LE PRESIDENT: J'ouvre la cinquième séance de la Commission III. Nous poursuivons le débat sur le point 21.3 de I'ordre du jour: Etat des contributions. J'ai déjà deux orateurs sur la liste et je prie les délégations qui veulent prendre la parole de s'annoncer.
Je donne la parole à la délégation danoise.
B. LOLK (Denmark): I have pleasure in speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, Finland, Sweden and Denmark . We also spoke on Friday when we expressed concern in connection with the way in which the problem in relation to FAO'S Cash flow situation was brought to the attention of the Conference.
Furthermore, we were not in agreement with the resolution contained in document C 83/LIM/22. We have now had an opportunity to review the amended resolution submitted yesterday with document C 83/LIM/22-Sup.l. I must admit that we still disapprove of the way in which this serious and wide-ranging problem has been brought to our attention and we would strongly recommend that should such problems occur in the future, due time should be allowed for full consideration.
With respect to the new draft resolution, we are still in principle against the delegation of authority from the Conference to the Council.
However, in the spirit of obtaining a consensus on this issue which applies only to the Programme of Work and Budget for 1984-85, we can go along with the resolution which constitutes a financial security net for the Organization in five phases which can be applied in case the financial situation should develop in an undesirable direction.
We appeal to all Member Nations to take action as soon as possible to pay in full their outstanding contributions, including arrears, and also to remit their assessed contributions for 1984-85 in accordance with Financial Regulation 5.5, and we recommend that the Secretariat give due consideration to finding a fair solution to situations such as this in order to avoid last minute ad hoc arrangements.
H.M. CARANDANG ( Philippines): The Philippine delegation has studied with care the new version of C 83/LIM/22, as indicated in Supplement 1. We are happy to see the improvements that have been made in this new version which provides on the one hand additional safeguards for full implementation of the budget against possible shortfall, and on the other hand also makes provision so that less harm is done to those who honour their obligations in time. I am particularly happy to see the provisions in (d) (i) which provide for reimbursement of whatever share has been taken from the cash surplus when full payment of the outstanding contributions are made for the biennium.
Therefore, we fully support this resolution.
H. POPP ( Switzerland): We were among those delegations last Friday who had the opportunity to give our opinion. We thank the Secretariat for its efforts to revise the original proposal; it is a definite improvement in the sense that it provides more safeguards, and it is more realistic. Secondly, it is less unjust to the extent that it distinguishes between those countries that have paid normally and correctly and those countries which are in arrears. Nevertheless, the second proposal is not basically different from the first one and we therefore have the same basic reservations that we had on the first one. It is mainly two points on which we disagree. The first one is that like the Scandinavians we disapprove of the way this matter has been brought up, that is, too late and in a too hasty manner. It is such an important matter that it needs careful evaluation by every delegation and we did not have the necessary time to do so. The second reservation is that we still are not convinced that it is really necessary. The Secretariat has sufficient possibilities to meet the kind of emergencies which are envisaged - the Special Reserve Account, the Working Capital Fund, possibilities of saving, and the possibility of borrowing.
Therefore, we would have hoped that this untimely proposal would have been withdrawn, but we have learned now that this is not possible. We appreciate the efforts of the Secretariat in making substantial improvements. We can go along with this new proposition. We do not oppose it even though, as I state again, we do not think that it is necessary.
M. FENWICK (United Statesof America): A great deal has been said on both sides to question and to support the proposed use of the cash surplus as a new safety net. My Government has instructed me to oppose the proposal and my explanation on this will be brief.
In giving its support to the Director-General's Programme of Work and Budget my Government did so with every intention of honouring its commitments, and we will. We are grateful that the new proposal no longer unfairly singles out our country. Nevertheless, my Government considers the measure to be unnecessary, an overreaction to possibilities whose remoteness do not justify the potential of this measure to serve as an unacceptable precedent for this Organization and for other United Nations agencies also. Perhaps before such a wide-reaching precedent is established through a solution which is temporary it might be wise to present the question to the Finance Committee.
Two years ago the United States opposed giving the Director-General the authority to borrow. The measure before us now contains a reaffirmation of that authority, and the opposition of my Government is as strong now as it was two years ago. My Government opposes in principle any measures that would have the consequence of withholding the cash surplus. Such funds in my Government's view belong to the Member Nations and should not be considered a ready resource to be tapped at will. Although the draft proposal establishes limited operative conditions under which the cash surplus could be withheld, it nevertheless violates the principle that the cash surplus belongs to the Member Nations. That is the position of the United States Government.
M. FRANCTSCT di BASCHI (Italie): Pour ma part, je dois confirmer les réserves que j'avais exprimées hier devant la Commission. Pour des raisons de principe je pense que nous ne pouvons donner notre approbation au projet de résolution contenu dans le document C 83/LIM/22. Je reconnais que la nouvelle version représente une amélioration très sensible, mais je le répète pour des raisons de principe nous sommes arrivés à la conclusion qu'il fallait nous abstenir sur cette résolution. Les raisons de principe et fondamentales sont que dans le projet de résolution, même amélioré, on ne fait pas de distinction entre deux éléments qui sont essentiels à mon avis: d'un côté il y a les contributions qui pourraient être retardées, de l'autre côté il y a le risque de contributions qui ne pourraient jamais être récupérées totalement ou partiellement. C'est un point très grave pour nous dans le sens où les pays membres ici représentés ont approuvé le budget de programme de travail et le nouveau barème des Nations Unies a été approuvé également.
