FO:LACFC/2002/14 |
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN FORESTRY COMMISSION |
Item 9(d) of the Provisional Agenda |
22nd SESSION |
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 7 - 11 October, 2002 |
IN-SESSION TECHNICAL PANEL:
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Executive Committee Note |
1. Illegal activities in forests cause a wide range of detrimental economic, social, and environmental impacts and constitute a considerable threat to forests in the Latin America& Caribbean region. Illicit practices and corruption have recently come to the forefront of international dialogue on forests and are being addressed by governments, NGOs, the private sector and international organizations. This interest has been stimulated by an increasing awareness worldwide of the immense costs associated with illegal activities. It is also apparent that ongoing efforts to improve forest management will have limited value unless accompanied by effective measures to reduce forest crime.
2. Illegal activities go well beyond illicit logging, encompassing the entire forest production chain from harvesting and transport through to industrial processing, trade and marketing. Illegal practices in the forestry and forest industries sector can be grouped into five broad categories:
i. Illegal occupation of forest lands
ii. Illegal logging
iii. Illegal timber transport, trade and timber smuggling
iv. Transfer pricing and other illegal accounting practices
v. Illegal forest processing
3. No regional assessments of the magnitude of illegal and corrupt activities in the forest sector exist and it is difficult to know whether they are increasing in frequency or magnitude. However, available information, albeit partial, shows that illegal and corrupt activities are prevalent in many countries.
4. There are several reasons to believe that the forest and forest industry sector may be more susceptible than other sectors to illegalities and corruption. These reasons include:
5. Given the reality that policies against forest crime and corruption normally face stiff resistance from vested interests, their effectiveness will largely depend on the political will and determination of government officials to push for reforms. Solutions must address the underlying causes of corruption rather than its immediate manifestations. The underlying causes are numerous and complex and include weak law enforcement, great inequalities in the distribution of economic power, a lack of protection of property rights, the prevalence of undemocratic decision-making processes, and so on.
6. Measures to combat forest crime are not likely to have an effect unless they are implemented in packages, consisting of different measures that can be used to varying degrees depending on a country's specific circumstances. Individually, each measure would contribute to fighting forest crime but would be unlikely to solve the overall problem by itself. Efforts to combat illegal practices must start with a general outline of strategies. Situations will vary, but there are three basic steps that proponents of sustainable forest management in the Latin America & Caribbean region or elsewhere can take to enhance forest law enforcement:
7. The range of specific national policy options that might be considered includes:
a. Increasing the rewards for integrity. If forestry officers are poorly paid or promotions are related more to patronage than to quality of service, there is little benefit in being honest. In such a context, the costs of losing a job are low and the propensity to accept bribes naturally increases. Thus granting higher salaries for forestry staff might be part of a complex response that creates incentives for honest behaviour.
b. Increasing the probability of detection. This set of measures includes better assessments of forest resources (including improved estimates of their commercial value) and the wide dissemination of the results. It may also include asking a third party to provide independent auditing, monitoring and reporting.
c. Increasing penalties. Penalties can act as deterrents if they are heavy enough and if they are commensurate with the economic value of the offence.
d. Reducing discretionary power of government officials. Because forest crime is more likely to occur if a few officials have considerable discretionary power over decisions that involve large values, reducing that discretionary power contributes to preventing corruption.
e. Streamlining the policy, legislative and regulatory framework. Fewer, simpler and clearer government rules would reduce opportunities for their subjective interpretation and for malfeasance. Legal recognition of the customary rights of local populations would improve the possibility of their reporting misdoings. Rules should be established that stipulate clear responsibilities and procedures for granting concessions and other access and use permits in public forests.
f. Increasing the use of market mechanisms. Markets can sometimes be used to avoid "command and control" policies and reduce opportunities for engaging in corrupt acts. If markets are reasonably competitive, administratively fixed prices (e.g. for awarding concession contracts) can be replaced by more open and transparent market mechanisms and the free play of demand and supply forces.
g. Involving the media, NGOs and the public in combating forest crime. Various independent environmental NGOs, acting as "watchdogs", in collaboration with the media, have been instrumental in uncovering illegal operations in many countries and have frequently succeeded in forcing corrective action. Enhanced public awareness of the nature of forest resources and the way in which they are used usually helps in creating pressure for better governance.
8. An important question is the extent to which (and types of activities) regional collaboration in addressing issues relating to illegal forestry activities is useful. There are obvious measures which could be undertaken in relation to trade in illegal forest products including matching of national import and export data, and areas surrounding chain of custody certification. Initiatives to rein in illicit activities by trans-national operatives is also an area which might bear fruit. For example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1999) makes it a crime to offer a bribe to a foreign public official and has been adopted by 34 countries. Sharing of national experiences in counteracting illegal activities will also be useful.
9. Members of the panel are kindly invited to analyze the following problems, as well as contribute to their solutions: