Chapter 2. International agreements concerning food and agriculture

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FAO, established by treaty in 1945 (Caldwell, 1984), is itself an example of international cooperation on common food and agricultural issues.

Specific issues have tended to be addressed through international environmental agreements, however. Table 1 lists the IEAs in which FAO has played an administrative role. The table was constructed by noting where FAO was explicitly mentioned in the agreement. FAO also has played a leading role in the negotiation of other agreements not listed here.

In this section, reference is made not only to the IEAs in Table 1 but also to other IEAs relating to food and agricultural issues. European Community (EC) directives and bilateral agreements are excluded from discussion. Although important, EC directives are negotiated within an institutional framework that makes their analysis different than that of IEAs generally, since many issues are negotiated simultaneously and repeatedly within the EC treaty structure. Similarly, bilateral agreements involve just two countries, and these are usually neighbours who regularly negotiate over other sets of issues.

Plant protection

Plant protection agreements are not concerned with the conservation of endangered plant species, but rather with the prevention of transnational spread of plant pests and diseases and with the control of trade in plants and plant products. Because the distribution of plants is localized, a number of regional agreements have been negotiated.

TABLE 1

International environmental agreements in which FAO has played an administrative role

Table 1 lists separate agreements for European and Mediterranean countries and for countries in Asia and the Pacific Region. Separate agreements also exist for other regions, including the Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa South of the Sahara (adopted in 1954 and signed by 22 countries) and the agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Quarantine of Plants and their ProtectionAgainst Pests and Diseases (adopted in 1959 and signed by 10 Soviet bloc countries).

Why are plant protection agreements needed? The principal reason is that protection by any one country will have little effect if its neighbours do not take similar measures. This is especially true of pests that are highly mobile, such as the Mediterranean fruit fly, or difficult to detect until their destructive effects have become apparent, such as the Dutch elm disease (Caldwell, 1984,p.192). Efforts by one country to control such pests would be costly to administer and would have little effect if its neighbours did not also seek to control the same pests. Before committing itself to a control programme, a country would have to be sure that its neighbours wanted to commit themselves to the same measures

Control of the desert locust

A number of IEAs have been established to control migratory locusts. Three of these are listed in Table 1; a fourth is the Convention on the African Migratory Locust Organization (adopted in 1962 and signed by nine countries). Control of locusts is vital to the agricultural interests of many countries. And because locust populations are localized, it is appropriate that the agreements concerning the control of locusts are regional. The need for such agreements is familiar: efforts by one country to control locusts within its own borders would be of little value if similar efforts were not undertaken by neighbouring states. For a country to commit resources to locust control, it must be confident that its neighbours are willing to undertake a similar commitment.

Forestry and aquaculture

Table 1 lists two forestry agreements. One is solely concerned with cooperation in research on the management of forest resources in Latin America and communicating this knowledge through an education programme. The other, the International Tropical Timber Agreement, is an agreement between producing and consuming nations to support research and manage forest resources sustainably.

A forest convention was being negotiated in the run-up to the Earth Summit to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, but was abandoned in 1991. In its place, a non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests was negotiated. It is possible that this declaration of principles may serve as the starting-point for a future forestry convention.

Table 1 also includes an agreement on aquaculture. Like the forestry agreements, it is intended to coordinate research, training and information exchange. Cooperation in research is important because research has characteristics of public good. If one country gives another a piece of information, this does not reduce the amount of information held by the first country.