Par conséquent, je ne vois pas pourquoi on devrait approuver le principe d'une délégation de la conférence qui a approuvé ces deux règles ou ces deux arguments au Conseil. La conclusion est que la délégation italienne s'abstiendra sur le projet de résolution.
M.S. ZEHNI (Libya) (original language Arabic): As we have not participated in the discussion so far, please allow me first of all to thank the Director-General on behalf of my delegation for drawing our attention in document C 83/LIM/22 to the various difficulties that might arise in the future and during the biennium concerning the implementation of the Programme of Work and Budget. The Director-General's ability to predict the various problems before they happen and to propose various solutions to the problems which do crop up instead of leaving the Organization exposed in a very precarious manner, prove to us that there is a sound management in the Organization and that the Director-General is eager to assume fully his responsibilities.
I have to say first of all that the financial problems indicated in the document which might occur in the next biennium have been created by all of us. And I think that all of us have directly or indirectly participated in creating these problems for which we are responsible. We think that if the Director-General did not draw our attention to these problems and had he not presented various solutions, all in sufficient time in advance we would have been the first to criticise the Director-General for not doing so. But as usual he has done it in a very frank manner and talked to us about the various problems and solutions. Therefore, I think we would not be fair to him if we did not support him in this direction.
The proposal presented to us in its present form is in our opinion a very logical one. After reading this proposal we understood very clearly that this draft resolution does not ask for any definite decision right now. That could be left to the Finance Committee and the Council according to the mandates that we give them. They can review the situation and determine the various needs for 1984. Only then would they have to take the right decisions to face the various problems in case they occur. If it turns out that the the various possible solutions concerning the working capital and the Special Reserve Account are not enough to solve these problems, we would be in complete agreement with keeping a part of the cash surplus that we have acquired during this biennium. We think that if we did that it would give the Director-General enough flexibility to allow him to face the various possible financial problems which could arise in future years.
I would like to repeat that my delegation supports the present draft resolution and its amended version. It seems that many delegations support the resolution in the way in which it is now presented.
G. BESCOS FERRAZ (España): Mi delegación, señor Presidente, apoya la nueva Propuesta de Resolución sobre financiación de las consignaciones presupuestarias para 1984-85, sometida a la consideración de esta Comisión por el Director General.
P. GOSSELIN ( Canada): As we did not speak on this issue on Friday, we welcome the opportunity to give some of our views on this revised version.
My delegation is fully sympathetic to what it means to run an organization as large and as active as this one when faced with uncertainty with respect to contributions from member countries. It is truly unfortunate that this situation is not limited to the FAO and we find it repeating itself in many other specialized agencies of the United Nations system.
We would have preferred it if this potential problem had been presented to us in sufficient time for our authorities to give it all the attention that it deserves. Canada is a fervent believer that it is the duty of all member countries, whether they be large or small, to pay their assessed contributions when they are called for. I am pleased and proud to say that it is Canada 's long established practice to do so, not only in FAO but throughout the United Nations system.
It should be obvious to everyone here that if all member countries, large and small, were also to meet what is, after all, their legal obligation the problems affecting FAO as described in document C 83/LIM/22-Sup. 1 would disappear. However, we do not live in an ideal world and events do not always unfold as they should. That is precisely why this Organization, like many others, has built-in safeguards which exist to enable it to go on and implement its programme even when faced with monetary crises brought on by shortfalls in contributions.
FAO has three such safeguards, some of which have been established quite recently: the Working Capital Fund, the Special Reserve Account, and the authority to borrow. My delegation believes that is where the funds should be sought. It is our understanding that both the Working Capital Fund and the Special Reserve Account are virtually full at present. The considerable amounts which have been accumulated, undoubtedly due to good management but despite past non-payments and late payments, I might add, should be applied and should be sufficient to meet the present difficulties and the difficulties that could arise in 1984.
I will not dwell on that latter point as it has been fully discussed by a number of other speakers. However, we believe that the figures that have been presented to us in support of this proposal present a far too pessimistic picture: a view of events which we do not share.
We will not speculate on the question of exchange rates since there are as many opinions on that issue as there are experts, but on the question of late contributions we find it very difficult to accept as a reasonable projection of events that the major contributors, who have just recently voiced their support for the Programme of Work and Budget by voting for it, would now place it in jeapardy by not paying their share of their contributions. On this point there should be no confusion about where Canada stands. We disapprove of these actions, and we urge all members to meet their legal obligations.
Further, we believe that if a problem should develop there are still other options open to the Organization. For example, the Director-General could call for an extraordinary conference meeting in 1984 to deal with a real problem should one materialize. Undoubtedly, there would be some costs involved. However, these might be minimized if such an extraordinary meeting could be called at the same time as a Council meeting.
The point really is that we should not take extraordinary measures to deal with problems that are conjectural. We should also not provide extraordinary powers - powers that could have repercussions throughout the United Nations system - to deal with a potential problem in this agency.
We who are members of these other organizations cannot really afford to act as if decisions in one organization would not have repercussions for others. We believe that it would be preferable to incur the extra expenditure of having an extraordinary meeting of the Conference in response to a problem that is manifest.
In view of the above, my delegation cannot lend its support to the Draft Resolution contained in document C 83/LIM/22-Sup. 1. If it were passed, we believe this action could have negative effects. It would give the wrong signals to those countries which are delinquent in this matter, encouraging them not to pay in the firm belief that others would pick up their obligations. It would penalize member countries which pay on time, thus forfeiting substantial gains on interest, and in fact it might encourage those very countries also to disregard their obligations and delay their own payments.
