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1. ABSTRACT


It is important to realise that, no matter how "parallel" the two institutional set ups and the different production systems they govern may seem at first glance, some sort of informal articulation and communication normally exists between the traditional and modern sphere, often on land matters. With the probable exception of land conflict resolution, for which decision-making is more focused and ultimately usually lies with only one key authority, at all echelons there is a multiplicity of decision-making levels that frame traditional institutions. The involvement of traditional community leaders brings natural resource claims and conflicts closer to illiterate persons, who rarely dispose of the many resources necessary to bring to bear their civil rights over livelihood assets through formal government channels and do not understand all the rules and regulations, and the rights and duties that come with them.

They may not have any such rights under national statute law, which does not recognise traditional usufruct. The village is not usually recognised as legal entity, yet it is at this level that we find the traditional institutions that could sustain genuinely community-based natural resource management (NRM). As different worldviews and knowledge systems will run, or flow, into each other under decentralisation and devolution, the dichotomy that often opposes "indigenous knowledge" to "modern science" is misleading, and the participatory evaluation of both would appear a fundamental starting point when analysing the dynamics of adopting new technologies, or new management and decision-making procedures. Arguably, community participation must take into account the norms upheld by traditional leaders, which implies that "win-win" scenarios are usually rare at any level and some trade-offs unavoidable.

Leadership structures must be assessed and informed by local settlement histories, which contribute to determine institutional in- and exclusion. Cross-country comparisons, although in a context of adherence to different legal systems, will still be of use, to the extent that the recording and endorsement of local organising practices is based upon certain "cultural traits" common to agricultural and merchant societies. In relation to these traits, among the myths to be dismantled is that the customary authority structures they produce are gender-biased, atavistic, opaque, unaccountable, unchecked and necessarily "undemocratic": when applying the "modern" criteria of "good governance" to traditional structures, most of them fare surprisingly well - rather, their roles are tied to different mechanisms for participation, social inclusion and decision-making on NRM.

NRM and village development committees have become ubiquitous, but their social legitimacy must be analysed, and the way in which their including traditional authority would modify decision-making mechanisms (and the interface with local government). This inclusion can take place in direct or in less direct ways, but should always be accompanied by providing flexibility in institutional arrangements that can be revised. Committees should not be newly created, but, if possible, existing institutions used, and, if necessary, adapted: in many areas a point of "saturation" with "artificial" committee structures has been reached (some call it "committee-mania") oblivious to farmers’ time constraints. Within the time constraints of development agencies there is a need to promote more thorough work on feasability analyses and longer term investigation, which can also take place alongside project activities.

The mode of "ownership" will be reflected in local interpretations of, and expectations from, the decentralisation process, which should be explored, as they may augur well or not, so that early "remedies" can be sought. Since for the time being it remains the most visible manifestation of decentralisation at the village level, local perceptions are much related to the process of restructuring administrative territories, as geographical units. Information is provided below on why to involve traditional leaders in the decentralisation and restructuring process. The extent to which this may be happening anyhow (by default) is part of the research hypotheses that guided fieldwork, which have not found to be relevant in all countries.

1.1. Introduction

FAO’s involvement with the issues emerging below goes back more than thirty years. In 1965, O. Draz, then FAO adviser in Syria, travelled to Saudi Arabia and was struck by local traditional hema range management, by its potential and the religious sanction behind the system; upon his return he began to promote the restoration of tribal control of grazing (discussed below in the context of Yemen).

Past centralised approaches to socio-economic development have led to meagre results, which is why advocacy for greater decentralisation is gaining momentum at a global level. Decentralisation is no new item on the agenda of policy-makers, but it is now taking place in a different, arguably more favourable context in political terms. Former attempts at greater decentralisation have largely failed to take into account the vital dimension of local institutions (Pretty 1995, Uphoff 1997). In the words of N. Uphoff, "for rural development, it is important to consider the capacity of local institutions, not as an alternative but as a complement to central institutions." (...) "Local decisions can benefit from generalized knowledge just as central decisions can be improved upon by considering local knowledge" (1997: 11, 19). Local knowledge embodied in "traditional" community institutions and customary authority systems are not always visible to outsiders - unless some representatives of such systems are already incorporated into local government structures, and hereditary positions are confirmed and recognised officially. They may not necessarily be that "traditional" either, and there is an ongoing debate about how tradition has often been "invented" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Douglas 1986, Mamdani 1996) to further the interests of particular actors in the rural setting, especially the colonial regimes of the time[1].

