaboration. There is no doubt that advances in technologies will result in new ways to learn about the oceans and their resources within the next few years, and States and RFBs should be prepared.

2. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL FISHERY ADMINISTRATIONS IN REGIONAL FISHERY BODIES

12. RFBs, as separate personalities, can achieve results their members, observers or cooperating countries could not attain individually. However, RFBs are no more effective than their mandate, institutional strength, and ultimately the roles played by their participants.

13. Although it is common to think in terms of members or non-members of RFBs, the point of focus for this paper is the role played by the national fishery administration (NFA). Some reasons for this are: NFAs are commonly the most active branch of government in discharging the members’ management and technical responsibilities under the RFB; NFAs are represented at the FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries;[191] and NFAs have lead authority over fishing and related activities at a national level, where approximately 90% of global fishing activities take place. The central reason is the increasingly important role of non-parties to RFBs, recognised by legal obligations contained in international instruments and the constitutive instruments of the RFBs themselves. RFBs are increasingly inviting non-members to become members, observers or cooperating/collaborating parties, entities or fishing entities[192], because the actions of NFAs, whether members or non-members, directly impact on the effectiveness of the RFB.

14. The questions are, therefore, what roles should NFAs play in RFBs, what roles do they play, and what are the consequences?

15. The roles that NFAs should play in RFBs are related to the terms of the constitutive instrument of the RFB and applicable international instruments[193] NFAs should fulfill their obligations under the RFB and international law. In addition, they should work proactively to close existing gaps in governance over IUU fishing by taking steps to strengthen the RFB, to accept and implement international instruments and beyond existing obligations to develop concerted international action as appropriate. The roles that NFAs do play in RFBs often depends on the state of their own resources - financial, human and marine - as well as economic benefits and political will.

16. To help close existing gaps in RFBs, NFAs should review and priorise their roles within RFBs and international law with the objective of combating IUU fishing. Their roles and obligations within the constitutive instrument of the RFB are described below, as well as the consequences when they do or do not take action to fulfill these roles. Some essential roles of NFAs in RFBs for combating IUU fishing are then presented.

2.1 The Terms of the Constitutive Instrument of the RFB

17. The Convention, Agreement or other instrument which establishes the RFB sets out the obligations of members, as well as the mandate, power and functions of the RFB. It can also describe duties of non-parties.[194]

18. The instruments contain members’ obligations which are administrative in nature, and those which are substantive, requiring development and implementation of resolutions, recommendations, decisions or policies adopted by the RFB. Each of these areas, described below, is important to combat IUU fishing. Fulfilment of the administrative duties leads to strengthened governance for the RFB, and implementation of management measures directly enhances the conservation of the resource.

2.1.1 NFA’s Role to Fulfill Administrative Obligations

19. As are required to discharge administrative, institutional or procedural duties in their roles as members of RFBs in support of the effective operation of the RFB. Such duties include: attendance at meetings; payment of membership assessments; participation in the decision-making process; institutional strengthening and capacity building as appropriate;[195] facilitating partnerships and stakeholder participation as appropriate; and complying with dispute settlement procedures. FAO RFBs have responded to these and related concerns in their recent internal reviews.[196] Some of the resulting reforms include implementation of autonomous budgets and scheme for members contributions[197] and amendments to the establishing Agreement and Rules of Procedure.[198]

20. These duties are indirectly supportive of the general mandate of the RFB. Partial or non-fulfillment can serve to dilute any effect the RFB will have in performing its functions and realising its objectives and purposes, including measures against IUU fishing.

2.1.2 NFAs’ Roles Relating to RFBs Management and Related Measures

21. NFAs may take action to develop, determine and implement management and related measures as members, cooperating/collaborating parties or other participant of the RFB. This could occur at any level, by any NFA, whether or not as a member of the RFB.

22. The body of management measures adopted by RFBs affecting IUU fishing has been expanding over recent years[199]. However, NFAs are not consistent in their implementation of such measures. In a recent survey of RFBs,[200] the following problem areas - related to NFAs’ roles - were identified as causing concern to RFBs, in addition to non-parties undermining measures: data provision by members; enforcement; acceptance of international instruments and political will. It goes without saying that these all impact significantly the RFB’s ability to combat IUU fishing.

23. Among the most troublesome of these areas, after non-parties undermining measures, is the underreporting or non-reporting by members.[201] As a consequence, some RFBs assume that the catch data is underestimated or not provided, and devise formulae to correct the stock assessment estimates. To reduce discrepancies in returns, some RFBs are taking action such as adopting improved reporting formats[202], but this still does not cover the failure by some NFAs to report.

24. The fact that NFAs still have a distance to cover in establishing and implementing measures, including those to combat IUU fishing, is reflected by the following factors, initially reviewed by the 1998 High Level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries convened by FAO (High Level Panel).[203]

• a lack of willingness by member States to delegate sufficient decision-making powers and responsibility to the regional bodies;
• a failure by some States to accept and implement international instruments central to enhanced fisheries governance such as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement;
• poor flag State control both by members and non-members of organizations or arrangements;
• members of organisations and arrangements not providing complete data and information concerning their fishing operations, as required, in a timely manner and, in some cases, not reporting catches at all;
• the lack of enforcement of management measures both at the national and regional levels; and
• fishing activities of non-members in the waters covered by a regional organisation or arrangement.

25. RFBs are working to overcome many of these problems, but the responsibility ultimately falls on the NFAs. The first step for NFAs is recognition, acceptance and prioritisation of their role in fulfilling obligations. Subsequent steps are described in companion papers, and include: implementation of national laws and policies as a result of directives, resolutions, recommendations or other decision of the RFB;[204] implementation of fisheries management measures compatible with measures of the RFB as appropriate;[205] implementation of community based management for small scale marine and inland capture fisheries;[206] implementation of international instruments;[207] provision of information, data and other statistics;[208] management of fleet capacity;[209] compliance with MCS and VMS requirements;[210] compliance with port State measures;[211] and taking WTO-Consistent Trade-Related Measures to Address IUU Fishing.[212]

26. The consequences of members’ or non-members’ failure to implement regionally agreed measures in relation to IUU fishing affect both the resource and the NFA’s right to allocations by the RFB. It goes without saying that the resource could be swiftly depleted,[213] leaving no future for food security or economic opportunity. In addition, as information systems, VMS, secondary monitoring and enforcement measures (such as trade) and global cooperation are developed, the NFA could be subject to increasing sanctions on a global basis, as well as diminishing fishing opportunities.

2.2 Essential Roles of NFAs in RFBs to Combat IUU Fishing Activities

27. It is suggested that some essential roles of member and non-member NFAs[214] in combating IUU fishing activities through RFBs would include the following:[215]

• accepting and implementing relevant international instruments, or applying them on a provisional basis pending formal acceptance;
• joining, cooperating/collaborating with or becoming an observer of a relevant RFB, and participating in meetings;
• fully implementing any direction, resolution, scheme, action plan or other decision relating to IUU fishing adopted by the RFB;
• fully implementing, monitoring and enforcing conservation and management measures of the RFB, including reporting, flag State compliance and MCS;
• as appropriate, initiating measures to strengthen the RFB’s mandate, institutional structure or policies to enable improved action to address IUU fishing;
• implementing national laws and policies prohibiting IUU fishing;
• implementing national laws and controls over national vessels/nationals to prohibit IUU fishing;
• providing required data and information to the appropriate RFB and other authorities in a timely and accurate manner;
• providing information requested for sub-regional, regional or international registers relating to IUU fishing;
• reporting on IUU activities, and making timely, complete and accurate reports on national fishing activities in order that IUU fishing can be detected;
• boarding and inspection of vessels to detect IUU fishing according to procedures agreed in the RFB;[216]
• taking followup action with the RFB and others as appropriate if IUU fishing is detected;
• port inspection, or allowing RFB to carry out port inspections in accordance with measures or other decisions adopted by the RFB;[217]
• monitoring, regulation or prohibition of transhipments or landings in accordance with measures or other decisions adopted by the RFB;
• imposing trade measures as may be adopted or recommended by the RFB, including requiring certificates of origin and prohibiting imports;
• cooperation in measures to identify and reduce fleet capacity;
• carrying out such démarches and other diplomatic action as may be agreed by the RFB; and
• cooperating in other regional or international fora to further the measures and other decisions of the RFB;

28. To avoid the consequences of unchecked IUU fishing, NFAs should cooperate with each other and any applicable RFB in developing an action plan which identifies and prioritises their essential roles, and in implementing the action plan on an urgent basis. The consequences of a NFA’s failure to fulfill its roles should be included in such action plan. For these purposes, relevant elements of the above framework could serve as a starting point for identifying the NFA’s roles in combating IUU fishing in cooperation with RFBs.

3. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY ASPECTS OF RFBS

29. RFBs serve as a gateway between international and national levels. They are well placed to contribute to the global efforts to combat IUU fishing, both in relation to their own convention or regulatory area - which in many cases includes high seas - and in collaboration with NFAs, other RFBs and international bodies. To do this effectively, the institutional and policy aspects of RFBs must be attuned to the task. These should be assessed in the context of the global movement towards strengthened fisheries governance by RFBs.

30. Recent international instruments concerning fisheries conservation and management - the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the Compliance Agreement[218] and the Fish Stocks Agreement[219] - have underlined the need for all RFBs to be strengthened appropriately to deal with new, additional responsibilities.[220] The FAO High Level Panel, having noted that the next ten years should be an era in which RFBs implement and enforce decisions, concluded that RFBs should:

“review and adapt, where appropriate, their mandates, structures and strategies in order to better play their increasingly important roles in the process of achieving sustainable fisheries development and to discharge their responsibilities in implementing the recent series of international instruments concerned with fisheries...”.[221]

31. Institutional review has been taking place in all FAO RFBs, as a result of a 1997 COFI directive that members evaluate each body to determine measures to be taken to strengthen it.[222] This directive was reinforced by Resolution 13/97, adopted by the Conference of FAO: “Review of FAO Statutory Bodies”[223]. In 1999, COFI expressed its satisfaction with the outcome of the implementation of Resolution 13/97, and urged FAO to continue the systematic analysis of these bodies.[224]

32. While FAO RFBs have reviewed their institutional aspects, especially in the past decade, there has been no collective systematic approach. Taking into account the need for such approach and the differences among RFBs, there is some movement towards development of performance indicators for use by RFBs as a basis for internal review and strengthening[225]. It is recommended that as part of such review and adaptation, RFBs consider the institutional and policy aspects which need strengthening to deal with IUU fishing and to implement the IPOA on IUU fishing. These are described below

3.1 RFBs - Institutional Aspects

33. Institutional aspects of RFBs are central to securing the cooperation needed to agree on, implement, and enforce the appropriate policies and measures on IUU fishing. They must be strong enough to achieve results under the RFB’s mandate, through NFAs and in cooperation with other global partners. There are two levels relevant to consideration of institutional aspects: one being the overall institutional functioning of the RFB, and the second being the institutional mechanisms used to implement policy. These are discussed below.

34. First, to the extent that overall institutional functioning of RFBs impacts on measures to counteract IUU fishing, factors currently undermining the effectiveness of regional fisheries governance should be noted. These have been identified as follows.[226]

• outputs of some organisations or arrangements not being operational because of the absence of an appropriate link between the scientific and technical experts on the one hand, and the decision/policy makers and those responsible for implementing decisions/policies, on the other hand;
• the lack of enforcement of management measures both at the national and regional levels;
• problems arising from many of the regulated stocks being harvested in mixed fisheries where the overall fishing capacity is neither limited or controlled;
• inadequate human and financial resources to enable organisations or arrangements to carry out their mandates satisfactorily; and
• the low frequency of meetings of organisations or arrangements.

35. Second, institutional mechanisms currently used to implement policy relating to IUU fishing are discussed below in the context of policy aspects.[227] These include: decisions/resolutions; establishment of committees or working groups; establishment and maintenance of registers; regularised reports of national action; adoption and implementation of specific schemes, including enforcement and trade; and collaboration and relations with others.[228]

36. To address these general constraints, the institutional aspects which would need to be included in the recommended internal performance review concerning IUU fishing should include the following: mandate and functions; institutional and capacity building measures; decision making powers and procedures; budget and finance; procedures and requirements for data and information collection, analysis and dissemination; enforcement mechanisms, membership, and dispute settlement mechanisms.[229]

37. To address institutional aspects of dealing with IUU fishing, RFBs should, in addition to carrying out internal review and institutional strengthening: evaluate the adequacy of existing institutional aspects in combating IUU fishing; determine policy objectives internally and in cooperation with other RFBs; coordinate institutional mechanisms as far as possible; strengthen institutional aspects and mechanisms as appropriate; ensure frequent and timely implementation of policies.

38. In addition, RFBs should take into account the existing body of regional and international activities in relation to IUU fishing, set out in Annex 1. In particular, the institutional capacity for establishment and maintenance of registers and other related information, inspection and enforcement, implementation and monitoring of programmes on landings, transhipments and trade, and coordination/cooperation with all involved are essential for deterring IUU fishing. Where RFBs’ institutional capacity is not adequate, alternate mechanisms should be identified with a view to improved international cooperation.

3.2 RFBs - Policy Aspects

39. Proactive policymaking by RFBs can lead to improved performance by RFBs in general, and success in combating IUU fishing in particular. The measures adopted by RFBs to implement the policies vary, and are somewhat dependent on their mandate, membership and institutional arrangements. For example, some RFBs are not positioned to determine if fishing is, in fact, illegal.

40. It is recognised that, on a global scale, policies to deal specifically with IUU fishing have only begun to emerge due to the relatively recent identification of the concept[230]. A number of decisions and resolutions have been taken in RFBs in relation to non-parties’ fishing in recent years,[231] but many gaps remain. RFBs are especially well positioned to adopt policies and measures which close existing gaps, and to do this a reasonably coherent approach should be taken.

41. To enhance a coherent approach at this stage, a common playing field should be identified to broadly describe what constitutes IUU fishing. Some flexibility in such a description would be needed in anticipation of new circumstances, technology and related factors. For general purposes, an international consensus among RFBs should be reached on the ambit of IUU fishing. This could include IUU fishing which has already been identified by RFBs, together with the following basic elements, as starting points for consideration:

• fishing, fishing operations in support of fishing, or activities related to fishing;
• areas under national jurisdiction and the high seas;
• contravention or undermining of applicable conservation and management measures or related measures officially adopted by an RFB or implemented by a coastal State;
• failure to effectively exercise the required jurisdiction or control over nationals and vessels;
• failure to fully meet reporting requirements.

42. Many RFBs have developed policies to counter IUU fishing, often in the context of fishing by non-members, and adopted a range of measures to implement the policies. The measures are detailed in Annex 1, and include the following: registers and information relating to IUU fishing[232]; inspection and enforcement;[233] VMS,[234] presumptions,[235] landings, port inspection and transhipments,[236] trade measures;[237] cooperation with non-contracting parties;[238] fleet capacity,[239] and resolution calling for action against IUU fishing.[240] However, these policies have generally been adopted in recent years in response to specific situations, leaving gaps in implementation and a need for a more coherent approach.

43. Implementation of the recent international instruments has also formed part of the focus for RFBs.[241] They are encouraging their members and non-members to become party to the international instruments, inter alia in the context of controlling IUU fishing. However, the pace is slow. While most RFBs are investigating and reviewing, through appropriately constituted working groups how best to address the relevant issues, very few RFBs have actually taken concrete steps towards implementing the desired regime. The issues are complex, and the RFBs are the only realistic option for the conservation and management of shared stocks.[242] To this end, RFBs should adopt, and encourage members and non-members to adopt, provisional measures to implement applicable international instruments, as formal solutions are being developed.

44. Among the most challenging policy-related constraints for some RFBs is not the development and adoption of policies and measures against IUU fishing, but their implementation among members. This can form a considerable chasm between the objective and results. For example, RFBs’ policies and measures on IUU fishing tend to address non-parties and open register flagging even though it is acknowledged that IUU fishing is also carried out by companies and individuals originating from the RFBs’ parties.[243] The roles NFAs should play in the RFBs, described above, are crucial in this regard.