Finally, it could establish an unfortunate precedent which could be copied elsewhere throughout the United Nations system.
For all the above reasons, we are in the position of not being able to support the resolution that is before us.
A.S. OULD MOULOUD (Mauritanie): Je pense qu'il ne s'agit pas d'être pour ou contre cette résolution, il s'agit en fait de sauver cette Organisation en cas de besoin. Ceux qui pensent que les pays ne paieront pas leurs contributions, je crois là que c'est une affirmation gratuite puisque quelle que soit leur situation économique ils ont toujours payé, même si ce versement arrive en retard. Franchement, je ne comprends pas lorsque certaines délégations disent que le Directeur a tous les moyens pour ne pas demander que cette résolution soit approuvée; que le Directeur est autorisé à prendre des crédits, je ne vois pas quel est le bailleur de fonds qui va accorder des crédits à une organisation lorsque les difficultés sont dues au fait que certains pays n'ont pas payé à temps leurs contributions. Je pense que la version actuelle de la résolution qui nous est présentée est le fruit de plusieurs efforts de la part de toutes les délégations: personnellement, ma délégation appuie cette résolution.
T. AHMAD ( Pakistan): Despite the fact that this issue has been debated in the last two or three sessions, we have not had the opportunity of expressing our views on the subject.
We have recently approved the Programme of Work and Budget of the FAO by consensus, and we appreciate the fact that the Director-General has brought out the problems which the Organization may encounter while implementing the Programme of Work and Budget which has been approved by consensus.
We appreciate the fact that there are mechanisms available within the FAO system to meet certain shortfalls of finances, but following the explanation given by the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General about the fact that the Working Capital Fund is basically a small amount which is meant for purposes other than these, and particularly when it is meant for meeting the emergency needs of some of the developing countries in the area of livestock desease, perhaps it would not be feasible to draw on that to the extent that would be required.
Similarly, the Special Reserve Account also has other demands on it, and we are also concerned that now, when you are taking the dollar at 1 615 lire, the amount of money which we had during the last biennium because of the favourable currency rate would not be available this time. In fact, you may get the reverse; you may have a currency situation where you would be depleting the Special Reserve Account because of the unfavourable currency situation. Similarly, there are other demands on the Special Reserve Account.
We also share the concern which has been expressed about the undisputed fall in the dollar in the coming two years. We also feel that it has reached a level which possibly cannot be maintained over the next two years.
Considering all these facts, considering that there are arrears in payments of contributions, and that there are delays in payments of contributions which are sometimes by default and sometimes by design, and considering the currency fluctuations and all the other factors., we feel that it is perhaps the right thing for the Director-General to bring this issue to the notice of the Conference so that the FAO has the money to implement the Programme of Work and Budget which has just been approved by consensus.
It was already yesterday that the Conference elected some members of the Council. The Council is a body on which all regions are represented. We feel that the resolution asks nothing more than for a decision on the delegation of authority to the Council, which is a body elected by the Conference itself. We find it rather surprising when it seems that the Conference itself does not have confidence in the most important organ of the Conference which continues to meet during the biennium when the Conference cannot meet, particularly when the Council is elected by the Conference and has regional representation.
In the circumstances we also find it very strange that there are suggestions that there may be an extraordinary meeting of the Conference itself. Firstly, it is a very expensive proposition. Secondly, logistically and administratively it would be a difficult undertaking. Particularly we find it redundant when you have it within the Constitution, within the legal framework, a body to meet during those two years when Conference cannot meet and to delegate all the work to the Council. We also feel that the proposal of the Director-General is not to delegate the authority to the Director-General, or FAO itself, but to delegate the authority to your own Council, which is a legal body under the Constitution. You are simply asking the Council that, at that particular time, after looking at the Working Capital Fund and the status of the Special Reserve Account, and also at the borrowing capacity, if after that you require any money then you can draw it out of the cash surplus. We find that this is not a very revolutionary or a very radical solution and could be very easily acceptable, because you are simply giving the Council the authority to decide if a situation arises.
We have also heard the argument that perhaps it is encouraging the delinquents by allowing for the funds to be drawn from this cash surplus. We are in sympathy in that, we agree with that entirely. We also feel that all Member States who sit down and approve the Programme of Work and the Budget should promptly pay their contributions so that the work can be implemented. But we also feel that it is not merely the question between the delinquents and people who pay regularly. Perhaps the more crucial issue is of the institution itself. Just by mere desire to pass on the burden to the delinquents, we feel it would be almost too much to allow the institution itself to suffer. We do not view the issue as between the delinquents and those people who pay regularly. We view the issue as between the delinquents and the institution itself. We feel that what should be of paramount importance is the institution so that it has the capacity and the resources to continue functioning. Under these circumstances we find that the resolution is very balanced, is very cautionary in its wording, does not propose any drastic change in the Constitution on legal processes. It simply states that at a certain stage the Council may look at the situation and, if the situation so warrants, should be allowed to draw on the cash surplus, and that too temporarily.