In rural areas decentralisation policies intervene in already established political arenas which notably are marked by the legacy of numerous development interventions. Development initiatives using the rural community as an entry point should thus be informed by a detailed analysis of the local polity and social structure if the benefits for those who are normally excluded are to be more than marginal (Messer 1998). The involvement of traditional community institutions may come at the expense of broad community participation, and not include groups of lower social standing. However, in situations where their involvement is indeed desirable, how could this be achieved? Related to such discussion is the increasingly popular concept of social capital as an analytical tool to appraise the "development value" of autochthonous patterns of collaborative social organisation and cohesion. The present research has therefore asked what constitutes social capital linked to traditional institutions in the context of community-based development, what in- and exclusion rules may lead to the bypassing of certain segments of rural society and/or to disproportionate advantages of certain others?

Among the few areas in which some formal articulation has been documented between decentralised government institutions (and NGOs or multi-/bilateral agencies) and traditional (community) institutions is the realm of common property resource management (see, e.g., FAO 1999 a,b). But in reality informal linkages do already take place. A sustainable operational mode of organisation, articulation and communication among the stakeholders of decentralisation processes must be found, and the policy framework be not just "enabling", but one that would allow an iterative process to mature, until such a mode is found and adjusted to. A people-centred development and sustainable livelihoods focus implies reaching beyond the relatively "safe" production and environmental issues to some more sensitive geo-political, socio-economic and cultural concerns, and the rise of civil society. Policymakers often lament inadequate levels of management capacity at local levels, and sometimes use this as an excuse to not further devolve responsibilities. By backing local practices, "advertising" and, possibly, articulating them better, the realisation is endorsed that decentralisation must also take place "from below", and the process equipped with a greater deal of credibility and the reciprocal trust necessary for its success.

1.2. Background[2]

The present publication builds on a brief literature review (FAO 1997c), which found that the various considerations on these institutions in connection with the particular historical and political background of the different countries have led to government policies that can be related to in five groups: policies of exclusion, policies of integration, policies of adaptation or "modernisation", policies of association or "controlled dualism", and policies of informality or "laissez-faire". These policies defy all generalisation and unilateral relation of cause and effect, but nonetheless reveal a strong tendency toward exclusion among the former command economy countries whereas countries with free market ideologies can be found elsewhere in the typology[3]. "In general, the role of traditional institutions is much determined by the nature of the layout of local political arenas, the modes of negotiation and confrontation between the different local institutions and the strategic groups that interact with them, the nature of what is at stake, the potential for institutional mobilisation and the social or symbolic capital which the main actors of these institutions dispose of. This "micro-political dimension" is important but often underestimated in the field of development, particularly in respect to the management of resources generated by projects or other interventions" (FAO 1997c: 1).

In the past just like today, to refer to the sphere of "tradition" may come in handy for any given individual or group of actors attempting to take advantage of opportunities. In a number of cases, "traditional" authority has thus been enforced by powerful groups from outside the community to suit specific purposes through the legitimacy conferred upon it by the explicit reference to the "traditional", and justified by that same élite in their interactions with international development personnel on that basis, exploiting romantic Western notions of long-lost "community life".