45. To address policy aspects of IUU fishing, RFBs should cooperate to evaluate existing policies to counter IUU fishing, proactively develop new policies as appropriate and prioritise the implementation of measures in support of such policies.

4. MEASURES TO COMBAT IUU FISHING

46. The measures taken to date by NFAs and RFBs have made a start at deterring IUU fishing, but there is still much work to be done, considering the existing situation: the movement of displaced fleets to other fishing grounds to continue IUU fishing for other species; fleet capacity has not been significantly reduced;[244] many countries where the IUU fleets are based have little enforcement capacity; required inspection and documentation for trade, landings and transhipments of IUU caught fish is not uniformly enforced; fishing vessels operating under open registers do not respect RFBs regulations and still engage in rapid and frequent change-of-flag practices; and the negative effects of IUU fishing can be more economic and social rather than ecological in nature.

47. Happily, cooperation among RFBs is on the increase,[245] which will facilitate proactive coordination among them in appropriate fora,[246] as well as compliance by all members.[247] In particular, cooperation among RFBs in the exchange of information and data is growing, with a view to exchanging information on fleet movement, compliance, management and trade.

48. This surge of cooperation and coordination would benefit from focused consideration of these and other continuing problems, as well as possible measures to combat IUU fishing that might be strengthened or adopted by RFBs to improve their effectiveness, particularly in light of recent international instruments. Existing measures of RFBs (described in Annex 1) should be evaluated and strengthened and new approaches should be developed. Some measures which RFBs could consider or build upon to combat IUU fishing, and which could serve as the basis of such evaluation and development, follow.

4.1 Collection and Dissemination of Information, Establishment of Registers

49. At the international level, cooperation among RFBs could lead to establishing and maintaining a comprehensive register of measures adopted by RFBs against IUU fishing. This should build on existing initiatives as appropriate,[248] and could include information on fleet movement, compliance (including sightings), management and illegal trade. In particular, it could take into account elements appearing in Annex 1, as well as information on regulatory actions taken in one region which may affect fleet operations and fishing operations in another region. It could serve to enhance coordination among RFBs in coordinated action for policymaking and enforcement.

50. At the international level, RFBs could develop a tracking system to detect, and exchange information on:

• the real time movement of fleets and activities of vessels positioned to engage in IUU fishing activities;
• the change of registration of vessels; and
• the catches from area of origin to point of sale.

51. At the international level, RFBs could adopt information requirements for catch documentation and a register for illegal trade.

52. At the international level, RFBs could encourage all NFAs as appropriate to provisionally implement the Compliance Agreement by, inter alia, submitting appropriate information to the High Seas Vessel Registration Database System.

53. At the regional level, RFBs could establish and maintain registers as appropriate which complement the international information systems, containing information relating to IUU regulatory measures, IUU fishing by members or non-members and enforcement action. Such information could include fleet capacity and vessels implicated in IUU fishing or trade.

54. At the regional level, RFBs could require, as appropriate, members and non-members to submit to them a current list of vessels licensed to fish in the Convention Area.

55. Considering that some RFBs are notified immediately regarding IUU fishing activities and others review this on an annual basis, RFBs could, as appropriate, work towards real-time, integrated reporting systems to allow immediate detection of and action against IUU fishing and trade.

56. To encourage full and accurate provision of information by members or applicable non-members, RFBs may consider compliance with information requirements to be a criterion for allocations or other benefits, and non-compliance to be a reason to impose trade or other sanctions.

4.2 Inspection and Enforcement

57. RFBs could, as appropriate, develop and adopt inspection schemes including measures authorising inspection to detect IUU fishing:

• by members, or those operating from member States;
• at ports during offloading;
• during transhipment at sea (if this is permitted);
• at specified points in the market chain; and
• of non-contracting party vessels, in accordance with international law and a presumption that IUU fishing has been carried out (see below under presumptions);

58. Measures to achieve full flag State compliance could be taken or strengthened, including:

• acceptance and implementation of international instruments by members and non-members of RFBs, and provisional application until formal acceptance is effected;
• adoption of clear boarding and inspection procedures at a standard equal to or stronger than that set out in the Fish Stocks Agreement;
• cooperation and coordination among RFBs and their members in making diplomatic démarches, implementing appropriate trade sanctions and licensing vessels; and
• implementation of flag State compliance measures could be a criterion for allocations or other benefits, and non-compliance could be a reason to impose trade or other sanctions.

59. Member States of RFBs could conclude reciprocal enforcement agreements among themselves and with cooperating States.

60. RFBs could monitor implementation by member States of management and enforcement measures for IUU fishing, including reporting requirements to the RFB, and designate such implementation as a criterion for allocations.

61. RFBs and member States could adopt a presumption, for enforcement purposes, to the effect that a non-Contracting Party vessel engaging in fishing activities in the RFB Regulatory Area is undermining conservation and management measures unless there is proof to the contrary.

62. RFBs and member States could cooperate to review and reform the law relating to flag State jurisdiction, with a view to defining the responsibilities and liabilities of nationals who own and/or control a vessel which operates under the flag of a country maintaining an open register.

63. RFBs could cooperate and coordinate with NFAs, and each other, in the development of schemes to identify harmonised requirements for the use of VMS.

64. RFBs could establish, where none exists, a Working Group or Committee on inspection and enforcement of IUU fishing, or review existing institutional mechanisms for effectiveness in inspection and enforcement and strengthen them as appropriate, taking into account, inter alia:

• information and documentation required, including the format;
• existence and effectiveness of vessel and gear marking requirements;
• availability of independent staff to carry out inspections;
• deterrence factor of existing arrangements;
• linkages between infractions and penalties;
• timeliness of RFB’s review of monitoring and enforcement activities;
• whether penalties include region-wide sanctions, such as trade or refusal of licenses; and
• cooperation by member States in implementing monitoring and enforcement, and reporting to RFB.

65. The establishment of international inspection forces, and their right, in cooperation with RFBs, to board vessels suspected of IUU fishing could be considered.

66. RFBs could agree on a standard for serious offences and penalties for IUU fishing offences, including, inter alia:

• the right to confiscate all fish, fishing gear and vessels carrying out IUU fishing in contravention of RFB regulations; and
• the agreement of all RFBs and their members not to license vessels where there is conclusive proof it carried out IUU fishing in any place without submitting to appropriate judicial or administrative process;

4.3. Landings and Transhipments

67. RFBs and NFAs could consider measures to impose a ban on landings and transhipments of fish from vessels identified as having engaged in or assisted IUU fishing, and could extend such a ban to the country to which they are flagged.

68. At-sea transhipments could be prohibited or otherwise controlled (e.g. notification of time and place, observers, etc.), mindful of the difficulty of implementing such a measure.

69. Measures to refuse landing of fish that has been transhipped could be considered by RFBs and NFAs.

70. RFBs and NFAs could consider a global catch documentation scheme to identify the origin of the fish at landings and transhipment points.

71. Measures for port inspections and standard international documentation, as noted above, could be developed or strengthened.

72. In general, the fullest possible measures for port State control consistent with the Fish Stocks Agreement could be reviewed and implemented.

4.4 Trade

73. Trade documentation and certification schemes in use by existing RFBs could be globalised or strengthened to enable improved detection of IUU caught fish.

74. Measures to prohibit the import and export of IUU caught fish could be taken or strengthened.

75. Trade measures could extend to all facets of the fishing industry, including vessel and gear manufacturing, consistent with international requirements.

4.5 Fleet Capacity

76. Many RFBs do not have a mandate to address fleet capacity. However, RFBs could, as far as possible, take or strengthen measures to cooperate in monitoring fleet capacity, and addressing excess capacity as it affects IUU fishing.

4.6 Coordination and Cooperation with non-Contracting Parties

77. RFBs and NFAs could consider improved coordination and taking or strengthening of measures to cooperate with non-Contracting parties, entities and fishing entities, including inter alia:

• coordinated and intensified diplomatic démarches to non-parties;
• invitations to join or participate in the RFB;
• notification to the IUU fishing entities, etc. of conservation and enforcement measures;
• undertaking public education and information programmes in countries which engage in IUU fishing and consumer countries, partnering as appropriate with consumer organisations or NGOs; and
• working with responsible industry and NGOs to collect and publish information on IUU fishing.

