by
J.A. Gulland
Chief, Marine Resources Service
Fisheries Resources and Environment Division
Fisheries Department
FAO, Rome
1. INTRODUCTION
Under the new Law of the Sea coastal states are given a high degree of control over the fishery resources lying in the Exclusive Economic Zone, out to a distance of 200 miles. However this control is not absolute. In particular the draft treaty implies that if the resources are large compared with the capacity of the coastal state to harvest them, then fishermen of other countries should, under certain conditions, be given access to these under-utilized resources. The nature of these conditions is a matter of concern to many countries, both coastal states and those with distant-water fishing capacity, and can be considered from different view-points - legal, economic, social, etc. This note concentrates on the resource aspects, particularly from the view-point of the coastal state. These will be dealt with in two major sections - the nature and definition of any possible surplus to which other countries should be given access and the costs, direct and indirect, of giving access.
2. THE CONCEPT OF A SURPLUS
The principle that, under certain conditions, foreign fishermen should be given access to resources as it has become established in the draft Law of the Sea is the result of the interplay of many arguments and considerations, among which biological factors played at most a small part. However, the basic biological argument is apparently straightforward, and is based on a few simple points:
(a) It will be assumed that there is a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) which can be taken from any stock, and this yield, and the population level which will produce it can with appropriate research be estimated.(b) This MSY may be modified by economic considerations, as well as by environmental factors.
(c) The coastal state shall determine the allowable catch.
(d) If this TAC is greater than the amount the coastal state can catch, the difference is a surplus, which can be allocated to foreign fishermen.
Taken together these points might be taken to imply that the surplus - to which foreign vessels should be given access - is equal to the MSY less the catch taken by the coastal state. This does not in fact seem to be the intent of the LOS text, nor would it be a rational approach to management of fish stocks in the light of what is known about the dynamics of fish stocks, and the economics of fishing.
So far as the draft text of the LOS treaty is concerned the two concepts (allowable catch, and MSY) are kept distinct. The relevant paragraph (Article 61(1)) simply calls on the coastal state to determine the allowable catch. There is no explicit guidance as to how this allowable catch should be calculated. It is implied in the later paragraphs of Article 61, and in Article 62 that such calculation would be based on a balance of the interests of conservation and utilization.
Article 61(3), which is where MSY is mentioned, is concerned with keeping the population at a level which can produce the MSY. This condition is satisfied by a range of population sizes, the upper limit of the range being the maximum population size, set by the carrying capacity of the environment. At the lower end of this range, harvesting the MSY will, according to the simple population models, leave the population at this same level (the MSY level). At higher levels continued harvesting of the MSY is possible, and will cause the population abundance to decrease until it reaches the MSY level. Sustained harvesting from population in this range at any rate less than the MSY will cause the population to stabilize at some point in the range, and any such harvests would seem to be consistent with the terms of this Article of the draft treaty.
There seems, therefore, no reason, so far as the Law of the Sea is concerned, for the allowable catch to be set at, or even close to, the MSY (always assuming that such a quantity can be defined and measured). However, the concept of MSY is wide when considering management, and the setting of allowable catches, and it is worth considering it in more detail.
The concept of MSY has been subject to frequent attacks (e.g., Larkin, 1977). Many of these are economic or social in nature, but there are also biological objections. The principal ones are (1) there are natural fluctuations in the abundance and productivity of many stocks, unrelated to fishing, (ii) the yield that can be taken from a stock varies with the pattern of fishing (ages and sizes of fish caught), and (iii) the possible yield from one stock depends on events on other related stocks (e.g., of species that feed on the first species), including any exploitation of those stocks. Thus it is not possible to determine a unique and constant value of the MSY from a stock. The catch that may, in biological terms, be taken will vary from year to year, depending inter alia on the natural conditions in that year (e.g., occurrence of a good year-class), the sizes of fish being harvested, and fishing and other events in related stocks. Some, though not all, of the complications are dealt with by talking about MSAY, i.e., the Maximum Sustainable Average Yield, which would be the greatest yield that could be taken under average conditions.
