The history of Japanese fisheries is replete with incidents of conflict, some relatively easily and amicably solved and others to which solution was found only after outbreaks of violence and bloodshed; some have been only local - level, intravillage disputes between different factions in a fishing community or between different villages within a prefecture over access to shared or adjacent sea spaces. Others, the more important ones, have involved fishermen from two or more prefectures and have had to be resolved at the national level. Some such major incidents have had a long and continual history, going back to feudal times whereas others have been relatively short, sharp and quickly settled. The causes of these major disputes have been varied having stemmed from entry rights disputes, gear conflicts, illegal fishing, island ownership, boundary jurisdiction and institutional reform problems. As would be anticipated, the differential rates at which different communities adopted new technologies was one of the major sources of fisheries conflict. Ironically, particularly since the latter led to a great improvement in the administration of Japanese fisheries, both the 1901 and 1949 fisheries laws led to many disputes.
Territorial Behaviour and Interpersonal Conflict Management
Although legally all fisheries rights waters belong to all members of an FCA, in practise small spots within such a sea area are conceived of as temporarily belonging to an individual fishing unit. This private “ownership” within the common domain arises in several ways, all of which fundamentally function to promote equitable access to resources and to minimize and manage interpersonal conflict between or among fishing units. Some such temporary private tenure arises through the licensing by an FCA for several years of a given tract of the common sea to a particular fishing unit and for a particular purpose, such as aquaculture, or through the formal, annual exclusive award by the FCA of a specified spot(s) to a particular unit of capture fishermen for a specific target species, as in the live-bait fishery in the Yaeyama archipelago (Ruddle and Akimichi, n.d.).
But by far the commonest way in which temporary private tenure to communal sea space arises is through the exclusive use of fishing spots as a result of closely guarded personal knowledge. In the Yaeyama archipelago, for example, fishermen observe that territorial behaviour and de facto “ownership” of particular fishing spots “Emerges naturally through individually-acquired knowledge and experience” (Ruddle and Akimichi, n.d.). A fisherman's knowledge and use of fishing spots is largely determined, of course, by his age and experience, by his physical abilities and capital available for investment in fishing. That in turn largely determines the technology or technologies that he customarily employs, the target species sought and therefore the locations and habitats exploited. His use of fishing spots is also determined in large part by the location where he received his early training in fisheries, his place of residence and the accessibility of a given fishing spot.
Territorial Behaviour
Fishermen in Yaeyama traditionally maintain four informal tenurial levels: fishing spots that are well-known to everybody (“the known sea”), sites regarded as personal(“the place where I usually fish”), a man's favourite fishing spot (“my sea”) and a man's secret fishing spot (“concealed little sea”) (Ruddle and Akimichi, n.d.). Invariably they determine the quality of a fishing spot by the size of the individual animals taken and its total yield. Perhaps of even greater importance, though, is the rate at which spots yield on a sustained basis and at which yields return to what are regarded as good levels following exploitation. Naturally, fishermen strive to know as many “good” spots as possible, since that guarantees a substantial and regular income. But possibly even more important is the breadth of knowledge, skill and experience demonstrated by constantly good catches. This enhances a man's prestige within the community and ensures him the respect accorded a master fisherman. It also guarantees that his views will be carefully considered during the resolution of conflicts within the community and that he will carry weight in inter-community disputes also.
Fishermen are faced with the fundamentally important problem of arranging the spatial and temporal allocation of their effort among the different categories of fishing spot, a technique known in Yaeyama as “allocating the sea” or “taking a small piece of the sea” (Ruddle and Akimichi, n.d.). At this there are acknowledged professionals and amateurs, since allocating the sea is a complex task that requires the balancing of a large number of fixed, cyclic and unpredictable environmental, human and social variables, which are rendered more complex by the need to take into account the efforts of competing fishermen, since other fishing units seeking the same target species and using the same technology might know, and are free to work a person's “good” or even supposedly secret fishing spots. Thus, in the face of even friendly competition between members of the same community, fishing becomes a contest of skills and wits, and is governed by interlocking sets of formal regulations as well as communitysanctioned rules of behaviour. Fishermen skilled at allocating the sea invariably attain a high rate of success for effort expended. This, too, serves to enhance their prestige within the community.
By not revealing information verbally and avoidance behaviour Yaeyama fishermen preserve their secret fishing territories. The location of favourite or secret fishing spots is never revealed. Only generalized information about “good” fishing spots is given even to relatives or very close friends, and then only when a man is about to retire or has already done so. Sons who work regularly with their fathers inherit this information throughout the many years of on-the-job training during their joint working life, whereas sons who work separately are not so instructed, since, depending on intra-family relationships, they might form part of the perceived competition.
This issue is intimately bound-up with pride and notions of self-esteem among fishermen, and therefore again with a man's status within the fishing community, and all that arises from it. It is asserted that no self-respecting fisherman would ever ask “…such a foolish question” as where another man had fished on a particular day, since a competent man can tell immediately where another had worked simply by looking at the composition of his catch. Further, it is noteworthy that fishermen themselves are careful not to be noticed appraising another person's catch. Rather, they send their wives to hang around chatting at the harbour or the FCA wharf, where they can peek at a competitor's catch as it is being unloaded, weighed and carefully boxed for air-freighting to the central fish market.
