

## 4. NMPACT: BEYOND CONVENTIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

### 4.1 The principles of engagement

Much of the uniqueness and effectiveness of NMPACT derived from the principles of engagement. These provided the partners with an overall framework to buy into and gave the joint response a strong conceptual rootedness. The development of the principles stemmed from the common analysis of the partners of the limitations of traditional approaches to complex emergencies founded on the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality and largely limited to relief. The experience of the external interventions in the Nuba Mountains over the 1990s had created a shared understanding between the NMPACT stakeholders of the political functions of aid in conflict situations (Macrae and Leader, 2000:9). This common understanding led to the articulation of the ‘principles of engagement’, the underlying theme of which was to integrate the aid framework within a political framework for conflict transformation. Using humanitarian assistance to contribute to conflict resolution and peace building meant applying conditionality and the principles were intended to guide the partners to undertake consistent decision making.

Though it has been difficult to assess the level of success of the Co-ordination Structure in ensuring partners’ adherence to all the principles, these are regarded by all involved as providing an extremely valuable programming tool. There is no doubt, as demonstrated by feedback from an internal review in 2003 (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2003) that most partners feel that an original aspect of NMPACT derives from these principles against which the performance of their interventions is measured. The principles focus on sustainability of programmes, national ownership, equitability of interventions across the political divide, transforming conflict and ‘doing least harm’, as the ‘do no harm’ approach (Anderson, 1999) was renamed by the NMPACT partners. The principles of engagement represent an innovative instrument of aid co-ordination in the context of assistance to the Sudan, especially in areas affected by conflict.

The internal review also emphasised that, thanks to the principles of engagement, such as the focus on capacity building, NMPACT has been effective in generating a strong sustainability focus which cuts across the work of the partners and which has resulted in the implementation of programmes that are directed more towards training and capacity building than to the delivery of external inputs. This trait is particularly significant given the fact that agencies have been operating in an environment where the cease-fire had not yet matured into a peace agreement, which has been reached only very recently. The emphasis on capacity building from the outset in such context represents an important departure from the model of assistance used in other areas of conflict in the Sudan.

One of the most fundamental principles of engagement was that of equitability, which was originally an implication of the principle of ‘doing least harm’, but became increasingly relevant to all aspects of programme development and implementation. In the words of the NMPACT programme document, ‘*NMPACT understands equitability as a practical means to promote a programme that addresses the disparities and the lack of choices and opportunities experienced by the Nuba people arising from historical neglect and conflict*’ (Office of the RC/HC, 2002b:17). The principle advocates for the use of measurable and fair standards to ensure that partners’ interventions respond to local needs and capacities without re-enforcing the underlying causes of conflict. In order to provide the partners with an

objective basis to apply the principle, the First NMPACT Partners' Forum recommended that a region wide cross-line survey be undertaken in order to provide the partners with the necessary data and information to prioritise areas of intervention and target population in an equitable manner. The survey was carried out by a large number of international and Nuba humanitarian workers and by representatives of local CBOs as well as HAC and SRRC in November 2002. The first objective of the survey was to analyse strategies and goals of the Nuba people and the barriers they faced, especially with regard to return, resettlement and recovery, in order to understand the social, economic and political contexts of the possible interventions of the NMPACT partners. Secondly, the survey aimed to collect sufficient information to compare livelihoods and geographic differences in people's quality of life in order to support the principle of promoting equitable and fair interventions.

The survey, which was conducted using streamlined technical information collection systems agreed upon by HAC and SRRA, provided an important opportunity for the two official counterparts to become acquainted with the reality of the region in areas under the control of the opponent. Despite the political sensitivities surrounding the survey, there was a very high level of interaction and co-operation between the representatives of HAC, SRRA, the GoS Ministry of Planning, the SPLM Policy Advisory Committee (PAC), NRRDO and Nuba Net (a confederation of Nuba Mountains NGOs operating in GOS areas), which participated in the survey. The representatives of the two warring parties worked together in a very open and constructive manner and easily reached a consensus on programming priorities for the NMPACT partners (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2002f:8). The principle of equitability allowed NMPACT to make headway in promoting cross-line initiatives and in building a rapport between HAC and SRRC around the co-ordination of the programme.

The data collected during the survey showed that there was a profound gap in terms of access to facilities, with communities in SPLM areas being distinctly disadvantaged compared to those in GoS areas (although on GoS side there was a difference between rural and urban areas, with the former being markedly worse off). However, the survey report emphasised that the key element for the NMPACT partners was not the provision of services, as most of the people interviewed were still affected by the main consequence of the crisis in the Nuba Mountains: displacement. The survey team argued that for the process of rehabilitation to be sustainable, provision of services and other type of assistance had to be linked to people's return to their land, as this was the only strategy that would have allowed people to have access to a sustainable livelihoods resource base and to take advantage of existing economic opportunities. The results of the survey were presented to the Second Partners' Forum, where the partners decided to collectively embark on a series of studies on land tenure to inform partners' efforts to support IDPs return (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2002e).

The principles of engagement indirectly became an important instrument to formulate policies, as the information collected to underpin the implementation of the principles had an inevitable impact on the policy making processes within the programme, resulting in the prioritisation of the issues of displacement and land tenure. Other principles, such as that of the protection of sources of livelihoods, drove the Co-ordination Structure jointly with some NMPACT partners to formulate clear environmental guidelines (including specific procedures for dams' construction) to be adopted by the NMPACT partners and enforced by HAC and SRRC (White, 2003).

Lastly, the principle of supporting national ownership and promoting Nuba leadership made NMPACT unique in its involvement of government and SPLM counterparts in the co-ordination of the programme, thereby conferring ownership of the process to the national authorities. Local ownership was also reinforced through the participation of a large number of national representatives in the Partners' Fora, where key programming decisions were discussed and agreed upon. The Fora, as well as other cross-line meetings, were held in a neutral location in the Nuba Mountains established with the consensus of both warring parties. The fact that NMPACT brought the Government of Sudan and the SPLM together on Sudanese soil several times in a neutral environment has been seen by many programme stakeholders as a substantial contribution to the conflict transformation process in the region, which remains the ultimate goal of NMPACT.

A summary of the NMPACT principles of engagement is presented in Table 13 overleaf.

