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FAO's effectiveness at country level: A synthesis of evaluations in countries with major emergency and rehabilitation programmes (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Haiti)

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FAO's effectiveness at country level: a synthesis of evaluations in countries in protracted crises (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Haiti)

I. Introduction

In 2010-2011, the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) carried out three country evaluations (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Haiti), following the 2008 Programme Committee request that 'country evaluations should continue as a regular evaluation activity of FAO and that future evaluations should focus on countries at different levels of development'. These country evaluations formed part of the evaluation work plan presented to the Programme Committee at its 103rd session². They were selected because the country portfolios reached annual emergency funding in excess of USD 10 million per year, marking the accountability threshold above which independent evaluations are mandatory.

The country evaluations are analysed together in this synthesis report as all three are part of the list of 22 countries in protracted crises, identified in the 2010 State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI)³. The Report defines protracted crises situations as 'characterised by recurrent natural disasters and/or conflict, longevity of food crises, breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to the crises. Countries in protracted crises thus need to be considered as a special category with special requirements in terms of interventions by the development community'⁴.

The three country evaluation reports present quite different characteristics, even though there are common elements in terms of both the context for agriculture and food security and the nature and scope of FAO's interventions, structure and operational modalities. There is also a striking degree of convergence amongst the conclusions and direction of the recommendations in the three reports. The similarities and differences between conclusions and recommendations will be presented throughout the report.

Country	Period under evaluation	Delivery of evaluation
		report
Ethiopia	2005-2010	January 2011
Zimbabwe	2006-2010	May 2011
Haiti	2005-2010	February 2012

II. Purpose, Scope and Methodology of Country Evaluations

Country evaluations provide FAO's internal and external stakeholders with a systematic indepth assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impacts and sustainability of the programmes and activities undertaken by FAO in the countries, irrespective of source of

¹ CL 135/4. report of the Ninety-ninth Session of the Programme Committee, Rome, 28-30 May 2008, 135th Session of the Council.

² PC 103/6

³ The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010: Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises.

⁴ Ibid. p 12

funding (regular programme or extra-budgetary resources from development and humanitarian donors), the location of the project management (HQ, country or other) as well as assessing those activities that FAO Representations undertake in terms of policy and sectoral support and coordination which may not be funded directly through a project. The evaluations also review FAO's capacity in terms of mainstreaming a range of cross-cutting issues (gender, capacity development, and environmental concerns) as well as its use and advocacy of a range of FAO's normative products and public goods.

The three country evaluations followed similar methodological approaches and steps. As outlined in the OED guidance on country evaluations, all three comprised an initial portfolio review, an inception report to define the evaluation framework, in-depth country visits by the evaluation teams and a range of consultations with relevant stakeholders inside and outside FAO. Findings and recommendations were presented and refined following presentations in country and in Rome Headquarters (HQ). For Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, additional impact studies and reviews were prepared for specific projects and sectoral interventions. Additional analysis was also conducted in Zimbabwe and Haiti on coordination and cluster capacity.

III. Assessment of the role of FAO in policy, strategy and programming

III.1 FAO's contributions to and coherence with government and country priorities

The three country evaluations reviewed the role of FAO as a lead agency in the agriculture and food and nutrition security sectors. FAO activities were found to be largely aligned with Government priorities and strategies. However, FAO has not been systematically a key actor in supporting the Government to develop sectoral and sub-sectoral strategies across the range of FAO's areas of expertise. Some positive examples were found where FAO has made significant contributions, i.e. the support provided to the development of the national strategy on conservation agriculture in Zimbabwe and on economic corridors in Ethiopia.

The evaluations found that the value of FAO's policy and strategic support is often determined by the specific technical and policy capacity present within the country and subregional teams. There are some good example of sub-sectoral strategic contributions by FAO (in crop production, drought management and on integrating HIV/AIDS in the national Agricultural Plan in Zimbabwe; in Ethiopia through the incisive role and capacity of the FAOR to engage with the Government on policies and strategies). However, in Haiti the evaluation found little evidence of contributions to strategic priority setting in the agricultural sector.

III.2 Coherence with FAO's goals and strategic objectives

The strategic priority setting has primarily been carried out through the National Medium Term Priority Framework (NMTPF) and, in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, also through the Disaster Risk Management Plans of Action (PoAs). The evaluations were critical of the non-strategic nature of the NMTPFs in particular and the absence of fully fledged Country Programming

⁵ Ethiopia: Impact Assessment of the BSF Project in Tigray and Amhara Regions; Impact Assessment of Livestock Emergency Interventions; Zimbabwe: Study of FAO Support to strengthen market linkages

⁶ Zimbabwe; Study of FAO effectiveness in coordination; Haiti: Cluster Agriculture: note detaillée

Frameworks (CPFs), which were found to be factors limiting FAO's capacity to be a key strategic player in agriculture and food and nutrition security. This is reflected not only in terms of FAO's role vis-à-vis external stakeholders and partners but also in terms of reduced internal programme coherence.

