![gaiv_top](/images/devanimalhealthlibraries/headers/gaiv_col.jpg?sfvrsn=58a49958_1)
23 May 2024, 08:30 hours; Rome
This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).
Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.
HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (25 April 2024): in total, 91 outbreaks/events have been reported in five geographic regions caused by H5Nx (5), H5N1 (79), H5N5 (4), H7N3 (1)* and H7N9 (1)*. (see Table 1 for details)
LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update (25 April 2024): 0 new event was reported.
Number of human cases officially reported since last update (25 April 2024): 3 new events were reported.1,2,3
* corrected on 24 May 2024.
1 https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2024_avian_influenza_report_vol20_wk15.pdf
2 https://www.health.vic.gov.au/health-advisories/human-case-of-avian-influenza-bird-flu-detected-in-returned-traveller-to-victoria
3 https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2024/s0522-human-case-h5.html
Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2023 (i.e. current wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023 (i.e. previous wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential reported since the last update
Virus | Country/Area | Last observed outbreak | # events reported since the last update | Total # events reported since 1 October 2023 | Species affected during the reporting preiod |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H5 |
China |
17/05/2024‡ |
2 |
2 |
Pallas's gull |
South Africa |
29/02/2024 |
1 |
31 |
Poultry |
|
United States of America3 |
23/04/2024 |
2 |
101 |
Rock pigeon |
|
H5N1 |
Brazil |
23/04/2024 |
4 |
58 |
Cabot's tern, Common Tern |
Bulgaria |
10/05/2024 |
2 |
16 |
Poultry |
|
Canada1 |
08/04/2024 |
26 |
98 |
American Black Duck, American Crow, American goshawk, Anatidae, Black-billed Magpie, Blue-winged Teal, Brent Goose, Canada Goose, Great Horned Owl, Horned Grebe, Mallard, Peregrine Falcon, Red-tailed Hawk, Rough-legged Buzzard, Snow Goose, Tundra Swan, Turkey Vulture, Velvet Scoter; Red Fox, Striped skunk |
|
Finland |
15/12/2023 |
1 |
71 |
Arctic fox |
|
Germany |
18/04/2024 |
1 |
186 (incl. |
Anatidae |
|
Hungary |
26/04/2024 |
1 |
135 |
Poultry |
|
Japan |
28/04/2024 |
5 |
138 (incl. |
Chicken; Large-billed crow, Mallard, Mountain hawk-eagle, Steller’s sea eagle |
|
Slovenia |
19/04/2024 |
1 |
14 |
Mute Swan |
|
United States of America3 |
16/05/2024‡ |
38 |
2 283 |
Turkey, Poultry, WOAH Non-Poultry, Live Bird Market; Bald eagle, Black-billed magpie, Common grackle, Hawk, Horned grebe, Red-tailed hawk, Rock dove, Rock pigeon; Bobcat, Cat, Cattle, Red fox, Virginia opossum |
|
H5N5 |
Canada |
08/04/2024 |
3 |
7 |
American Crow, Striped Skunk |
Japan |
30/04/2024 |
1 |
31 |
Large-billed crow |
|
H7N3 |
Australia4 |
23/05/2024‡ |
1* |
1* |
Poultry |
H7N6 |
South Africa |
18/12/2023 |
1 |
81 |
Poultry |
H7N9* |
Australia4 |
24/05/2024‡ |
1 |
1 |
Poultry |
Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal, government websites. Data cut off time: reported on 22 February 2024 8:30 CEST. $:estimate. ‡: date of confirmation.
The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are available HERE.
Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since 24 August 2023 are listed in the table, those reporting for the first time since 1 October 2023 in orange. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:wild birds, F: Feral, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans, example: W123 indicates 123 wild birds affected. EA: Fully Eurasian; rEN: Reassortment Eurasian and North American.