Fisheries conservation

Table 1 lists two fisheries agreements in which FAO has played an administrative role. Many others have been negotiated. including:

• Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (adopted in 1949 and signed by six countries);
• Agreement Concerning Measures for Protection of the Stocks of DeepSea Prawns, European Lobsters, Norway Lobsters and Crabs (adopted in 1952 and signed by three countries):
• International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (adopted in 1952 and signed by three countries):
• Convention Concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube (adopted in 1958 and signed by six countries);
• Convention of Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (adopted in 1958 and signed by 34 countries);
• Convention Concerning Fishing in the Black Sea (adopted in 1959 and signed by three countries);
• Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Marine Fishing (adopted in 1962 and signed by six countries);
• Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (adopted in 1970 and signed by 18 countries);
• Convention of the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Southeast Atlantic (adopted in 1969 and signed by 16 countries);4
• Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts (adopted in 1973 and signed by seven countries);
• Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (adopted in 1978 and signed by 12 countries);
• Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (adopted in 1980 and signed by 27 countries and the European Community);
• Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-EastAtlantic Fisheries (adopted in 1980 and signed by ten countries and the European Community);
• Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean (adopted in 1982 and signed by seven countries and the European Community).

Because most of the agreements are concerned with all species of fish within a geographic area or with particular species, they limit the potential number of signatories.

In general, the fisheries commissions established by these IEAs collect data and carry out research necessary to advise on how fisheries could be more effectively exploited. They are often invited to make recommendations on managing the resource. For example, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, established by the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, may "make recommendations designed to maintain the populations of tuna and tunalike fishes that may be taken in the Convention area at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch".

Quite apart from the fact that "maximum sustainable catch" is generally not justified economically (for example, Clark, 1976), implementation poses great difficulties. The agreement stipulates that commission recommendations must be implemented by parties to the agreement, but only if parties do not "object" to the recommendation. If any party does object to the recommendation, that party is not required to comply with the recommendation. Clearly, stronger mechanisms are needed if these agreements are to succeed in more effective management of fishery resources.

Marine mammal protection

A number of IEAs are concerned with the management of marine mammals. These include the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (adopted in 1946 and signed by 24 countries), the Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (adopted in 1957 and signed by tour countries) and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (adopted in 1972 and signed by 11 countries).

The Whaling Convention is perhaps the best known of these agreements, but its fame results as much from its failures as from its successes. The

Whaling Convention was preceded by the 1931 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which banned commercial hunting of right and bowhead whales, as well as the killing of calves or female whales accompanied by calves (Lyster, 1985, p. 8). The earlier agreement had little effect, however, partly because it was not signed by five major whaling nations (Japan, Germany, Chile, Argentina and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The 1931 agreement did not establish a commission, and hence was not a flexible instrument for managing whaling.

The Whaling Convention was established by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which sets quotas and regulates whaling methods. Perhaps the greatest success of the Whaling Convention was the commercial ban on whaling adopted in 1986. But that ban - as well as the Convention itself - is now under threat. While the Convention was set up originally to reduce current harvest rates in order to increase future rates, any country may sign the agreement, and the vast majority of current signatories are primarily concerned with bringing all commercial whaling to an end.

Like the fisheries agreements, the Whaling Convention does not impose harsh requirements on its parties. If a party objects to an amendment to the regulations governing the exploitation and conservation of whales, it is not bound by them. In effect, therefore, countries may do whatever they wish. However, two United States laws, known as the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967 and the Packwood-Magnusom Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, authorize the United States Government to take economic sanctions against any country whose activities diminish the effectiveness of the conservation measures of the International Whaling Convention. These sanctions include bans on fish imports and on fishing in United States territorial waters. As a result, in 1 983 the United States withheld 171000 tonnes (worth about US$55 million) from Japan's fish allocations within the United States 200-mile coastal zone in retaliation for Japan's objection to the Whaling Commission's decision to halt commercial whaling in 1986( Lyster, 1 985).

The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty, first negotiated in 1911,is among the most successful of all IEAs. The agreement was reached as the fur seal population was close to extinction. The seals were being hunted by the United States, Canada, Russia and Japan. Canada and Japan hunted the seals at sea, while the United States and Russia harvested their own breeding populations on land. Pelagic sealing was a particularly wasteful method of harvesting; many seals were killed without being retrieved, and most of the seals taken at sea were female. The 1911 treaty did not limit the total catch of seals, but it banned pelagic sealing. Since the United States and Russia had every incentive to manage their own populations efficiently (on the Pribilof islands and on the Commander, Robben and Kurile islands, respectively), the ban was expected to produce a substantial increase in the present value profit from the resource. Canada and Japan were compensated by being given a fixed share of the total harvest of the United States and Russia.