Where FAO seems to have made more consistent contributions to strategic planning is in the area of design and support to investment plans (through the FAO Investment Centre -TCI) but these are not always integrated in the main thrust of FAO country strategic frameworks.

III.3 Linking short- term interventions to longer-term development

One of the main programmatic challenges in the three countries is that of reconciling the short—term activities carried out under the sizeable emergency related and humanitarian-funded portfolios, with the smaller and less resourced projects looking at longer term development measures to reduce vulnerability and develop various aspects of the agricultural sector. In all three countries, the portfolio managed by the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) using humanitarian funding sources tends to overshadow (in terms of funding and operational capacity) the activities and projects carried out under the development component. In terms of programming, all three evaluations, while recognising the need for humanitarian interventions in the agriculture and food and nutrition security sectors, question the final impact (and related need) for FAO to manage so many short term asset replacement interventions. The evaluations raise a number of issues that are summarized below:

- 1. The evidence of a substantial need for input distribution (agriculture and livestock) is scarce
- 2. Distribution of free inputs and services can have a negative impact on the fledgling national private sector of providers of services and goods (as is the case of free vaccination campaigns in Ethiopia or free distribution of seeds and cultivars in Haiti)
- 3. The criteria and implications of targeting choices should be better defined and understood. While FAO has a mandate to target the most vulnerable, this has implications and consequences depending on whether households are landless or have a minimum of productive capacity and assets for farming. Different vulnerable groups require different targeting and support.
- 4. In some cases the design and choice of input distribution seems to be driven more by donor priorities than needs analysis
- 5. Emergency programming tends to be repeated over the years proposing the same shortterm solutions instead of trying to better analyse the vulnerability factors and seek more durable solutions to build longer-term resilience
- 6. FAO needs to strengthen its key messages and advocacy with donors so that it is not forced to 'squeeze' development interventions (such as conservation agriculture in Zimbabwe) under the short term funding timeframes of humanitarian donorship.
- 7. There is a need to better complement and frame asset replacement with protection, prevention, risk reduction and longer-term measured to increase resilience.

This being said, in Zimbabwe particularly positive progress was noted on efforts to integrate the short-term emergency response activities with the longer term needs to address the root causes of vulnerability and build resilience. The overall programmatic approach in this country focuses on vulnerability risk reduction along with measures and activities aimed at strengthening small-holder producers' capacity and with the strengthening of market and private sector service providers.

In Ethiopia, the evaluation found that FAO should play a key role in helping the country to bring diverse opportunities and challenges together under one umbrella, which cover the distinct - but integrally linked - processes of development, emergency response, recovery and resilience building. To do this, FAO must first align the policies, strategies and technical support interventions that it advocates to ensure that they are interlinked, cohesive and relevant which was not the case at the time of the evaluation.

In Haiti, efforts to link short term emergency activities with longer term development measures have been limited by a range of factors, from internal operational set-up to absence of funding for development activities and lack of adequate analysis supporting the transition from short-term asset replacement projects towards longer term resilience building and rural development. The interventions which did have a longer-term focus, such as watershed management activities, were not very effective due to weak scalability and sustainability.

III.4 FAO's role in vulnerability analysis and evidence based programming

One of FAO's institutional roles is that of providing information and analysis for agriculture and food and nutrition security. At the country level, this capacity should feed into the programming cycle and support the design and targeting of appropriate interventions.

In Zimbabwe, over the past five years, FAO has provided continuous support to the agricultural information system, assisting the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development (MoAMID) to collect, analyse and disseminate information on crop production and to some extent market prices and functioning. This has included annual crop assessments (including Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions –CFSAMs- in 4 of the past 5 years) which have fed into broader food security assessments undertaken by the Food and Nutrition Council (FNC) and the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVac). Information collected has been analysed and discussed within the FAO-lead agricultural coordination working group (ACWG) and related sub-committees (including the nutrition gardens Working Group). This group has also supported a strong normative role and managed to reach broad sectoral consensus on good practices to be translated into Government policies.

In Ethiopia, the technical assistance provided to the Central Statistics Authority (CSA) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) has effectively brought together key stakeholders and the evaluation concluded that the FAO project has helped to understand better the crop production data collected by the different data producers, and to foster a dialogue on maximizing the comparative advantages of the CSA and MoARD.

The evaluation notes however that two other related activities have met with less success.

• FAO efforts to build interest and capacity amongst GoE and international partners in using the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC) have not

- met with major success, in part because other analytical frameworks already exist in Ethiopia.
- Attempts to develop an ambitious sectoral database system for MoARD have largely failed due to inadequate FAO technical support, and in particular a lack of synergy with other FAO food security information system work.