1 the total includes events with sample collection date since 1 October 2023 data issued from the Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link]
2 a detailed list of wild bird species affected, consult weekly findings report on avian influenza in wild birds from Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link]
3 for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link]
4 for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action, Victoria, Australia [link]
§: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link]
WILD BIRDS
Azat, C., Alvarado-Rybak, M., Aguilera, J.F. & Benavides, J.A. 2024. Spatio-temporal dynamics and drivers of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in Chile. Front Vet Sci, 11:1387040. reference
Muñoz, G., Ulloa, M., Alegría, R., Quezada, B., Bennett, B., Enciso, N., Atavales, J., et al. 2024. Stranding and mass mortality in humboldt penguins (Spheniscus humboldti), associated to HPAIV H5N1 outbreak in Chile. Prev Vet Med, 227:106206. reference
Hall, V., Cardona, C., Mendoza, K., Torchetti, M., Lantz, K., Bueno, I. & Franzen-Klein, D. 2024. Surveillance for highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) in a raptor rehabilitation center-2022. PloS One, 19(4):e0299330. reference
Provencher, J.F., Brown, M.G.C., Hargan, K., Lang, A.S., Lapen, D., Lewis, H., Mallory, M.L., et al. 2024. Pathogen Surveillance in Swallows (family Hirundinidae): Investigation into Role as Avian Influenza Vector in Eastern Canada Agricultural Landscapes. J Wildl Dis, 2024 Apr 26. reference
Ahrens, A.K., Jónsson, S.R., Svansson, V., Brugger, B., Beer, M., Harder, T.C. & Pohlmann, A. 2024. Iceland: an underestimated hub for the spread of high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in the North Atlantic. J Gen Virol, 105(5). reference
Cho, A.Y., Si, Y.J., Lee, D.Y., Kim, D.J., Kim, D., Jeong, H., Song, C.S. & Lee, D.H. 2024. Index case of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in wild birds, South Korea, November 2023. Front Vet Sci, 11:1366082. reference
DOMESTIC
Barnes, A.P., Sparks, N., Helgesen, I.S. & Soliman, T. 2024. Financial impacts of a housing order on commercial free range egg layers in response to highly pathogenic avian influenza. Prev Vet Med, 228:106209. reference
Ramsubeik, S., Stoute, S., Crossley, B., Rejmanek, D., Jerry, C., Jackson, W., Bland, M. & Ochoa, J. 2024. Natural Infection with H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Influenza (HPAI) Virus in 5- and 10-Day-Old Commercial Pekin Ducklings (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus). Avian Dis, 68(1):65-71. reference
Wolters, W.J., Vernooij, J.C.M., Spliethof, T.M., Wiegel, J., Elbers, A.R.W., Spierenburg, M.A.H., Stegeman, J.A. & Velkers, F.C. 2024. Comparison of the Clinical Manifestation of HPAI H5Nx in Different Poultry Types in the Netherlands, 2014-2022. Pathogens, 13(4):280. reference
Qui, N.H., Thu, N.T.A. & Linh, N.T. 2024. Factors affecting highly pathogenic avian influenza vaccination practices at poultry farms in Tra Vinh, Vietnam. Open Vet J, 14(3):794-804. reference
MAMMALS
[Preprint] Nguyen, T.Q., Hutter, C., Markin, A., Thomas, M., Lantz, K., Killian, M.L., Janzen, et al. 2024. Emergence and interstate spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in dairy cattle. bioRxiv, 2024.05.01:591751. reference
Burrough, E.R., Magstadt, D.R., Petersen, B., Timmermans, S.J., Gauger, P.C., Zhang, J., Siepker, C., et al. 2024. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Domestic Dairy Cattle and Cats, United States, 2024. Emerg Infect Dis, 2024 Apr 29;30(7). reference
Uyeki, T.M., Milton, S., Abdul Hamid, C., Reinoso Webb, C., Presley, S.M., Shetty, V., Rollo, S.N., et al. 2024. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Infection in a Dairy Farm Worker. N Engl J Med, 2024 May 3. reference
Meade, P.S., Bandawane, P., Bushfield, K., Hoxie, I., Azcona, K.R., Burgos, D., Choudhury, S., et al. 2024. Detection of clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in New York City. J Virol, 2024 May 15:e0062624. reference
Graziosi, G., Lupini, C., Catelli, E. & Carnaccini, S. 2024. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Birds and Mammals. Animals (Basel), 14(9):1372. reference
Kwon, T., Trujillo, J.D., Carossino, M., Lyoo, E.L., McDowell, C.D., Cool, K., Matias-Ferreyra, F.S., et al. 2024. Pigs are highly susceptible to but do not transmit mink-derived highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 May 7:2353292. reference
Szaluś-Jordanow, O., Golke, A., Dzieciątkowski, T., Czopowicz, M., Kardas, M., Mickiewicz, M., Moroz-Fik, A., Łobaczewski, A., Markowska-Daniel, I. & Frymus, T. 2024. Upper Respiratory Tract Disease in a Dog Infected by a Highly Pathogenic Avian A/H5N1 Virus. Microorganisms, 12(4):689. reference