Therefore not only do we find we can support the resolution easily, we also think that it should not be difficult for other Member Nations to support. Any Member Nations who have any reservation, if they are represented in the Council, can also raise the issue when it is being discussed there according to the situation. Or, since it is a regional representation, the Council can ask their representatives from their regions to project their point of view at the time the Council is taking a decision. We are not taking a decision now. We are only asking that, depending on the circumstances, let the Council decide. We think it can be supported and we urge that Member Nations allow the institution, the modalities and the mechanism of implementing the Programme of Work and Budget which we have only recently approved.
H. TAKASE ( Japan): Our delegation did not have the opportunity to express our view on document C 83/LIM/22 on Friday. Our position is that we oppose this resolution. The reasons are more or less the same as some delegations have already said. We do not see the necessity of the resolution. An important financial principle is involved here and we should be cautious to throw it away, etc. etc. We would not like to repeat it here once again, just to save time.
The new resolution presented by the Secretariat yesterday reflects those efforts made by the Secretariat to improve the original proposal and we appreciate its efforts very much. Nonetheless our delegation thinks that the new resolution is not in essence different from the original one. We have in particular strong misgivings that the resolution would lead to a situation where the delay in the contributions by some countries, is that being covered by the cash surplus which should duly be allocated to those members who have paid. The resolution by no means encourages those member countries which have not paid their contributions to do so in the future. We would like to appeal to those countries who have not paid their contributions to do so as soon as possible. To my mind, this is the first thing we should do. So far as this new amended resolution is concerned, our delegation would like to express its strong reservations from that viewpoint, and we would like to say that we could not lend support to this resolution.
J. HEIDSMA ( Netherlands): Since my delegation has already intervened twice during this debate, I shall be very brief. The reason behind this resolution and the discussion around it, of course, is deferred and late payments and arrears. This is unacceptable. It has always been unacceptable because it affects the conceptual foundations of this Organization. Nevertheless, it occurs - and it even occurs on an increasing scale. We have now arrived at the situation where it apparently can cause such serious problems that ad hoc emergency measures may have to be taken.
We are still not convinced that this is, in fact, the case, but we deplore nevertheless the reasons behind it, late and non-payment of assessed contributions. My delegation can reluctantly go along with the present ad hoc solution, but we think that the time has come when structural measures ought to be taken in the near future in order to avoid the hasty sort of decisions we have to make now. We would like to urge the Secretariat to think about this and to come up with proposals, difficult as this might be, to find a more permanent solution to these problems.
H. BENATTALLAH (Algerie): Monsieur le Président, nous avons bien compris les circonstances et les termes dans lesquels est présenté le projet de résolution. L'amélioration du nouveau projet nous conforte dans notre position et nous lui renouvelons notre appui. Ce faisant, nous renouvelons notre confiance au Directeur général de l'OAA et partageons ses inquiétudes légitimes. Nous tenons à dire que nous ne la considérons pas comme une mesure de défiance ni comme une prime aux défaillances de certains Etats.
Enfin, la gestion saine de l'OAA qui fait l'unanimité d'ailleurs dans cette Commission, nous rassure sur la destination de cette mesure de sauvegarde, mais puisque l'on évoque le spectre d'un précédent - et nous partageons cette préoccupation - il faut garder à l'esprit un autre précédent, celui évoqué au paragraphe 5 du dispositif, c'est-à-dire le pouvoir de contracter un emprunt, qui lui, n'a pas été creé en raison précisément des garanties de bonne gestion de l'OAA. Je vous remercie.
G. HACKEY ( Australia): We note that the proposal before us is based on a number of assumptions about shortfalls in payment and non-payment during 1984 which, if they eventuate, clearly would lead to a critical situation. We question the likelihood of the assumed levels of non-payments occurring. From all we have heard, it seems to us that it is most unlikely that it would do so.
I think I would like to be a little frank and name countries. The calculations, as we understand them, are based on the possibility that the United States might shortfall in payment by something approaching US$8 million over the biennium, and, in the worst case, assume no payment at all. From the Federal Republic of Germany the assessment would be of the order of US $40 million. If those assumptions were met - and it is our view that they certainly are extreme in 1984 - there would be a shortfall from the United States approaching US $4 million. Of course there would be something like US $20 million non-paid by the Federal Republic of Germany. In such an event, under normal financial regulations, paragraph 6.1 (b) would provide that a substantial amount of the cash surplus to be distributed would be applied against those shortfalls. The whole of the United States shortfall would be covered by a cash surplus due to be distributed, say, US $4 million. Germany 's share of the cash surplus, approximately US $3 million, would be totally against the German arrears. So there would be an amount of something like US $7 million of the cash surplus which, under the rules existing at present, would be applied. There would also be arrears from other countries and I understand that there are a good many of them, although in total some rather less. It would also take up a further share of the cash surplus. So, under the existing rules, there is provision that quite a lot of the cash surplus will be withheld, if you like, or certainly applied against the arrears situation. If the situation is more critical, there are the other safety nets that have also been mentioned here this morning by other speakers, the Working Capital Fund and the Special Reserve Account.
Australia does not like the resolution for other reasons as well. We are concerned about the equity of funds being wittheld from fully paid up members in order to meet a situation arising from delinquency in payment by others. We do appreciate that the resolution now before us is an improvement on the first resolution, in that it does provide that, where a cash surplus is withheld, the ultimate distribution of any part of the surplus will not be applied to those countries which are in arrears until they are fully paid up.
