1. Opening of session
2. Election of Chairperson
3. Adoption of the Agenda
4. Why manage small-scale fisheries in sub-Saharan Africa? (emerging trends and benefits)
5. Presentation of the review of experiences in managing small-scale fisheries in sub-Saharan Africa government management traditional management co-management (coastal, inland [reservoirs and lakes], lagoon)
6. Constraints in the application of the approaches
7. Lessons learned (compliance, enforcement, costs, economic and social impacts)
8. Future strategies for applying management systems in the region (fishery, local conditions, institutions, processes, policies)
9. Recommendations for small-scale fisheries management in sub-Saharan Africa (strategies and policies)
10. Adoption of the Report
DONDA, Steve
Principal Fisheries Officer
Department of Fisheries
Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environmental Affairs
P.O. Box 593
Lilongwe, Malawi
Tel: (265) 78 85 11/78 80 70
E-mail: [email protected]
HUTCHFUL, George
Deputy Director of Fisheries
Ministry of Food and Agriculture
P.O. Box M 37
Accra, Ghana
Tel: (233-21) 77 60 05
Fax: (233-21) 77 60 05
E-mail: [email protected]
KONAN, Angaman
Coordonnateur halieutique
Ministère de l'agriculture et des ressources animales
BP 84, Adiaké, Côte d'Ivoire
Tel: (225) 07 04 21 98/21 24 86 80
Fax: (225) 21 35 04 09
E-mail: [email protected]
MAEMBE, Thomas Wanyika
Director of Fisheries
Natural Resources and Tourism
Fisheries Division
P.O. Box 2462
Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania
Fax: (255) 22 21 22 930
E-mail: [email protected]
MANNING, Peter
Fisheries Management Consultant
76 Sandbrook Road
Stoke Newington
London N16 OSP, UK
Tel: 020 7249 28 17
E-mail: [email protected]
NDIAYE, Ousmane
Chef de Division Pêche artisanale
Direction de l'océanographie et des pêches maritimes
Ministère de la pêche
1, rue Joris
BP 289, Dakar
Sénégal
Tel: (221) 821 65 78
Fax: (221) 821 47 58
E-mail: [email protected]
NJOCK, Jean-Calvin
Responsable de la Gestion des ressources aquatiques
Programme des moyens d'existence durables dans la pêche
01 BP 1369, Cotonou
Bénin
Tel: (229) 09 25
Fax: (229) 05 19
E-mail: [email protected]
ONABANJO, Margaret (Ms)
Deputy Director (Fisheries)
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and
Natural Resources
P.M.B. 135, Garki
Abuja, Nigeria
Tel: (234-09) 234 51 29
Fax: (234-09) 234 64 25
E-mail: [email protected]
POMEROY, Robert
Senior Scientist
World Resources Institute
10GSTNE
Washington DC 20002
USA
Tel: (1-202) 729 7623
Fax: (1-202) 729 7620
E-mail: [email protected]
SOWMAN, Merle (Ms)
Co-Director
Environmental Evaluation Unit
University of Cape Town
Private Bag, Rondebosch
Cape Town, South Africa
Tel: (27-21) 650 28 71
Fax: (27-21) 650 37 91
E-mail: [email protected]
ZERBO, Henri
Chef de Service Etudes et statistiques
à la Direction des pêches
Ministère de l'environnement et de l'eau
09 BP 1104 Ouagadougou 09
Burkina Faso
Tel: (226) 35 60 36/61 63 04
Fax: (226) 35 70 69
E-mail: [email protected]
BONZON, Alain
Fishery Planning Officer
Fisheries Department
FAO Headquarters
Viale delle terme di Caracalla
00100, Rome
Italy
Tel: (36-06) 570 56441
Fax: (39-06) 570 56500
E-mail: [email protected]
HARRIS, Aubrey
Senior Fisheries Officer
FAO Subregional Office for Southern and East Africa
P.O. Box 3730, Harare
Zimbabwe
Tel: (263-4) 22 52 69
E-mail: [email protected]
JALLOW, Alhaji
Fishery Planning Officer
FAO Regional Office for Africa
P.O. Box 1628, Accra
Ghana
Tel: (233-21) 70 10 930 ext. 3193
Fax: (233-21) 70 10 943
E-mail: [email protected]
BEDARIDA-GAVEH, Sroda (Ms)
Freelance Interpreter
P.O. Box 586, Mamprobi
Accra, Ghana
Tel & Fax: (233-21) 23 29 86
E-mail: [email protected]
DJIN, Evelyne (Ms)
Freelance Interpreter
P.O. Box 10373, Accra-North
Accra, Ghana
Tel: (233-21) 22 19 56/50 12 20
E-mail: [email protected]
IMBOUA-NIAVA, Victor
Interprète de
conférence
BP 474 Cidex 1, Abidjan
Côte d'Ivoire
Tel:
(225) 22 47 33 04/07 07 66 90
Fax: (225) 22 47 52 06
TETTEY, Stephen
Freelance Interpreter
P.O. Box 15705, Accra-North
Ghana
Tel: (233-21) 50 00 53/
