At the macroeconomic level, failure of the economy and its multi-sectors to deliver the “economic” goods and services as planned has always been attributed to a wide variety of constraints which can range from the vagaries of Mother Nature like natural calamities, bad weather and climate (e.g monsoons, tidal waves and their resulting floods) to biophysical, financial, institutional, politico-legal, socio-cultural-techno-economic and a whole host of other constraints. Following below is a discussion of the more salient and pertinent constraints.
Central to these constraints is the human factor (HF) - the human failing in ensuring that the economy is steered in the right direction with the right determination and discipline. In this respect, regular monitoring and evaluation of its performance and follow-up with appropriate government intervention are important.
First and foremost, the existing wage and price structure as found in the national and especially local economy does not encourage nor provide the necessary incentives for:
aa) producers to supply greater quantity to the market or
bb) consumers with “excess disposable income” purchasing power to spend in order to induce and bring about the multiplier effect of active money circulation as should occur in a vibrant economy.
Also, the range and choice of goods and services in the country are quite limited that consumers have to look outside the country to satisfy their demand for them. Likewise, the range and choice of fisheries products in terms of product differentiation or different product forms are also limited. In other words, there is not enough value added to the fish supplied to the market.
Time, like money and natural resources is valuable and scarce: either fixed or limited in supply. Just as resource management is important, time and money management is similarly important. It also calls for careful and judicious use of these scarce factors of production. In Bangladesh, the long arm of the government tends to sap the energy and imagination of the people doing business in the country. Nothing discourages and blunts productive and business initiatives and enterpreneurial spirits more than unnecessary and time-wasting government procedures. The sense of time and urgency of purpose have to be more widely inculcated among the people. Such government bureaucracy and other inefficiencies has earned the country the label of high-cost economy of doing business here.
The failure of the Bangladesh fisheries economy to perform as planned such as (1) supplying the much needed fish to meet the rapidly growing demand for fish, variously estimated from 1.2–4.6 million tons by 2000, (2) create the employment and other income-generating opportunities for the over 1 million people entering the labour and job market each year can be and has been traced to a multitude of constraints and human failing. The human failing arises when public finances have to be managed and disbursed in a timely and disciplined fashion so as not to disrupt the laid-down work plan, schedule and the public trust.
Related to this human factor (HF), a major cause for the poor sectoral performance is the observed declining trend in the productivity of labour (fishing effort) in the fisheries sector which also seems to permeate throughout the whole economy. Such per unit input productivity concerns are not only limited to labour but also encompass all the other inputs.
Like the macroeconomy, the fisheries economy also suffers from excess capacity or capacity not presently fully utilised. Instead of fully utilising this excess capacity, more capacity is added or developed. It costs money to develop this unnecessary additional capacity. This means that scarce national capital and resources are unnecessarily tied up which will remain unutilised. Many examples can be cited where such investment in capacity development can be found. Such investments could have been more productively invested in other sectors.
Again, these shortcomings are directly related to misdirected government policies and programmes.
While figures for the labour productivity of fisheries are not available in the form desired, an indirect indication of its productivity can be gleaned from the following statistics on the annual rates of growth of fisheries production.
The average annual trend rate of growth for pond fish production is about 3.9 %; for inland fish production, it is 0.2 % and for overall fish production including both inland and marine subsectors 1 %. Within these 2 subsectors, certain capture-based fisheries are in fact recording little or no or even negative growth in catch (Table 1). As fisheries is the employment of last resort for many rural unemployed people, the fisheries labour force has now swelled to about 3 million people, working full- and part-time. If “seasonal and subsistence” fishermen are also included, then its rank swells to more than 10 million.
Since Bangladesh fisheries, especially smallscale capture fisheries is already overcrowded, the labour absorption capacity of this subsector is thus limited in the future. Any new substantial entry into this subsector beyond the present saturation point will further drive down the already low labour productivity, making the fisheries even more uneconomic. As such, effort should be made immediately to attract redundant fishermen out of the overcrowded fisheries.
