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GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE OILSEEDS, OILS AND OILMEALS SECTOR
Review of policies and changes since 1995

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. When the Group adopted the Guidelines for International Cooperation in the Oilseeds, Oils and Oilmeals Sector in 1980, it agreed to regularly review progress made towards achieving the objectives and policies covered in the Guidelines. Accordingly, Government measures taken mostly during 1995 and 1996 which have a bearing on the objectives laid down in the Guidelines, are reviewed in this document. The content of this paper is based on replies to requests for information circulated by the Secretariat and other public information available. Delegates are invited to provide additional information during the session.

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

2. During the period under the review, policies affecting the oilseed sector were influenced by a general undercurrent of liberalization which included widespread progressive withdrawal of the public sector from market intervention. This development - which continues a trend already observed at the time of the last review of policies in 1995 (CCP:OF 95/4) - has its roots in general economic policy reforms encompassing more than just the agricultural sector. Another important factor observed during the period under review was the tendency of many countries to reduce public outlays on agricultural support programmes due to more stringent budget constraints. Finally, during the course of 1995, policies in WTO member countries started to come under the influence of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URA), strengthening the general reorientation of agricultural production and trade policies mentioned above.

Production policies

3. <u>Price support schemes</u> continued to affect production of selected oilseeds, oils and fats in a number of countries during 1995-1996 (Table 1). Among developed countries, the **EU** continued to support the production of butter and olive oil, the intervention prices of which were raised in 1995. Since 1992 the EU producer prices for oilseeds have been determined by the world market, while producers receive direct income support payments (‘compensatory payments’) on a per-hectare basis. Upward movements in world oilseed prices during 1995-1996 triggered slight downward adjustments in these compensatory payments. Government costs incurred for the various programmes are shown in Table 2. Price schemes in support of oilseed production remained in place in **Switzerland** and **Norway**. In these countries, support prices were set at levels close to or above international market prices, and price intervention was accompanied by various market oriented measures, including public storage schemes, programmes to raise consumption, export subsidization and border protection.

4. In the **Russian Federation**, where fixed guaranteed minimum prices were abolished in 1994, the government announced more flexible procurement prices at which limited amounts of oilseeds were bought to replenish public reserves. The volume of such government purchases has fallen progressively, reflecting lack of funds and/or relatively unattractive purchase prices.

5. In the **USA**, minimum price guarantees for oilseeds and butter remained virtually unchanged during 1995-1996 (see Table 2 for public costs incurred). From mid-1996 onward, policies were determined by the introduction of new legislation for the period 1996-2002 (known under the name of FAIR Act, or The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act). One of the main objectives of the new legislation was to make agricultural production more responsive to market signals, along with an overall reduction in government controls.

6. Under the FAIR Act, support given to oilseed cultivation was curtailed. The loan rate for groundnuts was frozen below the 1995 level, and loan rates for all other oilseeds were confined to a particular range, thus preventing support prices from rising beyond certain levels. The main innovation of the FAIR Act was to replace target prices, deficiency payments and area set aside requirements as applied to “program crops” (i.e. wheat, feed grains, upland cotton and rice) with fixed payments to producers; these payments, which will decrease over time, do not depend on production levels or market prices and

are paid out to farmers irrespective of which crop they plant. The direct outcome of these measures was an overall relaxation of production and area controls, with planting decisions being increasingly determined by market conditions rather than public support programmes. In fact, the expansion of oilseed plantings observed during the 1996/97 season seemed to be mainly driven by fundamental market forces rather than government policies.

7. As to developing countries, most of those supporting oilseeds prices, reported only moderate or no increases in the level of administered producer prices. In fact, in many instances, support prices did not keep pace with overall inflation. In a few cases, support prices exceeded international market prices, and price schemes had to be supplemented with trade control measures. However, the general tendency was one of support prices moving closer to international market prices. Countries operating state purchasing schemes in conjunction with producer price guarantees, reported decreases in volumes procured due to shortage of funds. During the period under review, several governments decided to suspend or discontinue price support for oilseeds (**Turkey**, **Morocco**, **Mexico**, and **Zimbabwe**), while others, rather than raising support prices on the basis of production cost increases, linked the level of administered prices to changes in market prices. In other cases, government support prices and accompanying measures were replaced by floor prices and/or purchase agreements negotiated directly with private sector enterprises (i.e. oilseed crushers) which, in exchange, were offered preferential treatment, such as special import permits or import duty rebates.

