Chapter 8
Support plans

Support plans provide the backing to enable implementation of the ASF or other emergency disease contingency action plans.

FINANCIAL PLAN

Experience has shown that delay in obtaining finances is a major constraint to rapid response to emergency disease outbreaks. Immediate application of even modest funds can save major expenditure later. Forward financial planning is therefore an essential component of preparedness.

Financial plans need to be developed to provide immediate provision of contingency funds to respond to disease emergencies. These are for expenditure required over and above normal operating costs for government veterinary services. Plans should be approved by government departments, including economic planning authorities and the department of finance.

The funds may cover the cost of the whole eradication campaign. They usually cover the initial phases of the campaign, pending a review of the outbreak and the control programme and funds required to finalize eradication.

The conditions under which funds may be released should be specified in advance. They would normally be provided to the CVO when:

• ASF or another emergency disease has been diagnosed or suspected;
• the outbreak can be controlled or eradicated;
• there are approved disease-control plans in place.

The funds may be held as special funds sequestered for the purpose or as drawing rights against a government account to an agreed amount.

In some countries, it may be desirable for funds to be provided by the government and private sector for emergency programmes against ASF and other diseases, as agreed after reviewing the nature and proportion of public and private benefits derived from elimination of the disease. A funding formula may be agreed upon, covering payment by each sector of a fixed percentage of the total cost of the campaign or whereby each sector pays for specific components. If the private sector is to contribute, it must be determined who benefits and therefore who should share the cost. This may include processing industries, traders and farmer organizations. It must be determined how private-sector funds will be raised. This could be done by livestock industry levies, perhaps on livestock transactions or slaughterings, held in secure funds or industry insurance. Voluntary individual insurance policies are satisfactory for insuring against losses from a disease or disease-control actions but are unsatisfactory for raising campaign funds.

It may be that funding of the whole emergency disease eradication campaign is beyond national resources. In this case, forward planning should be carried out to identify potential international donors, including emergency support from FAO or other international agencies. Procedures for applying for funding and requirements for submitting an application should be determined in advance.

The financial plan should include provisions for compensation to owners for livestock or property destroyed as part of the disease eradication campaign. Inadequate compensation is inherently unfair and counterproductive to the campaign, fostering resentment and lack of cooperation. It also encourages farmers to hide the presence of the disease. Compensation should be based on a fair market value of the animals at the time of slaughter, assuming values for healthy animals. The same principle should be applied to products and property. Valuation should be done by independent, professional valuers. If individual valuations are not practical, generic valuations for different classes of livestock may be acceptable. Compensation for consequential rather than direct losses are difficult to administer and are inappropriate. If replacement of stock after a period is considered a better alternative than cash compensation, it should be confirmed in consultation with pig owners, as some may be discouraged from resuming pig farming.

RESOURCE PLANS

The first step in preparing a resource plan is to make a resource inventory. This is a list of resources needed to respond to a moderate-sized outbreak of ASF or another high-priority emergency disease, including personnel, equipment and other resources. The following resource lists should be regarded as indicative rather than exhaustive:

National animal disease control centre

• senior disease control veterinarians and epidemiologists;
• financial and administrative officers;
• staff for recording and processing epidemiological and other information;
• maps of scale 1:50 000 and 1:10 000;
• computers;
• communication equipment to local headquarters, e.g. telephone, fax and e-mail.

Local animal disease control centres

• senior disease control veterinarians and epidemiologists;
• technical support and administrative officers;
• offices;
• office equipment;
• maps;
• telephone and fax;
• proformas for disease control operations.

Under some circumstances, computers with e-mail may be available.

Diagnostic laboratories

• trained laboratory staff;
• standard laboratory equipment;
• specialized equipment for key emergency diseases;
• diagnostic reagents for antigen (FA) and ELISA.

Diagnostic/surveillance

• veterinarians and support veterinary auxiliary staff;
• transport;
• maps;
• communication equipment;
• leaflets or posters on the disease(s);
• equipment for collecting and transporting diagnostic samples, including blood;
• animal-restraint equipment.

Slaughter, burial and disinfection

• supervising veterinarian and other personnel;
• transport;
• humane killers, ammunition or other approved means of killing, such as carbon monoxide for poultry;
• protective clothing;
• animal-restraint equipment;
• front-end loaders and earthmoving equipment;
• approved disinfectants, soaps and detergents;
• shovels and scrapers;
• high-pressure spraying equipment;
• fuel for incineration, generally diesel mixed with a small amount of petrol and old tyres to expedite burning by encouraging air circulation and maintaining high temperatures.

Quarantine and livestock movement controls

• enforcement teams;
• transport;
• road blocks;
• signs and posters.

A list of existing resources should be prepared, including specifications, quantities and locations. A register of specialist staff should be maintained, with qualifications and experience with ASF. Resource lists and staff registers should be maintained at the national disease control centre and regional offices.

Comparison of the lists of necessary and available resources will inevitably highlight many deficiencies. The resource plan should identify how these deficiencies can be rectified in an emergency.

There are various options for obtaining the necessary extra resources:

• a list of places where essential equipment and stores may be purchased, hired or borrowed;
• a central store of hard-to-obtain items, such as disinfectants, and items that take time to prepare, such as proformas;
• arrangements for supply of personnel and equipment from other government agencies, e.g. earthmoving equipment from the department of works and transport and communications equipment from defence forces;
• arrangements made through veterinary associations for temporary employment or secondment of veterinary practitioners in an emergency.

Supply of diagnostic reagents presents special problems, as international sources are limited. An international reference laboratory for ASF should be consulted about sources of reliable diagnostic agents.

It should be noted that to maintain adequate diagnostic capacity and ensure competence, laboratories should routinely perform basic tests on specimens of known and unknown status and send test samples to reference laboratories from time to time to cross-check even negative results.

The resource plan and inventory lists need to be regularly updated.

LEGISLATION

Acts of parliament or government regulations providing the legislative framework and powers to carry out disease control actions need to be put in place as part of preparedness planning. This may include legislation to:

• make ASF and other animal diseases compulsorily notifiable;
• allow entry of officials or other designated persons on to farms or other livestock enterprises for disease-surveillance purposes, including collection of diagnostic specimens, and to implement disease control;
• authorize proclamation of infected areas and disease-control zones;
• authorize the quarantining of farms or other livestock enterprises;
• authorize bans on movements of livestock, livestock products or potentially contaminated materials and issue permits for movement under specified animal-health conditions;
• authorize compulsory destruction and safe disposal of infected or potentially infected animals and contaminated or potentially contaminated products and materials, subject to fair compensation;
• authorize other disease-control actions;
• provide for compensation to owners of livestock and property destroyed as part of disease-control programmes and define standards for such compensation;
• allow codes of practice to be mandated for risk enterprises and livestock markets, abattoirs and knackeries and authorize disease-control actions for them;
• authorize compulsory identification of animals where appropriate.

For countries which operate under a federal system of government, there should be harmonized, consistent legislation for animal disease emergencies throughout the country. The same should apply between countries in regions where there is unrestricted exchange of livestock and animal products under free-trade pacts, such as the European Union, the Mercosur countries in South America, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).