Techniques for Minimizing Conflict
Among Yaeyama fishermen several customary techniques are employed to ensure that the likelihood of interpersonal conflict is avoided or at least minimized. Among these the most important are avoidance behaviour on the sea and the acknowledgement of the rights of a first-comer to a particular fishing spot.
Among Yaeyama fishermen a moderately competitive attitude towards others employing the same technology stems from the common desire to avoid being perceived of lazy. Prouder and more successful men are motivated by the desire to be known as a “capable man on the sea,” in other words a leading fisherman whose skill, knowledge and capacity to “allocate the sea” are continually demonstrated through regular and frequent fishing trips and his constantly good catches (Ruddle and Akimichi, n.d.).
Competition is intense among Yaeyama fishermen. However tempting it might be, this should not be interpeted as an early symptom of the anomie that has been described as rampant among fishermen in other parts of Japan, such as in the Inland Sea, where crowding of inshore waters, pollution, inter-sectoral conflicts and, possibly, over-fishing undermine the huge fishing effort expended (vide infra). Rather, in Yaeyama, as in many other less-heavily fished parts of Japan, competition stems more from the use by different fishermen of different gears, such as fixed nets and gill nets set in close proximity to one-another and aimed at the same target species. The use of incompatible technologies compounds and confuses the notion of competition.
In Yaeyama, although still severe, competition to a large extent still takes such basically harmless forms as aquiring the first-comer's rights to a “good” fishing spot on the opening day of a particular fishing season, such as that for gill netting. Such competition is intense because the next man to fish that spot, perhaps on the next day, can expect to obtain only 25–30 percent of the first-comer's catch.
At sea avoidance behaviour is practised assiduously whenever there is the slightest chance of inadvertantly revealing the location of a “good” secret spot. Such behaviour takes two main forms, ceasing all activities and leaving a spot rapidly when another boat is seen approaching the general area, and not continuing towards a pre-selected spot and diverting to another location, if is apparent that another fisherman has already reached the general vicinity of one's spot.
Since the tenured waters of an FCA are the common property of all the Association's members, it follows that there is nothing legally sacrosanct about an individual's secret or favourite fishing spot. Apart from those places specifically allocated to individual fishing units for particular purposes, any spot can be used freely by any fisherman.
In Yaeyama (Ruddle and Akimichi, n.d.) and off the main island of Okinawa (Akimichi, 1984), and most likely in many other places too, the priority right to a fishing spot by a firstcomer is absolutely sacrosanct. Again, there is nothing in the formal law to uphold this right, but it is ironclad in customary law. The first man to reach and work a particular spot “owns” that location until he packs up and either returns to port or moves elsewhere. The duration of “ownership” varies according to the technology employed: e.g., overnight for gill netting, up to several weeks for the operation of a fixed net, or just a matter of a few minutes for a cuttlefish spearer. This rule applies within and among all types of fishing.
In some places, such as off Itoman, on Okinawa Island, spots for temporary fixed nets are selected and marked by individual fishermen on the previous day. Once so marked, they cannot be used by another fisherman employing the same technique (Akimichi, 1984).
The Informal Resolution of Interpersonal Conflict
Conflicts tend to occur fairly frequently within an FCA but their impact is mitigated by the fully participatory consensus approach to decision-making that is characteristic of Japanese organizations (Vogel, 1975). Neither squad nor group leaders nor the directors of an FCA have authority to make decisions on behalf of the membership. Policy and other major decisions are always made at meetings where everybody involved is in attendance and which are governed by the normative objective of attaining a consensus that embraces the interests of all concerned, rather than a simple majority approval. Decisions made otherwise are unacceptable. Such meetings are essentially negotiations that involve concessions and counter-concessions, compromises and the accommodation of various interests. They may be protracted and extend over several weeks until a consensus has been achieved. This process has been well-illustrated for fishing communities in Kyushu (Kalland, 1981) and Hokkaido (Short, n.d.), and is characteristic of Japanese decision-making in general.
Although a rare occurrence, since the “first-comer priority rule” is ironclad and upheld by both customary rules and Coast Guard regulations, some more aggressive fishermen attempt to intimidate others into leaving a “good” fishing spot at which they have arrived first. Physical violence is not the common result, but if such behaviour is repeated the help of an influential and respected third party is sought to resolve the arguement and settle the conflict. Community opinion and peer pressure will be brought to bear on the offender, since the first-comer is always supported. Only rarely and in extreme cases of repeated intimidation will the assistance of the Coast Guard be sought.
An intermediary and peer pressures are used to resolve informally a variety of other relatively minor conflicts. For example, resources are “siphoned-off” when a gill netter sets his net to intercept fish that would be otherwise caught by another man's fixed net. Some gill netters interprete this as a practical means of obtaining recompense, since fixed nets are incompatible with other technologies and those employing them infringe official rules because they fail to relocate their nets as regularly as specified by prefectural regulations. Since both parties are behaving improperly, the gill netter by violating the firstcomer's rights of the fixed netter, and the latter by leaving his nets in place too long and therefore not freeing the area for the gill netters to operate efficiently, neither party usually voices a serious complaint. But when such territorial behaviour persists over a long period a sense of general unpleasantness develops. If the two contending parties alone are unable to settle their grievance the community renders assistance by providing a mediator, and by exterting pressures on the contending parties to “behave properly.”