Modification of the MSY in the light of economic factors, as mentioned in Article 61(3), is a curious concept. The MSY, to the extent that it exists, is a biological entity determined by the nature of the fish stock and its physical and biological environment, and will not be affected by the economic factors affecting the fishery. What is presumably meant by this concept is the modification of the target or allowable catch to a figure that is different from (and therefore less than) the MSY. The need for such a modification arises from the fact that, as pointed out in the frequent criticisms of the MSY concept by economists, the economic and social benefits from a pattern of fishing that takes the MSY will be generally less, and often much less, than those from alternative patterns involving a lower amount of fishing. The benefits from fishing at a level less than that giving the MSY include lower total costs, greater catch rates for the individual fishermen, reduced year-to-year variability in catches, and greater stability of the fish stocks. The benefits generated will be of different types, and each type of benefit will, in general, require a different fishing pattern to be maximized. For example, keeping the catch rates of individual fishermen high (e.g., not less than the level required to give them a reasonable net income) will require a lower amount of fishing than maximizing the number of fishermen employed. There is therefore no unique pattern of fishing which, for a given stock, can a priori be considered optimal. However, if the national objectives are defined, and the balance between them established, then it is, in principle, possible to establish the optimal fishing pattern appropriate to those objectives. These could well change over the year as national policies or other factors, e.g., fuel prices, change. In any given year this optimal pattern (amount of fishing, sizes of fish caught, etc.) will produce a certain catch. This catch should maximize benefits (including future benefits, appropriately discounted), and could be considered the target, or allowable catch in the sense of the Law of the Sea discussion.
The most serious difficulty in the simple argument to establish a "surplus" is the implication in the fourth step ((d) above) that if the catch that would be taken by the coastal state, with its existing capacity is less than the target allowable catch, then the difference - "surplus" - can be taken without affecting the existing coastal state fishery. This is seldom the case 1/. Any fishing by foreign vessels, carried out in addition to fishing on the same stock by the coastal state, will reduce the abundance of the stock. This reduction will tend to reduce the catches by the coastal state, or require it to increase the amount of fishing (and hence costs) if it is to maintain its catch. In either case the benefits to the coastal state from the resources off its coasts will be reduced. The pattern of fishing is therefore on the arguments of the previous paragraphs, sub-optimal, at least to the coastal state. A surplus therefore does not exist.
1
/ There are exceptions. The commonest is when species taken by the foreign fleet is not harvested at all by the local fishermen. Generally in these cases there is little or no impact on local catches, but if there is an interaction with the locally caught species, there can be some effect. This may even be beneficial, if the species caught by foreign vessels preys on the locally caught species.
This argument ignores the possible benefits that the coastal state might get from the foreign fishery. It is now usually the practice for the coastal state to extract benefits of one kind or another from foreign fleets fishing off its coast. These benefits include direct payment of licence fees, supply of a certain proportion of the catch to local markets, assistance from the foreign country in training, etc., and others. If these direct benefits exceed the costs and reduced benefits to the local fishermen, then the overall benefit to the coastal state from the resource will be increased. In that case the "surplus" might be defined as the amount taken by the foreign vessels when the total benefits to the coastal state (however this is measured) are greatest.
Both the benefits and costs to the coastal state will be affected by the conditions of access (e.g., level of licence fees paid, location of foreign fishing relative to local fisheries, etc.). Thus the calculation of a surplus, and the determination of the conditions of access are not independent processes. The magnitude, and indeed the existence, of a "surplus", in the sense used here, depends on the degree to which the coastal state can devise conditions which will increase its net benefits, either from limiting the costs, or increasing the gross benefits.
It may be argued that, in determining the optimum level of exploitation, the quantity to be maximized should be the total net benefits to the world community, including both the coastal state, and other states whose fishermen might be granted access. This would be expected to result in a different and somewhat more intense pattern of fishing than that maximizing the net benefits to the coastal state alone. However, the difference may not in practice be large. It would clearly be unreasonable for the coastal state to agree to a state of affairs in which the distant water fishermen receive considerable benefits, while the coastal state is worse off than it would be if there were no non-local fishery. (This would be particularly true if the coastal state were a developing country, and the distant water vessels came from a rich developed country). Thus, to be feasible, any pattern of fishing must take account of the costs and benefits to the coastal state. Conversely a pattern of fishing to maximize benefits to the coastal state which involves non-local fishing, is only realistic if sufficient benefits are generated also for the non-local fishing vessels.