4.7 Coordination and Cooperation with other RFBs and other Bodies

78. In general, RFBs which have not recently carried out internal reviews should consider doing so, using appropriate performance indicators, with a view to strengthening their overall effectiveness including measures to combat IUU fishing and cooperate with other RFBs in so doing.

79. RFBs could take measures to ensure that cooperation and coordination with international fora are strengthened. This would include implementing to the fullest extent possible relevant decisions and instruments taken at international level, and contributing to the development of international cooperation among RFBs through international mechanisms. These could include international information systems and meetings, such as COFI and meetings of FAO and non-FAO RFBs.

80. RFBs should continue coordination and cooperation through meetings, cooperative scientific and research initiatives and information exchanges, and should identify further areas for cooperation against IUU fishing where none currently exist, taking into account the need for information exchange, management and trade measures, catch documentation and enforcement as suggested in this paper or identified by RFBs.

4.8 Support for an IPOA on IUU Fishing

81. RFBs could adopt resolutions or other decisions to support an IPOA on IUU fishing, and take appropriate measures to implement the IPOA.

5. CONCLUSIONS

82. The number of RFBs established since the adoption of UNCLOS is, like the Universe, expanding. Legal instruments, in responding to new technologies, trade patterns, information systems and the rapid depletion of resources, are looking further out to sea and up the ladder; they, too are expanding. In this case, the growth industry encompasses obligations in high seas areas and for parties and non-parties of RFBs.

83. But the problems persist. As noted above - and it is worth repeating: there is continuing movement of displaced fleets to other fishing grounds to continue IUU fishing for other species; fleet capacity has not been significantly reduced; many countries where the IUU fleets are based have little enforcement capacity; required inspection and documentation for trade, landings and transhipments of IUU caught fish is not uniformly enforced; fishing vessels operating under open registers do not respect RFBs regulations and still engage in rapid and frequent change-of-flag practices; and the negative effects of IUU fishing can be more economic and social rather than ecological in nature.

84. The root of the problem? Implosions. At the national level, there are some serious problems with political will and delegation of authority to RFBs. Then the mandate, functions, capacity, financial strength and operation of the RFBs weigh in - they are often inadequate to deal with the situation. Then the problems shift to compliance with management measures or other decisions of RFBs by members or non-members, but the focus at regional level seems to spotlight non-members. Great chasms exist in acceptance, implementation and enforcement of RFB’s decisions and measures, which is far from ideal in most cases. Retentive attitudes are fuelled by profiteering through open registers, subsidies and trade.

85. Solutions - incorporated into an IPOA - should seek to bolster expansion. To achieve this, age-old problems should be brought to the surface, as far as possible, through a collective review of the roles of national fisheries administrations in RFBs, review by RFBs of their own mandates, functions and measures, and a better-defined system of coordination among NFAs and RFBs in relation to policies, institutional mechanisms, information systems, measures and enforcement systems for IUU - and other - fishing.

86. It is also the time for new approaches and concepts to be developed; the world is not flat, and should not be content simply with implementation of existing laws and practices. Globalisation must be the inspiration for this, and not the taskmaster.

87. Driving the new approaches should be a vision of strengthened fisheries governance through RFBs, the gateways between global and national. This means development of clear roles and responsibilities for NFAs and RFBs. This should be accompanied by identification and acceptance of the consequences of failure to fulfill these roles and responsibilities. It also means strengthened and coordinated action to expand well beyond the boundaries of the NFAs and the RFBs to international bodies already involved, to supportive national and local bodies - and, above all, the general public. Respect for the resource is a universal message.

Appendix 1

A SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES OF RFBs IN RELATION TO IUU FISHING

This survey provides examples of some activities undertaken by many RFBs in relation to IUU fishing.[249] It is indicative of the increasing focus of RFBs on IUU fishing and related areas, as well as the need for coordination in agreeing on and implementing an IPOA.

1. REGISTERS AND INFORMATION RELATING TO IUU FISHING

CCAMLR The 1999 policy to enhance cooperation with non-Contracting Parties includes provision for the Executive Secretary to develop a list of non-Contracting Parties implicated in IUU fishing and/or trade, either after the adoption of the policy or during the three years prior, which has undermined the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures.

FFA operates the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels, which must submit information to and have good standing on the register in order to fish in any of the FFA member countries’ waters.

HIGH SEAS VESSEL REGISTRATION DATABASE SYSTEM In support of the Compliance Agreement, a High Seas Vessel Registration Database System (HSREG) was created in 1995 to facilitate monitoring of vessels licensed to fish on the high seas. All parties to the Compliance Agreement must provide data to FAO in respect of their vessels licensed to fish on the high seas. The development of the System was funded by the Government of Canada. The database currently contains information on a total of 621 licensed vessels from two signatories to the Agreement, Canada and the USA. FAO is encouraging its members that have accepted the Agreement, and those that have not, to make their data available for the database, even though the Agreement has not yet entered into force. The volume of licensed vessels in the databse will increase dramatically when the Agreement enters into force, and plans to permit user input through a secure Internet site have been considered.

GFCM in its Report of the Twenty-Second Session, 1997, notes the failure of many members to contribute information to a proposed register regarding fishing vessels operating in the high seas, or from Mediterranean ports.

IATTC reports plans to develop a register of longline fishing vessels authorised to fish in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. It also reports that at a meeting in July, 1999 of tuna commission secretariats representing CCSBT, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC and SPC, it was decided that each commission should identify licensing requirements for tuna fishing vessels and establish a registry of such vessels active in their areas of competence, including documentation of licenses held by the vessels. The Commissions will exchange the information in the registries and also with FAO to facilitate tracking of vessels moving between oceans, and cooperate with investigations into the activities of specific vessels fishing for tunas.

IBSFC A 1999 Working Group on Control and Enforcement recommended to the 25th Session that the vessel list of cod should be amended, and a full fleet register should be established.

ICCAT adopted a Resolution at its Ninth Special Meeting (Madrid, November-December, 1994), Regarding the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, which states that the Contracting Parties should take the necessary measures as soon as possible to maintain a register of all high seas fishing vessels greater than 24 meters in length and provide ICCAT with this information annually; ICCAT shall encourage non-Contracting parties to do the same. In 1999, it published a list of around 340 longline tuna fishing vessels claimed to be involved in IUU fishing and flagged to countries operating open registers.

The ICCAT Resolution Concerning the Unreported and Unregulated Catches of Tunas by Large-Scale Longline Vessels in the Convention Area adopted at the 11th Special Meeting in Spain, 1998 requires the Commission to request the Contracting Parties, Cooperating parties, entities or fishing entities which import or land frozen tuna and tuna-like products to submit specified information on an annual basis. The Compliance Committee and Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT statistics must then identify those whose vessels diminish the effectiveness of management measures. ICCAT may then request the revocation of their vessel registration or fishing licenses.

IOTC at its Third Session adopted a recommendation concerning registration and exchange of information on vessels, including flag of convenience vessels, fishing for tropical tunas in IOTC areas of competence. This is a comprehensive undertaking, as it applies to contracting Parties and non-Contracting Parties which have fished in the area, and vessels longer than 24 meters, and those under 24 meters on a voluntary basis. Contracting parties must submit a list of all fishing vessels licensed to fish in their waters.

2. INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

CCAMLR requires under Conservation Measure 118/VII that a non-Contracting Party vessel be inspected when it enters a port of any Contracting Party, and prohibits landings or transhipments without inspection according to specified requirements. Information on the results of all inspections of non-Contracting Party vessels conducted in the ports of Contracting Parties, and on any subsequent action, are to be transmitted immediately to the Commission, which then transmits the information to Contracting Parties and the flag State.

FFA member countries have adopted the Niue Treaty on joint and reciprocal cooperation in fisheries surveillance and enforcement. Although it does not specifically address IUU fishing, actions taken under it could combat such activities, and it could serve as a model for other regions.

