0875-B1
Emily Boyd[1]
This paper addresses institutional fit between community forest owners, carbon sequestration and conservation. It relates a case study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project (NKMCAP) in Bolivia, which claims to be one of the world’s largest carbon sequestration projects. It argues that the scheme’s primary concern to protect and enhance the forest’s physical property by converting natural capital into financial capital for trading on the global carbon market undermined the institutions embedded in land-use and forestry, resulting in barriers to project outcomes. Over the project process, a shift took place from its initial focus to one on social capital. Focusing on the community level the research addresses the outcomes, perceptions and conflicts of the project. It frames these within the wider institutional arrangements over “rights” to carbon and the potential “misfit” between levels. The paper draws primarily from interviews with project stakeholders, communities and government officials, and an evaluation workshop in 2001 It recommends that to avoid conflicts bio-carbon projects must consider carefully issues of participation, bargaining power, identity and ownership. The paper recommends the particular consideration of social capital and local institutions in carbon sequestration and conservation projects.
A number of key barriers to change, implementation and outcomes are highlighted in the paper, such as power dynamics and hierarchies, local governance and participation. A participatory evaluation workshop (Boyd and Scholze, 2001) identified the problems that project activities had encountered, including unclear objectives and expectations that local people’s assumptions about sustainability were the same as the project’s. The compensation aspect plays strongly raising local expectations, as well as the assumption that local population would take on the rules established by project activities (such a micro-credit). One key expectation that ran across the project from global to local players was the underlying aspiration that the project would generate carbon credits in the first commitment period (2008-2012). The political pressures were thus extremely high to achieve positive results.
The lens of enquiry considers the impacts and barriers to carbon sequestration projects within a framework of scales, including: global, national and local institutions. Governance of carbon sequestration schemes take place at these scales, including, global actors such as multilateral investment banks, private sector and NGOs, and local forest user communities who are characteristically considered one of the principal agents of change to threatened ecosystems. Carbon trading is to whom carbon credits accrue, and whether the state represents the “rights” of people from who’s forest, tress and land credits are being gained. Each of these levels has something to gain in terms of benefits, but they have different interests and bargaining leverage, which impacts the sustainability of projects. The local issues most relevant to bio-carbon are rules over property rights access to information, organisation and participation.
· Local - Set to gain development benefits (land rights) biodiversity, environmental quality
· National - Set to gain credits/DFI/publicity at international level leading to more initiatives/biodiversity
· Global - Set to gain CO2 emissions reductions/biodiversity
The ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to stabilise greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Its Kyoto Protocol, established in 1997, sets legally binding emissions targets for industrialised counties amounting to a total cut of at least 5%from 1990 levels in the first commitment period (2008-2012) (UNFCCC, 2002). The UNFCCC and its Protocol represent a first step in the establishment of an international regime for tackling the problem of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol is the only legally binding framework that encapsulates the concept of paying for environmental services provided by forests and trees. Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities provide a low cost emissions reduction option through the removal of carbon dioxide from the global atmosphere through sinks (plantations/trees) or reducing emissions from the sector by curbing deforestation (conservation). However, LULUCF is associated with leakage, additionality and uncertainty risks, resulting in the exclusion of avoided deforestation as a mitigation option under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (emissions trading schemes between developed and developing countries).
Since the 1990s Bolivia has been actively engaged in creating environmental and social legislation regarding the use and management of its natural resources and participation of local peoples. These include, the 1992 General Environmental Law, 1994 Popular Participation Law, 1995 Plan of Land Use for Santa Cruz, 1996 Forestry law, 1996 Agricultural Reform Law (INRA), and the Law of Ministers Executive Power in 1994.