**Table 12. NMPACT Principles of Engagement** (adapted from Office of RC/HC, 2002b:17-18)

Implications for NMPACT partners	
Principles of engagement	
All interventions part of a single, integrated, conflict transformation programme.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Design and implement interventions within an agreed programme framework, with common goals, principles and co-ordinating mechanisms, using the NMPACT ‘accountability’ guidelines.</li> <li>▪ Communicate transparently, share and receive info with each other and with communities.</li> </ul>
Develop an enabling environment for Nuba-led longer term peace process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Make effective use of the current cease-fire to respond to immediate humanitarian needs and support/initiate dialogue between different peoples from the Nuba Mountains (residents and IDPs).</li> <li>▪ Support wider analysis and consultation and incorporate findings into on-going programming.</li> <li>▪ Take proactive measures to create/protect opportunities for Nuba dialogue and emergence of a representative Nuba voice.</li> <li>▪ Contribute to raising public awareness of the cease-fire process and the roles of the parties involved.</li> </ul>
Use ‘least harm’ approach – avoid endangering opportunities for longer-term peace building.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Use best available info on current needs and disparities to develop equitable and fair cross-line interventions (using planning and review matrices and integrated survey findings) to address disparities.</li> <li>▪ Ensure that various perspectives are considered when taking programming decisions, making proactive efforts to support Nuba civil society to develop its analysis and guide interventions.</li> <li>▪ Work together to develop systematic analysis/understanding of opportunities for conflict transform. to inform intervention design.</li> </ul>
Ensure that interventions strengthen self-reliance, local capacities and opportunities for socio-economic and cultural interdependence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Use best available information on current capacities and disparities to develop equitable and fair cross-line interventions (using planning and review matrices integrated survey findings) that address disparities.</li> <li>▪ Adopt an overriding capacity building approach to ensure that interventions build capacities of Nuba people and institutions.</li> <li>▪ Follow participatory methodologies that encourage maximum levels of joint planning and implementation with Nuba communities maximising opportunities for local and sustainable solutions (e.g. support development of accessible markets over external inputs).</li> <li>▪ Seek opportunities for developing constructive interdependence (social, cultural, economic) between peoples of the Nuba Region.</li> </ul>
Ensure protection of human rights and sources of livelihoods.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Recognise the reality that the primary cause of current livelihood insecurity is lack of secure and protected access to natural resources, markets and kinship networks.</li> <li>▪ Develop readiness and capacities for using opportunities to raise awareness of human rights, for advocacy, and to maintain physical presence on the ground to protect human rights and access.</li> </ul>
Be flexible: responsiveness to changing conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop NMPACT as a phased, multi-sectoral programme, with component projects responding to on-going feedback and advice.</li> <li>▪ Participate in on-going development and revision of NMPACT framework to respond to emerging realities.</li> </ul>
Obtain unimpeded, secure access to all areas in Nuba	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ UN RC/HC to advocate with the relevant authorities to resolve and clarify all issues of access and humanitarian liaison within the timeframe stated in the cease-fire agreement.</li> </ul>

## 4.2 Political humanitarianism and collective advocacy

The process of programme design for NMPACT went hand in hand with a strong and co-ordinated advocacy action directed at western diplomats to facilitate the unblocking of the humanitarian impasse in the Nuba Mountains. This had particular significance in light of the fact that a food security crisis was evolving in SPLM controlled areas. Such action culminated in the collective decision between 2000 and 2001 of most of the agencies operating in GOS controlled areas either to suspend their operations in the north or to initiate activities in SPLM controlled areas where access was denied by the Government of the Sudan. This move was aimed at applying pressure on government officials to open up access to SPLM controlled areas, where needs were known to be great and increasingly acute. The decision to withdraw from GOS areas was difficult to take, as this *de facto* meant depriving more needy people of external assistance, but the common analysis of the partners was that aid was being used to lure away people from SPLM areas into GOS areas, thus contributing to exacerbate the conflict in the region. For this reason, it was felt that temporary withdrawal from government controlled areas was the most ethical short term choice.

The partners were aware that the mounting crisis in SPLM territory required a political solution and that they needed to attract more international attention to the situation in the Nuba Mountains to resolve the access issue. The UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator at the time therefore used his offices to increase advocacy with western diplomats on behalf of all the partners. This action was a major factor in catalysing senior diplomatic interest that in January 2002 resulted in the brokering of a Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM in Burgenstock, Switzerland. The accord was aided by the good offices of US Senator John Danforth, who had been appointed US Envoy for Peace in the Sudan by President George W. Bush on 6<sup>th</sup> September 2001. The signing of the CFA presented the process to develop a response in the Nuba Mountains with a major opportunity. The NMPACT programme finally had a chance to become operational. In its final design it became closely linked to the implementation of the CFA and stipulated close co-operation with the Joint Military Commission/Joint Monitoring Mission (JMC/JMM), the international force mandated to monitor the cease-fire as well as the military and policing roles of the parties in the region. Once again, this represented a novel development in the context of the Sudan assistance in that a humanitarian intervention was expressly linked to a political initiative.

The vigorous interaction with key political and military actors involved in the Nuba Mountains question was an important constant of the NMPACT approach. From its very inception NMPACT was actively engaged with the JMC/JMM and there was regular and structured interaction between NMPACT and the Friends of Nuba Mountains, a group made up of senior diplomats working in the Sudan, which provided political leadership for the JMC/JMM. The actors concerned, particularly the JMC/JMM were not always entirely amenable to the concerns raised by NMPACT. However, a deliberate commitment to active, constructive engagement cemented relations and over time proved crucial in ensuring that a number of important issues, which are beyond the remit of humanitarian organisations but which impacted on the response, were addressed in a timely and adequate manner. These included land tenure issues, conflict between nomadic and farming groups and the harassment of civilians by the authorities to people returning to farms (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2003:20).

The multiple forms of advocacy and engagement with a range of national and international political bodies under the aegis of NMPACT have in the view of some partners and observers added an important new element in the Sudanese humanitarian context (Office of the UN RC/HC, *ibid.*). The joint advocacy promoted by the UN agencies and the partner NGOs since 1999 has allowed NMPACT unprecedented links, on the part of a humanitarian operation, to the political sphere, an approach that was defined of ‘political humanitarianism’ (Pantuliano, 2003:6). Some of the partners argued in a review of the programme (Office of the UN RC/HC, *ibid.*) that particularly in the early period of the Cease-Fire Agreement, NMPACT was a key factor underpinning the first extension of the cease-fire since it was seen as an important element of the peace dividend. Thereafter, NMPACT facilitated greater interaction between the parties and buttressed relations in such a way that it has translated the main aim of the CFA, which was to avert a food security crisis in the Nuba Mountains, into a reality.

Later on, NMPACT’s research work on land tenure issues was used to inform the special negotiations on the contested areas that took place in Kenya from January 2003 to January 2005 within the context of the wider Sudan peace process (Wily, 2004). In addition, the studies have provided the basis for developing the Terms of Reference of the Nuba Mountains Land Commission envisaged by the Two Areas Protocol agreed in Naivasha, Kenya, in May 2004 and endorsed in the implementation modalities of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005.