Tomás, G., Marandino, A., Panzera, Y., Rodríguez, S., Wallau, G.L., Dezordi, F.Z., Pérez, R., et al. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus infections in pinnipeds and seabirds in Uruguay: Implications for bird-mammal transmission in South America. Virus Evol, 10(1):veae031. reference
AI VIRUSES
Fusaro, A., Zecchin, B., Giussani, E., Palumbo, E., Agüero-García, M., Bachofen, C., Bálint, Á., et al. 2024. High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe-Why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict. Virus Evol, 10(1):veae027. reference
Ospina-Jimenez, A.F., Gomez, A.P., Osorio-Zambrano, W.F., Alvarez-Munoz, S. & Ramirez-Nieto, G.C. 2024. Sequence-based epitope mapping of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 clade 2.3.4.4b in Latin America. Front Vet Sci, 11:1347509. reference
Lin, S., Chen, J., Li, K., Liu, Y., Fu, S., Xie, S., Zha, A., et al. 2024. Evolutionary dynamics and comparative pathogenicity of clade 2.3.4.4b H5 subtype avian influenza viruses, China, 2021-2022. Virol Sin, 2024 Apr 26:S1995-820X(24)00060-9. reference
Tare, D.S., Keng, S.S., Walimbe, A.M. & Pawar, S.D. 2024. Phylogeography and gene pool analysis of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses reported in India from 2006 to 2021. Arch Virol, 169(5):111. reference
Heo, G.B., Kang, Y.M., An, S.H., Kim, Y., Cha, R.M., Jang, Y., Lee, E.K., Lee, Y.J. & Lee, K.N. 2024. Concurrent Infection with Clade 2.3.4.4b Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N6 and H5N1 Viruses, South Korea, 2023. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(6). reference
Cho, A.Y., Si, Y.J., Kim, D.J., Seo, Y.R., Lee, D.Y., Kim, D., Lee, D., et al. 2024. Novel Avian Influenza A(H5N6) in Wild Birds, South Korea, 2023. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(6). reference
Reid, S.M., Byrne, A.M.P., Lean, F.Z.X., Ross, C.S., Pascu, A., Hepple, R., Dominguez, M., et al. 2024. A multi-species, multi-pathogen avian viral disease outbreak event: Investigating potential for virus transmission at the wild bird – poultry interface. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Apr 30:2348521. reference
Lee, S.H., Jeong, S., Cho, A.Y., Kim, T.H., Choi, Y.J., Lee, H., Song, C.S., Nahm, S.S., Swayne, D.E. & Lee, D.H. 2024. Caught Right on the Spot: Isolation and Characterization of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus from a Common Pochard (Aythya ferina) Being Attacked by a Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus). Avian Dis, 68(1):72-79. reference
Souci, L. & Denesvre, C. 2024. Interactions between avian viruses and skin in farm birds. Vet Res, 55(1):54. reference
Murashkina, T., Sharshov, K., Gadzhiev, A., Petherbridge, G., Derko, A., Sobolev, I., Dubovitskiy, N., et al. 2024. Avian Influenza Virus and Avian Paramyxoviruses in Wild Waterfowl of the Western Coast of the Caspian Sea (2017-2020). Viruses, 16(4):598. reference
Thomazelli, L.M., Pinho, J.R.R., Dorlass, E.G., Ometto, T., Meneguin, C., Paludo, D., Frias, R.T., et al. 2024. Evidence of reassortment of avian influenza A (H2) viruses in Brazilian shorebirds. PloS One, 19(5):e0300862. reference
Wang, Y., Li, X., Lv, X., Li, Y., An, Q., Xiu, Y., Lv, X., et al. 2024. H6N2 reassortant avian influenza virus isolate in wild birds in Jiangxi Province, China. Virus Genes, 2024 May 9. reference
Amin, F., Mukhtar, N., Ali, M., Shehzad, R., Ayub, S., Aslam, A., Sheikh, A.A., et al. 2024. Mapping Genetic Markers Associated with Antigenicity and Host Range in H9N2 Influenza A Viruses Infecting Poultry in Pakistan. Avian Dis, 68(1):43-51. reference
Lai, C.C. & Hsueh, P.R. 2024. Human infection caused by avian influenza A (H10N5) virus. J Microbiol Immunol Infect, 2024 Apr 22:S1684-1182(24)00074-4. reference
Feoktistova, S., Sayganova, M., Trutneva, K., Glazova, O., Blagodatski, A.S., Shevkova, L., Navoikova, A., et al. 2024. Abundant Intra-Subtype Reassortment Revealed in H13N8 Influenza Viruses. Viruses, 16(4):568. reference
ASSAY
Bordes, L., Gonzales, J.L., Vreman, S., Venema, S., Portier, N., Germeraad, E.A., van der Poel, W.H.M. & Beerens, N. 2024. In Ovo Models to Predict Virulence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5-Viruses for Chickens and Ducks. Viruses, 16(4):563. reference
SURVEILLANCE
Shemmings-Payne, W., De Silva, D., Warren, C.J., Thomas, S., Slomka, M.J., Reid, S.M., James, J., Banyard, A.C., Brown, I.H. & Ward, A.I. 2024. Repeatability and reproducibility of hunter-harvest sampling for avian influenza virus surveillance in Great Britain. Res Vet Sci, 173:105279. reference
Pinotti, F., Kohnle, L., Lourenço, J., Gupta, S., Hoque, M.A., Mahmud, R., Biswas, P., Pfeiffer, D. & Fournié, G. 2024. Modelling the transmission dynamics of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in a live bird market. Nat Commun, 15(1):3494. reference
Fujita, R., Tachi, T., Hino, M., Nagata, K., Saiki, M., Inumaru, M., Higa, Y., et al. 2024. Blowflies are potential vector for avian influenza virus at enzootic area in Japan. Sci Rep, 14(1):10285. reference