As alluded to above, this phenomenon is not only limited to the fisheries sector but also affects the other sectors of the economy like the industrial sector, namely jute and cotton industries. Using the base year 1973/1974 = 100, the labour productivity index for jute production declines from 106 to 94 to 97 to 92 to 88 and for cotton from 92 to 88 to 83 to 87 to 86 for each of the subsequent years (BBS, 1982).
In this respect, the 1983 World Bank's fisheries sector report summarised the weaknesses of the fisheries sector, in particular the Department of Fisheries as:
lack of sufficient technical capability in fisheries development planning
lack of clear definition and assignment of functional responsibilities for fisheries extension and other support services
complicated and time wasting administrative and financial control procedures
lack of trained manpower
inadequate career planning and development
Because of these weaknesses, the productivity of the staff of the Department is not as high as it can be. Department staff apathy is found to be quite prevalent. Many of them have real misgivings and reservations regarding improved working conditions. Lack of job satisfaction is an excellent indicator of expected staff work enthusiasm, performance and output.
More than this, the single most important constraint which impedes the achievement of the goals, objectives and targets of the fisheries sector revolves around weaknesses and delays in programme and project implementation, execution and management. Weakness in management is not unexpected given that many of the senior staff members of the Department and Ministry possess technical qualification or background. Out of a staff strength of 4,796 people in the Department, close to a fifth or 914 class I officers have technical training. For class II officers, 114 out of 124 or 92 % are technical personnel.
Furthermore, close to a third of the 299 Department staff who have been trained abroad is not working in the areas for which they have been trained (Kutty, 1991 pers com). This is clearly a “misallocation” of manpower resources which should be rectified. As for non-technical personnel, there are respectively only 15 and 10 class I and II officers in the Department of almost 5,000 personnel. Their educational background is mostly in accounting, commerce or administration.
This shows that personnel and job responsibilities are usually not well-matched with staff abilities, backgrounds, experiences, interests and qualifications (training). For example, the Department of Fisheries already has 6 trained staff in Fisheries Planning and yet not one of them is placed in a position which makes use of their training obtained at considerable expenses. It is therefore necessary to ensure that manpower trained in the different fisheries disciplines is effectively deployed and retained in the posts which can effectively use their skills and training.
Another recurring lament and cause which have been ascribed to the poor performance of the sector in general and of fisheries projects in particular is the lack of continuity in leadership at different levels in the government. Government officials are constantly being changed and transferred. There does not appear to be any rationality in such changes/transfers except to move people around every 1–3 years. Sometimes, even sooner.
Given that the Department is responsible for implementing and managing a sectoral plan with an allocation of Tk750 crore, the staff strength and capability in terms of key occupational classifications, skills and competence is clearly inadequate. In more specific terms, the Department has to manage 36 different projects worth Tk84, 540 lakh. This is in addition to its routine services to the sector.
Thus, in a sector as important as fisheries there is not even a fully-qualified economist in the Department, let alone a fullyqualified business management or public administration graduate ! Although competence in management can be acquired on the job and short-term training, modern management competence calls for more rigorous post-graduate degree training. In other words, the Department has to build up a minimum critical mass or core of management personnel with advanced training in management, some of whom can and should be personnel with technical qualification.
To compound this problem further, the Department is presently acutely short of staff, especially senior and mid-level staff. This is because many positions at every level within the Department hierachy have not been filled. Everett and associates (1985) reported that the total number of posts paid from the revenue head is 3,125 and under the development head 1,148, making a grand total of 4,273 posts. Of this number, 1,225 posts or 29 % were vacant. More specifically, of the 604 Class I posts only 337 have been filled. This is a vacancy of 44 %. At a higher and top management level, 33 % of the posts of deputy directors and above were also vacant (Everett, et al, 1985).
As of April 1991, the picture of vacant posts has improved to an extent. However, there still remains altogether a total of 1,159 vacant posts compared to 1,225 in 1985. Out of 929 class I sanctioned posts, 179 (broken down as follows: 94 under revenue and 85 under development head) or 19 % remain vacant. For class II posts, 12 out of 124 still remain to be filled. Although the picture of vacant posts has shown some improvement, a closer examination of the Department's placement practice shows that the problem still persists but in a different form. Even though certain senior positions have been filled, the staff (that is, the incumbent) is not at his position but has either been seconded to another position or occupying another position.
