It is significant that fisheries experts (including fisheries economists) are stressing the importance for management purposes of two of the concepts that underlie systems of traditional management. These are limited access and local participation. And under particular circumstances, some of those experts also note the value of closed seasons (Bhukaswan, 1980:51).
Natural resource management economists time and again have explained the reasons why historically mature commercial fisheries tend to enter into a period of decline corresponding to our fourth stage (Crutchfield, 1982; Pearse, 1980). This all too common “depressing pattern” (Crutchfield's words) is caused by an influx of fishermen into a common property fishery in which profits (or a subsistence standard of living during bad years) can be made. As more fishermen compete for a limited resource, overcapitalization (Marr, 19) is apt to occur on larger bodies of fresh water (including the larger natural and manmade lakes in Africa and some major rivers like the Amazon). Even if it doesn't, catch per unit effort, per capita income and living standards of fishermen decline.
Solutions to the problem must involve limited access; “economically, rational fishery management necessitates the transformation of common property through some kind of limited entry system designed to optimize net benefits from the fishery” (MacKenzie, 1983:iii). As for local participation through the revitalization and adaptation of traditional management systems and the creation of new institutions, we have already quoted a number of fishery experts advocating that approach which would link local participation and limited access by giving fishing communities greater control over a restricted fishery (Kapetsky, 1981; Christy, 1982; and Panayotou, 1982). As for closed seasons (and closed areas), Bhukaswan notes their utility for various freshwater fisheries (reservoirs in particular) in Asia (1980:51–52), while Welcome (1979:12) suggests that “control of fishing season” may be the most reliable of current management techniques advocated by governments for large rivers.
Against this background it is depressing to note that few government agencies (including fishery departments) emphasize any of these features (with the partial exception of closed seasons) as major management modes for riverine fisheries. Just as fishermen are part of the problem yet must be involved in its solution, so it is with government agencies which continue to stress such regulatory measures as gear restrictions which undercut the economic efficiency of fishing units. In addition not only are they virtually unenforceable except under special conditions, but also the use of fisheries personnel for enforcement purposes undercuts their effectiveness as extension agents and data collectors.
Such dominant regulatory measures are usually derived directly from, or have been influenced by, restrictions placed on traditional fisheries by colonial governments. Generally speaking, these were designed to protect the fish rather than to enhance living standards of fishing communities. Techniques, like poisoning, which were unfamiliar or culturally abhorrent to colonial officials were prohibited in the absence of research concerning their actual impact. Though often now called fisheries assistants, the lower level officials in direct contact with fishermen were literally called “fish guards” in former British colonies, while their counterparts in departments of wildlife and forestry were often called “game guards” and “forest guards”. Their relationship with local communities was apt to be an adversary one, the fish, game and forests to be protected from the locals by a series of rigidly enforced prohibitions, of which -- in the fisheries case -- gear restrictions were the most common. And, as we have seen, limited access rights of local fishing communities to the fish resources on which they were dependent were undercut rather than supported and given a legal basis. Even various techniques of intensification, like “brush park fisheries ” were apt to be viewed with some suspicion (Welcomme, 1979:194).
Though a greater willingness to experiment exists today, there is far more continuity with the colonial past in approaches to the management of riverine and other small-scale fisheries than change. This is in spite of the fact that report after report emphasizes the economic irrationality of many of the current management techniques along with the inability of countries in the tropics to enforce them. Enforcement problems are underscored by recent reports and letters from experts dealing with small-scale fisheries development in various countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Received in response to our request for up-to-date information, a sampling of replies follows:
Gambia: Baseline information sufficient to design such strategies as seasonal and areal closures is “lacking”. Reliance on dominant measures by “stipulating a minimum mesh size (is) ineffective because of several factors” including shortage of manpower, inaccessibility of fisheries and the multiple role of fisheries personnel with their “ tax collecting or law enforcement” functions causing fishermen “ to loose confidence and respect in fisheries personnel.”
Uganda: “ The Departments of Game, Fisheries and Forests are still crippled for lack of equipment. … The lakes, particularly hard-pressed Kyoga, are being fished out by a desperate population growing at a rate of 3.5 percent a year.”
Central Africa: “That Departments of Fisheries do not have the staff to enforce regulations is clear.”
Indonesia: “There is essentially no enforcement of any regulations (with the notable exception of the trawling ban …). It is my feeling that local level participation is essential for enforcement… (I suspect) lack of enforcement here is only partly due to lack of enforcement personnel…. Telling a poor fisherman that he must not use a certain length net or a certain mesh size just doesn't make sense. He is just trying to make a living.”
Amazon Basin: “Amazonian Indians, for example, would benefit from the legalization and protection of their traditional lands (and their inherent resources), but such legalization … has not been implemented in most areas.”
Costa Rica: Though continental fishing for commercial purposes is prohibited by law, problems include, “the illegal fishing which is destructive (because it utilizes) methods such as explosives, poisons, lime, arbaleta, tarraya, etc., commercial illegal fishing, (and) lack of logistical support and personnel” for the Department of wildlife.
Honduras: “First of all I want to let you know that due to the low budget for the area it has not been possible to carry out a program of fishing management in our country.”
Looking to the future, it is important for Departments of Fisheries to take a new approach to the management of riverine fisheries where they work with local communities to help the latter increase production and raise their living standards. Such dual goals can only become compatible if limited access is combined with government assisted local participation and a variety of other management techniques which are considered in the final section of this report. Even if current management techniques were up to the task (and there is very little evidence of cases where they are), most governments in the tropics do not have the financial and personnel resources to enforce them. For that reason alone enforcement, to succeed, must have the understanding and strong backing of the fishing communities themselves.