3. COSTS
3.1 Losses to existing fisheries
The most significant costs of any foreign fishery are likely to be the impact on the local fisheries, particularly, though not solely, through reduced stock abundance. There are, however, significant other costs. The draft Law of the Sea Convention gives the coastal state obligations as well as privileges, and the former include ensuring management and conservation of the resources. This obligation will involve costs in research, and probably in implementation and control of any management measures.
The costs imposed on a local fishery by the addition of a foreign fleet are illustrated in Figure 1. This shows a typical yield curve, relating the amount of fishing (fishing effort) to the average yield which would be obtained if that effort were maintained over a period. The present local fishery is indicated by the point A, with average annual yield of 50 000 tons. Since the maximum yield is well over 100,000 tons it might seem reasonable to allow access to foreign fleets to take 50,000 tons.
What would happen then will depend on the reaction of the local fleets, and on the conditions of access (whether measured as catch or effort). What is most unlikely to happen is that the local fleet will continue to catch 50 000 tons, and the foreign fleet takes the same. A doubling of total catch to 100000 tons (i.e., to the point A2) will require that the total effort is much more than doubled (from F1 to F2, i.e., from 32 to 120 units). If this were to happen, and the local fleet were to maintain its catch at 50,000 tons, it would have to increase its effort from 32 to 60 units (i.e., half the increased total effort). This would seem unlikely when one of the basic assumptions is that the capacity of the local fishery is limited. In any case such an increase in effort would involve an increase in costs.
A much more likely event would be that the foreign fleet takes 50,000 tons, and the local fleet maintains its effort at 32 units. This would increase the total effort (to F3) and the total catch (to A3). However, because of the fall in .catch per unit effort, the catches by the local fleet would fall (to C). In the example illustrated, this means a fall from 50,000 tons to about 35,000 tons. That is the loss to the local fishery as a result of allowing access by foreign fleets is some 15,000 tons.
In the simplest case, as represented by the preceding example, where two fleets operate on the same stock, and take the same sizes and condition of fish, the impact of foreign fishing will be given directly by the marginal efficiency, in the sense of Gulland (1968), that is the proportion of the catch taken by additional fishing effort (in this case the foreign fleet) which represents real additions to the total catch rather than from reductions in catches from existing vessels. Figure 2 shows how this marginal efficiency decreases as the total catch (expressed as a percentage of "MSY") increases. The curves correspond to different assumptions about the biological characteristics of the stocks and the nature of the model used in assessing the state of the stock. Too much attention should not be given to the details of the curves, but it should be stressed that even for the upper (most favourable) curve the marginal efficiency falls significantly below 100% when the stock is still relatively lightly exploited. For example it falls to 90% when the catch is between 10% and 30% of the maximum, i.e., at these low exploitation rates the reduction in catches by existing fleets is 10% of the catch taken by additional vessels.
In practice foreign vessels will often not exploit the same segment of the resource as local vessels. Typically they can be expected to work further offshore and in deeper water. This is likely to involve somewhat different species, and usually larger and older individuals when the same species are concerned. An obvious, but perhaps not entirely typical example is that of most penaeid shrimps. Juvenile shrimp occur in lagoons and other inshore waters, and are taken there mostly by small-scale fishermen using traditional gears, while the adults occur offshore and are harvested by commercial trawlers (locally based or from foreign countries). In such cases, if only the events during a single brood of fish or shrimp is considered, there will be no direct effect of the offshore fishery on the inshore catches. However, if heavy fishing affects recruitment of young fish, then the offshore fishery can affect the fishery on juveniles. To the extent that the most serious impacts of too heavy fishing come as a result of recruitment failure, and the fishery on the adults can have the final determination of the size of the spawning stock, this effect can be large. However, it is difficult to determine and conclusive evidence of so-called "recruitment over-fishing" usually comes only after the stock concerned has collapsed.
To the extent that a new fishery exploits total different species to any existing fishery there will be no immediate impact. However, it is unusual for there to be no overlap at all. Trawl fisheries in particular tend to take a large number of species incidentally (the so-called by-catch) even when they are targetting principally on one or two major species. These can cause losses when there is a local fishery specializing on one of the by-catch species. For example in the Northeast Pacific one of the most valuable demersal species in the North American fisheries is the halibut. Considerable problems were raised (particularly before the introduction of 200 mile limits) through the incidental catches of small halibut by the trawl fleets from Asia, which were targetting on the more abundant but lower priced demersal fish (flatfish, rock fish and Alaska pollock).