The treaty also includes an important enforcement provision. If one party violates the agreement, the agreement becomes null and void. This is a strong deterrent to cheating, since all parties would be worse off without the agreement than with it. Although the agreement has been amended since 191 1, it remains in force today. The agreement is discussed further in the final chapter, "International environmental agreements reconsidered", (p. 43).

Animal welfare

Several European agreements concern animal welfare, including the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes (adopted in 1976 and signed by 17 countries plus the European Community), the European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter (adopted in 1979 and signed by 10 countries) and the European Convention for the Protection of Animals During International Transport (adopted in 1968 and signed by 19 countries).

International cooperation is needed in these cases for two reasons: because consumers want to be confident that all the food they purchase satisfies minimum standards for animal welfare and because farmers who must comply with local laws do not want to lose competitive advantage to imports.

Bird protection

Since many bird species are migratory, the policies of one country regarding the harvesting of birds and the protection of their habitat affect the abundance of the species in other countries. Birds are valued for controlling pests that may harm agriculture, as a food source and also for aesthetic and ecological reasons.

Several IEAs are intended to protect bird populations, including the Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture (adopted in 1902 and signed by 12 countries), the International Convention for the Protection of Birds (adopted in 1950 and signed by ten countries) and the Benelux Convention on the Hunting and the Protection of Birds (adopted in 1970 and signed by three countries). The first two agreements have had little effect (Lyster, 1985), while the third has imposed quotas on the taking of particular species.

Terrestrial species

Two lEAs are concerned with the conservation of particular terrestrial species. The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (adopted in 1973 and signed by five countries) provides for the coordination of research programmes, restricts the killing and capture of polar bears and seeks to protect their ecosystem.

A number of agreements are concerned with the conservation of the vicuna, a relative of the llama, which has long been hunted for its wool. Wild populations are currently found in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru' and they once existed in Ecuador. The Convention for the Conservation and Management of the Vicuna (adopted in 1979 and signed by four countries) prohibits "the hunting and illegal trade of the vicuña, its products and derivatives within the territory" of the signatories. Like the polar bear agreement, IEAs regulating the conservation of vicuña, have been successful. Lyster (1985,p. 94) states: "It would certainly be hard to give the vicuña, more comprehensive international legal protection than it receives at present, and if the species does not prosper it would raise serious questions as to the worth of negotiating any international wildlife treaties at all."

Endangered species protection

Both polar bears and vicuña, are also cited in the appendices to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (adopted in 1973 and signed by more than 90 countries). The CITES convention governs international trade in endangered species. It includes a list of endangered species and requires that trade be regulated by permits. Species cited in Appendix I are those that are "threatened with extinction" and by and large prohibited from trade, while Appendix II species are "not necessarily now threatened with extinction [but] may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival." Appendix 11 species cannot be exported without a permit, and in issuing a permit the designated authority of the state must determine that the "export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species." However, import permits are not required for these species.

The most novel dimension of CITES is the regulation of trade between parties and non-parties. The agreement prohibits parties from trading with non-parties unless the latter produce documentation comparable to that required of parties. The large number of signatories is probably the result of this requirement.

CITES has come under strain recently because of a conflict between African nations seeking a ban on trade in African elephant ivory and those with better managed populations who would like trade to be continued.

Nature conservation

A number of IEAs are concerned with the protection of particular ecosystems. These include the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (adopted in 1940 and signed by 17 countries), the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (adopted in 1979 and signed by about 17 countries) and the Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region (adopted in 1985 and signed by about five countries). Others are concerned with nature in general and include the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted in 1972 and signed by about 98 countries) and the Convention on the Conservation of Biological Diversity (adopted in 1992 and signed by more than 150 countries).