IBSFC Non-Contracting Parties are to have an authorization from the Contracting Party for fishing outside fishing agreements, and to inform IBSFC the conditions under which such fishery can take place. A first outline Baltic Sea Control strategy was adopted by the Working Group on Control and Enforcement, in January 1999 as follows, with additional recommendations on short-term and medium-term improvements:

• at national level, elaborate specific objectives and strategies for controlling the cod, sprat, herring and salmon fisheries considering all types of vessels, fishing gear and geographic parameters such as the amount of landing places; set targets for landing control, sea control and back/forwards cross-checking;
• specify appropriate means to achieve this strategy/targets such as human resources, equipment (including new technologies such as satellite tracking) and budget and strive towards a clear distribution of tasks/responsibilities in case several authorities are involved;
• ensure that effective and equitable enforcement systems are put in place and strive towards their gradual harmonisation and equitable prosecution of infringements; and
• gradually develop integrated systems for reporting, striving towards online/real time reporting.

ICCAT has adopted an action plan for enforcing regulatory measures for those vessels fishing contrary to the ICCAT conservation measures. This includes step-by-step plans involving vessel sightings, formal warning to flag States and a request to rectify the situation, prohibition of imports of bluefin tuna or swordfish.

IOTC reports that most of the countries where the IUU fleets are based have little enforcement capacity and it is therefore probable that fishing takes place both within EEZs and high seas areas. At its Fourth session in 1999, IOTC adopted a resolution calling for actions against fishing activities by large scale open register longline vessels, including by denying fishing licenses and more effectively monitor and report such operations (including through port sampling).

NAFO adopted its Scheme to Promote Compliance by non-Contracting Party Vessels with its Conservation and Enforcement Measures in 1997. In a decision of September 1999, allow Contracting Parties to board and inspect a non-Contracting Party vessel sighted in the Regulatory Area and take further action as appropriate under international law. To this end, Contracting Parties are encouraged to review their domestic measures to exercise jurisdiction over such vessels. NAFO also has a Scheme of Joint International Inspection and Surveillance.

NEAFC adopted a Scheme of Control and Enforcement in respect of Fishing Vessels in Areas Beyond the Limits of National Fisheries Jurisdiction in the Convention Area in 1998. It involves satellite-based vessel monitoring and an obligatory presence by Contracting Parties with more than 10 vessels in the relevant sea areas, as well as specific follow-up to serious infringements. Also, Contracting Parties have agreed to permit inspection by a Contracting Party of the vessels of another Contracting Party on the high seas. It requires parties to notify NEAFC of vessels authorised to fish in international waters, and requires regular catch reporting to the Secretariat.

NPAFC’s Committee on Enforcement reviews annually unauthorized salmon fishing activities in the convention Area, and the cooperative enforcement efforts of the Parties in the detection of illegal fishing operations. The Parties send patrol aircraft and vessels, and provide reports to the NPAFC annual meetings. All Parties have pledged to maintain enforcement activities during 2000 at levels similar to those in 1999, as a deterrent to the threat of potential unauthorized fishing activity. NPAFC will hold an Enforcement Planning and Coordinating Meeting before the 2000 fishing season.[250]

3. VMS

CCAMLR has included mandatory VMS in its Catch Documentation Scheme.

ICCAT adopted a Resolution on Vessel Monitoring at its Fourteenth Regular Meeting (Madrid, November 1995) that satellite tracking and catch reporting systems under the responsibility of flag States should be encouraged, and ICCAT should request cooperation of non-Contracting Parties to adopt a similar system.

IOTC reports that some member countries have implemented the use of VMS, including Australia, Sri Lanka, Maldives and the British Indian Ocean Territories.

FFA FFA member countries have been developing a region-wide VMS system.

NAFO has a Program for Observers and Satellite Tracking.

NEAFC adopted a Scheme of Control and Enforcement in respect of Fishing Vessels in Areas Beyond the Limits of National Fisheries Jurisdiction in the Convention Area in 1998, involving satellite-based vessel monitoring.

4. PRESUMPTIONS

CCAMLR’s Conservation Measure 118/XVII contains the presumptions that a non-Contracting Party vessel which has been signed engaging in fishing activities in the Convention Area is presumed to be undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures.

In the case of any transhipment activities involving a sighted non-Contracting Party vessel inside or outside the Convention Area, the presumption of undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures applies to any other non-Contracting Party vessel which has engaged in such activities with that vessel.

ICCAT adopted a Resolution at its 11th Special Meeting in 1998 Concerning the Ban on Landings and Transhipments of Vessels form non-Contracting Parties Identified as having Committed a Serious Infringement. Inter alia it presumes that a non-Contracting Party, etc.[251] sighted in the Convention Area is undermining ICCAT conservation measures.

NAFO’s 1997 Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the Contracting Parties in the NAFO Regulatory Area (STAFAC) presumes that a non-Contracting Party vessel engaging in fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area is undermining conservation and management measures unless there is proof to the contrary.

NAFO also regards any vessel which they have reasonable grounds to believe to be without nationality as a non-Contracting Party.

5. LANDINGS, PORT INSPECTIONS AND TRANSHIPMENTS

CCAMLR’s Catch Documentation Scheme[252] adopted in November, 1999 for toothfish caught in the Convention Area requires all landings, transhipments and importations of toothfish into the territories of Contracting Parties to be accompanied by a completed Catch Document containing information relating to the volume and location of catch, and the name and flag State of the vessel.

CCAMLR requires under Conservation Measure 118/VII that a non-Contracting Party vessel be inspected according to specified requirements when it enters a port of any Contracting Party, and prohibits landings or transhipments without such inspection.

Under the same Measure, Contracting Parties must ensure that their vessels do not receive transhipments form a non-Contracting Party vessel which has been sighted and reported as having engaged in fishing activities in the Convention Area, and therefore presumed as having undermined the effectiveness of CCAMLR Conservation Measures.

CCSBT reports that actions taken to estimate IUU catches include monitoring Japan’s fish import statistics and collection and review of information on tuna landings at selected Indian Ocean ports, by representatives of Commission members.

IBSFC established measures to prevent IUU fishing which became effective in 1995, and requires Contracting Parties to refuse landings of cod which have been transhipped.[253]

IATTC maintains an independent scientific staff and offices in major fishing ports to collect information directly from vessels, managers and processing facilities, in addition to obtaining some information from national agencies. It also monitors catch made by the surfact gear fisheries, allowing for statistical collection. All large purse seiners carry an observer.

ICCAT adopted two Resolutions at its 11th Special Meeting in 1998 concerning the:

• Ban on Landings and Transhipments of Vessels from non-Contracting Parties Identified as having Committed a Serious Infringement. Inter alia it requires port inspections and prohibitions by Contracting Parties on landings or transhipments. Information is to be transmitted immediately to the Commisison. ICCAT reports that at-sea transhipments have been prohibited, but this is not well implemented;[254] and
• Unreported and Unregulated Catches of Tunas by large-scale Longline Vessels in the Convention Area. The Commission is to request Contracting and Cooperating importing parties in which the products are landed to collect and examine as much import or landing data and associated information as possible and submit specified information to the Commission each year.

IOTC At its Fourth session in 1999, IOTC adopted a resolution calling for actions against fishing activities by large scale open register longline vessels, including by refusing landing and transhipment of catch from such vessels.

NAFO’s 1997 Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the Contracting Parties in the NAFO Regulatory Area (STAFAC) requires port inspections prior to landing or transhipment, and provides for prohibitions. Information is to be transmitted immediately through the NAFO Secretariat to all Contracting Parties and relevant flag States. Annual reports are also required regarding inspections. NAFO has a separate programme for port inspection.

NEAFC agreed in 1999 on a new scheme on control and enforcement to be applied in waters outside national jurisdiction. It sets out agreed measures to counteract non-Contracting Party fishing in the area including prohibitions of landings of catches taken contrary to NEAFC recommendations.