### **4.3 NMPACT’s food security approach**

The vigorous advocacy action that had been promoted as a result of the collective adherence of NMPACT partners to the principle of ‘Do No Harm’ (Anderson, 1999) to obtain a cease-fire agreement in the region had largely been prompted by the need to avert a severe food security crisis looming over the SPLM controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains. Staving off the acute food security crisis was the objective that drove the cease-fire negotiations and became the primary aim of the Cease-Fire Agreement. While the cease-fire was being negotiated and prior to the arrival of the international monitors, the agencies which later became partners of NMPACT worked together with Nuba agencies and representatives to learn how to best address the crisis without undermining the Nuba food economy. The SPLM areas of the Nuba Mountains had not received international assistance since 1989 and there was therefore a danger of destabilising the local economy and creating a dependency syndrome through the provision of food aid, as had happened in many parts of southern Sudan. A new approach was designed within NMPACT where food delivery was coupled with programme interventions strongly focused on supporting local capacity and enhancing sustainability through strengthening the local food economy.

The NMPACT food security approach prioritised capacity building over the delivery of external inputs (food aid and infrastructure) and removal of the constraints to food security (insecurity, barriers to access to land, market constraints, amongst others) from the onset of the intervention. This was a reversal of the approach used in southern Sudan within the OLS umbrella where the focus on emergency or short-term measures continued to prevail and where longer-term interventions to strengthen food security were relatively uncommon. Delivery of food aid and seeds and tools took place in the Nuba Mountains as well in the context of NMPACT to support more vulnerable communities, but these interventions were coupled by joint efforts to root the partners’ response into a deeper understanding of the causes behind food insecurity in the region.

The NMPACT partners invested a lot of collective resources into analysing the local economy and identifying points of entry to support and strengthen it. This continuous collective learning took place through joint assessments and reviews. Region-wide surveys looking at production, productivity, market access and marketing issues were undertaken and the findings jointly analysed at the Partners' Fora.

The population of the Nuba Mountains was subdivided by the NMPACT partners according to the livelihoods activities in which people were engaged, i.e. rural farmers (in GOS and SPLM areas), pastoralists, urban dwellers and IDP camp occupants, the latter three categories only found in GOS areas (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2002d:21). The rural farmers were later divided between poor, average and better off depending on their holdings (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2002f:41). The reason behind the subdivision was to help the agencies tailor their response to the specific needs of the people and ensure that assistance would be equitably distributed across the different livelihoods groups and their subcategories. The partners recognised that there was some sort of general hierarchy among the groups, whereby urban dwellers were the best off, followed by pastoralists, farmers and camp occupants (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2002d:21). The principle of equitable assistance, which was one of the fundamental principles of engagement of NMPACT, required that assistance be provided in an equitable manner on the basis of need and this meant that the partners had to prioritise camp occupants and farmers in removing barriers and recovering assets to rebuild their livelihoods security. The findings of the region-wide cross-line survey in late 2002 highlighted the need to address the issue of displacement within the Nuba Mountains as a priority, particularly for people confined to IDP camps, in order to facilitate people's return to their homeland and their access to a sustainable resource base.

The Partners' Fora and the cross-line survey also showed the need for the partners to place a special focus on land tenure issues, which were perceived to be one of the greatest constraints to food security in a region that had been considered largely food secure in the past. Several studies were carried out (Manger *et al*, 2003a; Manger *et al*, 2003b; Harragin, 2003a), including a three months survey which covered all parts of the Nuba Mountains region (Harragin, 2003b). The survey analysed and recorded traditional land ownership, existing land titles and illegal land alienation to non-Nuba owners. This work was undertaken in order to underpin advocacy action to ensure that IDPs could reclaim land grabbed in the past and return to their farms in contested areas of the Nuba Mountains. It is important to emphasise that the research work on land tenure was carried out while the conflict was still active, albeit under conditions of cease-fire.

Advocacy action was promoted by the NMPACT partners to ensure that local purchase of food from within the Nuba Mountains be maximised and that food aid be limited to areas of extreme need where cultivation had not been possible. Much peer pressure was applied on to the World Food Programme (WFP) and other large agencies and donors by other NMPACT partners to ensure that local purchase was prioritised over the injection of food originating from external sources. The advocacy action brought limited results during the first two years of operation of NMPACT but was successful in ensuring an adequate targeting of communities and more strategic use of food aid. Part of the assistance was in fact devoted to support the demining operation which other NMPACT partners were carrying out in the Nuba Mountains.


### 4.3.1 Analysis of NMPACT Food Security using the FAO Twin Track Approach

FAO has developed an analytical framework which aims to assess the health of a food system in crisis. This is an attempt to help those responding to food emergencies to consider their interventions in terms of the resilience of the system to withstand shocks in the longer term and in so doing think well beyond the immediate and temporary efficacy of emergency response to immediate and life saving needs. Elements of such resilience include ‘*strengthening diversity; rebuilding local institutions and traditional support mechanisms; reinforcing local knowledge and building on farmers’ capacity to adapt and reorganise*’ (Pingali, Alinovi & Sutton, 2005:16).

The framework is organised in terms of two ‘tracks’ which are considered mutually reinforcing. Direct and immediate access to food is the first and is what is considered essential in the immediate term and important for medium term planning. Rural development and product enhancement is the second track and consists of elements which its creators consider are essential for stability and predictability (see details of the framework in Annex III).

The framework, which is premised on the assumption that food emergencies are social and political constructions, is consistent with the thinking that underpinned NMPACT. An analysis of the NMPACT interventions using the Twin Track Framework is therefore useful in determining the extent to which the programme lived up to its objectives. The following table shows how the food security related interventions of the NMPACT partners evolved over the period 2002 to 2004 and are compared with the state of interventions of the same organisations prior to the establishment of NMPACT in 2002.

**Figure 3.**



The summary of the 188 interventions covering the work of 14 NMPACT partners (see details in Annex IV) involved in the Agriculture and Food Economy sector, shows a number of clear trends<sup>12</sup>. Key to these is that since the inception of the programme the

<sup>12</sup> The information has been derived from a series of NMPACT documents, chiefly the information tables produced between 2002 and 2004 (see Annex IV), and from a stocktaking exercise detailing agencies’ activities in South Kordofan State which was prepared during the development of the Nuba Mountains Programme (NMP), NMPACT’s precursor.



balance of interventions increasingly falls into the category of Rural Development and Productivity Enhancement (RDPE) in both GOS and SPLM controlled areas as opposed to those that are described as belonging to Direct and Immediate Access to Food (DIAF). This is significant given that until the beginning of 2002, major parts of the Nuba Mountains were under an effective aid embargo and the region was in the midst of conflict. In other circumstances the trends would be quite different, but here it would appear that NMPACT, with its emphasis on local capacity building, sustainability and protection of livelihoods, has delivered in its own terms and in line with the Twin Track Approach has successfully facilitated a collective response that has buttressed the stability of the food system. The DIAF element has remained fairly constant in terms of the numbers of interventions, though showed signs of tailing off in 2004. The modest nature of this element of the response in a crisis of this nature and magnitude is likely to be unusual (and for example is in direct contrast with what happened under OLS) given the tendency for agencies to solicit as well as receiving encouragement to provide food and other short-term emergency provisions such as seeds and tools which are part of this framework.

