The Final Act of the Conference (Annex 2) provides a long and impressive list of States that participated in the Conference. However, representatives from many of these States only attended the sessions intermittently, and most States did not participate actively in debate in either formal or informal sessions. Indeed, it was pointed out by Peru, in debate at the sixth session, that only about 40 to 50 States had participated to a significant extent in the Conference.
The primary dichotomy on most issues in the Conference was between States with distant-water fishing interests and coastal States, with the former group being heavily outnumbered in terms of the latter group. The intensity of debate and discussions at the Conference illustrated, in a classic manner, the highly political nature of fisheries conservation and management.
All of the world's leading DWFNs participated actively in the Conference, and on all major issues before it. This grouping of States including China, Estonia, EC, Japan, Korea, Poland, Thailand and Ukraine, strongly defended their distant-water fishing interests. This situation is understandable given the national importance of high seas fishing to these States. In 1993 these States took 3.1 million tonnes of fish of all species on the high seas, representing 65 percent of the total high seas catch.
In Conference discussion and debate, DWFNs argued principally from the 'freedom of the high seas' premise, as set forth in Article 87 of the 1982 Convention. While DWFNs saw the need for the more effective conservation and management of high seas fish stocks as a means of arresting further resource degradation, there were fundamental differences with coastal States on how and what measures needed to be put in place in order to prevent further stock depletion and to allow them to be rebuilt.
At issue for DWFNs throughout the Conference was the primary concern that their conditional right to fish on the high seas would be eroded through the progressive development of international law. Indeed, some DWFNs viewed the Conference simply as an attempt by some coastal States to extend national influence beyond the provisions of Part V of the 1982 Convention.
In debate these States generally sought to minimize the regulation of high seas fisheries through precisely described global measures. Rather the DWFNs maintained that the outcome of the Conference should specify conservation and management arrangements in broad terms only, and that subregional or regional organizations or arrangements should have the responsibility for developing and implementing arrangements based on subregional or regional needs, taking into account the dynamics of particular fisheries.
The major issues for DWFNs in the Conference centred around the issues relating to the compatibility of conservation and management measures; areas of high seas surrounded entirely by an area under the national jurisdiction of a single State; duties of the flag State; international cooperation in enforcement on the high seas, and port State measures. While supporting fully the special requirements of developing States under the Agreement, the DWFNs at times expressed concern in the Conference about those developing States that already had well developed domestic fleets which were now fishing to a significant extent on the high seas. The DWFNs sought to ensure that these developing States with large industrial fleets were not exempted from meeting obligations under the Agreement by virtue of the level of their economic development.
Both developing and developed coastal States were strongly represented at the Conference. However, not all coastal States had a congruent interest in the outcome of the Conference, and while they were united on many issues before the Conference, there were discernable schisms on some important issues such as the application of the precautionary approach in fisheries and data requirements for conservation and management.
An important grouping of coastal States in the Conference was the Like-Minded Group of States. This Group was led by a core-group consisting of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Peru, while the broader membership included Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Viet Nam. However, some of these States did not take an active role in debate at the Conference.
The core-group of the Like-Minded States met frequently, usually on a daily basis throughout the sessions of the Conference, while meetings of the Group as a whole were less frequent. The core-group of the Like-Minded States also convened intersessional meetings to consider issues before the Conference, to coordinate positions in the debate and negotiations, and generally to develop a common strategy towards the Conference.
In the course of the debate and negotiations at the Conference coastal States were primarily preoccupied with two fundamental inter-related issues: the need to protect the integrity of coastal States' rights and interests with respect to areas of national jurisdiction, as provided for in Part V of the 1982 Convention, and the implementation of conservation and management arrangements for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks that would not prejudice or otherwise undermine national efforts to secure proper and sustainable utilization of these stocks within EEZs.
In the early sessions of the Conference there was some support among coastal States for the separate treatment of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, especially by those States that had a significant interest in the former stocks. However, some coastal States, and in particular developing coastal States, believed that such an approach could lead to a disproportionate focus on one type of stock and as a consequence they did not favour such a strategy for negotiation purposes. For this reason there was agreement among the coastal States that both types of stocks should be treated together.
During the deliberations of the Conference it was apparent that some developing coastal States, which already have important high seas fisheries or which have national policies in place to expand into high seas fishing, sought to lessen the restrictions associated with high seas conservation and management, as might be agreed by the Conference, or to use their developing country status to reduce obligations with respect to high seas fishing. This situation put these coastal States at odds with some other developing and developed coastal States on some issues such as the application of the precautionary approach to fisheries conservation and management, data requirements for conservation and management, and duties of the flag State.
For coastal States some of the major issues in the Conference focused on compatibility of conservation and management measures, the role and functions of regional or subregional organizations or arrangements in fisheries conservation and management, non-members of organizations or non-participants in arrangements, flag and port State control, international cooperation in enforcement and effective dispute settlement.
With the exception of some Latin American States, and in particular Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru and Uruguay; small island developing States (SIDS) from the South Pacific including Cook Islands, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Samoa and Solomon Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago from the Caribbean; African States such as Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal, and Asian States including China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, developing States generally took a low profile in Conference debate and in the deliberations of the informal working sessions. In a large measure the degree of participation by developing States reflects the economic importance of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks to these States and the impact that the outcome of the Conference could be expected to have for these States. As a group in the discussions and debate, the Group of 77 did not play an important role in the Conference process, though the chairperson of the Group made a small number of interventions on matters not germane to the substantive fisheries issues before the Conference.
The Chairman's revised negotiating text, issued at the third session of the Conference, contained a detailed section relating to the special requirements of developing States with respect to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. Developing States, and in particular those with important economic interests in the two types of fish stocks, played a key role in the debate that led to the strengthening and consolidating of the provisions of this part of the text (see Part VII of the Agreement) and in securing technical assistance commitments from developed States. In discussion on this issue FAO's role in assisting developing States enhance their national capacities for fisheries conservation and management was acknowledged explicitly and subsequently reflected in Article 24 of the Agreement.
One difficulty that many developing States faced with respect to Conference participation was the high cost of sending and maintaining delegates in New York for extended periods of time. It was pointed out by some States that it costs US$ 10 000 per delegate for airfares and per diem for a three week session of the Conference. Few developing States were in a position to afford such high costs and as a result consistency in representation at the Conference was adversely affected.
In accordance with UNGA resolution 47/192, the Conference Secretariat established a voluntary fund to support the participation of developing States in the Conference and some States benefited from that fund. However, the availability and extent of these funds were usually not known well in advance of sessions and this created difficulty for some developing States in planning their participation.