The Ministry of Sustainable Development and Planning was established in 1994 to oversee national development and within it the National System for Protected Areas (SNAP) and its National Services for Protected Areas SERNAP. The National Service for Protected Areas (SERNAP) was created in October 1998 as a decentralised and independent operative structure from the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Planning in La Paz. Its main objective is to co-ordinate efforts for the maintenance of protected areas, wildlife resources and genetics. The National General Treasury finances all of SERNAP’s activities through international donations and internal financing. SERNAP is the leader of its specific sector in the country and its mission is to co-ordinate the functioning of the National System of Protected Areas. (http://parksinperil.org/PiP/04a_partnerorgs.shtml#serviciobolivia)
Bolivia signed the United Nations Convention on Climate change in 1994, and in its commitment to that established the National Climate Change Programme in 1995 dependent on the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Planning. The main role of the Programme was to execute the National Communications and develop its National greenhouse gas inventory based on 1990 levels, to develop its vulnerability and adaptation strategies and it options for mitigation in the energy, forestry and agricultural sectors. The development of the National Action Plan for Climate Change in the Forestry, Agriculture and Energy Sectors ensued. In 1998, a National Council for Climate Change was established, which co-ordinates the State and NGOs, to participate in the development and implementation of National climate change strategies. The same year the establishment of the Bolivian Joint Implementation Office (PRONIC) took place (Vargas, 1999).
The Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project (CAP) was established in 1996 as part of the USIIJ pilot phase. Logging concessions were purchased through land acquisition by the Nature Conservancy (TNC) with the Bolivian government, and a consortium of companies including American Electric Utilities, BP Amoco, Pacificorp. The park which already existed was almost doubled in size to 1 523 446 hectares of diverse lowland and upland forests and was initially expected to sequester a conservative estimate of 14 million metric tones of carbon (tC) over 30 years (USIJI). Since then the estimate has been re-evaluated to up to 7 million tC. The project developed/negotiated an offset sharing system that provides 49% of the offset credits to the Government of Bolivia, 49% to the industry contributors and 2% to American Electric Power <http://www.aep.com>, the lead investor, as a project development “bonus.” The Government of Bolivia is required by contract to spend the proceeds from the sale of offset credits (20%) on park management activities in Noel Kempff and throughout Bolivia, and on other biodiversity preservation activities. Bajo Paragua is situated in northeastern Bolivia, bounded by the Paragua/Tarvo and Itenez rivers to the west and north, and Bolivia’s international frontier with Brazil to the east. The Park is characterised by its geological formation of the outcrops Caparu formed in Precambrian times.
The primarily CAP goal was to promote carbon emissions reductions through conservation by proving that leakage could be controlled. Leakage is the shift of activities from one area set aside for its carbon stocks to another area resulting in the over all increase in carbon emissions. The drivers of the project were the international investors and the private NGOs. The National Park’s objectives were to get the logging concessions in order to gain the rights to conserve the forest’s biodiversity.
There are a number of reasons identified, including: priorities (power related), project design and approaches underpinned by guilt for the loss of jobs and the need to target communities for leakage activities (change agricultural and production practices).
The overriding project objective was to conserve biodiversity and enhance sequestered anthropogenically induced carbon dioxide from the global atmosphere. The community development component experienced insufficiently clear priorities regarding sustainable development benefits. The types and quantity of activities reflected an over ambitious programme, which did not have clearly defined sustainable development objectives and contained many features of a conventional charity focused development programme. Dale Heydlauff, American Electric Powers, when describing the community development component of the project (2001) highlighted that “funding of sustainable development activities in local communities adversely affected by the cessation of the logging activities through the loss of jobs and tax revenue.” Expectations were raised as a result of communities being told they would receive compensation from the CAP as for the loss of jobs (and not so clearly regarding access to the Park). A sense of guilt including a lack of trust was reinforced from historical relations, which established an antagonism between the communities, project and the Park for the first three years of the project intervention. The aspirations of the CAP and the Park were that the communities should embrace the change opportunities brought about the project, particularly, regarding the activities directly linked to leakage activities such as agroforestry and management plans for agricultural farming. Several issues, such as local priorities for jobs, and control over their own territory and decision-making became central to the project activities.