From the NMPACT information tables it is difficult to assess the full extent of the impact on the ground of the collective NMPACT partners' intervention in support of the recovery of local food systems, since a full impact assessment is yet to be undertaken. However, at the peers review workshop organised by FAO in Nairobi in January 2005 during the preparation of these study, representatives from Nuba communities and international food security experts working in the Nuba Mountains emphasised that significant changes have taken place in the region since NMPACT became operational. Some of the examples quoted included the increase in the number of markets throughout the region, the levelling of prices between markets in GOS and in SPLM areas (in 2001 market prices for non locally produced goods in SPLM areas were at least double the prices in GOS areas), the increased diversity and availability of goods in SPLM markets' basket, the opening of cattle markets and the increased market access for farmers and livestock keepers. Participants also mentioned the increased access to key services like water.

These preliminary observations, which obviously will need to be corroborated by in-depth research and analysis, seem to suggest that NMPACT's approach to food security, with its emphasis on advocacy to remove barriers to sustainable livelihoods security (including through collective advocacy to obtain a cease-fire and a monitoring body), has had an important role in strengthening people's own strategies to enhancing resilience and lowering the dependency on external food aid, as the decrease in the number of agencies involved in emergency delivery of aid and seeds highlighted in Figure 3 above seems to demonstrate.

It has been commented at the peers review meeting in January 2005 that NMPACT's innovative food security approach was made possible because it was part of a wider institutional context where local counterparts were genuinely committed to promoting more long sighted responses and not to manipulate external emergency assistance for political purposes. Undoubtedly, NRRDO's role in discouraging international organisations from delivering excessive quantities of aid to the Nuba Mountains in the wake of the case-fire and its advocacy in favour of local purchase of food and seed played a crucial role in shaping the design of NMPACT and its food security strategy. It is important though to remark that NRRDO had benefited for a number of years from

the technical assistance of a number of international food security experts who worked hard to build the capacity of the Nuba organisation.

#### **4.4 The interface between local institutions and external stakeholders**

Since the beginning, NMPACT strove to promote Nuba leadership in the implementation effort and to confer ownership of the implementation process to the national authorities. It should be emphasised that the SPLM controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains have developed a remarkable and unique experiment in grassroots democracy which is unparalleled in the rest of the country, be it in government or SPLM administered areas. This is very largely thanks to the vision of the late Yusuf Kuwa Mekki, the first SPLM Governor of the Nuba Mountains, who endeavoured to initiate a democratic political process in the areas under his control. The centrepiece of such process is the South Kordofan Advisory Council, a Nuba parliament that meets yearly to decide on the most important matters of policy facing the Nuba, including continuing the war, a decision that was made by civilian representatives in the Council on an annual basis. The Council, established in 1992, is the supreme legislative body in the SPLM areas of the Nuba Mountains and has the authority to overrule the executive (the Governor). A functioning judiciary has also been established in the SPLM areas. In these areas people are able to discuss, debate and express their views in a free and organised manner. Since the early 1990s it has become traditional for the people to meet regularly and discuss political and other issues that concern the community as a whole (cf. Flint, 2001). This form of collective, democratic decision-making is a remarkable achievement in the context of the Sudan, especially in an area that has been at war for nearly two decades and the NMPACT partners were committed to ensure that the programme would not undermine emerging Nuba institutions.

The strong involvement of HAC and SRRC in the Co-ordination Structure allowed NMPACT to confer ownership of the design and implementation process. It also provided the partners with a channel to address issues with official counterparts both at the field and central (Khartoum/Nairobi) levels, thereby facilitating prompt resolution of problems when they arose. As said earlier (3.2), it is important to observe that these counterparts were traditionally perceived to be unhelpful and often obstructive, but by working together around a common platform they neutralised each other's more extreme positions and engaged with the international partners in a very constructive manner.

Although the programme did well to involve government and SPLM counterparts in the co-ordination of the programme, the Co-ordination Structure and the partners were not equally successful in extending this ownership to the Nuba NGOs and the community on the ground during the first phase of the programme. The aim of promoting genuine Nuba leadership within the response as a whole therefore remained elusive. The lack of local Nuba control over the interventions that were being designed and carried out was a flaw which came to the surface as the programme was rolled out. While many partners focused their efforts on capacity building of local communities, very little was done to support the emergence of genuine Nuba leadership, as envisaged by the NMPACT document. This limited the capacity of the local communities to steer the rehabilitation and development process and the ability of the partners to focus their response in line with a genuinely Nuba analysis, set of aspirations and priorities. The imbalance of power was skewed in favour of international humanitarian representatives when it came to setting agendas and priorities for the interventions in the region, including food security

responses. Many of the NMPACT partners however recognised that it was incumbent upon them to remedy this situation in order to be true to the philosophy and mandate of the programme (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2003).

More efforts are being undertaken at present to involve the Nuba at the grassroots level in all phases of the programme cycle. A NMPACT Monitoring and Evaluation Unit made up of staff from the Nuba Mountains has recently been set up with the support of the World Bank, which is training Nuba Mountains communities in participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation techniques (World Bank, 2004). The underlying idea is that trained communities will be empowered to set priorities for rehabilitation and development interventions in their areas, monitor implementation of programmes and projects and review the performance of external agencies vis-à-vis the principles of engagement.

#### **4.5 Information flows and links with the NMPACT response and policy framework**

The success of NMPACT in its early days was due to a large extent to the fact that the programme had a dedicated co-ordination structure at both the local and the central levels which facilitated the flow of information between the partners. In the internal review of the programme undertaken in September 2003, many of the NMPACT partners observed that the NMPACT framework and the co-ordination structure had been instrumental in helping them define, prioritise and co-ordinate activities. In their opinion the framework also provided networking opportunities for agencies working in the Nuba Mountains, especially through the regular monthly meetings and the Partners' Fora. The partners felt that NMPACT had been instrumental in supporting the member agencies to identify and forge new partnerships, especially with local organisations, and that the framework had ensured greater efficiency of ongoing and planned assistance to the Nuba Mountains through information sharing and mainstreaming of approaches (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2003:10).

Within the programme, information was mainly shared through circulation of written material via the Co-ordination Structure as well as through personal interaction. Regular reports and in-depth studies were circulated to the partners by the Co-ordination Structure, which would also circulate partners' documents to the whole range of partners. Furthermore, a detailed 'NMPACT Partners' Information Table' would be regularly prepared and shared with all programme stakeholders, including donors. The tables described ongoing and planned activities, areas of intervention, planned inputs, existing budget and funding gaps for each of the NMPACT partners, which found the table a very important instrument to keep abreast of the details of other partners' interventions. The existence of such tables has allowed the charting of the trends in the NMPACT partners' assistance efforts, such as in the case of the Twin Track analysis presented above (see 4.3).