6. TRADE MEASURES

CCAMLR’s adopted a Catch Documentation Scheme in November, 1999 for toothfish caught in the Convention Area. The purposes of the Scheme are to: monitor the international trade in toothfish; identify the origins of toothfish imported into or exported from the territories of contracting parties and determine whether they were caught in a manner consistent with CCAMLR conservation measures; and gather catch data for the scientific evaluation of the stocks. To meet these purposes, all landings, transhipments and importations of toothfish into the territories of Contracting Parties must be accompanied by a completed Catch Document containing information relating to the volume and location of catch, and the name and flag State of the vessel.

CCAMLR’s related Conservation Measure 170/XVIII, consistent with precautionary management and international law, obligates Contracting Parties to take steps to identify the origin of toothfish imported into or exported into its territories, and allows for cooperation of non-Contracting Parties.

CCSBT agreed in November 1999 to the introduction of a Trade Information Scheme from 1 June 2000, expected to curb unregulated fishing for southern bluefin tuna, noting that while members had reduced their catch considerably, the level of non-member catch had steadily increased. It will require trade documentation for imports validated by an official of the competent authority of the exporting country or entity.

IBSFC’s 1999 Working Group on Control and Enforcement recommended as a medium-term improvement necessary control of markets and structures.

ICCAT has implemented a Trade Certification Scheme, involving Contracting Parties prohibiting imports of bluefin tuna from flag of convenience countries. ICCAT adopted a resolution at its 1999 annual meeting calling for further action against IUU fishing in the ICCAT area and other areas by large scale tuna long-line fishing vessels, to: ensure that such vessels do not carry out IUU fishing; take every possible action consistent with relevant laws to urge businesses and others involved in importing and transporting tuna and tuna-like species to refrain from any transhipment or other action involving fish taken through IUU fishing; inform the public of the causes of IUU fishing and urge them not to purchase such fish; and urge all involved in manufacturing fishing vessels and equipment to prevent its being used in IUU fishing activities.

This supplements the ICCAT Resolution Concerning the Unreported and Unregulated Catches of Tunas by Large-Scale Longline Vessels in the Convention Area adopted at the 11th Special Meeting in Spain, 1998, which requires the Commission to request the Contracting Parties, Cooperating parties, entities or fishing entities which import or land frozen tuna and tuna-like products to submit specified information on an annual basis. The Compliance Committee and Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT statistics must then identify those whose vessels diminish the effectiveness of management measures. ICCAT may then request the revocation of their vessel registration or fishing licenses. The Commission recommends trade measures, if necessary to prevent such fishing activities from continuing. The most recent measures adopted at its meeting in 1999, involved lifting prohibitions in respect of Panama because of its action in conformity with ICCAT standards, but extending them in respect of Belize and Honduras and imposing them on Equatorial Guinea.

IOTC, at its Fourth session in 1999, adopted a resolution calling for actions against fishing activities by large scale open register longline vessels, including by urging importers and others in the market chain to refrain from any transactions involving this catch, educate the public not to purchase product sourced from open register operations and prepare possible measures, including trade restrictive measures, to prevent or eliminate open register operations.

IOTC also notes it is not possible in general to use trade data to estimate the catches of small-scale longliners because fish is merged with local production, and reports are not made to their flag countries or countries where they are based. These vessels are mainly owned and operated by Taiwan Province of China.

NPAFC parties submit to the Commission their salmon catch and trade statistics.

7. FLEET CAPACITY

GFCM adopted resolutions in 1995 (95/2 and 95/4) with the objective of gathering information on fleet capacity, specifically fishing vessels operating on the high seas and from Mediterranean ports. Its report of the 1997 Twenty-Second Session notes that a number of States had made progress in keeping fishing capacity under control, but a relatively small number of reports were received in response to the resolutions.

IOTC adopted a resolution at its Fourth Session in 1999, on the Management of Fishing Capacity of Long Distance Tuna Longline Vessels in the context of its concern about IUU fishing in the IOTC area of competence. Inter alia, it requests the Scientific Committee to provide recommendations on the optimum fishing capacity to permit the sustainable exploitation of tropic tunas, as a basis for the IOTC to consider limiting fishing capacity to an appropriate level. It also emphasises the importance for IOTC member and non-member States and other fishing entities with a substantial number of vessels in the Indian Ocean of taking corresponding action to the Japanese decision to reduce such vessels by 20%.

8. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH NON-CONTRACTING PARTIES

CCAMLR adopted a Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and non-Contracting Parties in 1999 as part of its Catch Documentation Scheme. The Executive Secretary is requested to develop a list of non-Contracting Parties implicated in IUU fishing and/or trade either after the adoption of the policy or three years prior, which has undermined the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures. The Chairman must then write to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of each non-Contracting Party, inter alia inviting them to attend as observers or accede to the Convention, encourage them to participate in the Catch Documentation Scheme, seek their assistance in investigations and request them to deny landings or transhipments as appropriate. Conservation Measure 170/XVIII, relating to the Catch Documentation Scheme also invites non-Parties to participate.

CCSBT has initiated a Plan of Action to encourage countries and entities which have not acceded to the Convention and whose fleets take significant quantities of southern bluefin tuna,[255] to accede to the Convention or cooperate with the Commission’s Conservation and Management Measures, as appropriate, and to collect, verify and provide to the Commission more comprehensive and accurate data. Direct discussions, initiated in 1998 are continuing, and representatives attend Commission meetings as observers.

CCSBT reminds non-members of their responsibilities under international agreements and instruments including UNCLOS, the Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct.[256]

GFCM Resolution 97/2 on Activities of non-Contracting Parties adopted at its 22nd Session in 1997 called upon non-Contracting Parties whose vessels engage in fishing activities in the region to become members of GFCM or otherwise cooperate in the implementation of the recommendations of the Council.

IATTC reports its principal concerns about IUU fishing are based on fishing by Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea. The former has expressed its intention to cooperate fully with the Commission, but the Republic of Korea is not a party.

ICCAT adopted a Resolution on Coordination with non-Contracting Parties at its Ninth Special Meeting in Madrid, December 1994, which inter alia requires ICCAT to contact all non-Contracting Parties known to be fishing in the Convention Area to urge them to attain status as a Cooperating Party, and permits them to be observers at meetings.

This was followed by ICCAT’s Resolution at its Fifteenth Regular Meeting (Madrid, November 1997) on Becoming a Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity. Inter alia it requires ICCAT to contact all non-Contracting Parties, etc. known to be fishing in the Convention Area to urge them to attain status as a Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity. The Commission’s Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures is responsible for reviewing requests from non-Contracting Parties and recommending such status.

IOTC adopted a Resolution at its Third Session on Cooperation with non-Contracting Parties to urge them to become contracting Parties. A recommendation was adopted concerning registration and exchange of information on vessels, including flag of convenience vessels, fishing for tropical tunas in IOTC areas of competence.[257]

NAFO’s 1997 Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the Contracting Parties in the NAFO Regulatory Area (STAFAC) gives a mandate to review annually the information compiled, actions taken under the agreed Scheme and the operation of the Scheme, and where necessary, recommend to the General Council new measures to enhance the observance of NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures by Non-Contracting Parties and new procedures to enhance the implementation of the Scheme by Contracting Parties.

This is supplemented by a 1999 decision that Contracting Parties may board and inspect a Non-Contracting Party’s vessel sighted in the Regulatory Area and take further action as appropriate under international law. To this end, Contracting Parties are encouraged to review domestic measures to exercise jurisdiction over such vessels. The vessel to be boarded must consent to such boarding. A related NAFO decision to implement the Scheme and promote compliance was taken which allows Contracting Parties to regard as a Non-Contracting Party any vessel which they have reasonable grounds to believe to be without nationality.

The President of NAFO signed diplomatic démarches to certain non-Contracting Party flag States whose vessels fished in the NAFO Regulatory Area in 1998/99.[258]

NASCO adopted a Resolution at its Ninth Annual Meeting in 1992 on Fishing for Salmon on the High Seas, that all non-Contracting Parties fishing for salmon on the high seas of the North Atlantic be invited to sign and comply with the Protocol to the Convention on States not Party to the Convention (adopted at the Ninth Session) and that Contracting Parties transmit information about sightings to the Secretariat and secure compliance with the Conventions by their nationals and vessels.