The Convention on Biological Diversity, signed in June 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, is largely intended as a vehicle for transferring resources from rich to poor countries to pay the cost of conserving biodiversity in the poor countries, especially tropical rain forest countries.The convention establishes the principle that poor countries should be compensated for the "incremental costs" of conservation - roughly, the additional costs of conserving biological diversity that has global value but that otherwise would not be protected. It also states that the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is administered by the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Development Programme, should administer such resource transfers, at least on an interim basis. The convention is analysed in the next chapter.

Pollution control

Many environmental problems affect food and agriculture indirectly, among them, marine pollution, air and water pollution, ozone depletion, climate change and nuclear incidents. A great many IEAs cover these problems (Barrett, 1991), but two are particularly noteworthy.

Protection of the ozone layer

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted in 1987, revised in 1990 and 1992 and signed by about 86 countries plus the European Community) specifies reductions in the production and consumption of about 20 substances that deplete stratospheric ozone.This agreement is considered one of the great successes of international cooperation. The United States negotiator to the protocol later reflected (Benedick, 1988, p. 429): "... in undertaking collaborative preventive action to protect future generations from potential dangers, the nations represented at Montreal charted new paths in environmental cooperation and established both a precedent and a standard by which future international negotiations will be measured."

The original Montreal Protocol required that developed-country signatories reduce their emissions of eight ozone-depleting substances largely, CFCs - by 50 percent by the year 2000. The agreement was amended in June 1990, when the number of substances controlled was increased to 20 and the reduction of 50 percent was replaced by a virtual ban. In November 1992, the agreement was amended again to move the ban forward to 1996 and to include other substances. Developing countries were required to meet weaker targets in the 1987 agreement, and the 1990 amendment included provisions for transfers of resources from rich to poor countries. These transfers were to be for the "incremental costs" of complying with the agreement, and it was the offer of transfers that made the agreement acceptable to countries such as India and China.

The Montreal Protocol is explicit in stating the obligations of individual countries and it is also unique in that it allows trading in national obligations. Finally, the protocol provides incentives for countries to accede to the treaty, both because transfers are provided to poor countries and because "sanctions" apply to non-signatories.

Global climate change

The Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted in 1992 and signed by 153 countries) has received more criticism than acclaim. Signed in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, the Climate Change Convention does not specify precise targets for reducing such greenhouse gas emissions as carbon dioxide. Instead, it commits developed-country parties to develop policies "... with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of ... anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol." Such parties are also committed to "... provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under [the convention]." The extent to which developing country parties are expected to implement their commitments "... will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties."

Arguably, the most important aspect of the Climate Change Convention is the principle that countries may fulfil their commitments jointly. The principle of "joint implementation" was originally proposed by the governments of Germany and Norway. Although the principle has yet to be defined precisely, it is intended to allow countries to fulfil obligations with greater flexibility. For example, the Norwegian Parliament declared in 1989 that Norway should stabilize its carbon dioxide emissions at the 1989 level by the year 2000. Norway has adopted a number of policies to achieve this end - including a carbon tax. But, for Norway to meet its target unilaterally would be expensive. The country burns little coal and does not have a natural-gas grid; almost all of its electricity is provided by hydro power. Since only global emissions affect climate change, Norway has argued that it could more efficiently achieve its national target by effecting emission reductions offshore. Joint implementation would allow Norway to pay for abatement in other countries and to receive "credit" for doing so.

While the concept of joint implementation is a potentially important innovation, the Montreal Protocol goes much further by allowing virtually unrestricted international trading to achieve explicit national emission reduction targets. Furthermore, the Climate Change Convention provides no real penalties for countries that remain outside the agreement. Since the problems of stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change appear to be superficially quite similar- both involve all countries - it is critical that the theory of IEAs is able to explain why efforts to obtain international cooperation in these two cases produced such vastly different outcomes. This is discussed in the final chapter, "International environmental agreements reconsidered", (p. 43).