Field document
November 1990
| FI:DP/AFG/86/013 Field document November 1990 |
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT ON RAINBOW TROUT CULTURE IN QARGHA FISH FARM, KABUL |
AFGHANISTAN
Report prepared for the project
Rainbow Trout Culture in Afghanistan
by
David Edwards
Project Coordinator
This report was prepared during the course of the project identified on the title page. The conclusions and recommendations given in the report are those considered appropriate at the time of its preparation. They may be modified in the light of further knowledge gained at subsequent stages of the project.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations or the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Rome, 1990
Hyperlinks to non-FAO Internet sites do not imply any official endorsement of or responsibility for the opinions, ideas, data or products presented at these locations, or guarantee the validity of the information provided. The sole purpose of links to non-FAO sites is to indicate further information available on related topics.
This electronic document has been scanned using optical character recognition (OCR) software. FAO declines all responsibility for any discrepancies that may exist between the present document and its original printed version.
1. INTRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE
3. EVALUATION OF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS
3.5 Recommendations for future activity
The project coordinator last visited Kabul in January 1989. Since then, several proposed assignments were cancelled due to the serious security situation around the project site at Qargha fish farm. The current short mission was fielded from 15 to 30 November 1990, with terms of reference which specified the following tasks :
review project activities since the coordinator's last visit
propose future action, possibly ending the project
prepare a short terminal report.
As detailed in the coordinator's third report dated February 1989, project progress until that time had been excellent. Both survival and growth of the young trout at Qargha fish farm were better than anticipated by the project document. However, at that time several serious problems and potential problems were already apparent, as follows:
1. An urgently-needed consignment of fish feed was held up at the Afghan border due to closure of the road by military action. Nets for floating cages were delayed for the same reason.
2. The Qargha area itself was experiencing daily military action, posing danger to staff working there. In particular, fire was frequently exchanged across Qargha Lake, making it impossible for fisheries personnel to work on the reservoir.
3. Due to tightening UN security regulations, including evacuation of all non-essential staff, the coordinator's visits were subject to shortening or cancellation.
Despite these difficulties, the project continued to make good progress until June 1989. Pending delivery of imported feeds, fish were fed on an improvised wet pelleted diet composed of offal (livers, stomachs, lungs, etc. of sheep, cows and camels) mixed with cereal flour and extruded through a hand mincing machine. This diet was used from January until May, when the delayed 10-t shipment of dry feed finally arrived by road. At that time a total of approximately 64 500 fish averaging 95 g in weight were held at Qargha. Thus a total weight of almost 6 t of fingerlings had been produced, using 6 t of dry pelleted food plus 733 kg of locally-made wet feed. This compared favourably with the project's fingerling production target of 55 000 fish averaging 30–50 g by March 1989.
By spring 1989 the concrete raceways and swimming pool available for holding trout fingerlings were stocked at their maximum safe fish density. The plan specified in the project document required that fish be transferred at this time into floating cages moored in Qargha Lake for on-growing to market size. Accordingly 15 cage frames were constructed, and the nets for them were imported. Regrettably, the security situation at Qargha remained serious throughout spring and summer, and it was impossible to moor and work the cages in the lake due to the physical danger to staff.
At the same time, the fish unfortunately came to the notice of soliders stationed at Qargha, in particular the militia. Large-scale thefts of trout from all the ponds by soliders continued through the summer, and the fish population of the swimming pool was wiped out by “fishing” with grenades. Senior officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform did their best to stop the stealing without success. In August it was thus decided to harvest and sell the remaining stocks, keeping only about 5 000 fish for experimental growth studies and for use in future as broodstock.
The fish offered for sale were considerably smaller than the normal market size for the species, and consequently could not command a high price. At first, trout averaging 120 g were sold for Af 100 each regardless of their precise weight. Later, price was set on a per kilogramme basis. The following sales were made:
789 fish were sold at Af 100 each
489 kg were sold at Af 400/kg
2 435 kg weresold at Af 300/kg
During this period, security difficulties at Qargha put the area “out of bounds” to civilians, and it was not possible to sell fish at the farm-gate as planned. Because of the need to dispose of fish quickly, they were offered to UN and government employees and the diplomatic community. Buyers were universally complimentary about the quality. The total weight of fish sold were slightly more than 3 t, for a total revenue of over one million Afghanis (US$ 1 = Af 55 at the official UN exchange).