Attempts to create a database accessible to all partners and stakeholders were also made following the conclusion of the Baseline Data Collection Survey in November 2002, during which team members were able to gather a high amount of data for each of NMPACT's technical sectors. The establishment of the database was though hampered by the turn over in the co-ordination of the programme and the long gap that followed before a new NMPACT Programme Co-ordinator was appointed. The data are still available at the Office of the UN RC/HC in the Sudan and recently, at the Third

Partners' Forum, the latest Co-ordination Structure team has expressed its intention to set up the database as soon as possible, with a particular focus on IDPs' related information (place of displacement, available facilities/assets in area of return, routes, immunisation, prevalence of diseases e.g. HIV/AIDS and malaria in area of return, returnees' technical skills and need for training, etc.) in order to inform partners' strategies of support to return to the Nuba Mountains (Office of the Deputy UNSRSG and UN RC/HC, 2005:19).

Regular monthly meetings of the partners were scheduled in Khartoum and in Nairobi as well as at the field level, both in Kadugli and Kaoda, respectively the GOS and the SPLM headquarters, with the main aim of sharing information and reviewing progress towards the implementation of the principles. Technical meetings of the various sectors also took place, although more randomly. Some of these meetings were held cross-line with a model similar to that of the Partners' Fora, e.g. the Save the Children sponsored workshop on Health and Food Security held in Elbati in January 2003 (SC-US, 2003). Cross-line meetings of the Co-ordination Structure (UN/HAC/SRRC) were also held *ad hoc* to discuss emerging issues, e.g. the facilitation of cross-line access for implementing partners and the identification of a neutral location (Elbati) for cross-line meetings.

The most important avenue for information sharing was obviously the Partners' Fora, where all stakeholders both at the capitals and the field levels were gathered together to review progress, share information and discuss policy issues. The agenda for the Fora were set by the NMPACT Programme Co-ordinator, HAC and SRRC with the input of all partners, including local NGOs. The Fora provided an invaluable opportunity for national and international partners operating at the local level to meet in the same place with managers, donors and policy makers stationed in Khartoum and in Nairobi (or at agencies' headquarters in other countries) and take joint decisions on key aspects of the programme. This meant that Nuba people from local CBOs and NGOs had a chance to actively influence and direct the NMPACT policy agenda and orient the priorities of the programme. At the Fora the partners would collectively review the implementation of the planned activities, share information and discuss the collective research agenda to inform policies aimed at strengthening partners' interventions. As a matter of example, at the First Partners' Forum in July 2002 the decision was made that more analysis and investigation was needed to identify disparities and different levels of needs in the region and prioritise interventions on actual needs (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2002d). This led the partners to plan and carry out the region wide cross-line survey which provided the basis for the second phase of NMPACT, which was focused on rehabilitation. At the Second Partners' Forum in December 2002, a collective decision was made that more research was needed into the issue of land tenure, also to underpin the results of the cross-line survey, which had identified displacement and return as the most critical issues to be addressed by the NMPACT partners (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2002e).

## **4.6 Limitations in delivering the model and new challenges**

### **4.6.1 Institutional failings and their effects on implementation**

The central role of the Co-ordination Structure in the success of NMPACT was further brought to light by a year long staffing gap in 2003, both at the central and field levels, which was largely the result of bureaucratic and administrative delays of both UNDP and UN-OCHA (Office of the UN RC/HC, 2003:26). This gap left the programme without leadership and support and especially affected the partners' focus on the principles of

engagement and the interaction between the counterparts. In the 2003 internal review, the partners commented that *'without a fully staffed Co-ordination Structure in place, the bridge built between HAC and SRRC last year has become weaker and there has been no direct interaction between the two counterparts on Sudanese soil since January 2003'* (Office of the UN RC/HC, *ibid.*). The absence of field co-ordinators on the ground led counterparts and partners to complain that insufficient attention was being paid to peripheral areas of the Nuba Mountains region, with the consequence that the 'doing least harm' principle was neglected. The resultant lack of information on needs and disparities undermined the development of the intended focus on equitable responses across the region, particularly along political lines and for the different livelihoods groups. Furthermore, the prolonged lack of field co-ordinators weakened the capacity building process of HAC and SRRC, frustrating their efforts to play their co-ordinating role effectively, as well as undermining attempts to root the response in even more deeply amongst a diverse set of local actors.

Crucially, collective decision making, which had so marked the evolution of NMPACT, was restricted by a change of leadership within the UN system, which put strong emphasis on the internal coherence of UN activities and structures. In an attempt to restructure the UN operation throughout Sudan, unilateral decisions about the NMPACT programme were made which did not fully involve either the counterparts or the partners. This had negative effects on the trust building and ownership which had been forged in the preceding years. In particular, the official counterparts were disappointed with this turn of events and over time relations gradually deteriorated. Both parties disliked the change of approach and the SPLM/A in particular felt that certain decisions had considerably affected their interests.

The absence of a fully functioning Co-ordination Structure was felt particularly in relation to the monitoring of the principles, the equitability one above all. A case illustrating the problem arising from the staffing gap is provided by the seeds and tools distribution that took place in the Nuba Mountains in 2003. The NMPACT Focal Point for Agriculture and Food Economy, FAO, made considerable effort to ensure equitable FAO assistance between GOS and SPLM areas and to base the distribution on available information about the disparity of needs in the two areas. However, in the absence of NMPACT Field Co-ordinators and of opportunities to meet at the field level (no Partners' Forum was held in 2003 and 2004 and sectoral field level meetings only resumed in late 2003) further inputs of crop seeds and hand tools were distributed in the region by both NMPACT and non-NMPACT partners in an uncoordinated fashion. This resulted in an imbalanced response, with in this instance the GOS areas benefiting disproportionately. The partners commented that this was not an isolated example and that imbalances were being created in other sectors since the loss of guidance from the Co-ordination Structure at both the field and the central level had inevitably weakened the focus on the principles. In the 2003 review the partners concluded that the equity issue was highly complex and that it was impossible to address it adequately without a strong NMPACT Co-ordination Structure (Office of the UN RC/HC:*ibid.*:28). It is interesting to note that the JMC/JMM commented that in general terms they perceived the NGOs as having better incorporated the NMPACT principles into their operation than the UN agencies, whose adherence to the principles diminished once the Co-ordination Structure became less operational (Office of the UN RC/HC, *ibid.*:19).

The changes that arose around the implementation of NMPACT reflect weaknesses within the UN co-ordination system as a whole. NMPACT was born out of the vision of an array of national and international actors and many within the UN system provided it

with leadership. However, there was a systematic failure within the institution to recognise and reward innovation. Despite the presence of a wide number of influential backers, ranging from donors to Bretton Woods institutions, and the obvious buy-in of both the warring parties and of numerous UN agencies and INGOs, the Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator was ultimately in a position to override consensual decision making to give priority to the restructuring of the overall Sudan operation. The complaints of several amongst the NMPACT partners can be summarised in the statement of the head of one of the leading NMPACT partners who commented that while the effort of ameliorating the strategy and the vision of the UN operation in the Sudan was commendable, the UN was running the risk of 'throwing the baby with the bath water' (personal communication, 2003). The very considerable autonomy of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator, though, and the lack of a clear accountability structure meant that NMPACT was very vulnerable to changes in priorities and policy from the top.