But leaving that aside for the moment, the whole thrust still does involve imposing a cost on those who have paid their dues to meet a situation arising from other countries not having paid their dues. In effect, and assuming further that ultimately there will be a full distribution - ultimately - it amounts to interest-free borrowing from fully paid-up members, the costs of which are borne by those fully paid-up members. We would certainly prefer to see a borrowing system which spreads the costs more equitably over all Member Nations.
One further concern that I would register is that we think that there is some risk in a resolution of this nature that it might be both self-fulfilling and self-defeating. It seems to us that there is an incentive here for countries to manage their affairs so as to be in arrears to the extent of their expected share of the cash surplus, and to be in arrears at that extent in November of next year, as a kind of safeguard in case cash surplus distribution is withheld. I am suggesting that this may not arise just from countries manoeuvering to try and avoid the purpose of the resolution - it could also arise from budgetary processes and appropriation processes. In our own case, in Australia, we will have to make provision in the first half of 1984 for whatever we are going to seek for the funding of this Organization in our 1984/85 fiscal year; and, finance ministries being what they are, they will wish to make the net appropriation the net amount that they would expect to pay in the best situation which will almost certainly assume a refund of cash surplus. So, without any design at all, we may well be in a situation in which we have to be in arrears to the amount of our expected cash surplus, if the cash surplus is withheld.
In an extreme situation, I can see that a good many countries could be placed in this situation and, by very virtue of having the resolution, you generate a situation where there are extra arrears, which make the Resolution self-fulfilling. That situation does arise: but it is also self-defeating, because you have to apply the cash surplus to meet the arrears which the Resolution has generated. That may sound a rather fanciful circumstance, but I do not believe that it is beyond the realms of possibility.
We are also concerned that the major principles will certainly be seen as a precedent. We are concerned that we may be setting a precedent not only for the funding of this Organization, but for UN agencies in general. We believe that such a measure, with such wide-ranging implications, deserves much more consideration than our governments have been able to give to this point.
We do commend the Secretariat for exercising foresight. We commend the Secretariat for their responsiveness in the last few days, and developing a resolution which we believe is a very significant improvement on the one we had before us initially. But I say again that we do not believe that any of us have had enough time to think through all its implications, not only for this Organization but for UN organization funding in general. We do think that there is a real need to consider the cash flow problems longer term for this Organization, and we would strongly favour the Finance Committee being directed to address the subject, and also to review the financial regulations and consider possible amendments. One thing which we think could be looked at in such a review is the question as to whether cash surplus should be available to offset arrears. We certainly believe that the present provision to that effect in the regulations provides no incentive to pay on time, and that is one of the reasons for our objection to the present resolution.
If indeed a critical situation occurs at the end of 1984, we think it will be because of withdrawal of support on such a scale as to warrant a fundamental reappraisal of the funding and budget of this Organization - and a much more fundamental reappraisal that can be met by a measure such as that proposed before us at present. If that fundamental reappraisal becomes necessary, it is naturally a matter for the Conference, and if necessary the convening of a special conference; but there would obviously be a need to consider what short-term holding action might be necessary in that extreme situation, which we very much doubt is likely. We see the resolution as providing for a stop-gap measure to meet such a situation, but we are far from sure that withholding the cash surplus will be the only answer or the best answer. In that case, we believe that other safety nets need to be looked to. It would be a temporary stop-gap, the cost of which would be imposed upon and borne by the countries who are fully paid up; and if a stop-gap measure is needed, we would certainly prefer to see a measure whose costs are borne more equitably by all members.
P.G. SCALIERIS ( Greece): My delegation has followed with great attention the debates last Friday and yesterday on this very interesting problem. I must say that we were impressed by the great majority who approved the measures proposed by the Secretariat to overcome this problem, and in this respect Greece had of course no difficulty in going along with the proposals. The revised presentation of C 83/LIM/22 is I believe a very good and very nice compromise paper. Of course, the main reason is that this great majority of developing countries are very aware of the economic problems of the Organization, and they are also afraid of the impact which this problem could have on the execution of the budget - and I realize of course that this budget has been unanimously approved by all members of FAO.
The Greek delegation would of course be happier if there was no need to deal with this paper - if the situation was not there, and of course we regret that we have arrived at this point. But I must tell you that we are not surprised. Greece has proposed, in the Council in 1979, and intensified campaign by the Secretariat to collect outstanding contributions, and to persuade Member Nations to meet their obligations promptly. A year later, in the Finance Committee, we began to study this problem, and we gave the first alarm signals. Our last session in the Finance Committee dealt with the problem and stressed the danger of a continuing increase of delayed payments and a continual increase of deteriorating finance, in this case of the Organization. In his first intervention in the first Commission, our head of delegation also mentioned this problem and urged some measures. So it is an old problem which must be confronted by all of us in one way or another.
The Secretariat has, I believe, the duty to keep the Finance Committee and the Council of the Conference informed about the status of the payments and the cash flows, and of any developments relating to the payments of the assessed contributions - and of course to make some proposals. I believe that these proposals are very competent and responsible to face the situation, or a part of the situation, because I do not believe that we can resolve the problem if some member countries continue to withhold the payment of their assessed contributions. I see the Conference or the Council as being the most competent organization to deal with these proposals, and I do not see any unprecedented or unusual action in such a proposal.
The Council has delegated some financial powers to the Director-General. This time it only delegates the power to examine the situation: if I understand it aright, we do not give authorization to the Council to decide on the withholding of the cash surplus but only to examine the situation.