Besides taking its toll on the Department's capability in discharging its given mandate in fisheries, staff shortages also result in the lack of operations and maintenance capacity (O and M) of the Department. Without this O and M capability, especially constant maintenance, not only the quantity of work output but also the quality of the work carried out will not be up to the standards prescribed. Maintenance and repair, a reverse of repair and maintenance are the essence of ensuring that the performance and output of work (e.g management of project activities) do not slack and fall below a certain prescribed level.
Many fisheries projects, combining both production-oriented programmes and provision of infrastructures like R and D facilities such as laboratory buildings, training centres and experimental stations together with the necessary scientific machineries and equipments which are competently designed and implemented at great expenses are not at all well maintained nor kept in good working conditions.
As a result, the output and services expected out of these programmes, facilities, equipments and machineries respectively are not forthcoming. Many break down or in a state of total disrepair after installation or after some time. A small investment in O and M (including spare parts), staff's dedication and a sense of responsibility would ensure their continued useful life and thus bestow continuing benefits. Along this line, greater effort should be exerted to EDUCATE the PUBLIC to have a more responsible attitude towards and regard for government property and public amenities/infrastructures.
There is also in Bangladesh a great tendency to promote largescale fisheries projects. This is consistent with the characteristic penchant and attitude in planning and designing fisheries programmes and projects in which over-ambitious or unrealistic targets are set (in spite of past experiences). The country's policy-makers and planners should not only be realistic but also practical and pragmatic, especially given the country's prevailing socioeconomic situation and condition. It does not make much economic sense to plan large and ambitious projects only to find that they cannot be implemented efficiently due to a lack of multi-faceted incapabilities and constraints. This has been the country's experience in development planning since 1973.
Although valuable lessons can be learned from past experiences in project implementation through project completion reports, it is observed that such project completion reports are seldom prepared at the terminal year of the project. If they are prepared, they are rarely widely circulated, let alone read and studied for future reference.
Formulating and putting together a five-year plan or an annual development programme is no easy task to be taken lightly. The well-being of the country, in particular its future depends greatly on it. Development planning is a continuing process and not a one-time exercise undertaken when its appointed time comes around every five year cycle or annually at about the beginning of the fiscal year. This planning requirement which calls for continuous effort should be recognised, internalised and made an integral part of the working habits and ethics by the country's planners and policy-makers at both the economy and sectoral levels. Recall the constant maintenance requirement necessary for high performance made earlier ?
To ensure and maintain high staff performance and output, regular staff evaluation, “repair and maintenance” is needed. This “repair and maintenance” of staff can be brought about by sending them for training at regular intervals. Such training and “retooling” can also serve to improve their work output and productivity. So is improved management.
Next, an examination of the types and nature of fisheries projects carried out since the first five-year development plan was launched in 1973 will reveal that many of these projects involve the provision, construction, rehabilitation and strengthening of fisheries infrastructures and facilities from pre- to post-harvest stages of fish production.
Some examples are the construction of fishing ports/harbours, fish landing centres and markets, ice and freezing plants, poldered shrimp farming complexes and fish hatcheries. Often overlooked and not readily recognised or understood is that these “hardware” projects do not directly influence and increase fish production per se. As a result, the much expected increase in fish output did not materialise and with good reasons. It will take time for these “hardware's” indirect influence to exert any impact on fish output.
Now that these “hardware” are in place, more attention and effort should be shifted to programmes and projects which underpin and directly increase fish output. Greater financial resources should be alloted to actual production activities like credit to support operational costs of fish production as opposed to credit for the purchase of boats and boat engines/motors and construction of ponds.