In Haiti, apart from the support provided to the National Agricultural census in 2010, FAO has not played any significant role in generating data and analysis of food security to support national and internal programming capacity.

III.5 Effects and Impact of FAO's interventions

The evaluation reports in all three countries note the lack of information related to measuring the impact of FAO programmes and activities. More specifically, the reports identify the lack of appropriate analysis and resources dedicated to understanding impact, in particular the absence of monitoring data that looks at outcomes beyond the recording of inputs and activities carried out. Little use is made of data disaggregated by gender, age or vulnerability status in identifying beneficiaries of interventions. When there is an adequate inclusion of women in project activities, this is often due to external causal factors rather than by design.

In Ethiopia, the evaluation included two dedicated impact assessments for interventions in the livestock sector and on the Belgian Survival Fund Project in the Tigray and Amhara regions. The assessment of this latter project concluded that it had been successful in terms of empowering communities and local institutions; enhancing household food security and improving health and nutritional status of chronically food-insecure beneficiaries, with spill-over positive effects to other people in the project areas. Anecdotal evidence suggests that FAO support through other projects has contributed to increased food production, agricultural diversification and the protection of productive assets.

In Zimbabwe, activities such as crop diversification and conservation agriculture, livestock genetic improvement, animal health and market linkages were found by the evaluation to contribute to reducing smallholders vulnerability. However, there is still room for assisting the farmers to establish farming systems that can increase their resilience, in particular to climate variability.

In Haiti, the absence of information on impact made it difficult to reach any conclusions. However, the evaluation stated that interventions are largely based on short term solutions not supported by longer term considerations of sustainability and do not contribute to the protection and/or increase of productive assets. The evaluation also indicates that the most significant impact on beneficiaries has been the supply of liquidity (through cash for work and input distributions) to households and farmers in the aftermath of the crises.

IV. FAO's capacity in sectoral advocacy and resource mobilisation

The reports come to quite different conclusions regarding FAO's advocacy profile and work in the three countries. The Haiti evaluation links FAO's poor performance as a sectoral leader with the overall dramatic decline of agriculture as a sector overall. It also reports the rather

systematic negative feed-back of Government counterparts and others on FAO capacity for raising global issues, leading discussions and in general advocating for food and nutrition security and agriculture.

In Ethiopia, the advocacy and policy role of FAO was found to be beneficial, particularly that related to economic corridors. This was mainly attributed to the profile and interest of the sub-regional representative. But FAO's participation and leadership role in other areas related to the food security agenda was reported to be inconsistent. The report attributes this uneven performance to the over-stretching of available human resources. The capacity for sectoral resource mobilisation in the work of TCI was commended but this was not connected with the other work of FAO in the country.

The Zimbabwe report describes FAO as a more respected and recognised lead player in agricultural coordination and nutrition through the Healthy Harvest Initiative. However, FAO did not have any engagement in promoting dialogue and providing support —even as an honest broker- on land issues which are clearly a priority for the country. Nevertheless, FAO through its coordination role for the agricultural sector is also managing to mobilise resources for a broader group of partners and stakeholders.

V. Institutional arrangements and operational capacity for delivery

V.1 Structure and functions

All three evaluation reports present findings and recommendations on FAO's structure and functions. Two of the countries, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have comparable structures as they comprise several teams with different roles and responsibilities. These are:

- the sub-regional FAO office (the sub-regional office for Southern Africa –SFS- in Zimbabwe and the sub-regional office for Eastern and Central Africa – SFE- in Ethiopia) with the multi-disciplinary team, responsible for multi-country coordination and technical support
- 2. the FAO Country Representation team, providing normative and policy support to the country and managing development projects
- 3. the Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (also called the Disaster Risk Reduction Unit)

In both countries, the evaluation reports conclude that this tripartite structure presents several weaknesses and suggest similar corrective actions. Having all these teams with different resources and responsibilities provides an extremely fragmented image of FAO to external partners and Government and in general it is considered as detrimental to FAO's corporate identity, its image and raises significant issues relative to the smooth internal working of the Organization.

The first is that the Sob-regional Representative, who doubles as FAO Representative (FAOR) for the country as well as having to cover the role of technical officer in his field and this overstretches a single individual.

The second is that the sub-regional coordination offices and teams for emergencies are not located in the same country as the FAO 'regular' sub-regional coordination structure. This entails a 'split' sub-regional coordination capacity with unclear relations between the sub-regional office and the sub-regional emergency office. While Zimbabwe has found a good modus operandi with the sub-regional emergency office in Johannesburg to deal with this split, by integrating the sub-regional emergency coordinator in the multi-disciplinary team and fostering very close collaboration between the two structures, this is not the case for the Ethiopia and East Africa sub-regional emergency coordination team based in Nairobi.