Handling Theft
Outright theft or deliberate damage to another person's gear is a more serious problem. In the Yaeyama archipelago, although evidence is scanty and mostly hearsay, spear fishermen who work at night using flashlights as well as non-fishermen who swim out from the shore are widely considered to steal fish from nets and traps. Stolen fish can be easily identified by the alert fisherman since those pulled carelessly from the gill net have their heads torn off. Further, non-gill netters who attempt to sell gill-netted fish can be easily identified because fish caught in a gill net show evidence of this by marks on the scales around the gills. The composition of a night spearer's catch also discloses whether he has been poaching, since usually he can spear only animals, such as parrotfish (Scaridae), that sleep at night among the corals. If, however, his “catch” includes a large number of nocturnally-active species, such as emperors (Lethrinidae), which are difficult to spear when swimming, then theft can be suspected.
Gill nets are obvious targets for poachers, since they are marked at night with flashing lights. Usually the gill netter sets his net at dusk and returns to port. Next morning he goes out to haul the net. But the astute fisherman turns-off the lights and stays on the sea overnight, partly to guard his net. Occasionally thieves cut the gill net to remove the fish more carefully. Bottom lines are also raided by poachers during the spawning seasons of emperors and sea bass (Epinephelus spp.).
The records of the Coast Guard in Yaeyama show no cases of theft because theft or deliberate damage to gear is either ignored or, in more flagrant or repeated cases, handled by the community without recourse to the law. Community mechanisms are employed to reach an agreement between the victim and the culprit and to fix a level of monetary compensation.
Successful fishermen, who have no need to steal to secure a livelihood and whose good fishing reputation is already established, modestly assert that even a good fisherman has within him the potential to steal, and were it not for his own pride he could perhaps succumb to the many opportunities to do so when at sea. While such men look down on thieves there is at the same time a tendency to pity a man who is so lacking in fisheries skill that he has to lower himself to stealing. Generally his shame when caught and loss of face are regarded as punishment enough. Not unexpectedly this sense of tolerance declines markedly when a man is repeatedly victimized, at which point a mediator intercedes and community pressures come into play. Social ostracization is the severest penalty imposed by the latter on an unrepentant thief
The Formal Resolution of Interpersonal Conflict
When time-honoured, informal community mechanisms prove inadequate to resolve a particular conflict more formal, yet still informal, channels are resorted to. In their study of Yaeyama fishermen Ruddle and Akimichi (n.d.) have termed this the “Informal Court of Last Resort.”
This procedure can be exemplified for Yaeyama fishermen by the conflict over sites for lift netting for live bait. Live bait fishing is one of the most important fisheries in Yaeyama since on its success depends the seasonally important bonito fishery and employment in local factories that process bonito. Lift netting for live bait is thus a critical activity that depends on the skillful exploitation of small fishing spots by an experienced and knowledgeable leader of a small group of men. As a consequence of the high level of community economic dependence on the lift netters, and particularly on their leaders, such men enjoy a high status and important role in the community. Since this fishery is of such crucial importance it is nowadays strictly regulated via an agreement drawn-up by the Yaeyama FCA and by a lottery process that annually re-allocates registered fishing spots for live bait among the lift netters. Access to this group is strictly limited to experienced bait fishermen.
Until just over a decade ago no formal regulations were applied to this fishery, and as a consequence there was considerable discord over the use of fishing spots. A basic problem is that some spots are close to others with which they are intimately linked by fish behaviour, in that according to the phase of the diurnal tidal cycle fish move between the two spots. Lift netting groups with first-comer rights to a particular spot claimed that their right was being infringed upon by other groups that had decided to work the adjacent and related spots at the same time, and therefore were, in effect, stealing the firstcomer's fish.
This inter-group problem occurred frequently and without satisfactory resolution, such that it was eventually taken-up by the “Lift Netting Squad,” an organization confined to lift netters that is regarded as formal within the FCA membership but is informal within the official hierarchy of fisheries administrative institutions. Since the squad (“The Informal Court of Last Resort”) was unable to resolve the problem it was eventually taken before the FCA Executive Board, and its solution was finally accepted by the Annual General Meeting of the FCA, which included all the lift netters. The outcome was the acceptance of a “Formal Agreement on Bait Fisheries for Bonito” and the institution of an annual lottery for the re-allocation of registered lift netting spots among all the lift netting groups. In terms of fishermen's behaviour the important points of this agreement are: That for the first season only, or for as long as fish remain there if for less than one season, the right to exploit a newly discovered lift netting spot belongs to it discoveror; nonregistered spots, which are freely exploitable for lift netting, can be worked for only two consecutive days by the same fishing unit; poachers must give-up their catch to the unit to which the spot is registered for the year; fishing units cannot exchange spots among themselves; and units not using their allocated spots forfeit the use right to other units.