Examples of operational or variable costs for fish farming are expenses for fish seeds, fertilisers, feeds and piscicides. Depending on the species cultured, production system adopted and the intensity of production employed, from extensive to semi-intensive to intensive, the operational costs of such variable inputs can range from 10–20 % for seeds, 25–50 % for feeds and 10– 15 % for fertilisers respectively. Under Bangladesh conditions, seeds, feeds and fertilisers respectively account for 10–15, 60–70 and 15–20 % of the total cost of production (Kumar, 1991, pers com).
Many fish producers in Bangladesh do not use inputs. If they do use inputs, they do not apply sufficient quantity to have any appreciable effect on yield, let alone apply them at the optimum or recommended levels and rates of input application. This is partly because they cannot afford these direct out-of-pocket costs. As a result of this limited use of either yield-increasing or yield-protecting inputs, these fish ponds are grossly underutilised. The carrying capacity of the water column in the ponds can sustain higher production.
Again, implying that the available capacity of the area available for production is not yet fully utilised. Yet, calls are still made to expand the area under production, that is, construct new ponds. Valuable scarce agricultural/arable land is known to be converted into fish ponds till this day when there are about 43,301 ha of derelict ponds. This is what is meant by developing or adding new capacity to existing capacity which is still not yet fully utilised.
Average fish yields are low, variously estimated at 500–800 kg/ha/year. Yields of 2 tons and up have already been obtained with judicious application of inputs. Thus, government assistance in this production aspect would encourage more fish producers to use inputs. Fish yields would correspondingly increase by at least another two to four times the existing level.
This source of growth in fish production (from culture) can add to the total supply of fish for the country which is still insufficient to meet the growing demand of fish estimated to be around 1.2–4.6 million tons by 2000. Current production is about 0.8 million tons (although it is “believed” to be closer to 1.5 million tons). This source of additional supply can be quite easily attained with minimum investment.
It is calculated that it will require an input cost of about Tk8,000–10,000 per ha to bring the output level to 2 tons from the present 500–800 kg/ha/year for those ponds already under production but not applying sufficient inputs. Of course, for derelict and culturable ponds, the investment will be higher. According to Kumar (1991, pers com), it will cost Tk20,000–40,000/ha to bring culturable and derelict ponds under fish production.
For instance, for 50,000 ha it will cost the government a financial outlay of Tk0.4–0.5 billion. The increase in fish supply would amount to 1,200–1,500 kg/ha X 50,000 ha or 60,000–75,000 tons, not an insignificant increment in supply. The target of 2 tons/ha/year is only a minimum level. Yields of up to 10 tons are possible today.
Similarly for smallscale or artisanal fisheries (especially marine fisheries), the government can extend a similar credit assistance package which takes care of the operating cost of fishing of the smallscale fishermen. Here, greater effort should be directed at the pelagic fisheries resources which are presently under-exploited in contrast to demersal resources. In this regard, the government should not finance the construction of new fishing boats nor the motorisation of existing fishing boats.
While the pitfalls of planning by sector alone are recognised, in practice fisheries development planning in Bangladesh is still carried out on a narrow sectoral basis with very little industry consultation taking place, let alone consultation at the grassroots level. Inter-sectoral and inter-industry considerations, linkages and impact in planning are not now actively or only minimally taken into account. Fisheries planning cannot be made on a narrow sectoral basis if the potentials and opportunities of the different sectors are to be effectively developed. The present top-down planning approach can be significantly strengthened by combining the advantages of bottom-up approach to planning.
Planning is only one facet of the total development process. Recently, the government has identified the sector-based approach to planning as being partly responsible for the lack of impact and benefits accruing to the poorest of the poor. To remedy such shortcomings, the government will complement the sector-based approach with target group-based approach to planning. This in itself will not overcome such shortcomings. It is the implementation and not the policy or plan which has to be strengthened.
While it is recognised that the complex nature of fisheries may extend the time of preparation and appraisal of fisheries investment projects, all efforts should be made to accelerate the process in order to shorten the time between identification of opportunities and the implementation of such projects (FAO, 1986).
Such delays as well as delays and weaknesses in project implementation/execution/management arising from lengthy government financial and administrative procedures further limit the achievement of the planned targets and objectives.