(233-24) 37 64 69
Fax: (233-21) 50 00 54
E-mail: [email protected]
INTRODUCTION
1. The Expert Consultation on Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Sub-Saharan Africa was convened due to the recognition that fisheries resources in many parts of the region are being overfished, and that these fisheries, if they are effectively managed, have the potential to reduce poverty, improve nutrition and contribute to economic growth. The fisheries in much of the region are small-scale and are characterized by strong community ties within fishing communities, high labour intensity, and relatively fragile livelihood conditions. Although the definition of small-scale fisheries is debated, in sub-Saharan Africa it generally refers to those fishers who use small, usually traditional, boats that are often motorized and who employ largely hand-operated gear.
2. At present, the prevailing regime for small-scale fisheries in the region is open access, whereby there are no effective limitations on entry and harvesting of fisheries resources. Within this context, there has been considerable growth in the number of people employed in small-scale fisheries in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, there has been population growth, expansion of trade and a rapid growth in the use of fishing technology. These factors have contributed to the significant pressure on fisheries resources in this region.
3. In recognizing the challenges facing the implementation of effective fisheries management plans, the Expert Consultation was convened to share lessons learned and explore possible solutions to the problems of managing small-scale fisheries in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a summary of a background document for the Consultation, with a particular focus on rights-based management and the involvement of fishers and other stakeholders in decision making and management responsibilities.
THE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGING SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES
4. Due to the problems outlined above, there is not a sufficient supply of fisheries resources to meet the demand for them. As a result, it is necessary to establish harvesting levels that are as close as possible to the sustainable optimum productivity of the resource. This entails identifying the biological optimum of the resource, which identifies a stock size that produces a catch that is as close as possible to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). In addition, maximum economic yield (MEY) is calculated in order to assess the economic optimum of a fishery. Ideally, these two concepts (MSY and MEY) suggest that for a particular stock, there is a level of fishing effort that can be sustained year after year, with surplus growth neatly compensating for overall catch. Although the practicalities of this are difficult to achieve, if these concepts are regarded as broad ranges of yields, rather than precise targets, then they do offer a conceptual framework for fisheries analysis.
It is recognized that once demand in a fishery exceeds the long-term optimal capacity of the fish stock to supply, there is a need to limit fishing in some way, if the maximum benefit from the resource is to be attained. This means limiting fishing effort, the combination of people, boats, fishing gear and ancillary equipment needed to harvest the fish. It means, essentially, that open access must end and that some people will have the right to fish while others will be excluded.
5. At present, through an open access fishery, no property rights exist. Even if fishers make claims to property rights, these do not exist because the claims are not enforced or respected by others. Thus, a 'right' refers to the capacity to assert a claim and have others respect it. Property rights, whether held by the state as state property, by a community as community or common property, or by an individual or company as private property, are an important basis for effective management of fisheries.