The third element is that in all three countries the emergency coordination units are separate from the rest of FAO and have a significant degree of autonomy in terms of reporting lines, funding and programming decisions vis-à-vis the Representation. In Zimbabwe, the FAOR has established a Country Management Team which constitutes a positive move in ensuring better integration between emergency and development activities. This is mirrored in Ethiopia, with the establishment of a Senior Management team, comprising the various parts of FAO.

V.2 Operational and administrative capacity

Most of FAO's operational capacity in the three countries is provided under the emergency component of the FAO programme. In Ethiopia, coverage outside of the Addis office is provided entirely by nine sub-national offices (located within Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development - BoARD) managing emergency activities, but in some cases providing support to development activities as well. In Haiti, the six sub-national offices are also entirely dedicated to emergency activities.

In Zimbabwe, there is a variation on the model. FAO has no sub-national offices but projects are managed by implementing partners with the technical support of relevant project officers based in Harare. Since most of its projects are implemented through NGOs, the Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (ERCU) has a strong monitoring role in two main aspects: a) monitoring NGO compliance with contractual obligations; and b) monitoring performance of the interventions. The Evaluation felt that this was a noteworthy step that should be shared with other Representations.

Whichever model is used to manage operations, it is clear from the evaluations that there is a need to improve coordination amongst development and emergency activities as well as occasionally amongst emergency activities under different project funds. The support function provided by sub-national offices and/or other units such as the Zimbabwe Monitoring Unit need to provide core capacity and support to all FAO's activities so as to improve efficiency in operations and increase quality in implementation. A major barrier to this integration is found to be in the different funding lines, separating Regular Programme (FAOR) activities from extra-budgetary development projects and, with an even bigger gap in terms of Budget Holding responsibilities and management lines, from emergency extra-budgetary funding.

V.3 Technical capacity

Common conclusions from the evaluative findings across the three countries can be summarized as follows: technical support present in current FAO teams at country level (and considering the multi-disciplinary teams at sub-regional level) is not sufficient to support FAO's activities at both policy and project implementation levels. Members of the MDT are over-stretched and sometimes some key technical positions are missing (such as the absence of a Food Security officer in Ethiopia). This is particularly the case for those areas of FAO's work which may be of strategic importance but are not supported by direct extra-budgetary resources. Where extra-budgetary resources are present, projects can supplement their need for technical expertise by hiring dedicated staff but they then serve the specific project rather than the whole of the FAO team.

The other major challenge in FAO's technical capacity at country level is how to ensure more integrated cross-sectoral work, better integrating the various aspects of FAO's technical activities and subsuming them to the need to achieve greater impact in institutional capacity and in strengthening beneficiaries productive and/or resilience profiles. This cross-sectoral challenge extends also to the issue already underlined on how to better provide the continuum between emergency response, recovery and long-term development objectives.

The evaluation reports further analyse the specific aspects of FAO's work in a range of subsectoral technical areas, from food and nutrition security, to crop production and protection, markets and value chains, livestock health and production, natural resource management (land, watershed, soil, forests, water) and fisheries. In general, FAO has some good results in some of the areas, less in others but the general conclusion is that it is spread too thinly over too large a number of interventions. The Ethiopia evaluation recommends that FAO increase the depth and moderate the breadth of field activities, concentrating efforts to promoting innovative approaches in the areas of food security and rural development that can be scaled up through national programmes. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, it was recommended that FAO should focus on scaling-up successful activities such as Conservation Agriculture and also on how to put in place a whole-farm approach that integrates CA with livestock and trees to sustainably address the farmers' diverse livelihoods needs.

Findings from the Haiti evaluation underline another common element touched upon in the two other countries. The Haiti programme has suffered from very low technical capacity stemming from the difficulties in recruiting and retaining international and national staff with adequate technical backgrounds as well as having received very little support from other FAO offices.

V.4 Funding for FAO activities

All three reports underline the imbalance between emergency and development funding in the three countries, with emergency short-term activities covering for areas where longer-term development funding and interventions would be more appropriate. All three reports call for a more strategic resource mobilisation function, whereby resources follow design and strategic priorities rather than the opposite. The other important factor is that, in the light of all the other recommendations that advocate for a significant integration of the FAO

teams, the resource mobilisation function must become one that serves the corporate needs of the Organization and not just of one of its parts and where the real drivers are more closely connected with the impact that FAO wishes to have on beneficiaries resilience and food and nutrition security.

VI. Focus on cross-cutting issues and core functions

VI.1 Gender

Gender was considered by all three evaluations. They all found that gender balance of FAO teams was unsatisfactory and more efforts need to be made to recruit women, especially in positions of higher responsibilities, than is currently the case.

The gender focus in technical and operational work was also found to be insufficient. FAO should focus more on improving capacities to monitor and report on impact based on gender disaggregated data. Internal capacity needs to be strengthened through improved recruitment practices (especially for field positions), training and by empowering more the function of the gender focal points.