At the aggregate level, it is obvious that the targets for fish production of 1 million tons as planned under the 3 five-year plans and 1 two-year plan have not been achieved. On average, about a quarter of the projected target output is not attained. This works out to about 250,000 tons of shortfall in fish supply. The shortfall is even greater if the Karim (1988 and 1990) estimated fish requirement of 3.66 million tons by 1990 and 4.59 million tons by 2000 is taken into consideration. An in-depth analysis of the factors and reasons for the target output shortfall reveals the following.
One main cause is institutional weakness in monitoring and evaluation of fisheries programmes and projects. This is amply reflected in the overall poor performance of the national and local economy. Budgeted funds allocated and committed for fisheries remain largely unspend at the end of each year and correspondingly at the end of each five-year plan. Table 5 below shows the budget allocated and the amount expended and unspend.
Table 5. Amount Budgeted and Expended for Fisheries Under the Different Five-Year Plans
| Plan | Budgeted | Expended | % Used |
| (Tk Million) | |||
| TFYP | 3500 | 1400 | 40 |
| SFYP | 1740 | 1580 | 90 |
| SFYP (rev) | 1830 | 1580 | 86 |
| TYP | 440 | 390 | 88 |
| FFYP | 490 | 190 | 39 |
| FFYP (rev) | 370 | 190 | 51 |
In spite of the budget being revised downward in the Annual Development Programmes (ADPs) each year, the fisheries sector still finds it difficult to utilise the money committed. As a result, the programme and project activities are not carried out as provided in the sectoral plan. The increased fish output expected is thus not realised.
Because of this, fisheries planners find that their allocated funds are transferred out of the fisheries portfolio into other portfolios. Still, the government fisheries service finds it difficult to fully utilise the revised lower budget levels. This shows that the planning officials who prepare the fisheries plan are either not realistic in their planning or they lack the necessary skills and knowledge to develop realistic production targets, cost projections and how to go about in achieving the goals they set for themselves. Very often such plans are not subjected to sufficiently rigorous feasibility studies, let alone field appraisals.
Clearly, steps have to be instituted at once to examine, among others:
aa) the organisational and functional structure and performance of the various fisheries agencies in general and the Department of Fisheries in particular which are charged with serving the public with a view to remedy the inherent weaknesses, if any
bb) lines of authority and whether decision-making process is centralised or decentralised
cc) responsibilities, capacity and willingness to delegate and share responsibilities
dd) accountability
ee) professional (technical and managerial) skills and competence of the personnel of these fisheries agencies
ff) adequacy of existing staff number and composition and proposed human resource development programme
gg) adequacy of annual operating budget, especially for field work to carry out planned activities
At the same time on the other hand, it also happens that government revenue shortfalls resulting in its inability to match the foreign or hard currency component of many projects has similarly cause unnecessary delays in project approval and implementation. Of late, this has become quite a serious constraint. Because planned targets for fish production and export are not attained, foreign exchange earnings from fisheries which is ranked third after jute and garment also suffer. It is only out of the income or revenue earned when targets are attained that the government will have or has the necessary funds to invest or match the foreign exchange component of externally-assisted projects. A classic case of the vicious cycle !
Under the new FFYP (1990–1995) with a total outlay of Tk689.3 billion or US$19.4 billion, about 74 and 17 % of the investments in the public and private sectors respectively are to be funded from external resources. This means that the remaining 26 and 83% are to be financed with domestic resources respectively. The public sector allocation is Tk419.3 billion or 61%.
National resource mobilisation should be stepped up as the availability of external resources has slowly fallen and cannot be relied upon in nation building. According to the World Bank as reported by Norbye (1988), such foreign resources have decreased from 9.8 to 5.3 % of the GDP between 1980/81 and 1986/87.
Although the sum which can be raised locally may be small in the beginning, the government should immediately step up and mop up idle cash within the population, especially at the household level. According to available statistics, a total of over Tk11 billion savings, equivalent to about 2.7 % of the 1989 GDP is deposited by the household sector in different deposit-taking institutions at the end of 1989. This is not an insignificant amount !