NPAFC annually sends formal invitations to certain other States of origin[259] to accede to the Convention, and to attend NPAFC annual meetings in an observer capacity if they have not acceded to the Convention by that time. It also recommends that the Parties, as appropriate, encourage non-Parties to deposit instruments of acceptance of the Compliance Agreement with the FAO as soon as possible.

9. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH OTHER RFBs AND OTHER BODIES

CCAMLR At its 1998 meeting, CCAMLR reiterated its request to all international and regional fisheries organisations, especially those organisations with jurisdiction over waters adjacent to its Convention Area, to cooperate in combating IUU fishing. In particular, CCAMLR seeks cooperation towards the implementation of the CCAMLR conservation measure relating to the refusal of landings and transhipment of fish caught in violation of CCAMLR conservation measures and other requirements under the CCAMLR Convention. ISOFISH,[260] an NGO, was formed following the 1997 meetings of CCAMLR to collect, collate, analyse, verify and disseminate data, information and reports on longline fishing in the southern oceans.

CCSBT, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC and SPC met in July, 1999, and agreed on steps noted elsewhere, including the identification and exchange of certain information to address common problems such as fleet movement.

FFA and SPC cooperate in the exchange of information.

IBSFC established a Working Group on Transparency at its 25th Session in September, 1999. Its mandate, which embraces a balancing of interests, is to:

• assess all relevant implications of the access to and distribution of information on the proceedings and decisions of IBSFC with respect to relevant interest groups and the general public; and
• consider the terms, conditions, procedures and other relevant factors for the participation of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in meetings of IBSFC bodies as observers or otherwise;

bearing in mind at the same time that the integrity of IBSFC objectives and its effective functioning must be ensured.

IOTC adopted a Resolution on Southern Bluefin Tuna at its Third Session which called upon the CCSBT member States to urgently overcome their difficulties preventing agreement on a TAC, and offers to them the good offices of the IOTC Chairman, the Chairman of the Scientific Committee and the Secretary or their nominees to advise on means to achieve the objective of the CCSBT Convention. This is based on provisions in the constitutive instruments of each body to cooperate.

NAFO notes that some non-Contracting Party vessels appear to have relocated from the NAFO Regulatory Area to the NEAFC Regulatory Area, and that these vessel often re-register between such countries as Belize, Honduras and Sao Tome e Principe. NAFO has recommended close cooperation between international fisheries organisations to deal with this issue. Its decision in September 1999 to circulate information on non-Contracting Party activity to all Contracting Parties and, in summary form, to other relevant international fisheries organisations - ICCAT, NASCO, NEAFC, IBSFC and CCAMLR.. It also agreed to share with other Contracting Parties any reports they prepare for FAO on IUU fishing issues.

NEAFC A joint meeting of the regional fishery commissions of the North Atlantic and Adjacent Seas is planned for the year 2000. NEAFC has indicated its readiness to convene the meeting to strengthen cooperation and exchange experience. It will include NEAFC for the North-East Atlantic, NAFO for the North-West Atlantic and IBSFC for the Baltic Sea. For NEAFC, cooperation between fisheries management organisations is an aim with respect to the issues of dispute settlement and transparency of the work of the organisation.[261]

NPAFC jointly sponsored with PICES a scientific conference on “Beyond El Niño” in March 2000, and approved at its 1999 annual meeting a proposal to hold a joint meeting with NASCO in 2001 on the common challenges facing Pacific and Atlantic salmon.

Scientific advisory bodies such as ICES, PICES and ACFR carry out their mandates by coordination with other RFBs.

WECAFC’s 1999 action plan includes an item expressing the need to provide avenues for other RFBs working in the area to report on their activities to the Commission, strengthen partnerships and arrangements with the other regional and international organisations.

10. RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IPOA AGAINST IUU FISHING

ICCAT adopted a resolutions at its 1999 annual meeting fully endorsing the FAO initiative to develop an IPOA, and calling on Contracting Parties and others to participate actively in this work.

[179] Most of the pre-UNCLOS RFBs have been established since 1950, and there are two initiatives currently underway to develop new RFBs: the Multilateral High Level Conference (MHLC) process which is developing a draft Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, and the process developing a convention to establish the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO).
[180] The 1994 FAO State of the World's Fisheries and Aquaculture Report's conclusions that only 30% of the world's stocks were in a healthy state, together with its report of massive global subsidisation of the fisheries sector, was a milestone wake-up call.
[181] The 1993 Agreement to promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas; 1994 entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; 1995 adoption of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; the 1995 adoption of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Also note the 1999 adoption of the International Plans of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, the Conservation and Management of Sharks and the Management of Fishing Capacity, and the 1999 adoption of the Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. See Edeson, Tools to Address IUU Fishing: the Current Legal Situation, AUS:IUU/2000/8, for a further account of international instruments.
[182] Report of the Meeting of FAO and non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements, FAO Fisheries Report No. 597, FIPL/R597, paragraph 1.
[183] Ibid., Appendix G.
[184] Ibid., Appendix G suggests that RFBs have made improvements in the following areas:

- promoting the development of national research and management capacity;
- improving and strengthening data collection, handling and dissemination;
- addressing new issues such as fleet capacity, the effect of the payment of subsidies and by-catch and discards;
- adopting management measures and resolutions relating to such issues as effort reduction, gear type, minimum sizes, mesh sizes, etc;
- adopting rules and procedures for boarding, inspection and enforcement;
- taking measures to enable implementation of recent international legal instruments.