VI.2 Capacity development

All reports concluded that, to support a more focused and better integrated strategic approach to agriculture and food and nutrition security, FAO needs to concentrate more on supporting national systems. In order to do this, FAO must step up its capacity development efforts, in particular for policy and sectoral data collection and analysis. By working more closely with research institutions and national level associations, NGOs and farmer groups, FAO can improve the impact and sustainability of its interventions. In addition FAO should strengthen the continuity and sustainability of the capacity development work done for/through extensions services, farmers groups and private sector, frame it more in terms of systems approaches and be part of a strategy which is clearly spelled out.

VI.3 Sharing information and knowledge

In Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, FAO was able to play a catalytic role in terms of sharing information and knowledge in a number of key areas. Good practice examples documented in the evaluations comprise the following:

- In Zimbabwe, FAO was instrumental for the inclusion of a training curriculum on Conservation Agriculture in the national extension training as well as promoting nutrition education amongst partners through the Healthy Harvest initiative.
- In Ethiopia, FAO was and is a key partner in the assessment of the livestock sector interventions in relation to the application of Livestock Emergency Guidelines (LEGs). Major benefits included awareness creation, knowledge and skills acquired from the improved feeding and water rehabilitation works. The interventions with technical support from the relevant government offices and FAO have enabled community members to consider preparedness activities. Under other initiatives, FAO also supported information and knowledge creation for participatory forest management as

well as a more coherent approach to managing information systems for agricultural statistics under the CSA project.

In Haiti, the Organisation did not play a significant role in terms of information and knowledge dissemination. The only insight from the evaluation is relative to FAO's internal lack of capacity and systems to document its work and create a reliable repository of information and tracking on programme and project activities.

VII. Coordination and partnerships

VII.1 Sectoral and cross-sectoral coordination

Sectoral coordination in the three countries follows slightly different patterns. The main issues on coordination emerging from the three evaluations are:

- the continuum between longer-term development coordination mechanisms in the agricultural sector versus the shorter term 'humanitarian' coordination mechanisms (usually under the cluster label)
- the relationship between the agricultural cluster and the positioning of food security and nutrition coordination mechanisms
- the effectiveness and efficiency of these mechanisms and FAO's capacity to take on a 'lead' role
- the capacity and effectiveness of covering sub-national coordination mechanisms

In Haiti, the main coordination mechanism following the earthquake was through the Agricultural Cluster mixed group. The evaluation found that the cluster mechanism had improved between 2008 and 2010 and that this led to better coordination in containing the effects of the earthquake on food security in the country. However, the evaluation also questions the capacity of the Cluster to ensure correct support and targeting of displaced groups from urban areas hosted in isolated rural areas.

In Zimbabwe, FAO achieved good coordination with other initiatives at national level. The Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit activities in coordinating sector interventions through the Agriculture Coordination Working Group (ACWG) and its working groups are widely recognized by all stakeholders. The ACWG was thought to be an effective forum for: sharing information and knowledge among NGOS, Government and the donor community; reducing the extent of geographic overlap of NGO activities; and, agreeing on strategies to move the sector forward. However it appeared to the Mission that membership of the ACWG is almost a pre-requisite for partnering with FAO, which runs the risk of marginalizing local NGOs who are not members. Furthermore, as many NGOs and farmers organizations do not have the experience or skills to implement some activities, the Representation needs to be more innovative in building those skills. An independent qualitative study and partner survey concluded that FAO could make improvements in coordination through support to decentralization of coordination to regions/provinces, and by working to create greater ownership and involvement of Government in coordination fora.

In Ethiopia, the Government is much more firmly in the driving seat in terms of sectoral coordination, so there is less scope for FAO or other agency to play a significant role other than supporting. Here, FAO generated a good practice example by providing the secretariat and coordination function for the agriculture sector task force under the Government's flagship Rural Development and Food Security forum.

VII.2 Partnerships

Beyond the several aspects of partnerships already reviewed (capacity to align and work along Government priorities, coordination capacity), the evaluation findings bring some more insights into FAO's partnership patterns.

The first consideration is that FAO does not put to full use the benefits of partnering with national level academic and research institutions, in terms of developing good practices and piloting innovative approaches. Only in Zimbabwe did it make effective use of the private sector in terms of scaling up activities on seed and fertiliser procurement systems through card and electronic vouchers.

Activities funded through short-term emergency funding, make ample use of implementing partners (IPs). Despite the significant role and stake that IPs have in FAO's capacity and success in delivery of project activities, there does not seem to be a clear corporate approach behind the selection of and investment in Implementing Partners. The contractual tools used are mainly those of the Letters of Agreement and FAO does not seem to differentiate whether and how it works with the different range of IPs, be they private sector, farmers unions or cooperatives, extension and/or other public sector bodies. Because FAO does not have a systematic approach in its partnership engagements, it neither invests in, nor makes full use of, the IPs in terms of carrying/promoting the value of FAO's mandate and/or learning and involving IPs in design and management of results of FAO-led activities.