These savings are broken down as follows:
aa. Postal Bank Savings increased from Tk0.2763 billion at the end of 1971 to Tk2.4494 billion at the end of 1989
bb. Savings Certificates and Wage Earners, Development Bonds grew from Tk0.2809 billion in December 1971 to Tk8.5609 billion in December 1989
Although in absolute terms, the amount represents only about 3 % of the GDP in 1989, it nevertheless supplements the shortfall in the level of external resources available which declined from 9.8 in 1980/1981 to 5.3 % in 1986/1987 as cited above. This is clearly a positive domestic resource mobilisation trend which the government should further encouraged and developed.
Next, because of the country's heavy reliance on external resources for its national budget, in particular for many of its development programmes (estimated at 85 %), the government does not really have full control over how such resources can or are to be used. Unlike resources one owns, these external resources not only have externally-imposed requirements and conditions but also definite fixed duration. Because they are short-lived, long-term planning becomes problematic. Consistency in development thrust and direction are often lost or have to be sacrificed in order to take advantage of such external assistance.
As a result, government plans and activities very often are modified to fulfil changes suggested by development partner agencies or countries (donors). Frequent programme changes and policy shifts to accommodate such “externally-imposed wishes and requirements” disrupt long-term planning consistency, giving rise to erratic spurts of growth and uneven growth stimuli to the economy. Because they have fixed duration, such investments are seldom followed-up or continued after they are completed.
The momentum of the growth stimuli build up is lost as such investments are not carried through (far enough) so that their full effects are felt. Follow-up is for all intents and purposes non-existent due to a lack of financial support from the national treasury. Under such circumstances, it is thus very critical for the government to try to build in some kind of the long view in planning.
Investing in Bangladesh is relatively more risky when compared to the other neighbouring countries. Such risks and uncertainty are directly related to the annual occurence of severe cyclones, monsoon rains and floods. However, recent mitigating measures taken by the government to minimise its destructive impact have reduce such risks and uncertainty associated with floods to an extent.
Also, as such risks and uncertainty cannot be totally controlled or eliminated, Man has to rely on his ingenuity and technology to manage and soften its destructive forces. In this respect, the people of Bangladesh have adapted very well to his environment around him. However, much more can be done to help him to be even more resilient in managing his productive activities.
For example, the more than 200 Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation or Flood Control and Drainage (FCDI/FCD) Projects undertaken since the 1960s in different parts of the country have now made flooding less severe. Fish culture in the ponds within these embanked areas are now less risky.
There is also a definite role for the fisheries extension service to play in educating the people in organising and managing their fish production activities around the natural cycle of weather-related risks like cyclone, monsoon and flood occurence. In this respect, production and marketing (harvesting) planning and scheduling become critical. This calls for reliable information on weather forecasting and weather patterns. Equally important is the organisation of marketing such that producers do not suffer low prices due to glut arising from all producers harvesting at the same time.
Dismissing the adverse impact of the vagaries of the weather temporarily, it is clear that the delivery of government fisheries services (used broadly here) is weak and is not reaching the grassroots where it matters most. For example, it is learned during a recent site visit to Mymensingh that technology packages developed at the Fisheries Research Institute are not only not disseminated to the field, they are largely unknown to the other arm of the government fisheries service, the Extension Service of the Department of Fisheries.
Further, the technology packages being developed here are already known technology elsewhere which has been demonstrated to work. It is thus with a sense of despair to observe that rice-fish culture trials are still being carried out in 1990 when these were already done in Bangladesh in the late 1970s and by the same institution ! Instead of conducting more trials, the researchers should promote its adoption in the field.
It is frequently alleged that although a Fisheries Extension Service exists in the country, for all practical purposes the extension service is not yet operational. Its outreach activity is minimal, if not non-existent. Local budgetary constraints, staff interest and dedication and mobility, not to mention staff aloofness and unapproachable attitude all contribute to an ineffective and inefficient extension service.
More disturbing is the real institutional tension and rivalry observed between and among the various fisheries agencies in the country. Such uneasy rivalry is not healthy because institutional and individual suspicions are counter-productive. Already faced with acute R and D resources, they should pool resources, talent and expertise and collaborate with each other more instead of working at cross-purposes. The need for closer coordination and linkages between and among like-minded fisheries institutions is further discussed in the chapter on plan of Action.