A further change of leadership in late 2004 - at both the programme level and at the highest levels of the UN operation in Sudan - has allowed the project to get back on track with respect to its original objectives and the principles of engagement and to rebuild its partnerships with national counterparts and institutions. The Co-ordination Structure was in March 2005 carrying out a review to examine the continued relevance of NMPACT in a post-peace scenario and to analyse ways in which the programme can readjust its goals and principles in order to contribute to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

#### **4.6.2 The post-peace scenario: reinventing NMPACT to support the implementation of the CPA**

The Third Partners' Forum, which was held between Umm Sirdiba and Elbati (the neutral location identified by HAC and SRRC in the Nuba Mountains) in February 2005, focused on reassessing the continued role of NMPACT in a post peace scenario. The Forum concluded that the NMPACT framework, its goal and its principles of engagement continued to be highly relevant to the current regional context. The partners felt that the emphasis on 'Conflict Transformation' in the approach of the overall programme framework remained relevant, if not critical, in a post CPA era (Office of the UN Deputy SRSR and RC/HC, 2005:8).

There is widespread concern amongst the NMPACT partners, including the official counterparts, that the protocols making up the CPA may not have addressed all of the root causes of the conflict. However, the partners believe that underlying issues which could lead to renewed tension must be tackled through democratic, non-violent means by the local community and that the NMPACT model can be instrumental in fostering dialogue and constructive interaction in the region. Although the CPA has been agreed on paper, poor or late implementation of the protocols could have a serious negative impact on the ground and a lack of a common understanding about what the CPA actually says could also precipitate conflict and unrest. In this regard, the Third Partners' Forum affirmed that commitment of the NMPACT partners to a renewed effort to focus on the principles of engagement, particularly on the principle of fostering an enabling environment for an indigenous, Nuba led long-term peace process, which remains essential in this phase. The NMPACT partners will also focus on supporting successful power sharing between the warring parties and the integration of the two administrative entities, the Nuba Mountains (current South Kordofan State) and West Kordofan State,

which are to be merged into a new, enlarged State of South Kordofan according to the provisions of the CPA (Office of the UN Deputy SRSG and RC/HC, *ibid.*). This will require some official clarification or amendment to the original Programme Document by the two counterparts as the NMPACT mandate is currently restricted to the areas covered by the Burgenstock Cease-Fire Agreement, i.e. the five provinces of today's South Kordofan and only Lagawa Province in West Kordofan.

It is felt in many quarters that, given the special conditions accorded to the Nuba Mountains by the Two Areas Protocol signed in Naivasha in May 2004 and endorsed within the CPA in January 2005 and the general dissatisfaction of many Nuba about the agreement (cf. Nuva Survival, 2005), failing to successfully implement the CPA in the new South Kordofan State may pose a challenge not just for the reconstituted State, but for the entire CPA in the country as a whole (Office of the UN Deputy SRSG and RC/HC, *ibid.*). In this regard, the role of NMPACT in underpinning the implementation of the Protocol will be of considerable importance.

## 5. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

### 5.1 Co-ordination in complex emergencies

The experience of NMPACT and the processes that led up to it, albeit short, offer significant lessons for programming in complex emergencies, be it in other areas of the Sudan or in countries with a similar context. NMPACT was developed out of learning from the Operation Lifeline Sudan experience and capitalised on the shortcomings of that response to bring about changes that were unprecedented in the history of humanitarian engagement in the Sudan. In particular, NMPACT set out to bring a long-term perspective into an emergency context through its focus on the principles of engagement and their emphasis on national ownership, participatory development as relates to programme design and decision making and collective advocacy. The strong inter-agency co-ordination around the principles allowed the programme to break with the pattern of traditional externally driven responses to food insecurity and to adopt an approach focused on capacity building, promotion of sustainable agriculture and market revitalisation alongside conflict transformation and peace building.

Co-ordination in crisis contexts is traditionally difficult to achieve. Agencies' focus on visibility, competition for funds and an excessive attention to organisational self-interest (emphasis on own mandate rather than the interests of the intended beneficiaries) means that often co-ordination has little appeal in humanitarian contexts. Furthermore, in acute emergencies the humanitarian sector tends to privilege speed over quality of assistance and there is a fear that co-ordination would cause unnecessary delays (Van Brabant, 1999:15). In this regard, agencies do not consider that emergencies often become protracted and therefore the most effective responses are not necessarily the speediest ones. NMPACT's experience has shown that it is important to learn lessons that can help plan for the medium and long term while the crisis is still ongoing. The research work on land tenure issues, which was carried out while the conflict was still active, has been crucial in informing the peace process and today is providing a sound basis for external interventions aimed at supporting IDPs return and agricultural rehabilitation in the region.

In complex emergencies contexts agencies are also reluctant to create another 'layer of bureaucracy', so the challenge is to make co-ordination effective. This usually requires a cost, as effective co-ordination is time and staff intensive and needs to be properly resourced (Van Brabant, *ibid*:16). Again, the lessons learnt from NMPACT are that in the absence of an adequately staffed co-ordination structure the effectiveness of the programme was much reduced, the focus on the principles was weakened and, more importantly, the sustained interaction between the warring parties, which was a crucial element of success of the model, was severed, with the unwelcome effect of hindering the feasibility of cross-line operations for the partners.

Van Brabant (*ibid*:17) argues that in order for co-ordination to be effective, it needs to fulfil a number of functions, which range from serving as a contact point to providing situational updates, fulfilling security, learning and training functions as well as perform functions related to programming, political analysis, representation and strategic decision making. Table 14. overleaf summarises the main functions performed by the NMPACT Co-ordination Structure.