In Zimbabwe, the evaluation report raised some questions on the criteria used to select IPs and the engagement rules to further manage the partnering relationship. The evaluation recommended that FAO should use improved transparency in IP selection through establishing clear criteria, performing a capacity analysis of all partners, including NGOs at local level who may not be part of the national agriculture sector coordination mechanisms. Also, FAO should differentiate its contractual partnership instruments, using Memoranda of Understanding for the more generic/strategic overarching activities and Letters of Agreement for specific delivery (not just direct distribution but also using innovative market approaches).

The key direction that emerges from all three evaluations is that ultimately, investing in improved partnerships in terms of selection, capacity development and strategic choices in terms of typology (research, private, extension etc) will greatly enhance the capacity of FAO to scale up its innovative interventions and ensure longer-term sustainability as well as broader geographic impact of its interventions.

VII. Follow-Up to the Evaluations

For the three country evaluations analysed in this report, only Zimbabwe and Ethiopia have management responses; for Haiti, at the time of writing, it has yet to be finalised. For Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, all the recommendations were accepted and a number of corrective actions planned. Follow-up reports on implementation of the accepted recommendations will be available this year.

The Annex contains all the recommendations from the three country reports, organised by thematic area as analysed in this report. As is the case for the findings, there are many convergences in terms of the main thrust of the recommendations, looking beyond the country specific details. These commonalities provide a very good opportunity for the Organization, the Governing Bodies and FAO's partners to learn and use them as a basis for decisions and actions that will help improve FAO's effectiveness at national level, especially in countries in protracted crises.

Annex 1: Country Synthesis Report: Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Haiti List of Recommendations by category

Country	Policy, strategy and programming	Capacity in advocacy and resource mobilization	Institutional arrangements and operational capacity	Focus on cross-cutting issues and core functions	Coordination and partnerships	Increase Impact
Ethiopia	Develop a Road Map for FAO in Ethiopia. Restructure the national portfolio Draw on key policy documents Develop pillar-specific strategies. Strengthen the evidence base. Strengthen FAO accountability. Enhance the food security information system. Include MDG hunger indicators.	Engage proactively in programmatic resource mobilisation. Strengthen links between TCI and FAO Ethiopia. Establish fund raising forum. Mobilize regular budget resources for the deployment of a FSN expert within the SFE MDT. Engage with NFSP forums. Raise the profile of SLM, forestry, pasturelands and fisheries management.	Unify FAO in Ethiopia. Institutionalise information sharing. Develop clear guidelines for the engagement of SFE staff in Ethiopia issues. Establish a food security team. Establish an agricultural development and economic growth team. Establish a natural resource management team. Integrate the IGAD-LPI programme into SFE. Promote gender equity. Strengthen FAO's visibility in, and relevance to, Ethiopia (internationally recruited A-FAOR, JPOs, national volunteers, training, senior officers to cover external forums and policy)	Include gender indicators. Place greater emphasis on capacity building (quality data assembly and synthesis, policy analysis and policy development.) Provide training (and with improved training materials) related to extension and agricultural technology, Work with appropriate seed enterprises to build their capacity to recognize and nurture good contract seed producer groups.	Strengthen market perspectives and commercial partnerships	Increase the depth and moderate the breadth of FAO field activities. Seek funds for providing technical support and coordination to food security and economic development forums Reduce efforts to raise funds for micro-projects; concentrate more on the design of field based activities In seeds and crops shift from a distribution mode to capacity development and strengthening systems
Zimbabwe	FAO's Cooperation Framework not yet formalized. Finalize the CPF. Priorities that the FAOR and the GoZ may wish to consider for their	The CPF should be used as a tool for advocacy and resource mobilization.	FAO should mainstream gender both in FAO's interventions and in those of the sector. It should specifically develop clear gender equity outcomes and indicators for the Program,	Capacity development strategy for strengthening AGRITEX extension at provincial and district levels. Providing free inputs through FUs should be avoided as this may create a distraction to	FAO should look for opportunities to support MoAMID to co-chair the relevant coordination working groups and eventually to develop coordination mechanisms at district and	Adopt clear principles that should be followed in identifying and reaching the target groups. Based on these principles, project documents should provide a clear definition of target groups