Despite precautions taken to protect the 5 000 fish retained, including installation of heavy wood, wire and thorn covers for the raceways, thefts continued. By March 1990 only 750 fish were left, and currently about 460 survivors remain at Qargha. Their average weight is about 1.3 kg.
Because raceways remained full of fingerlings during spring 1989, the second importation of eggs planned for March 1989 had to be cancelled due to lack of space for rearing a new generation of fry.
The project has demonstrated the suitability of Qargha fish farm for trout culture. Water supplies to raceways were always of adequate quantity and quality. Water temperature was recorded daily, and ranged from a minimum of 4oC in January-February to a maximum of 20oC for a few days during September. This is a very suitable range for trout growth. Actual growth of fish was good, remaining ahead of plan even though the stock was crowded due to the impossibility of transferring them to floating cages for on-growing and despite periodic shortages of feed due to delayed deliveries. No disease problems were encountered.
The most serious difficulties experienced by the project were related to the security problems at Qargha, namely:
theft and destruction of most of the stock by soldiers
inability to work floating cages in Qargha Lake because of danger to staff
These factors resulted in the official harvest of less fish than planned. Only 3 t were sold, against a target of 10 t. However, it is known that 6 t of fingerlings were produced by spring 1989, using only 6 t of dry feed and 733 kg of wet. Had it been possible to grow-on these fish in cages as planned, the project target would certainly have been greatly exceeded. In fact, the fish consumed a further approximate 9 t of dry feed during the project period. This must obviously have resulted in the production of substantial amounts of fish, and project staff believe the target of 10 t was probably met. However, the true output of the farm can never be known as most of it was stolen.
Several factors combine to make a proper appraisal of the economics of trout production at Qargha impossible:
1. Since most of the fish produced was stolen, the true output of the farm is unknown. Calculation of food conversion is also impossible after the fingerling stage.
2. Government set the sale price of fish too low. At the time of sale, the average cost of meat on Kabul markets was almost double the price charged for trout from Qargha. For comparison, at the time the project document was drawn up, common carp were available in the bazaars at approximately the same price as beef. This carp is transported from other areas of the country, and frequently reaches the capital in poor condition. Further, in all countries where both trout and carp are available, the trout commands a much higher price, commonly 3 to 4 times more than carps. This is partly due to the greater percentage yield of meat from the trout carcase, but mainly to its superior flavour and relative lack of small bones.
Previous experience in Kabul supports the asumption that Afghanistan is no exception to this rule. Qargha fish farm was established in the mid-sixties when hatchery-reared juveniles were released into the lake for later capture by rod and line or nets. At that time there was a strong tourist industry in Kabul, and rainbow trout from Qargha could be sold to local hotels for about ten times the average price paid for meat products.
Pricing the fish too cheaply was a grave error. When trying to establish a trout-farming industry in a new place, it is very important to set prices as high as the market will support, so that the product will acquire a high-status, high-value image. Here, it is clear that project staff were in an exceptional “panic sale” situation, in which it was felt that generation of any income was better than the alternative of losing all the fish to theft.
The project document envisaged that trout feeds would be imported throughout the project period. Once it was established that trout could be grown in the hatchery, ponds and cages at Qargha, a second phase of the project could be considered, during which feeds would be manufactured locally.
Currently there is no industry in Afghanistan producing compounded feeds for animals or fish. Consequently few of the major raw materials needed to make dry pelleted trout diets are available in Kabul. In particular, no fishmeal is produced in Afghanistan, and presently none is imported.
It was always understood that such ingredients would need to be imported to manufacture good-quality diets for rainbow trout. This is not necessarily an obstacle to the development of an economically-viable trout-farming industry. Indeed, many of Europe's major trout-producing countries are also importers of fishmeal (e.g., France, Italy, Germany, UK). The important issue is that the market price of the trout be high enough to cover the cost of such imports. Due to the factors outlined above, i.e., theft and deliberate destruction of stock leading to a very low official harvest from a large quantity of feed, underpricing of harvested fish, and uncertainty about the true value of the Afghani currency, the project to date has failed to show that such imports of feedstuffs would be economic in the long term.