EXPERIENCES OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
6. Four case studies (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa and Ghana) were commissioned in preparation for the Expert Consultation, as a means of sharing experiences and lessons learned. All four case studies discussed co-management and examples of where co-management arrangements for small-scale fisheries have been introduced. In each of the countries, participatory stakeholder groups were formed as a means of participating in fisheries management, some of which have been delegated authority from government. It seems evident from these cases that if fishers are instrumental in developing and implementing rules that affect them, then this generates greater legitimacy and support for the management system.
7. However, these cases have also identified a number of problems that need to be recognized and addressed in order to achieve an effective management strategy. For example, fisher representation on co-management bodies is sometimes poor. There is often not enough time or resources to effectively support the initiative and open access needs to be limited in some cases. There is also a need to introduce alternative economic opportunities. A gap still exists between supportive policy and its implementation and there is a lack of support from government for co-management. Also there is still a habitual practice of a command-and-control style of management. With respect to the latter two points, it could be argued that governments have supported the establishment of co-management systems for fisheries, but have not appreciated the extent to which it requires a fundamental change of management culture and an empowerment of fishing communities.
8. Despite the problems that were identified, the cases highlighted examples where alternative approaches to managing small-scale fisheries have been explored. Obstacles still needed to be addressed, but foundations had been established to include fishers, and other stakeholders, in the management of fisheries as a means of increasing the legitimacy of the management system, establishing sustainable management of fisheries resources and improving the well-being of fishers.
CHARACTERISTICS OF RIGHTS-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
9. The importance of limiting access to a fishery has previously been highlighted. Critical to a rights-based system is the ability to exclude non-rights holders from access to the resource, otherwise open access occurs and anyone may lay claim to the benefit of the resource. A property rights regime may change over time as the particular circumstances of each society changes.
i) Essential characteristics of the right
There are a number of key characteristics that are essential to establishing rights. Firstly, property rights to harvest fisheries resources must be clearly defined. Ambiguity breeds uncertainty, which makes enforcement difficult and encourages challenges to the rights. Secondly, rights should be structured in such a way as to make their enforcement realistic and cost-effective. Effective implementation rests with gaining maximum consent for the rules from the fishing community, thus establishing legitimacy for them and for their enforcement. Thirdly, the rights that are recognised or created should generate, as far as possible, the correct incentives to achieve optimal and efficient use of fisheries resources. The more permanent the rights, the greater the incentive to nurture and conserve the resource. Finally, a management system should allocate rights to specific shares of the fishery, however they might be defined, so as to eliminate wasteful competition and to encourage efficiency.
ii) Determinants of the form of right
A number of factors need to be considered when selecting the form that the rights should take for a particular fishery. First, the nature of the fisheries resource should influence the decision regarding the particular characteristics of any rights-based system. A sedentary species located in a particular region, for example, would lend itself to a form of right that would be different from a species that ranged widely along the coast and was targeted by many communities.
Second, the societal characteristics of the fishery need to be considered. The distinctive demographic, social and cultural characteristics of the community harvesting the resource should necessarily influence the form that the rights take. For example, the larger the number of small-scale fishers in a fishery, the more difficult it is likely to be to achieve cost-effective enforcement of the rights-based system. This points to the need for legitimacy for the rules and the rule-making authority, and thus to the importance of participatory methods of management. In addition, the compatibility of institutions and methods of regulation with the culture and traditions of a particular society will have a bearing on the likelihood of it being effectively implemented. Finally, the form of use rights decided upon must be consistent with the management capacity available to ensure effective implementation.
iii) The rights holder
Property rights may be held by individuals or companies as private property rights, but they may be vested with the state as public property, or as the common property of a group of individuals or a community. For small-scale fisheries it is particularly important that careful consideration be given to a number of issues when deciding on the property rights regime. The proposed property rights regime should encourage stewardship by promoting optimal use of the fisheries resources. To achieve this, the regime should be able to strike the right balance between competing economic and social uses of the ecosystem. Consideration should be given to whether the proposed management authority has the capacity to promote cost-effective methods of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) and the capacity to collect data. The extent to which the proposed property rights regime will lead to greater equity and participation among resource users, is an important consideration in building a readiness among fishers to comply with rules decided upon.
iv) The structure and functions of a fisheries management authority
A management authority is needed for a fisheries management system. Management authority functions may be vested in more than one body. These may include community organizations or rights-holder or stakeholder representative bodies, local or other sub-national levels of government, or national governments, or an amalgam of these. The selection of the body fulfilling management functions should be based on the body's legitimacy in the eyes of fishers, its compatibility with legal jurisdictions, and its political capacity to operate effectively.