The quantity of activities the community development activities included revolving loan funds for microenterprises, such as heart-of palm plantings, agro forestry projects, animal husbandry, and been keeping for honey production. The project has provided funding to enhance health care programs with physician, emergency medical air service purchase of an ambulance and Radio system and stocking of pharmacies and medicines; and potable water supplies and sanitation systems; improve schools; repair toads and bridges; and establish better communication systems.” The sheer volume of activities stem from the initial design phase, which established a list of demands, much like a shopping list of activities to be established in each community.
4.2.1 Unclear institutions: property rights
“Property rights are thought to represent a set of rules that do not change, and if they must change, then owners should receive compensation.” (Bromley, 1997) Property rights are identified in this research as one of the central CAP challenges. According the Bromley (1997) there are two types of rules (institutions) those that pertain to contract, bankruptcy, and credit, which deals with transactional insecurity and there are rules of property, which addresses possessional insecurity (1997:43). The logic set out by Bromley is extremely helpful in identifying the problems seen in the Region regarding compensation. In the case of Noel Kempff it is noted that the forest/land that became National Park was never formally community owned land. It was effectively public property under concessions but it was managed and accessed informally by local communities. However, the Park and the CAP caused reactions in the community associated with representation of authority and control (rules) over resources, which were perceived as “excluding” people from benefiting from the Park. A key problem according to the project was at the onset there was no clear local organisation, which would have made it difficult for the project to initially ensure that activities were targeted at key user groups and to establish networks with the right people to understand the local institutions. An adequate baseline- study was absent, thus understanding of community relations and human interactions with the natural resources was limited. It still remains unclear how the local institutions will adapt to the implementation of private agricultural plots established in the land management plans and how credit for agriculture and production will evolve over time.
It is necessary to acknowledge that carbon sequestration projects provide a learning experience, but that the issue of accountability and transparency needs to be addressed early on in the project process. The failure to initially recognise that the communities are responsible guardians of the Bajo Paragua region was a short-coming on the part of the project. Future objectives should be to make communities real partners in the management of the Park. Changes have already been taking place regarding the running of the community development programme, with the inclusion of community members. It is important to acknowledge that these schemes are driven by highly political interests and power lies in the hands of those institutions that have access to information and skills to negotiate deals. Local organisation and capacity building are key to counteract this, together with establishment of clear user rights, information, and continuous dialogue. The project failed initially to take the time to build up the necessary social capital with the communities, to understand what governs peoples actions, including perspectives on environmental and social justice.
The potential for using a Kyoto or non-Kyoto market in carbon for forest protection depends on the ability to capture resources and effectively implement these with the social dimension. Within the framework of the carbon market, actors, ranging from the international banks to national governments, the private sector and communities require a collaborative management that is comprehensive and transparent across levels. Effective and equitable design, implementation and management of mitigation requires mature, collaborative, cross-disciplinary approaches that captures extraordinary amounts of information on: social, cultural and spiritual values; economic aspects; capacity building; roles and responsibilities; management models; cross-sectoral policies; environmental functions and conservation; protection and restoration of forests; and carbon trading models. This requirement is possibly too demanding for where we are at in terms of thinking and capacity.
One of the greatest challenges encountered in the project and can be extrapolated to the wider picture is that of different languages reflected in priorities at different institutional levels. These are manifested in design, implementation and management of the project. These include issues of ownership of ideas, land rights, who gains directly, and access to information. It is recommended to consider social capital in the project design and the appropriate mechanisms for this, such as a participatory approach, dialogue, realistic timelines and simplifying objectives. It is necessary to bring the actors together to consider the new institutions needed in carbon sequestration schemes, such as the local organisation. Finally, schemes should consider social ethic, such as contracts with communities over the goals and objectives of the project, agreement and negotiation skills.
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| [1] University of East Anglia,
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK. Email: [email protected] |