programming			Focus on cross-cutting		Increase Impact
	and resource	arrangements and	issues and core	partnerships	
	mobilization	operational capacity	functions		
collaboration could include		and establish clear gender	their core mission.	provincial levels. The TOR for	and should specify the criteria
gender, SLM, forestry and its		mainstreaming responsibility	their core mission.	the working groups should	and mechanisms to be used to
interfaces with agriculture		and accountability internally	FAO should mainstream	clarify expected coordination	select and reach the target
and livestock, climate change		within management job	gender both in FAO's	outcomes.	groups.
adaptation, food security and		descriptions	interventions and in those of		B. c. per
nutrition, and building			the sector. It should	FAO should seek more	Move away from direct
capacity of farmers unions		For contracting with IPs, use a	specifically develop clear	effective forms of cooperation	distribution of inputs. Seek
and other farmer's		mix of LoAs and MoUs with	gender equity outcomes and	with Farmers Unions to	guidance from CSAP to test
organizations to better		Government and other	indicators for the Program,	strengthen the empowerment	the use of vouchers (with or
provide services to their		partners, e.g. MoUs for	and establish clear gender	of SHFs, assisting them in	with or without contribution
membership.		general over-arching activities	mainstreaming responsibility	developing local associative	by farmers) as an effective
		and LoAs for specific activities	and accountability internally	and self-managed	means for helping farmers
. The PoA should be reshaped		with specified outcomes etc.	within management job	organizations that would	purchase their inputs and
to reflect a biennium country		For operational efficiency –	descriptions	enable them to access	strengthen markets.
work plan for 2012/13 with a		involve finance,		services and markets.	
clear RBM framework		logistics/procurement from			
540 1 11 11		the programme design and		Selection and management of	
FAO should continue		planning stage.		partnerships - improved	
providing assistance and		The FAO Depresentative		transparency of IP selection	
support on policy development and the		The FAO Representative, TCEO, ADG/RAF and OSD		through establishing clear criteria, performing a capacity	
implementation framework in		should consider combining		analysis of all partners,	
the areas of SLM, gender &		the two units i.e. the		include NGOs at local level	
agriculture, food and nutrition		Programme Unit and the		who may not be members of	
policy, climate change		ERCU, to create a strategic		ACWG, in compliance with	
adaptation, irrigation and		planning/programming		procedures in MS 507.	
water management, and		function, and, an operations			
agricultural extension.		function that would have			
		responsibility for planning and			
In collaboration with FNC and		implementing the overall field			
other partners, undertake		programme. The FAO			
household livelihood studies		Representative should			
to support the development		establish regular senior			
of integrated farming models		management team meetings			
and extension material and		to discuss strategic direction			
interventions for more viable		of the programme, resource			
SHFs and targeted asset		mobilization (human &			
building interventions for the		financial) priorities, and key			
chronically food insecure.		FAO messages and organizational positions. To			
Consider reengineering the		maximize the feedback loop			

Country	Policy, strategy and programming	Capacity in advocacy and resource mobilization	Institutional arrangements and operational capacity	Focus on cross-cutting issues and core functions	Coordination and partnerships	Increase Impact
	technological component in the CA package to optimize the contribution of livestock and trees to SHFs' livelihoods in a landscape planning approach. This requires including action research within agricultural extension to involve farmers in designing appropriate farming systems in different agroecological zones, that integrate CA with livestock and trees (CALT), testing adapted mechanized CA equipment, and assessing how new technology can be accessed by poor households.		between learning and programming, and to ensure gender mainstreaming receives adequate attention, the mission recommends that both the M&E Officer and Gender focal point be included in the SMT. Where an asset is created (i.e. from demonstration plots) or a farmer repayment is envisioned i.e. into a revolving fund or put towards a public good, the modalities for managing and using the proceeds should be discussed and agreed by the community and documented. This approach should be made explicit in the LoAs and appropriate controls built in to ensure accountability.			
Haiti	In the current context of the NMTPF, FAO very urgently needs to analyse its institutional links and its capacities, boosting them so that it can achieve its objectives in supporting the Haitian Government and population, especially those dependent on the agricultural sector. In Haiti FAO must put forward arguments based on substantial proofs concerning the manner in which the	FAO should base its action on the promotion of its integrated programme, the international reputation of its technical skills and its capacity to promote knowledge and better practices in order to mobilize donors to provide the long-term resources needed for development of the agricultural sector, including disaster risk management and reduction, strengthening of resilience and development interventions;	The Representation should be boosted in terms of human and financial resources through: - a Representative selected with the right profile and skills to guide sectoral analyses with the constant support of the experts required, if necessary with the Organization's own resources (TCP); such guidance requires technical and political skills and also the capacity to negotiate on the national and	The Organization must draw up a clear set of priority spheres, including crosscutting issues (gender, DRM, M&E, private sector and civil society participation) where it can commit its assistance and establish the necessary strategic partnerships. Consequently, FAO in Haiti must also in future carry out systematic evaluations and reviews to make sure that these cross-cutting issues are effectively being taken into		