Last but not least, the 83 government fish hatcheries and fish seed multiplication farms found throughout the length and breadth of the country do not presently have a well-conceived broodstock development programme. In fact, many of these hatcheries and fish seed multiplication farms do not even have sufficient number of broodstock fish, let alone broodstock of high quality and genetic makeup and vigour. As a result, they are not producing sufficient quantities of fingerlings to meet the government's requirements for fingerlings.
Finally, a large part of the constraints faced by the country and the fisheries sector revolves around socio-cultural-techno-economic factors. This will be the subject of a separate chapter in itself. A good illustration of this socio-cultural-techno-economic constraint has to do with the widespread and widening disparities in opportunities for upward mobility and socioeconomic advancement for the great majority of the population, especially the poorest of the poor. Reference is here made to the limited resource and poor smallscale fishermen who eke out a hand-to-mouth existence. In many ways, the existing fisheries sectoral structure is quite exploitative, typically characterised by patron-client relationship.
Opposing forces in the concentration of wealth and productive assets characterised by increasing size of production operations on the one hand and in the fragmentation of productive assets reflected through decreasing size of fishing and fish farming operations on the other, have greatly reduced opportunities to the poor and thus widen these disparities in opportunities. Fragmentation stems from overcrowding in smallscale marine and inland capture fisheries and the multiple ownership of ponds due to inheritance respectively.
Although the local fish marketing system can be described as quite efficient in moving the fish from the producers to the consumers, the marketing channel and middleman chain is quite long. There are simply too many middlemen. As such the market structure, conduct and performance is not as competitive as it can be with less number of middlemen. The price margin or spread at each stage or level in the marketing chain in the flow of fish from the producer to the consumer is thus large. This is because each middleman will add the cost of his handling charge plus a profit.
As will be pointed out in the chapter on the establishment of a Management Information System (MIS) for fisheries planning, past efforts in planning fisheries development have been based on a very weak and limited data base. This is a constraint which the government has increasingly recognised as a serious drawback in its planning activities. Obvious by its absence in past plan deliberations is a balanced treatment and discussion on the socioeconomic aspects of planning, production and implementation target setting, implementation problems and target beneficiaries.
Clearly, more information is needed on the socio-demographic and socio-cultural-economic profile and character as well as the aspirations, geographical and occupational mobility of the population, especially the present generation and what they want for their children.
Bangladesh's socioeconomic predicament is best summed up by Fusfeld (1966) when he observes that:
Low productivity and low incomes meant that savings were inadequate to achieve levels of investment that might accelerate economic growth. Low incomes also meant consumer demand inadequate to attract capital investment from other countries, including domestic sources (italics ours). Low levels of investment, in turn, completed the circle of low productivity, low incomes, and backwardness. Low incomes also meant poor housing, poor sanitation, and poor health conditions, which reduced both vigour and length of life and build a young population structure with a large proportion of unproductive dependents. Low incomes, furthermore, precluded innovation in economic affairs. Since innovation requires a surplus on which to rely in case of failure, a peasant family living at subsistence level cannot afford to experiment with new methods or machines: it must be conservative, for one crop failure means death from starvation. Also generating conservatism was the dominance in some underdeveloped areas of an economic elite with large land holdings and high incomes whose savings were usually not invested for national economic development but were used instead for acquiring more land, for money-lending at high rates of interest to the peasants (rent taking), or for investing in more advanced countries.
Are there opportunities in overcoming such socio-cultural-economic shortcomings? To overcome the development dilemma described by Fusfeld (1966), a great deal more data collection and analysis is required to uncover the cause and effect relationships inherent in the problem just elaborated.
Because of the dearth of information dissemination facility in the countryside, especially on technology either presently known or available or new, interested and innovative producers are starved of such information. It is often alleged that government extension agents are not willing to part with technological information. It is further alleged that they tend to keep such information to themselves for reasons best known to them.