There is also a compromise concerning the time: instead of dealing with it in 1985, we should start examining the problem in 1984, when there is a compromise of the two years -that is when we should begin the examination. That is why I say this paper is a nice compromise. Then there is also the possibility that the situation will change and it will not be necessary to withhold the surplus cash and, of course, after examining the other possibilities provided to find the money in order to execute the Programme of Work. So if we delegate this authority to the Council, again I say to examine the situation in one year's time, for which of course it is the competent organ of the Organization, then we will see if the situation has ameliorated. Perhaps we will not need to take any, decision, and in that time we shall also examine other related problems to avoid, in a way, punishing countries who have paid their contributions, or to see the consequences of this change in tradition, and also to see the other difficulties, as some speakers have pointed out. In fact, what we should do now is just postpone examination of the problem and say we will examine it in 1984 in the Council. We do not take any decision on that. We just say that the problem exists, no one denies it, and it must be examined in 1984.
That is why I find this paper a very nice compromise and I think we should accept it, if it is possible, without alteration. If in doubt, I appeal to member countries to pay their assessed contributions so that we have no problem in that case.
Finally, remembering the authority given to the Director-General to borrow money - an authority that is given and never used - even if the decision of the Council is to give to the Director-General this possibility, I am sure that if the situation is not very bad he will not use this facility.
CHAIRMAN: Now I have Korea . We have noticed your intervention yesterday on this subject. I take it you have some new elements to add. I give you the floor but, before doing so, I ask the Commission not to take this as a precedent for other delegations to speak again. I think we have a broad view of all the components of the Commission. We have heard lots of arguments and I think what we have will enable us to draw conclusions.
KWANG-HEE KIM ( Korea, Republic of): I am sorry to ask for the floor a second time. We expressed our view that we could go along with the resolution to empower the Director-General to withold the cash surplus if the worst situation took place and such a situation was warranted. But we expressed strong concern about the delegation of authority to the Council because this matter affects all member countries and their financial contributions which should not be dealt with by the delegation of authority to the Council. It should be dealt with by the Conference -by all members.
In this connection I need some clarification. If I understand this resolution correctly, should it proceed it is certain to waive the provenance of the Financial Regulation. If the Conference only can amend or change the regulation, I wonder whether the certain provenance of this Financial Regulation can be waived and superceded by the Council through the delegation of authority? I just need clarification on this other point.
M.B. SY (Senegal): En qualité d'un pays en développement je devrais être très déçu ou découragé par les positions que ce problème apparemment simple soulève, mais en réalité, je dois dire que je ne suis pas déçu, parce que je m'attendais à ce que les débats prennent une telle tournure. Cela résulte du fait que les débats qui ont émaillé cette question sont le reflet assez précis de notre monde de contradictions et de paradoxes. Je le dis parce que nous sommes ici entre Etats qui ont créé un organisme dont l'acte constitutif a pour objet essentiel d'élever le niveau nutritionnel et les conditions des populations placées sous sa juridiction, d'améliorer en tout cas le rendement de la production dans les pays en question, en somme de coopérer mutuellement pour prendre toutes les mesures indispensables permettant de résoudre les problèmes dans le sens des objectifs poursuivis par l'Organisation. Malgré tous ces principes nous assistons à ceci:
L'on a évoqué beaucoup d'arguments qui sont très respectables: les retards des paiements des cotisations ne doivent pas être encouragés par ce projet, on ne doit pas pénaliser les bons payeurs, on ne doit pas non plus créer le risque d'un précédent. Je m'arrêterai sur ces trois points pour donner les précisions suivantes: les retards de paiements dont on a parlé et qu'on ne voudrait pas encourager, en fait ne pourront jamais être encouragés parce que la plupart des pays qui ne payent pas leurs cotisations sont généralement des pays confrontés à d'importantes difficultés économiques qui doivent préoccuper toute la communauté internationale, car elles résultent d'un jeu inégal dans notre système économique, instauré par les plus forts, et dans lequel les plus forts continuent d'exploiter les plus faibles.
Il s'y ajoute, que certains retards sont dus à des systèmes monétaires très complexes et contrôlés par les puissances qui détiennent des devises, de sorte qu'il y a des pays qui ont payé leurs cotisations, mais celles-ci ne sont pas encore arrivées et mettront plusieurs mois à arriver. Cela tient à un système monétaire parfois très complexe qui échappe parfaitement au contrôle de la plupart des pays en développement dont les monnaies dépendent de celles des grandes puissances.
Ensuite, on ne voudrait pas que cette résolution crée un précédent; je souhaite que cela puisse créer un précédent, parce qu'il est très rare de voir un organisme disposer d'un fonds de réserve, à la suite d'économie réelle. Les fonds de réserve généralement connus sont des programmes non exécutés et non pas des réserves; or, ici il s'agit d'économies réalisées par une gestion saine et rigoureuse. A partir de ce moment-là, certains pays sont totalement d'accord pour approuver, sans réserve, cette résolution qui en fait va nous tirer d'une situation difficile, en cas de retard de paiement des contributions.
D'autres pays ont tendance à vouloir imposer une certaine domination et une certaine pression vis-à-vis des organisations internationales du fait qu'ils ont une participation financière particulièrement élevée. Dès lors, ils voient cet organisme créer un système qui tend à lui donner une certaine autonomie, cela les dérange, et pour cause. En tout cas, si l'on ne veut pas créer de contradictions ou de paradoxes, cette résolution ne devrait soulever apparemment aucune difficulté, à moins vraiment qu'on ne veuille instituer, dans les organisations internationales, ce que l'on a l'habitude d'appeler, à tort ou à raison, un véritable rapport de force.
