0775-A4
Jesse C. Ribot 1
A key component of good forest governance is the nature of the relationship between the centre and the periphery, not just between government and local people, but crucially also between government agency headquarters and their field-level staff. This article presents preliminary findings and recommendations from research on natural resources in decentralization efforts around the world. The article is based on a World Resources Institute (WRI) Comparative Research Project in Africa, and cases presented at the WRI-organized Conference on Decentralization and Environment in Bellagio, Italy in February 2002. The Africa-wide research project conducted field studies in Cameroon, Mali, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2001. The papers presented in Bellagio were based on WRI's African research project, WRI's Resources Policy Support Initiative (REPSI) in Southeast Asia, plus case studies from Bolivia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua and Thailand. All the cases explore the degree to which natural resource decentralizations have taken place, the degree to which they are democratic in nature, and their measurable equity and environmental outcomes. Most of the cases focus on forestry, while a few explore wildlife and water management. The main recommendations, which reflect key elements found to be lacking in decentralizations, include: 1) Work with democratic local institutions as a first priority, 2) Transfer sufficient and appropriate powers, 3) Transfer powers as secure rights, 4) Support equity and justice, 5) Establish minimum environmental standards, 6) Establish fair and accessible adjudication, 7) Support local civic education, 8) Give decentralization time, and 9) Conduct research to monitor and evaluate decentralization and its outcomes.
Decentralization takes place when a central government formally transfers powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy.2 Development agents, natural resource managers, and some environmentalists are promoting decentralization as a way of increasing both efficiency and equity in natural resource management (Agrawal 2001; Ribot 2002a). Where decentralization reforms are proceeding, they affect how local people value, access, use, manage, and voice their claims and concerns about natural resources.
Theorists agree that the efficiency and equity benefits of decentralization come from the presence of democratic processes that encourage local authorities to serve the needs and desires of their constituents (Smoke 2000; Uphoff and Esman 1974; Crook and Sverrisson 2001:5). The underlying logic of decentralization is that democratic (or locally accountable) local institutions can better discern and are more likely to respond to local needs and aspirations because they have better access to information due to their close proximity and are more easily held accountable to local populations.3 Downward accountability of local authorities-accountability to local populations-is the central mechanism in this formula.4 In brief, effective decentralization is defined by an inclusive local process under local authorities empowered with discretionary decisions over resources that are relevant to local people. It is an institutionalized form of community participation.
As called for in Agenda 21, governments, donors, and international NGOs have experimented widely with participatory natural resource management strategies as a means for increasing efficiency and equity in natural resource management and use. CBNRM experiments, such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, Joint Forest Management in India, and Gestion des Terroirs in Mali, created participatory processes in which local actors have exercised natural resource management responsibilities and decision-making powers. We are interested in decentralization because it is the institutionalized form of these inclusive processes.
This paper presents some results of research conducted around the world on the effects of decentralization on natural resource management and equity. The core set of studies was conducted in Africa from 1999 through 2002 in Cameroon, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. These were then compared with other ongoing research presented at the Conference on Decentralization and the Environment held by WRI at Bellagio, Italy from 18-22 February 2002. All of the researchers characterized the state of decentralized institutional arrangements by exploring the actors, powers and accountability relations within their research site. They also examined the kinds of social and environmental outcomes that could be associated with changes in these institutional arrangements. Some preliminary findings are presented below.
By and large, environmental decentralization laws and their implementation are falling short of producing the most basic conditions necessary for effective decentralization. The transfer of power and accountable and representative local institutions are necessary elements of effective decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). But, central governments (a) transfer limited and overly specified powers and (b) choose nonrepresentative local institutions to receive those powers. Nevertheless, there are some outcomes that can be measured even from partial decentralizations.
In Kumaon, India, decentralized democratic authorities have sustainably managed forests for over 70 years (Agrawal 2001). In Nicaragua and Bolivia, decentralized forest management has resulted in some local councils-where local councils were more open to popular influence-protecting forests against outside commercial interests (Pacheco 2002). Decentralizations in Bolivia, Cameroon, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe have led to greater inclusion of some marginal populations in forestry decisions (Pacheco 2002; Oyono 2002a; Larson 2002; Conyers 2002; Mapedza 2002).
In Nicaragua indigenous groups have managed to put their natural resource concerns on municipal council agendas, where they have chosen to run their own candidates for municipal office (Larson 2002:13). The democratic processes behind establishing management committees in Cameroon's community-forestry schemes has allowed marginalized Baka villagers in Moangué-le-Bosquet to create a niche for themselves in forest management (Oyono 2002a: 11). Increased local revenues have also been generated through environmental decentralizations in Zimbabwe, India, Indonesia, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cameroon (Mapedza 2002; Conyers 2002; Larson 2002; Resosudarmo 2002; Agrawal 2001; Bigombe Logo 2002). In Cameroon, for example, new forestry laws earmark timber stumpage fees for elected local councils. In Mali, the state promised that forests would come under the control of rural councils. After years of waiting for the government to transfer powers to them, elected rural councilors whose jurisdiction includes Mali's Baye Forest lost patience and began to protect the forests on their own (Kassibo 2002). Despite the Mali Forestry Department's claims that local councils lack knowledge and ability to manage local resources, their initiative demonstrated a strong local desire and capacity to protect and manage forests for future use (Dembélé and Dembélé 2001).