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].
America
Asia
North Africa and Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 01 October 2023 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 22 May 2024 (territory/area for sub/Antarctic zone)
Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.
Table 3. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years
Subtype |
Epidemiological situation overview |
---|---|
H5Nx Gs/GD* HPAI (1996) |
High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96- lineage (Gs/GD) were first detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. They have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses, since then and have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared. Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged presumably as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian inluenza viruses that also facilitated reassortment. Some important genotypes have been named unofficially (e.g. Z genotype in Hong Kong SAR, China in 2002, BB genotype derived from gulls in Europe in 2022 onwards). Of considerable significance has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses. Some of these Gs/GD viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in the Gs/GD lineage in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other viruses within this lineage persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link]. The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when a Gs/GD virus (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Viruses within the Gs/GD lineage continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b) that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. These waves involved multiple N subtypes. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die- offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species. For an updated list of bird species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE In 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats (1 farm) and dairy cattle (51 farms) in the United States of America. See HERE. USDA shared the Whole Genome Sequences, see HERE. Among the other Gs/GD virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans. Clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and related viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. A novel reassortant influenza A(H5N1) virus has been detected in poultry in Cambodia (since 2023), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam (since 2022) and was also detected in the human cases reported from Cambodia since late 2023 and Viet Nam in 2024. This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a more recent clade 2.3.4.4b virus [link]. Of the ten recent human cases, five of which were fatal, recorded in Cambodia (4) and Viet Nam (1). For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE In addition, more than 80 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022. Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals. For an updated list of mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE |
Avian origin H3N8 LPAI |
An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid 2021 [link]. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illneses who subsequently died. One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported. |
H7N4 LPAI (2017) |
One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. |
H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017) |
Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves. Most human cases exposed in live bird markets. Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update |
H9N2 LPAI |
First human case reported in 1998. To date, about 100 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported [link] Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems. Three major lineages and multiple genotypes. |
H10Nx LPAI |
To date, three influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], in September 2022, a second case in Zhejiang Province, China [link], in February 2024, the third case in Yunnan Province, China [link]. The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link]. |
FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.
General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian
influenza viruses.
Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk
of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.
Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.
For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].
Updates on avian influenza infection in dairy cattle have been shared by USDA, US CDC and US FDA through the following sites:
Next issue: 27 June 2024
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
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