Even when there is no overlap, it cannot be assumed that there will be no interaction. Experience in areas as diverse as the North Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, and the upwelling areas off California and Chile/Peru, have shown that the relative abundance of different species can change dramatically, and that the rise or fall of one species can be influenced by the degree of exploitation of other species. The interactions can be in different directions. The abundance (and hence the catches) of a predator will tend to be reduced by heavy fishing on its prey. However, catches of the prey species will tend to benefit from heavy fishing on its predators, or on other competing species.
Precise assessment of the reduction in catches by the existing fishery as a result of allowing access by foreign vessels will probably be difficult. Nevertheless some rough calculations can always be done, which will at least show the likely order of magnitude of any potential loss to existing fisheries, which can then be set against the potential benefits. At a minimum yield curves (or at least yield-per-recruit curves) of the type shown in Figure 1 can be determined. These will tend to provide an upper limit to the losses, on the assumption of complete mixing.
The assessments of the likely impact of foreign fishing should in most cases not be limited to a single 'best', or 'conservative', estimate, but should consider how the effects might be modified by the nature of the foreign access, and the degree to which this can be controlled. For example, a foreign fishery might be considered that could operate a long way offshore partly on species not caught by the local, inshore fleet, and partly on the older individuals of the species caught by the local fleet. In either case the direct impact of an offshore fishery would be expected to be small. However, the best catch rates for the foreign vessels might occur closer inshore, so that there would be greater overlap in species and sizes of fish caught with local fisheries, with correspondingly greater impact. The assessment of potential losses should therefore take account not only of the gross magnitude of any foreign catch, but also the sizes and species of fish caught. The degree to which these characteristics of the foreign fishery can be specified in advance, and made part of an access agreement - and enforced - is obviously also an important part of any assessment.
3.2 Costs of monitoring and control
The responsibility placed by the new Law of the Sea on the coastal state for the conservation and rational utilization of the resources of the EEZ, e.g., in determining the allowable catch, etc., implies costs to the coastal state. A full implementation of this responsibility might seem to imply that all relevant data (including statistical information from the fishing fleets) are collected and compiled; that these data are analysed to determine the status of the stocks; that appropriate management measures are determined and implemented, and that action is taken to ensure compliance with the regulations. All these costs tend to increase when foreign vessels participate in the fishery.
The most obvious of these costs is perhaps those involved in the last stage - control and enforcement. This aspects has been considered at a number of FAO consultations, and will not be considered further here, in a note concentrating on resource aspects.
The other costs, particularly the costs of data collection and research, are not negligible, and tend to be increased by the presence of foreign fishing, and the changes in the Law of the Sea. The first point is obvious - if fishing is restricted to local fleets, and perhaps only to the near-shore stocks, the amount and costs of research needed to monitor the stocks is clearly less than when large fleets are involved, and monitoring of the resources will have to cover their activities, and the offshore areas they exploit. The second needs some explanation. In the days of a 3 or 12-mile limit, when all nations had at least a theoretically equal access to high-seas stocks, there was a tradition - best developed in the discussions in ICES and ICNAF - for complete pooling of basic data (e.g., catch statistics) and free exchange between all scientists. Any country could have access to fairly comprehensive and unbiassed information about any stock by doing little more than participate in the discussions of these bodies, or their appropriate working group. While the situation has not changed completely, scientific discussions are now much more influenced by the conflicts of interest between the different countries. These, as a result of the changes in jurisdiction, have become increasingly polarized between coastal states and distant water fishing countries. In particular, in the context of granting access to a possible "surplus" it is clearly in the interests of the latter to show that stocks are large, and under-exploited. The coastal state would prefer a more conservative interpretation.
