Part I: Rationale and scope of local-level resource management: lessons from economic theory
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1. Natural resources and economic growth: towards a definition of sustainability
1.1 Production and exhaustibility
1.2 Justifying a conservationist strategy
1.3 Sustainability and reproducibility
1.4 Sustainability and individual rationality
1.5 Conclusion
2.1 A preliminary statement of the problem
2.2 The problem of open access
2.3 The problem of common property
2.4 Co-ordination failure under common property
2.5 The conjectural variations approach
2.6 The lindahl equilibrium
3. The property rights school solution: the privatization programme
3.1 The position of the property rights school
3.2 The efficiency of the privatization programme
3.3 The distributive impact of privatization
4. The unregulated common property: The prisoner's dilemma revisited
4.1 The role of private contracting: Lessons from the coase theorem
4.2 The role of decentralized punishment: Spontaneous co-operation in repeated PD games
5. Co-ordination and leadership in the unregulated common property: some lessons from game theory
5.1 Unilateral contribution
5.2 Co-ordinated contributions
5.3 Heterogeneous situations with PD, AG, and CG players
5.4 Conclusion
6. Moral norms and co-operation
6.1 Norms as constraints on the pursuit of self-interest
6.2 Norms as social devices shaping preferences and expectations*
6.3 Considerations about the emergence and erosion of moral norms
7. The possibility of co-operation: lessons from experimental social psychology
7.1 Co-operation in repeated games
7.2 Co-operation in games with communication
7.3 Co-operation in one-shot games
8. The Regulated Common Property
8.1 The efficiency of regulated common property
8.2 The distributive effects of regulating common property
8.3 Common property resources in the context of pervasive factor-market imperfections
8.4 Conclusion
9. Some concluding reflections on the privatization of common property resources