**Table 13. Key co-ordination functions of NMPACT Co-ordination Structure**

Key functions	Details
Services to members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Meeting rooms/venues for cross-line meetings</li> <li>▪ Salary surveys and labour legislation</li> <li>▪ Maps</li> </ul>
Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Collective agency contact point/agency directory</li> </ul>
Situational updates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Produce situational updates</li> <li>▪ Monitor and collate needs assessments and surveys</li> <li>▪ Monitor and collate resource availability</li> </ul>
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Information exchange on security situation</li> </ul>
Learning/Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Collect programme reports/reviews</li> <li>▪ Interagency discussion of reviews/evaluation</li> <li>▪ Carry out reviews/evaluations</li> <li>▪ Develop institutional memory of lessons identified</li> </ul>
Programming	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Database of projects (sectors/area)</li> <li>▪ Sectoral policies/guidelines</li> <li>▪ Facilitation of interagency programme planning</li> <li>▪ Review programming gaps/duplication</li> <li>▪ Operational role to fill gaps</li> </ul>
Political analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conflict analysis</li> <li>▪ Agency position in the political economy of the conflict</li> <li>▪ Scenario development</li> </ul>
Representation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To powerbrokers to negotiate framework of consent and access to humanitarian space</li> <li>▪ To donors for resource mobilisation</li> <li>▪ To ceasefire monitoring mission &amp; political actors for advocacy</li> </ul>
Strategic decision-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ About agency position in the conflict and principles of engagement</li> </ul>

Adapted from Van Brabant (*ibid.*:18)

The model of co-ordination offered by NMPACT had a low degree of controversiality since it focused on providing services to partners and facilitating learning and analysis, rather than assuming a strong lead role in decision making or management of security issues. The principles of engagement were originally designed to avoid that the Co-ordination Structure would focus on day to day management of the operation on the ground, something some of the partners were reluctant to accept. The emphasis of the Co-ordination Structure was therefore shifted on exercising a quality control of the operation and supporting the partners in their endeavour to be true to the principles. The donors' incentive to foster collaboration within the NMPACT framework was also undoubtedly another important factor that made the framework appealing to some of the partners. NMPACT's experience shows that there is much to gain from strategic co-ordination in complex emergencies, when analysis, discussion, monitoring and review of the situation and ongoing and planned interventions are required.

## **5.2 NMAPCT and innovation: the principles of engagement and political humanitarianism**

The focus of the principles of engagement on sustainability, equitability and 'do least harm' pushed for a shift in emphasis within NMPACT away from short-term emergency

intervention and externally driven aid delivery. The medium to long terms focus of NMPACT's food security intervention has proven to be effective in enhancing the potential for recovery and building the resilience of local communities in the Nuba Mountains. The findings of the Twin Track analysis presented in this study document the change in trend from emergency interventions to longer term responses over the three years of life of NMPACT. Preliminary observations from peer reviewers on the impact of the NMPACT partners' interventions seem to prove that NMPACT's approach to food security, with its emphasis on advocacy to remove barriers to sustainable livelihoods security, including through collective advocacy to obtain a cease-fire and a monitoring body, has had an important role in terms of strengthening people's own capacities to enhance resilience and lowering the dependence on external food aid.

The NMPACT framework has also been successful in using aid to foster dialogue between the warring parties. The adoption of the 'Do No Harm' approach resulted in joint advocacy to end the humanitarian blockade and to press for a cease-fire. The response has been characterised by extensive engagement with the Government of the Sudan, the SPLM, key diplomatic players and the cease-fire monitoring operation. The so called 'political humanitarianism' of NMPACT can be looked upon as a model to address livelihoods issues in a complex emergency by focusing on responses based on political analysis, advocacy, fostering links with key actors in the political and peace-keeping spheres of operation and strong local ownership of the recovery process. The significant results achieved by NMPACT in a relatively short space of time indicate that much can be learned from a response that is informed by a political analysis of food insecurity and entitlements deprivation, which departs from the more conventional technical and community centred responses of aid agencies to such crises.

Much remains to be tested and understood in the context of programming in complex political emergencies. NMPACT's experience, while of a short duration, shows that there is a clear role for applying long term and systematic development thinking to emergencies and supporting learning and analysis of the deep rooted causes of the main elements of a crisis to generate informed responses. While the need for quick external aid delivery cannot be avoided in the event of major crises or emergencies, there is definitely a need to adopt and adapt alternative models in contexts where such emergencies have become chronic and where there are political elements that need to be tackled to unblock the crisis. Its relevance for the Sudan is particularly high at a moment when peace and confidence building are very much on the agenda and when the situation in Dar Fur risks becoming a chronic emergency, where the international response is strongly driven by the provision of external inputs and has so far done very little to understand local political and livelihoods realities to inform interventions.

The experience of NMPACT demonstrates what can be done to span the divide between parties that have a history of acute and entrenched antagonism by providing a basis for building towards the future by promoting reconciliation and responsibility for change at various levels, even when the roots of conflict are far from being resolved. Whilst the peculiarities of any given situation will always differ, the rootedness of NMPACT in a range of developmental principles mean that it offers lessons for responses in various similar contexts in the region and beyond.

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
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# ANNEX I – CEASE-FIRE MAP OF THE NUBA MOUNTAINS (2002)





**ANNEX II –NUBA MOUNTAINS MAP SHOWING GOS AND SPLM AREAS (2000)** – adapted from African Rights, 1995

### ANNEX III – THE FAO TWIN TRACK APPROACH

<b>Twin Track Approach</b>	<b>Availability</b>	<b>Access And Utilization</b>	<b>Stability</b>
<b>Rural Development/ productivity enhancement</b>	<p><i>Enhancing Food Supply to the most vulnerable</i></p> <p><i>Improving rural food production, esp. by small-scale farmers</i></p> <p><i>Investing in rural infrastructure</i></p> <p><i>Investing in rural markets</i></p> <p><i>Revitalization of Livestock sector</i></p> <p><i>Resource rehabilitation and conservation</i></p>	<p><i>Enhancing income and other entitlements to food</i></p> <p><i>Re-establishing rural institutions</i></p> <p><i>Enhancing access to assets</i></p> <p><i>Ensuring access to land</i></p> <p><i>Reviving rural financial systems</i></p> <p><i>Strengthening labour market</i></p> <p><i>Mechanisms to ensure safe food</i></p> <p><i>Social Rehabilitation Programs</i></p>	<p><i>Diversifying agriculture and employment</i></p> <p><i>Monitoring food security and vulnerability</i></p> <p><i>Dealing with the structural causes of food insecurity</i></p> <p><i>Reintegrating refugees, displaced people</i></p> <p><i>Developing Risk analysis and management</i></p> <p><i>Reviving access to credit system and saving mechanisms</i></p>
<b>Direct and Immediate Access to Food</b>	<p><i>Food Aid</i></p> <p><i>Seed/input relief</i></p> <p><i>Restocking Livestock capital</i></p> <p><i>Enabling Market Revival</i></p>	<p><i>Transfers: Food/ Cash based</i></p> <p><i>Asset redistribution</i></p> <p><i>Social Relief/ Rehabilitation Programs</i></p> <p><i>Nutrition intervention programs</i></p>	<p><i>Re-establishing social safety nets</i></p> <p><i>Monitoring immediate vulnerability and intervention impact</i></p> <p><i>Peace building efforts</i></p>