Country Policy, strategy and programming	Capacity in advocacy and resource mobilization	Institutional arrangements and operational capacity	Focus on cross-cutting issues and core functions	Coordination and partnerships	Increase Impact
Organization can effective support the sector. FAO must urgently resume the dialogue process, both internally and with the Hai Government and its partner in order to develop the net CPF 2012-2016 (formerly to NMTPF), which will act as road map for FAO's strateg as a whole (normative work technical support to development and disaster preparation and management) in the count for the next five years, masure it is in line with the national priorities previous identified. The Organization must draup a clear set of priority spheres, including crosscutting issues (gender, DRI M&E, private sector and cisociety participation), whe can commit its assistance establish the necessary strategic partnerships. The programme: - should be built up on a lot term view of intervention, focusing on development the agricultural sector, bas on the Organization's normative and technical roand should coordinate	Representation should step up its collaboration with TCI and international finance institutions, carrying on a constant dialogue concerning the possibilities and modalities of increased funding to the new priorities of the CPF and the integrated programme; similarly, dialogue with TCS and FAO's relevant technical units should mean that FAO's interventions are better promoted to bilateral donors. All will re it ind	international stage; - an appropriate statutory allocation, backed up by the mobilization of associated experts and renegotiation of the United Nations salary scale in Haiti. The necessary investments in terms of time and human resources should be made for this new CPF, if need be under the ordinary programme. This will require a concerted effort on the part of the next FAO Representative, with technical support from Headquarters services and the designated regional office. It is essential that this exercise focus on interventions in direct support of DRM and implementation in partnership with the Haitian Government and other development partners. With a view to ensuring efficiency and effectiveness, the FAOR should be the holder and disbursement officer of the budgets for all FAO's activities in the country. FAO in Haiti, with the assistance of the appropriate technical divisions and TC, must very urgently boost its internal evaluation capacity and its capacity to monitor	account. Promotion of gender balance and the appointment of a gender focal point with clear responsibility for guaranteeing that the gender perspective is incorporated into FAO's programme in Haiti.		

Country	Policy, strategy and	Capacity in advocacy	Institutional	Focus on cross-cutting	Coordination and	Increase Impact
	programming	and resource	arrangements and	issues and core	partnerships	
		mobilization	operational capacity	functions		
		oomzation	operational capacity	Turicus		
	development interventions,		the overall programme.			
	emergency responses,		These capacities must be			
	rehabilitation phases and the		envisaged and structured in			
	boosting of national		such a way that it can			
	resilience;		provide its support in terms			
	- should be based on FAO's		of normative, political and			
	policy documents, including		strategic data and			
	its Strategic Objectives and		investment advice to the			
	the TCE operational strategy		Government and its			
	for 2010-2013;		development partners.			
	- should incorporate the MDG		историнено размено.			
	indicators;		The future Representative			
	- should boost differentiated		must promote a united view			
	specific strategies for the		among all FAO staff in the			
	growth of the agricultural		country. If such a view is to be			
	sector and the reduction of		successfully applied, a			
	chronic food insecurity;		management system and			
	- should pay special attention		collaboration structures must			
	to the marketing of inputs and		be put in place so that team			
	agricultural produce,		work can be carried out for			
	supporting both emergency		the planning, execution,			
	and development		monitoring and evaluation of			
	interventions, in close		FAO's interventions in the			
	coordination with the private		spheres of technical support,			
	sector;		disaster risk preparation and			
	- should highlight the nature		management, and			
	and extent of the measures		emergency response, based			
	needed in the juridical,		on:			
	institutional, commercial		the incompantion of diseases			
	policy and investment in rural		- the incorporation of disaster risk preparation and			
	infrastructure spheres in		1			
	order to remove constraints		management and emergency			
	on agricultural development;		response into FAO's ordinary			
	- should encompass a		technical support programme in Haiti;			
	baseline information and		iii nuiti;			
	M&E system, including		- an institutional memory			
	information on households in		made up of: (a) a really			
	a vulnerable situation or zone,		modern virtual library; and			
	and gender indicators;		(b) regular meetings			
	- should significantly boost the		(retreats) with all the country			
	collection of local market		' '			

Country	Policy, strategy and programming	Capacity in advocacy and resource mobilization	Institutional arrangements and operational capacity	Focus on cross-cutting issues and core functions	Coordination and partnerships	Increase Impact
	information, the establishment of cooperation agreements, especially with the United Nations bodies based in Rome; this will also require the FAO Representation to develop much closer relations and regular contacts with a certain number of key ministries in addition to the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development.		staff; - the definition of an organizational chart and familiarization of everybody with this and with the functions of each position; - training in the use of the Organization's systems such as FPMIS and DWH; - an internal and external communication strategy; - boosting of training and increase in exposure to relevant experiences, preferably in French-speaking countries (in Africa); - promotion of gender balance and the appointment of a gender focal point with clear responsibility for guaranteeing that the gender perspective is incorporated into FAO's programme in Haiti.			