[185] For extensive discussion on these areas and RFB governance, see Swan, "Regional Fishery Bodies and Governance: Issues, Actions and Future Directions" FAO Fisheries Circular to be published.
[186] FAO. 1999. "Report of the Twenty-third Session of the Committee on Fisheries". FAO Fisheries Report No. 595. FAO. Rome. paragraph 72.
[187] Australia. 1999. "Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing: A proposal to develop a global plan of action to curb illegal unregulated and unreported fishing". Mimeo. 5p. For further detail on this and other international action, see Doulman, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Mandate for an International Plan of Action, AUS:IUU2000/4.
[188] In the Rome Declaration on Responsible Fisheries, adopted by the FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries (Rome, 10-11 March 1999). in operative paragraph 12 j.
[189] Report of the Seventh Session of the CSD (New York 19-30 April 1999), paragraph 18, as published on the CSD website.
[190] For a concise description of the evolution and types of RFBs, and their mandates, structures, operation and dates of establishment, see the appended documents in the Report of the High-Level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries held in Rome, Italy, 26-27 January 1998, Committee on Fisheries Document COFI/99/Inf.11. See further Lugten, "A Review of Measures taken by Regional Marine Fishery Bodies to Address Contemporary Fishery Issues", FAO Fisheries Circular No. 940, April, 1999, and Marashi, "Summary Information on the Role of International Fishery and other Bodies with regard to the Conservation and Management of the Living Resources of the High Seas", FAO Fisheries Circular No. 908, 1996; Marashi, "The Role of FAO Regional Fishery Bodies in the Conservation and Management of Fisheries", FAO Fisheries Circular No. 916, 1996, and the Report of the Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies, note 4, supra.
[191] Other branches of government, such as foreign affairs, justice and environment also play important roles as appropriate.
[192] RFBs which have addressed cooperation with non-Contracting Parties include CCAMLR, CCSBT, GFCM, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NASCO and NPAFC. This is discussed further in Annex 1, section 7.
[193] Including the Fish Stocks Agreement (see note 3). Draft Conventions to establish new RFBs in the Western Central Pacific (in the Multilateral High Level Conference Process) and Southeast Atlantic (South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation) also include obligations for non-parties. The role of NFAs in establishing RFBs is a separate, but relevant question, in view of the current progress in establishing these new RFBs. However, this scope of this paper does not extend to these circumstances.
[194] The Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 17 is an authority for this.
[195] FAO RFBs have been reviewing this area recently; see See Swan, "Regional Fishery Bodies and Governance: Issues, Actions and Future Directions" note 7, supra. The trend for RFBs is to play a role in building capacity at the national and regional levels. However, across-the-board budgetary constraints mean that institutional-strengthening measures for FAO RFBs relate more to identifying work programmes which maximize benefits to members through their participation and implementation. An example of an institutional-strengthening measures is agreement among NEAFC's members to strengthen the organisation by establishing an independent secretariat in London.
[196] See discussion in Part 3 of this paper, infra.
[197] e.g., GFCM, IOTC.
[198] e.g., APFIC, GFCM.
[199] See Annex 1.
[200] See Swan, note 7, supra.
[201] See Bray, Global Review of IUU Fishing, AUS:IUU/2000/6, which contains reports that members are underreporting or not reporting in GFCM, ICCAT and NASCO.
[202] Other needed action identified by some RFBs include improvement of the national statistical systems, assistance in data collection and processing, and for developing integrated systems for reporting to strive towards online/ real time reporting. Coverage of all associated and dependent species is needed.
[203] Report of the High-Level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries held in Rome, Italy, op. cit. n. 12, paragraph 28.
[204] See Kuemlangan, National Legislative Options to Combat IUU Fishing, AUS:IUU/2000/9. This could also cover a request or other decision by the RFB that members implement relevant international instruments such as the Compliance Agreement or the Fish Stocks Agreement.
[205] This would be employed in circumstances which fall within Article 7 of the Fish Stocks Agreement, for example.
[206] See Drammeh, IUU Fishing and Small Scale Marine and Inland Capture Fisheries, AUS:IUU/2000/7.
[207] See Edeson, Tools to Address IUU Fishing: the Current Legal Situation, AUS:IUU/2000/8.
[208] See Evans, The Consequences of IUU Fishing for Fishery Data and Management, AUS:IUU/2000/11.
[209] See Greboval, IUU Fishing and the Management of Fishing Fleet Capacity, AUS:IUU/2000/13.
[210] See Davis, MCS and VMS Requirements to Combat IUU Fishing, AUS:IUU/2000/14.
[211] See Lobach, Measures to be Adopted by the Port State in Combating IUU Fishing, AUS:IUU2000/15.
[212] See Tokrisna, WTO-Consistent Trade-Related Measures to Address IUU Fishing - Developing Country Issues, AUS:IUU/2000/17.
[213] For example, the Patagonian toothfish faces imminent collapse due to fishing at approximately ten times the recommended level.
[214] Including cooperating/collaborating parties and observers.
[215] Because RFBs do not have direct mandates over the economic efficiency of fishing activities, obligations of members do not usually extend to such areas as reducing subsidies and dealing with overcapacity, two problems associated with IUU fishing. However, these topics have been discussed in some RFBs. For example, the GFCM has been concerned about overcapacity, and to that end hoped to establish an effective register of vessels operating on the high seas, or from Mediterranean ports (see Resolutions 95/2 and 95/4). Also, CCAMLR has welcomed the Japanese programme to decommission part of its longline fleet. The IPOA on fleet capacity should be applied as appropriate.
[216] This depends on whether there is a mandate to do so, and then it must be carried out within applicable rules and regulations of the RFB, member States and international instruments.
[]²¹⁷ For example, IATTC's independent staff carries out port inspections.
[218] Agreement to promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 1993. See note 7, supra.
[219] Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995. See note 7, supra.
[220] Report of the Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements, op cit. note 4. Also see Edeson op. cit. n. 29, Lugten, op. cit. note 12, and Swan, op.cit. note 7.
[221] It also called for attention to be drawn to the need for States to more widely participate in these instruments, ibid., subparagraph vi.
[222] Report of the Twenty-second Session of COFI, Rome, 17-20 March 1997, paragraph 31.
[223] The basis for this Resolution was financial - the Conference encouraged Article VI bodies to seek extra-budgetary funding or Article XIV bodies to provide their own financial resources Note that it was recognized that implementation of Resolution 13/97 would require a systematic and specific review of each statutory body, which in turn could promote the restructuring of the bodies, revision of the mandate, and undertaking of more financial responsibilities by member countries. It would also allow FAO to examine whether the reasons which led to the establishment of the bodies were still valid.
[224] The systematic analysis should especially relate to their institutional and financial arrangements, the strategies used to implement decisions and the recommendations and measures taken to address current international fishery issues. Report of the twenty-third session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, Italy, 15-19 February 1999, FAO Fisheries Report No. 595, paragraph 81.
[225] FAO is facilitating this. See also Swan, op. cit. n. 7.
[226] These are in addition to the problems caused by the failure of some members in fulfilling their roles. See Part 2.1.2 of this paper, above, and Report of the High-Level Panel of External Experts in Fisheries held in Rome, Italy, 26-27 January 1998, Committee on Fisheries document COFI/99/Inf.11, paragraph 28.
[227] See Part 3.2 of this paper, below.
[228] These would include members, non-members, other RFBs, IGOs, NGOs, industry, and other appropriate entities.
[229] These are reviewed in Swan, op cit. note 7 .
[230] See Doulman, op. cit. note 9.
[231] See Annex 1.
[232] CCAMLR, FFA, High Seas Vessel Registration Database System, GFCM, IATTC, IBSFC, ICCAT, IOTC.
[233] CCAMLR, FFA, IBSFC, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NEAFC, NPAFC.
[234] CCAMLR, ICCAT, IOTC, FFA, NAFO, NEAFC.
[235] CCAMLR, ICCAT, NAFO.
[236] CCAMLR, CCSBT, IBSFC, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NEAFC.
[237] CCAMLR, CCSBT, IBSFC, ICCAT, IOTC, NPAFC.
[238] CCAMLR, CCSBT, GFCM, IATTC, IOTC, NAFO, NASCO, NPAFC.
[239] GFCM, IOTC.
[240] ICCAT 1999 Annual Meeting.
[241] This is reviewed thoroughly in Lugten, op cit., note 12. They include NASCO, IPHC, GFCM, NAFO, ICES, CECAF. WECAFC, IWC, APFIC, NPAFC, NEAFC, CCSBT, OLDEPESCA, IBSFC, ICCAT, IATTC, FFA, SPPC, IOTC, and CCAMLR. See also Annex 1, Parts 7 and 8.
[242] This is reviewed thoroughly in Lugten, op cit., note 12, p. 95.
[243] For example, CCAMLR reports that IUU fishing in its Convention Area is being carried out, in the main, by companies and individuals originating from CCAMLR parties. See Bray, op. cit. note 23.
[244] Although some countries are addressing this, such as Japan, others, such as Taiwan Province of China are not.
[245] CCAMLR, CCSBT, FFA, IATTC, IBSFC, ICCAT, ICES, IOTC, NAFO, NASCO, NEAFC, NPAFC, PICES, SPC, WECAFC report participation in, or plans for, coordination with other RFBs. See Annex 1, section 8.
[246] Including at the Second Meeting of FAO and non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies and Arrangements to be held in Rome.
[247] These could include the Meeting of FAO and non-FAO RFBs, or other meetings among RFBs.
[248] Such as FIGIS.
[249] Information is sourced from Bray, op. cit. note 23, and available reports and press releases of the RFBs. On the whole, it does not include RFB’s reports to other bodies, such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
[250] News Release, NPAFC 7th Annual Meeting, October 24-29 1999.
[251] In conformity with certain conditions.
[252] See fuller description under “Trade” in this Annex.
[253] See Bray, op. cit. note 23.
[254] Bray, op. cit. note 23.
[255] In particular, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan Province of China have been the subject of discussions at CCSBT’s annual meetings. See Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting of CCSBT, Canberra, 8-13 September 1997.
[256] See Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of CCSBT, Tokyo, 22-26 February 1999.
[257] See further information on IOTC under heading 1 in this Annex.
[258] These were Belize, Honduras, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone. See Press Release, 21st Annual Meeting 1999, paragraph 6.
[259] These include the Peoples’ Republic of China and the Republic of Korea.
[260] The International Southern Oceans Longline Fisheries Information Clearing House. A joint venture between conservation organisations and licensed fishing companies, its mission is to assist governments in preventing IUU fishing and the incidental mortality of albatrosses and other seabirds in these fisheries. It estimates that illegal catch rates of Patgonian toothfish, is probably in excess of 100,000 tonnes in the last year. At this level of unlicensed overfishing, regulated fish stocks can be expected to start crashing to commercial extinction within three to five years.
[261] Press notice, 26 November 1999.