In view of the continuing very severe security problems at Qargha, described above, it is clear that the project's original objectives are not fully achievable at present. However, the project has made substantial achievements despite the constraints, having demonstrated the technical feasibility of producing trout to market size at Qargha fish farm. To maintain the momentum of the work and keep together the competent trained team of fisheries staff employed in the project, it is recommended that project activities be continued by government. In the immediate future UNDP/FAO will assist only via the cost-sharing arrangement for purchase of imported feeds. All other assistance will be terminated until such time that the security situation improves sufficiently to permit worthwhile progress to be made (e.g., by siting cages in Qargha Lake or by extending activity into other areas), when the programme should be reviewed again.
Meanwhile government intends to continue as follows:
1. Sufficient broodstock remain to provide self-sufficiency in eggs during the coming breeding season. The 460 fish can be expected to give at least 200 000 eggs, the number imported in 1988. The fish are now approaching 3 years of age, the normal time for first maturation of females. Males frequently mature a year earlier. The fish are from a spring-spawning stock, and should give eggs during January-March 1991. Examination of the broodstock during the coordinator's visit confirmed that the fish were approaching sexual maturity, but were not yet fully ripe. There is thus no requirement to make further imports of eggs.
2. After stripping of eggs and fertilization, incubation will be done in the same improvised hatching boxes used in 1988. They are still in serviceable condition.
3. After hatch, fry will be first-fed on imported dry diets.
4. When transferred to raceways at about 0.5 g average weight, most of the fish will be fed as before on imported dry pelleted feeds. However, government should also try feeding a proportion of the stock on wet diets based on locally available slaughter-house offal. It is said that up to 60% of offal from locally slaughtered animals is condemned as unfit for human consumption due to parasite infestation. The Ministry of Agriculture will liaise with the butchers' union to secure supplies of this waste material. However, it is known that many fewer animals are slaughtered in Kabul now than previously. This is because the traditional method of driving animals alive from the countryside (and even from Pakistan) into the capital is no longer possible due to closure of the roads by military action. Supplies of offal are therefore likely to be limited, but should be sufficient to allow the two feeding regimes to be compared.
Once peace is restored to the country, the prospects for both warm- and cold-water fish culture in Afghanistan are known to be good. At that time, a larger national programme for fish-farm development should be considered by government and international agencies. It could include the following components:
Cold water
re-equipping of Qargha fish farm as a trout hatchery and fingerling production centre. The project has already established the suitability of the farm for this purpose, but the equipment and facilities available are old and would operate more efficiently after modernization.
install floating cages for on-growing trout at Qargha and other reservoirs, especially Bandi Amir Lake at Bamyan.
stock juvenile trout into the lakes for subsequent capture by commercial netting.
development of local feeds using imported fishmeal and pelleting machines at the farm sites.
establishment of markets for trout at good prices, especially to hotels and restaurants.
training and extension work using these farms as demonstration units.
Warm water
re-open, extend and re-equip Darunta fish farm for seed production and on-growing of common and Chinese carps, for both commercial and demonstration purposes.
stocking of reservoirs in warm areas of the country for experimental work and small-scale commercial netting.
provide fingerlings to private farmers, allowing them to on-grow fish to market size in their own ponds.
develop supplementary feeds and fertilizers for intensification of fish culture in ponds.
improvement of post-harvest handling and transport systems to ensure supply of good quality fresh fish to the markets.
training and extension service for private farmers and government workers.
Under the adverse circumstances prevailing at Qargha, the trout culture programme there can currently make little new progress. Therefore UNDP/FAO assistance will be suspended pending an improvement in the security situation, with the exception that imported feeds will continue to be provided under an extension of the cost-sharing arrangement. This will enable government to continue running Qargha fish farm alone.
When the security situation in Afghanistan improves sufficiently, it is recommended that Qargha fish farm be included in a larger programme for development of both cold- and warm-water fish culture in this country.