Source: Pingali, Alinovi and Satton, 1995:17

ANNEX IV

FAO TWIN TRACK APPROACH FRAMEWORK: NMPACT PARTNERS' INTERVENTIONS 2000-2004

Table 1: GOS - Rural Development & Productivity Enhancement

	Availability	Access & Utilization	Security
2000	UNDP - Community farms UNDP - Livestock development UNDP - Storage infrastructure UNDP - Vet campaign	UNDP - Institution building UNDP - Micro-credit UNICEF - Institution building	UNDP - Small industries UNDP - Income generation UNICEF - IGAs
2002	FAO - Demonstration: vegetable production and water harvest, FAO - Demonstration community nurseries FAO - protection & storage – includes training component FAO - CBAHC – inputs and training SC-US - Training paravets SC-US - Seed revolving banks	UNDP - micro-finance and enterprise support UNDP - Gender awareness training	CARE - Food security assessment FAO - IGAs UNDP - Vocational training
2003	FAO - Training vegetable and crop production FAO - Training processing/production techniques FAO - Training CAHW FAO - Supply vet drugs FAO - Vaccination campaign for livestock NCA - Seed/grain bank establishment SC-US - School feeding SC-US - Tractor hire services SC-US - Seed banks UNDP - Marketing support and IG WFP - School feeding	FAO - Training of NGOs, LAGs in community based activities NCA - Extension services with GoS SC-US - Paravet training SC-US - CBA Training SC-US - CB/Training NGOs UNDP - Micro-finance support UNDP - Gender awareness training	FAO - Distribution of fishing inputs FAO - Training of fisherfolk in fishing gear use and production FAO - Training blacksmithing UNDP - Vocational training WFP – Food For IG

	<b>Availability</b>	<b>Access &amp; Utilization</b>	<b>Security</b>
2004	<p>FAO - Harvest training  FAO - Animal traction training  GAA - Animal traction  SC-US - Seed bank establishment  SC-US - Tractor service hire  UNDP - Vegetable gardens  UNDP - Oil pressing  UNDP - rehab of markets  UNDP - women's centres  UNIDO – provision of locally produced tools</p>	<p>GAA - Training agricultural extensionists  GAA - Supply vet drugs  GAA - Train vet extensionists  GAA - Create farmer and pastoralist committees  GAA - Credit to women  GAA - Support to Native Administration  GAA - Create Land Use Plans  GAA - Support improved land use methods  IRC - Women training on social development training  IRC - Literacy for self reliance  IRC - Support for establishment of 5 women's CBOs  SC-US - Training CBAs  SC-US - Capacity building of local NGOs  UNDP - Institutional support to NRRDO, SRRC, Regional Admin</p>	<p>FAO - Blacksmith training  GAA - Women IGAs  SC-US - Brick making training  UNDP - Poultry scheme</p>

**Table 2: GOS – Direct and immediate access to food**

	<b>Availability</b>	<b>Access &amp; Utilization</b>	<b>Security</b>
<b>2000</b>	FAO - Seeds and tools provision SC-US - Food delivery SC-US - Goat restocking SC-US - Seeds and tools UNDP - Goat restocking UNDP - Seeds and tools UNICEF - Seeds & tools WFP - Food distribution		UNDP - Conflict transformation
<b>2002</b>	CARE - Food distribution CARE - Seeds and tools FAO – Seeds and Hand tools provision SC-US - Agricultural seeds SC-US - Emergency food SC-US - Restocking (goats) WFP - Food distribution	UNICEF - Therapeutic feeding	
<b>2003</b>	FAO – Agricultural inputs provision SC-US - Food distribution SC-US - Seed and tools SC-US - Goat restocking NCA - Food distribution NCA - Seeds and tools WFP - General food distribution	UNICEF - Nutrition programme WFP - Food for work WFP – Food For Training	UNDP - Peace building
<b>2004</b>	FAO - Seed and tools distribution SC-US - Seeds and tools SC-US - Goats distribution GAA - Seeds distribution WFP - School feeding FFW – various (roads, haffir)		

**Table 3: SPLM - Rural Development & Productivity Enhancement**

	<b>Availability</b>	<b>Access &amp; Utilization</b>	<b>Security</b>
<b>2000</b>	-	-	-
<b>2002</b>	Concern - Local purchase of seed with NRRDO Concern - Training in seed bed prep Concern - Forestry: inputs and training Concern - Commodity injection for local markets Concern - Blacksmith equipment FAO - Vet drugs – inputs plus training FAO - Water harvesting – inputs plus training FAO - Reafforestation – inputs plus training	C. Aid - Core funding NRRDO UNDP - micro-finance and enterprise support UNDP - Gender awareness	CARE - Food security assessment Concern - Apiary training UNDP - Vocational training
<b>2003</b>	Concern - Tools and support for blacksmiths and carpenters Concern - Seed bank management Concern - On farm trials Concern - Commodity injection FAO - Blacksmith training FAO - Agro-forestry work FAO - Ox-plough training FAO - Livestock service delivery FAO - Provision of vet drugs FAO - Training CAHWs FAO - Studies in trade and markets UNDP - Marketing support and IG	C. Aid - Institutional support NRRDO C. Aid - Nuba Women's conference Governance meeting C. Aid - Support to PAC Concern - Micro-enterprise development fund Concern - Support to NRRDO Concern - Support to Nuba Policy Advisory (PAC) FAO - Capacity building of local authorities UNDP - Micro-finance support UNDP - Gender awareness training	Concern - Bee keeping programme demonstration Concern - Community trainings in agriculture and IGAs UNDP - Vocational training WFP – Food For IG

<p><b>2004</b></p>	<p>Concern - Seed bank training  Concern - Training in animal traction  Diocese El Obeid - Seeds to IDPs  FAO - Seed bank construction  FAO - Tree nursery development  FAO - Production of blacksmith toolkits (ITDG)  FAO - Training CAHWs  FAO - Livestock co-ordination meeting  FAO - Distribution vet drugs  FAO - Livestock co-ordination meeting  S. Purse - Planting of sorghum  S. Purse - Ox ploughing training  UNDP - Vegetable gardens  UNDP - Oil pressing  UNDP - rehab of markets  UNDP - women's centres  WFP- Distribution to vulnerable  WFP - School feeding</p>	<p>UNDP - Institutional support to NRRDO, SRRC, Regional Admin</p>	<p>Concern - Beekeeping training  Concern - Blacksmith and carpentry group training  Concern - Trade groups trained and supported  UNDP - Poultry scheme  WFP - Food security monitoring</p>
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**Table 4: SPLM – Direct and immediate access to food**

	Availability	Access & Utilization	Security
<b>2000</b>			
<b>2002</b>	CARE - Food distribution CARE - Seeds and tools Concern - Seed provision Concern - Provision of tools FAO – Hand tools and seeds distribution WFP - Food distribution		
<b>2003</b>	Concern - Seeds distribution FAO - Agricultural inputs provision WFP – General food distribution	UNICEF - Nutrition programme WFP - Food for work WFP – Food For Training	
<b>2004</b>	Concern - Seeds distribution FAO - Seed distribution	WFP - FFT WFP - FFW (roads)	

**Sources:**

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