What may be appealing to outside organisations (trying to find an entry point for community-based initiatives) is of course the sustainability of these rural institutions, enduring many a change in central government and development paradigm. This sustainability is in large part due to what Douglas (1986) calls a stabilising principle, which is often supernatural, or ancestral. It is this same principle that has frequently enabled the imposing of "traditional" leadership and practices on local communities who "should [and would, of course] know better", in other words, they may be aware of the fact that traditions are not impartial, are being manipulated or invented, but may put up with it as long as these arrangements are not seen as socially contrived. The processes unfolding in local socio-political arenas need to be understood on a case by case basis and the relationship of traditional authority to the history and heritage of the population groups of a given community assessed. Only then can we speak of social organisations and "grass-roots institutions" that are traditional in the sense that they are agents embodying important levels of cultural and social capital. It will then be necessary to examine what (type of) "agency" they have, namely, the capacity for action of social actors, or else their pragmatic competence[4].

Villagers themselves will create strategic alliances and invoke rules and legislation to best suit their needs (Messer 1999). This leads to different ways of trying to secure benefits from a project (or a decentralisation programme), or to impose exclusion or damage to competing social groups, but may also lead to new synergies. Personal identity is to a certain extent pre-determined through kinship, but may emerge in coalitions and change according to the resources to be captured, in function of the necessities felt at a certain point in time, and by a certain member of the household (it will be subject to the dynamics of intra-household resource allocation and decisions based on gender roles). In view of understanding what is "traditional", and how, it is therefore essential to disentangle the actors and their web of interlinked tactics, local norms and their dialectic relationship to individual strategies. According to Baland and Platteau (1996), "Tradition can play two central roles to support village-based common property resource management: (a) via norms of social behaviour and (b) via well-established patterns of authority and leadership. These two effects are in fact tightly linked in so far as one of the functions of traditional authorities is precisely to activate and reinforce social or moral norms" (324). The present analysis examines the practical implications of these norms through field research carried out during 1998 and 1999 in Yemen, Mali, and Mozambique. The underlying hypotheses, taken up in section 5 below, were never perfectly relevant in all research settings. Nonetheless, they guided fieldwork inquiries by providing a background against which the same kind of questions were asked[5].

1.2.(i) The broad institutional framework of decentralisation and rural development

After a period of state formation, many developing countries are now facing the challenge of improving the performance of governance by bringing the latter closer to the daily trials and tribulations of their rural constituencies[6]. As elsewhere, in Mali, Mozambique, and Yemen, community participation and political decentralisation have in part been determined by the "development paths", the major macroeconomic and political decisions, of these nations, which are quite unlike each other. The latter two countries have only recently emerged from civil wars that have had profound impacts on parts of their countryside and rural development programmes, particularly with regard to the physical and psychological consequences on local institutional relationships. To start discussing wider civil society-state relations the broad institutional framework and some stylised facts are introduced below to set the stage for an analysis of traditional community institutions[7].

Yemen

During the 1960s the Government of Yemen established a "Central Council for Tribal Affairs", to resolve disputes between rural tribesmen at the community level, and to provide suggestions about local needs. After the independence of South Yemen in 1967, the country became divided into two states: the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north. The latter replaced the councils in the early 1970s with Local Development Associations (LDAs)[8], formed through local elections and developed independently, and supported these associations technically and through the contribution of 75% of the traditional (religious) tax of zakat, collected by local government authorities at district level. In the mid-1980s the LDAs were replaced by the parastatal Local Development Boards (LDBs), and people felt their local initiatives were constrained by the new LDB laws, as these became less independent and their zakat support controlled by the Ministry of Finance. The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was divided into six governorates, superseding the earlier tribal administrative divisions, and the government established state agricultural and cooperative farms. In 1968, it declared a reconciliation among the tribes, prohibited tribal revenges and passed two land reform laws, in 1968 and 1970. These laws confiscated the property of sultans, emirs and sheikhs without compensation, and classified waqf, desert, and forest land, common rangeland and water resources as state property - whereby most of land in the southern governorates turned legally into state property. Most rangelands became neglected after the abandonment of traditional (urf) management rules.