The structure of the management authority should be tailored to the societal setting and to the physical attributes of the fishery. The management strategy needs to be flexible, to provide for the effective participation of fishers and others in the rule making and enforcement that will affect their lives and well being. It needs to provide a forum through which there is genuine power sharing, dialogue and decision making. These principles are embodied in the concept of co-management.
Co-management of fisheries may be defined as a partnership arrangement in which government agencies, the community of local resource users (fishers), non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders (fish traders, boat owners, business people, etc.) share the responsibility and authority for the management of a fishery. A typology of co-management incorporates five general types of co-management arrangements that range from central government instructing users on management decisions, to a scenario where user groups, who have been delegated authority, inform government of their decisions. Cooperative type co-management, situated in the middle, describes arrangements where government and users co-operate on an equal basis in decision making. There is no model for co-management, but the above typology facilitates an understanding of a wide range of complex management scenarios. Each of these could encompass different management tasks with different roles taken by the state and the other stakeholders, depending on the nature of the management task and of the makeup and abilities of the communities or groups participating in the co-management arrangements.
This co-management approach is important in the current situation with small-scale fisheries, where there are a large number of fishers, often operating over vast areas. In most cases government does not have the capacity to 'police' regulations, requiring an alternative approach to achieving fisheries compliance. It is argued that if fishers participate in developing rules and regulations that affect them, there is a greater tendency to support and comply with rules that they consider to be legitimate. Thus, co-management arrangements for small-scale fisheries in sub-Saharan Africa are a means of building legitimacy of the rules. Finally, community-based co-management arrangements should be nested within the national fisheries governance system. This is important in order to permit management authorities to have authority over the whole range of the target stock and yet also be compatible with the social, cultural and economic characteristics of the fishing communities and the broader society that utilize the resource.
A number of key functions of the management authority need to be highlighted. First, the management authority is responsible for recognizing or allocating rights to fisheries resources. A clear, explicit definition of rights is essential if they are to be recognized by others and enforced. The management authority would need to decide upon a set of criteria for an initial allocation of rights. Second, the management authority is responsible for addressing transitional problems. There is a need to move away from the open access, poorly managed regimes to more effective management based on access rights. This transition will bring clear gains to people involved in fisheries and to society as a whole. But it will also bring losses to some and it takes time to realize the gains. The problems generated by the delay between when losses are incurred and gains made need to be addressed. Failure to address the problems of this time lag can result in the proposed changes failing to materialize because of resistance to the change. Third, the fisheries management authority should take responsibility for ensuring the collection of data needed to make management decisions. While the tradition of scientific enquiry has much to offer in understanding our aquatic environments and the fisheries resources that depend on them, indigenous knowledge of such systems has been built up over centuries and this knowledge base should be utilized when making management decisions. Fourth, the management authority must back the rights-based system with effective monitoring and enforcement. The monitoring and enforcement mechanisms available will influence the types of rights that it would be feasible to use; for example, if it is not possible to monitor landings, a catch quota system will not be effective. In addition, monitoring and enforcement must be cost effective and affordable. However, compliance by fishers also relies on the extent of involvement of fishers in the management system, their understanding of its objectives and plans and the legitimacy of the management authority.
The management authority also needs to recognize the biological and socio-economic realities of the management system. Thus, it is important for a management authority to exercise control over the harvesting of a fisheries resource over the whole of its range, otherwise limits placed on harvesting in one part of a stocks range may be undermined by lack of restraint in another part of its range. This reinforces the need for a nested set of institutions designed to accommodate both the range of the stock and the socio-economic realities of those harvesting the resource.
v) The form of the use rights
As property rights define a relationship between people with respect to a resource, the form the property right should take depends on the particular circumstances of the fishery, including the traditions and the form of organization of the society in which the rights regime is embedded. There is not a particular form of property rights that is inherently the best for all fisheries, whatever the form the right might take, its objective must be effectively to limit the output of the fishery.
One form of right is called territorial use rights (TURFs) in which exclusive rights to fish are assigned to a community, group or individual within certain limits of aquatic territory. A TURF in itself does not necessarily constitute a sufficient limitation on harvesting. Outsiders may be excluded from the geographic area covered by the TURF, providing some limitation on catch, but without further rules, harvesting of the target stock is not necessarily limited to its optimal sustainable productivity. TURFs are best suited to resources that are relatively immobile or whose location at a particular time is predictable. In that case, the rights holders might have an incentive to assume responsibility for the development and management of the resource in question. In addition, TURFs should be nested in a wider management arrangement. Monitoring, control and surveillance would need to work in such a way as to offer an assurance to each community that other villages are complying with the agreed rules.
A second right relates to output controls - in which catches are limited and fishers have a right to a proportion of the catch. A total allowable catch (TAC) is decided as a percentage of the estimated biomass. A positive aspect of output control is that the TAC can be divided into individual catch quotas (IQ) (rights to catch a certain quantity of fish within a certain time frame). Catch quotas eliminate the incentive to race to catch the largest possible share of a limited quantity of fish and, thus, reduce the incentive to invest in boats and equipment for the purpose of winning that race. In addition, individual quotas that are assigned permanently, or at least for a long period, provide an incentive for fishers to achieve greater economic efficiency. However, there are also problems with this approach. First, if an individual quota system is to work in limiting the catch, there must be effective monitoring, control and surveillance. Catch quotas create an incentive to under-report catches as the size of a fisher's catch is used to limit how much more the fisher may harvest. Methods of enhancing the legitimacy of the rules increase compliance with them and allow more cost-effective enforcement methods to be adopted. Well designed co-management arrangements could help make output controls feasible in some instances.
A third right relates to input controls - which limits the right to use specified fishing effort. This includes limiting the size and type of boat, its power, the type of gear used, the size of the crew, the skills of the fishers and the time and location during which fishing takes place. The principal advantage of developing rights-based effort limitation is that it may be easier to regulate than output limitations. However, limiting inputs by licensing a specific number of fishing boats or sets of gear with just enough fishing effort to harvest the target species, does not create an incentive for the fisher to limit fishing effort as is the case with catch quotas. The incentive is still to catch as much as possible and to do so before others.
There is no simple choice of the form that rights should take for all small-scale fisheries in sub-Saharan Africa. The choice depends on the particular circumstances of each fishery and on the characteristics of the society, which may change over time. The forms that rights can take are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to have output limits (quotas) combined with effort limitations, area closures or closed seasons.
vi) Rights - the question of transferability
Making rights divisible and transferable theoretically facilitates greater efficiency. Secure and explicit rights generate a value for the owner roughly representing the resource rent associated with the catch that the rights permit. Formally permitting the transfer of rights has the advantage of permitting the management authority to establish conditions for their transfer that will meet the social objectives of the authority.
ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS AND DEVELOPMENT
10. The urgent need for alternative livelihoods for those displaced as a result of limiting access to small-scale fisheries are stressed in the case studies. It has been recognized that a time lag exists between when fishers incur change-induced losses and when the gains from limiting access become available. Although not a focus of the paper, it has been recognized that issues relating to the general development of the economy, value-adding to fisheries resources, exporting fish products and access agreements to foreign fleets need to be discussed further.
CONCLUSION
11. The principle aim of this paper has been to identify key lessons that might be applicable to the management of small-scale fisheries in sub-Saharan Africa. Key issues have been highlighted as a means of providing possible solutions to the complex problem of managing this sector. The case studies have indicated that some progress has been achieved in exploring alternative management strategies, particularly those that have implemented rights-based management and/or co-management arrangements. Although progress is still slow in many cases, lessons have been learnt and the sharing of this expertise is critical in identifying management strategies that will lead to greater success.