L. ARIZA HIDALGO (Cuba): Efectivamente ayer no pudimos hablar, hablamos el viernes y dijimos que considerábamos que la situación no era tan grave como se ha presentado después, se ha dramatizado un poco. Sin embargo, después de las primeras discusiones, hoy al llegar aquí, independientemente de que no teníamos los nuevos documentos, nos dimos cuenta después de oir algunas intervenciones, de que no había nada nuevo que estamos en las mismas condiciones. Los que estamos a favor hemos razonado el por qué deben tomarse estas medidas y creemos que son como resguardo a situaciones futuras y hemos planteado claramente, como lo hizo excelentemente la delegación de Libia y la delegación de Pakistán, cuál es el derecho que le corresponde a la Organización de prever su futuro.
Los que se oponen se han opuesto con algunas razones. Se ha hablado de que esto se ha flexibilizado y yo creo que además de flexibilizado se han hecho concesiones, ya que esta segunda versión es más explicativa que la primera; creemos que es mejor, pero la primera tenía los objetivos fundamentales y voy a decir por qué. Esta version nosotros la aceptamos también, es más amplia; sin embargo la oposición, la razón de por qué estamos aquí en esta trabazón. Se ha hablado de principios, pero esos principios no se han explicado qué principios son. Se ha hablado de alguna cuestión legal, de superávit, de normas financieras, de cargar a otros países el no pago. No se carga a ningún país el no pago y creo que la unica razón es simplemente que unos quieren seguir apoyando a FAO, otros tienen problemas y otros no quieren.
Con respecto a la liquidez dentro de los países, tampoco entendemos cuál es la razón; sin embargo hay dos razonamientos que nos preocupan. Uno, aceptar que los mecanismos actuales en alguna forma puedan aliviar la situación, pero esto sería constreñir a la FAO, limitarla, paralizar sus posibilidades de crecer. Otra declaración muy preocupante en cuanto a conceptos y principios de porqué somos miembros de esta Organización, es cuando se habla aquí de incentivo, quiere decir que formalmente estamos declarando aquí que se buscan incentivos,¿pero de qué tipo? Aquí no se puede hablar de comercio, ¿qué incentivos buscamos? Creo que ningún país va a estar incentivado o no incentivado. Si de acuerdo con sus principios soberanos ese miembro de esta Organización acepta su reglamentación, me parece que hablar de incentivos no es bueno, ya que se puede pensar que hay varios.
Señores, cuando hace cincuenta años nuestro país comenzó a poner pararrayos, hubo una discusión amplia porque algunos pensaban ¿para qué vamos a poner pararrayos? Nosotros creemos que aquí hay que situar los pararrayos, sencillamente porque estamos convencidos de que la situación está con vientos de agua pesada. Además, si somos extremadamente optimistas, como lo han sido algunos, nosotros no queremos pecar de optimistas, pero tampoco de pesimistas. Yo creo que no va a suceder nada de lo que se prevé aquí,¿por qué no poner pararrayos? De todas maneras vamos a estar resguardados. Sin ser pesimistas consideramos que están pasando las cosas ya. Muchas causas de la falta de liquidez son las inversiones en ciertas ramas de la economía que son muy rentables. El precedente, y yo creo que los precedentes están dados ya. A la UNESCO le acaban de negar el pago del presupuesto, al FIDA no se lo pagan;entonces, ¿por qué no ponemos nuestras barbas en remojo?
Estas son nuestras razones por las cuales mantenemos nuestro apoyo a la Resolución en todas sus partes y al Director General para que prevea el mantenimiento de la implementación del Programa de Labores y Presupuesto.
P. PASCAL (France): Je suis desolé de prendre la parole à nouveau mais je serai très bref. Je ne développerai pas à nouveau ce que je disais hier sur l'appréciation favorable que nous portions sur ce projet et sur le regret que nous formulions que le débat qui nous préoccupe aujourd'hui se soit déroulé sans préavis. Je n'entrerai pas dans des détails concernant des arguties juridico-financières consistant à savoir comment tel ou tel pourrait contourner le règlement. Ma délégation à cet égard a bonne conscience, et je voudrais confirmer que les contributions de la France dans les organisations internationales demeurent une priorité. Le dernier débat budgétaire qui s'est déroulé il y a quelques semaines en France l'a confirmé.
Quant au risque de précédent qui n'est certespas négligeable, il me semble que le délégué de l'Algérie a fait un juste sort à cette crainte. Le système de l'emprunt en effet nous apparaît bien plus pernicieux pour une organisation internationale que le système aujourd'hui proposé et l'on ne peut que se réjouir que le système de l'emprunt n'ait pas été pratiqué à la FAO ces dernières années.
S. CADENASSO F. (Chile): Mi delegación, señor Presidente, aprueba el Proyecto de Resolución indicado en el documento y presentado en esta Comisión, C 83/LIM/22-Supl.1, no siendo partidarios de emplear los fondos de la Cuenta Especial de Reserva, ni tampoco de tomar dinero a préstamo, sino que en casos extremos, con el peligro que ello encierra, autorizando sólo la utilización del superávit remanente en Tesorería del bienio 82-83, logrado gracias a una muy buena administración, y otorgando al Consejo y al Comité de Finanzas la facultad para autorizar al Director General a operar con estos fondos.