Mali

During the first republic of Mali, the conception and execution of development activities during the period immediately following independence were characterised by strong government involvement and national consolidation (with the associated standardisation of many norms and policies), sometimes to the detriment of local people’s initiatives. The circulation of goods and capital was controlled and the country relatively isolated, leading to informal cross-border transactions through a number of illicit networks and a devaluation in 1967. After the national assembly was dissolved after a coup in 1968, GDP slumped and food insecurity expanded, following a phase of extreme hardship especially for the rural population, transactions and the movement of cereal within the country are liberalised; collective agricultural fields abolished; the population allowed to move freely between the cities, and; contacts facilitated by government with the farmers of neighbouring countries. The government of the second republic of Mali brought about several steps towards decentralisation beginning in 1977 by creating participatory regional, local and sub-local structures called Development Committees and Councils[9], which are assigned authority to conceive, programme, implement and control development initiatives. These are converted into budgetary terms by the Council, composed two-thirds of elected members and one-third by appointees of the government administration in Bamako - the Committee is in charge of their execution, under the supervision of the Council. However, farmers suffered from heavy taxation, dissatisfaction spread, and after the growing civil society movements finally overthrew the 2nd Republic in 1991, democratisation became unstoppable.

Mozambique

At independence (1975), the Government of Mozambique put in place a system of state farms and government marketing boards in charge of administering prices for agricultural commodities, sold through (now abolished) stores part of a nation-wide rationing system. It also introduced Grupos Dinamizadores (GDs), a political branch of the party in power, Frelimo[10], including in the rural areas the Presidentes de Localidades. The idea of decentralisation takes hold in 1984 with Frelimo’s fourth party congress, which initiated changes centred on four main reforms: regional prioritisation, administrative decentralisation, liberalisation of commercial activity, and allocation of resources on the basis of economic pragmatism. Military destabilisation by Renamo[11] and ensuing civil war left infrastructure and rural institutions - shaped by colonialism, socialism, and local customs that have "survived" both - severely damaged. In 1996, an amendment to the 1990 constitution establishes the municipal framework, and in 1997 twelve further municipal laws are passed (law 2/97), which state that the decentralisation process does not affect the rural areas, but only the autonomy of urban municipalities (cidades, vilas, or postos administrativos). Discussions are in progress on the role to be given to municipal governors, as well as the geography of the decentralised provinces[12]. Recently, the event causing the most interest among civil society groups has been the process of formulating the new land law (19/97[13]) by which individuals or communities can acquire land rights through occupancy and use of a plot for at least ten years, or by occupying land according to "customary norms and practices", provided these are not contrary to the constitution.


[1] "Traditional" community institutions refers here to a variety of power structures (or 'dimensions of authority') in local communities, both 'formal' and 'informal' authorities, 'visible' and 'less visible', legal/rational and charismatic, political and religious, structural and functional, general and specific (e.g., leadership among women, youth, etc.) that can be conceived of as being "traditional" or "customary" in the functionalist sense - no value judgement is implied. "Traditional" community institutions are based on interpersonal, mostly face-to-face relationships among social (rather than administrative) units that are conceptually distinct from those contained in the modern construct of the nation-state. Throughout the document the risk is taken of over-simplifying complex ethnographic information, and the terms "traditional" and "customary" are used in an inter-changeable way.
[2] A semantic note...on the terminology contained in the present document is necessary, as the changes and modifications in language and its use are normally much slower to occur and establish themselves than the changes and modifications in the cognitive environment that they refer to (Mafeje 1999). As a result of the difficulties of conceptualising a number of notions employed below it has proven very difficult to use certain terms. Given that none of them is new or "neutral", they will evoke feelings and memories that are shaped by international, national and local history and they therefore become to a large extent locality-specific - or else the same terms will be interpreted differently depending on the context in question. Among these, many are directly associated with the colonial period, and the designations in use then may still be current today, formally or informally. This poses a considerable problem (and threat) to those who would like to see certain community institutions considered within the new context of decentralisation without the stigma carried over from the past. Which does not mean that historical information will be ignored, or that stigmatisation does not play a role in people’s awareness, behaviour, and preferences vis-à-vis collaborative activities. On the importance of local history and perceptions thereof in NRM planning see e.g., Astone (1998).
[3] More examples of the traditional/administrative chieftaincy, the councils of elders and the traditional associations illustrate these different policies further, and are discussed in that paper. Future research could elaborate an equivalent typology of local responses to government policies vis-à-vis traditional leadership (Scott 1999).
[4] The concept of agency has been elaborated by Giddens (1979).
[5] Draft Working Papers/Discussion Notes produced 1997-2000 by this research programme include:

FAO, 1997c, "Relations de Processus de Décentralisation et Pouvoirs Traditionnels: Typologie des Politiques Rencontrées", by N. Bako-Arifari, Decentralisation et Developpement Rural 15, FAO, Rome, 31 pages.

Othman, A. A., 1998, "Comparative Analysis of Traditional Structures in Decentralisation Policies and Programmes: Yemen Case Study," in Arabic, 36 pages.

Bâ, S. O., 1999, "Decentralisation et Pratiques Locales: Mise en relation du capital social, des institutions locales traditionnelles et des processus de décentralisation en vue d'informer les politiques de décentralisation," 102 pages.

Togola, K., 1999, "Decentralisation et Pratiques Locales: Mise en relation du capital social, des institutions locales traditionnelles et des processus de décentralisation en vue d'informer les politiques de décentralisation, " 74 pages.

Lamine, H. A. M., 1999, "Rapport de Synthese de l’Atelier ‘Decentralisation et Pratiques Locales de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles’," Bamako: AVES, 24-26 August, 12 pages.

Othman, A. A., and N. M. Messer, 1999, "Comparative Analysis of Traditional Structures in Decentralisation Policies and Programmes: Yemen Case Study," 76 pages.

Lundin I., and R. Alfane, 1999, "Análise Comparativa Das Estruturas Tradicionais Nas Políticas E Programas De Descentralizaçâo: uma leitura de realidade em Moçambique," CEEI, Maputo, May, 133 pages.

Soumaré, S., 1999, "Decentralisation et Pratiques Locales: Rapport de Synthese," 36 pages.

Lundin, I., 1999, "Alguns comentários sobre o resultado de um estudo sobre autoridades tradicionais," communication to the Seminar on "Rural Household Income Strategies and Interactions with the Local Institutional Environment", 26 July, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, Mozambique.

Lundin I., and R. Alfane, 2000, "Traditional Structures in Decentralisation Policies and Programmes and Rural Reality in Mozambique," 41 pages.
[6] This may of course rather happen "by default", in attempts to capture important rural votes. The important thing to remind oneself of is, to borrow a phrase from Chambers (1997), whose reality counts?
[7] The technical details of the legal provisions of decentralised NRM are discussed in section 4 below.
[8] For a succinct discussion of community-based associations see also UNDP, 1999, "Community-Based Regional Development in the Republic of Yemen", Component IV, Programme III, PAEG.
[9] Government decree NE77-44/CMLN of 12 July 1977 created the Comité de Développement and Conseil.
[10] The Frente para a Libertação de Moçambique. J. Hanlon finds that: "It could be argued that democratisation is even more important at local level than at national level. Indeed, Frelimo's biggest mistake may have been to convert the grupos dinamizadores (GDs) into party cells rather than local government structures. At their best, the system of GDs and mass meetings was profoundly democratic; local people in their neighbourhoods and workplaces were involved in all of the decisions that affected their lives. If Frelimo had been able to maintain some of this level of democratisation, many later problems might have been avoided" (1997).
[11] The Resistência Nacional de Moçambique.
[12] "The first law on decentralization with the deconcentration of responsibilities, Law 2/87, is approved by the one-party Popular Assembly in 1987. In August of 1994, Law 3/94 is approved, where it is considered to decentralise the management of urban and rural districts, with a local government to manage the finances and património of these territories in 128 rural and 23 urban districts. It is a product of this phase of the debates that provoked many reflections, which obviously were not without controversies. In June of 1998 the first local elections, took place in thirty three autarchies, but the opposition boycotted the act almost in full" Guambe (1998).
[13] Passed by parliament in September 1997.


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