In cases from Cameroon, Indonesia, and Uganda, transferring exploitation rights to local bodies has reportedly resulted in overexploitation of timber, primarily due to the need for income for local governments and local people. Local youth in Cameroon have expressed their desire to profit from the forests, citing the fact that previous generations and the government have done so before them, so why shouldn't they (Oyono 2002a). It is not clear in these cases whether local practices have been any worse for the resource base than the central government's common practice of allocation of commercial concessions. Decentralization should enable local people to exploit resources for subsistence or cash. The question is, who decides, and within what management parameters?
Some social problems, including elite capture and violence, have also been associated with decentralization. In some districts in Brazil, Bolivia, Cameroon, India, Indonesia, Mali, Nicaragua, Mexico, Senegal, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, elite groups have captured the benefits of decentralization efforts for their own use (Brannstrom 2002; Pacheco 2002; Oyono 2002b; Baviskar 2002; Resosoudarmo 2002; Kassibo 2002; Larson 2002; Melo Farrera 2002; Ribot 1999a; Bazaara 2002; Muhereza 2002; Mandondo and Mapedza 2002). In Cameroon, chiefs and management committee members are colluding to establish themselves as a new `forestry elite' (Oyono 2002a). In Indonesia and Cameroon, local people are being used as proxies for outside commercial interests to gain access to timber (Resosudarmo 2002; Oyono 2002a). Decentralization also changes the distribution of powers in complex ways, creating new winners and losers. Violence among resource users has been reported within decentralization efforts in Indonesia, Mali, and Cameroon (Peluso 2002; Resosudarmo 2002; Kassibo 2002; Latif 2002). In Mali, conflict among farmers and pastoralists has reportedly increased, but it is not clear that this increase is due to decentralization or to other changes in land occupation and herd management (Personal communications, Cheibane Coulibaly, Bamako, Mali 2001; Bréhima Kassibo, Bamako, Mali 2002).
Central ministries are targeting and allocating powers to a variety of local institutions in the name of decentralization. Often these institutions are neither locally representative nor accountable, since effective decentralization is not the only purpose of those choosing them. Choosing and building on representative and accountable local institutions is a critical aspect of decentralization. In short, the studies found that inappropriate institutions that are not systematically accountable to their people have often been chosen (see Ribot 2002b). These include customary authorities, NGOs, private institutions and individuals. Choosing these institutions does not establish democratic decentralization.
Obligations and instrumental objectives of the state are being transferred to local authorities in lieu of powers that create a domain of discretionary local decision making. These mandates are often unfunded. Tax and fee revenues, when available, do not always cover the cost of obligations. Uses with no commercial value are transferred instead of lucrative opportunities. Technical decisions, such as which management techniques should be used or which resources can be harvested and when, are often conflated with non-technical decisions concerning who should have access to natural resources. Treating commercial and subsistence allocation decisions as technical decisions for the forest service to make hides the fact that central government agencies are reserving for themselves what are ultimately political choices. These non-technical decisions are being retained centrally, though they are precisely the kinds of decisions that could be made by local authorities with little threat to the resource (Bazaara 2002).
A set of `subsidiarity' principles is needed for guiding the division of executive, legislative, and judiciary powers among levels of government. These principles could include the following: discretionary powers must be transferred to give local authorities some independence; these powers must have value or significance to local people; mandates must be matched by sufficient fiscal resources and technical support, and mandates should not be the only powers transferred to local authorities; commercially valuable resource-use opportunities should be transferred to local authorities in addition to subsistence-oriented usufruct rights; technical decisions, some of which need to be made at a central level, must not be conflated with political decisions concerning use of resources (i.e., who should have access to and benefit from them); attention should be paid to the separation and balance of powers at each level of government. Further, public resources-including most forests, fisheries, and pastures-should be kept within the public sector. They should not be privatized.
Even perfectly representative and downwardly accountable local authorities may overexploit resources and ignore minority interests if given the unbridled power to do so. Assuring positive environmental and social outcomes requires standards and means for ensuring that nationally defined environmental and social concerns are taken into account. A minimum environmental standards approach would replace the centrally directed micromanagement approach currently exercised through elaborate plans and planning processes. Most current approaches require excessive planning and supervision for any commercial use.
Before decentralizations can be judged, time is needed for them to be legislated, implemented, and take effect. First, locally accountable representation with discretionary power must be established. Then, accompanying measures must be identified to assure environmental protection, justice, and freedom from conflict. To encourage the decentralization experiment and test the conditions under which it yields the benefits that theorists and advocates promise, decentralization must be fully tested, monitored, and evaluated. Recommendations from this research are listed in the abstract.
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1 Senior Associate, Institutions and Governance Program, World Resources Institute, 10 G St., N.E., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20002, USA. [email protected]
2 See Agrawal and Ribot 1999.
3 See Ribot 2002b:5; Crook and Manor 1998; Therkildsen 2001; Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Saito 2000; Shackleton and Campbell 2001.
4 Brinkerhoff 2001; Therkildsen 2001; Olowu 2001; Blair 2000; Crook and Manor 1998; Agrawal and Ribot 1999.