N. RAYEL ( Ireland): My delegation shares the concern expressed by a number of other delegations about the manner in which this matter was brought to our notice without giving us sufficient time to fully examine it. We also deplore the situation leading to the tabling of this resolution, namely, outstanding contributions and arrears.
The revised draft resolution as now presented to us is a considerable improvement over the earlier one and we can therefore reluctantly support this resolution.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL: I will try to be brief. I would like to thank the great majority of the members who have supported the resolution. I know that some of them have reservations and so what I have to say is addressed to them. But it is also addressed to those who have not been able to support the resolution because I hope that on reflection they will see that the dangers they feel about this are not in fact as great as they fear.
I would like to say once again that the timing was not chosen by the Secretariat. It was forced upon them by the timing of external events and statements during the Conference. If we had known those situations to exist before, we would have come with them before. They just aggravated a continuing problem of which everybody was aware and so we had no choice. The question of taking action now arises simply because - here I am answering the delegation of Korea - it is essential if the Council is to deal with this matter to delegate authority to it to do so specifically in the terms that are stated here. There is no other way of giving them that authority.
For those who feel reluctant about giving the Council authority, I have mentioned other precedents but as Pakistan said this morning it is difficult to see why there should be objection because Rule XXIV of the Basic Texts says that the Council shall between sessions of the Conference act on behalf of the Conference as its executive organ. And in sub-paragraph 3 of that it says that the Council shall exercise control over the financial administration of the Organization. It is able to authorize withdrawals from the Working Capital Fund in certain circumstances and it can approve between Chapter transfers in the budget and even delegate some of its powers to the Finance Committee. Therefore, the Council already has very substantial financial powers in matters which might be just as important as this one.
The fundamental problem continues to exist. There are some who feel that nothing is going to happen, but the Secretariat believes that they have to be ready for the worst case if it does happen. That is another reason for deferring the situation to the Council. We shall know the answer by November 1984, and possibly nothing will happen. In that case, it is not necessary to worry so much in advance about precedents and so forth.
Much has been said on the question of disincentives to pay produced by this resolution. I am afraid that I do not follow that at all because if Member Nations do delay all or some of their contributions, they will not only be reducing the cash suplus which would otherwise be available for distribution to them, they will also be accumulating problems for the future and they will eventually end up in arrears. All that will happen is that they would not be able to offset cash surplus against their future contributions, and they would have to be assessed at the full amount. Therefore, they would not eventually escape anything.
It is true that this will be unfair to others who have paid up on time in full. That is undoubtedly true; there are ways of dealing with that problem. It has been suggested by two delegations and it would have been easy to put it in the resolution, but no one has suggested doing so.
However, I would like to point out that there is some disincentive in this draft resolution for those in arrears because they will not get a share of the cash surplus unless they liquidate their arrears. In fact, you are envisaging disincentives to a large number of Member Nations and not just to one or two large ones. That is something new. I really do not see how this increases disincentives to pay. I think on the contrary it increases incentives to pay promptly and in full.
Although nobody has proposed a further amendment on the point, suggestions have been made that there should be a structural review by the Finance Committee. The Finance Committee will be reviewing the matter. One delegation that suggested that a review is necessary probably will be a member of the next Finance Committee and therefore it can be dealt with in the Finance Committee.
Finally, I am really suprised by the reference to a special Conference. It is not necessary if you delay the decision and delegate it to the Council. Just think of the expense of that Conference. We are having a big discussion in this Commission over a question of dollars and yet the idea suggested is that we spend half a million or a million dollars for a decision which the Council might or might not take on its behalf in quite a normal way in a year's time. The Director-General I think would not do that. Only if the totality of the contributions collapsed would that be necessary, and that would be a fundamental problem. I hope we are not dealing with fundamental problems. I do not think it serves the interests of the Organization to suggest that we are dealing with fundamental problems here. That is why I consider this to be a reasonable way of dealing with a hypothetical problem in a prudent but cautious conservative manner. I hope on reflection that it will be seen by all in that light.
Once again, I am grateful for the support that the proposal has received from the great majority of those present.
CHAIRMAN: The time is advanced, and we have to come to an end of this debate. Therefore, I abstain from trying to make a real summary because that might provoke another debate.
The item we have discussed is the last item of this Commission entitled "Status of Contributions." Hardly anybody talked about status of contributions; we really talked about what is to be done about it in the future in case it becomes even worse than it is. Clearly the main subject of discussion was this proposed resolution in order to delegate power to the Council to take measures if necessary.
There are countries who are against, some did not like it but could go along, but clearly the big majority was in favour of it. So I think it is safe to say that the resolution is approved by the Commission and the Drafting Committee will suggest to us a draft for our report in that sense, including all the very interesting arguments in a condensed form, please, which have been brought forth in this debate.
I would like to ask the Secretary to announce the exact timetable and geographic indications for the Drafting Committee and for the final meeting when we will have to approve the end of the report of this Commission.
D.C. McLEAN (Secretary, Commission III): Now that we have finished at about 1 o'clock the Drafting Committee will meet at 5 o'clock. Because we did not complete this item in time for the Drafting Committee to review the draft and make a final draft for the Commission, we will not be able to review the items as a Commission today. We shall therefore have an extra session of the Commission at 9.30 tomorrow morning for the adoption of the report.
The meeting rose at 13.00 hours
La séance est levée à 13 heures
Se levanta la sesión a las 13.00 horas