In these circumstances a coastal state would be foolhardy to rely entirely on research and interpretation provided by the distant water countries. It will require sufficient research effort and scientific expertise of its own to at least check the systems of data collection, and the methods of analysis used. This raises questions of more than cost; many of the coastal states have only limited scientific expertise, and what they have is in strong demand for other urgent tasks. Here there is a clear opportunity for independent input, as exemplified by FAO's regional fishery bodies, and particularly the role played by FAO or other experts independent of any of the countries involved, in the technical activities (assessment working parties, etc.) of these bodies.
Note:
I am grateful to Prof. Burke for drawing my attention to the question of what data the coastal state is required to take account under the terms of the Convention. This is a legal question which I am not competent to answer. The point here is what data a coastal state would need, in own interests, in order to set appropriate controls. It will need more data, and the data will cost more to collect and analyse and there are foreign fleets fishing.
3.3 Indirect effects
In addition to the above direct effects, allowing access to foreign vessels will often indirectly affect in a number of ways the patterns of national fisheries development in the coastal state. The effects can be beneficial - the foreign fishing can demonstrate where fish are, and how they can be caught, and develop a market (in the foreign country, the coastal state or in a third country). All of these can help the coastal state in building up its own fishery, and in many cases, ultimately replacing the foreign fishery. However, this effect may not be quite as beneficial as it might seem. The obvious tendency is then for the local fishery to develop along similar lines to the distant-water fishery. That usually involves large sophisticated vessels, with high capital and running costs, but relatively low labour costs. This may well not be the most appropriate form of development for the coastal state. As has been emphasized elsewhere (including in documents for other preparatory meetings for the FAO World Conference, e.g., on Control of Effort, and Development Strategies), there are a great variety of objectives (food, employment, economic profit, etc.) which a country can pursue, and the choice and balance between these objectives will greatly influence a country's policies. In particular it is likely that national objectives, and other non-fishery factors (availability of capital, or of skilled or unskilled labour) in the coastal state will differ from those in the distant-water fishing country. The former may therefore find that it would be quite inappropriate to use the latter as a model or guide for developing its own fishery.
In passing it may be noted that even in developed countries the large distant-water trawler is seldom the most economically efficient unit. Developing countries can be misled into thinking that very large sophisticated trawlers represent modern fishing (and therefore the type of fishing they should aim at), whereas the most successful fisheries in developed countries are often the small, family-owned, vessel of a type not so very different to vessels appropriate to developing countries.
Somewhat similar remarks can apply to some of the "benefits" - training, research, technical assistance, etc. - that can be offered by distant-water countries in return for access. These undoubtedly can be extremely useful to the coastal state if appropriate to its conditions. Too often, though, the nature of the training, etc., is appropriate to the conditions of a distant-water fishery (e.g., training in the operation of large factory trawlers) and at best may be useless, and to the extent that it encourages the wrong type of local development, may be positively harmful. As another example the construction (even at no cost to the coastal state) of a large well-equipped scientific laboratory or research vessel can be of little value if the coastal state has not the staff and resources to run the institution or vessel properly, and would be harmful if it distracts scientific resources from other work.
4. DISCUSSION
The earlier sections of this paper have reviewed briefly the concept of a 'surplus' existing within a country's EEZ to which foreign fleets might be given access, and the costs, direct and indirect, which might be experienced by the coastal state as a result of granting such access. It is clear that a "surplus" is a slippery concept, subject to various interpretations. Under plausible interpretations a "surplus" exists, and access should be granted, only if the benefits that could occur would exceed the possible costs, direct and indirect, to the coastal state. These costs include reduction of catches by existing local fisheries, costs of research, monitoring and enforcement, and the possible undesirable distortion of future developments in the coastal fisheries.
These may not be easy to evaluate precisely, but rough estimates are possible, and should always be made. These evaluations should also consider how different conditions of access to a given 'surplus' (e.g., in terms of the season or location of fishing, or the sizes or species caught) can affect the losses. In many cases, especially when the same stock would be exploited by the local and foreign fleets, the losses could be considerable. Then a 'surplus', under the interpretation used here, would not exist, even though the current catches might be well below some theoretical MSY. Coastal states may therefore wish to adopt a cautious attitude to granting access, though it should also be stressed that the potential benefits can, in some circumstances, be large (though the true worth of some of the 'benefits' should be evaluated carefully), and, subject to the assessment of the possible costs, access by foreign fleets in those cases should be welcomed.
Figure 1
Figure 2