8. In several countries, <u>area or production limits</u>, designed to reduce the unwanted effects of price support programmes remained in place. In the **EU**, producers of arable crops, including oilseeds, were required to set aside a part of their land in order to receive income support payments; after a reduction by two percentage points in 1995/96, the set-aside rate applied to oilseeds has remained at 10%, though the rate for other crops was reduced to 5% in 1996/97. The oilseed specific area threshold, which, if exceeded, triggers penalties, seems to have contributed to the slow-down in the expansion of oilseed production: after having exceeded the threshold in 1994, oilseed plantings remained within the established limits in both 1995 and 1996. Also, regulations to limit olive oil support payments remained in force, and excess production triggered reductions in intervention prices in both 1995 and 1996. In **Switzerland** support to oilseed farmers continued to be subject to area limits. The **USA** continued to limit the volume (‘quota’) of groundnuts entitled to receive support prices. Following the introduction of the FAIR Act, the setting of a ‘minimum quota’ was discontinued, and future quotas will be determined based on projected domestic usage. Furthermore, limitations on total annual financial support received by individual farmers remained in force.

9. Regarding <u>measures to affect production by means other than through support producer prices</u>, various governments continued to distribute agricultural inputs at subsidized prices, though outlays on such schemes remained well below government plans in most countries. Furthermore, in several countries, including some developing countries, the use of private sector financed crop insurance schemes to protect farmers from weather induced production and income fluctuations was promoted. With regard to credit subsidization programmes, a contraction in the level of government outlays and efforts to increase private sector participation in lending operations were noted. In the **Russian Federation**, the extension of production loans (‘commodity credits’) was resumed, which included the provision of subsidized inputs under the condition that farmers would sell their crop to state procurement agencies. Finally, in a large number of developing countries, governments continued to provide technical and financial assistance for the development of their oilseed-based industries, with a view to reduce import dependency and/or to raise foreign exchange earnings.

10. **Canada** also reformed its production support programme. In line with its URA commitment to reduce direct assistance to agricultural producers, support provided to grain and oilseed farmers through the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) was phased out in 1995. As compensation, farmers were offered one-time lump sum payments; funds to improve the transport infrastructure; and export credit guarantees. At the same time, increased attention was given to various income safety net programmes. With the termination of the WGTA, the past bias of government support towards export oriented wheat production has come to an end, opening the way for more diversified and market-oriented crop production that could improve the relative position of oilseeds.

Marketing and public stockholding policies

11. The role of the public sector in marketing of oilseeds, oils and meals has been reappraised in several countries. Numerous governments proceeded with reforms focusing on market liberalization and deregulation, including the privatization of state owned production and processing units, the abolition of state controlled marketing boards or cooperatives, and/or the reduction of price controls and border protection. At the same time, the increase of market transparency and the development of commercial links amongst economic agents within the sector (e.g. direct contractual agreements between oilseed farmers and crushers) were encouraged.

12. In **China**, decentralization and deregulation efforts continued. Most of the administrative and financial responsibility for, *inter alia*, public procurement, price stability and local supply was delegated to the provincial authorities which, in turn, entrusted the commercial operations to parastatal enterprises. However, the central government maintained overall control over oilseed production and marketing at the national level, with a view to ensure that urban consumption needs were met. State procurement of oilseeds and oils constituted (together with control over external trade) the main tool for regulating their domestic distribution. Oilseed purchases were effected partly at market prices and partly at procurement prices fixed below market level when they were combined with the distribution of subsidized inputs.

13. In the **Russian Federation**, on-going deregulation and privatization policies (which included external trade liberalization) affected also the marketing of oilseeds. Involvement of the private sector in marketing increased, while public procurement shrank further due to unattractive government prices and/or lack of public funding. In 1996, the government endorsed a new medium-term development programme aiming at the stabilization of agroindustrial production and increased production efficiency. This programme could lead to increased government control over the production and marketing of oilseeds and derived products and may raise government spending for market support measures.

14. Continued or increased intervention in oilseed markets was reported from **Switzerland**, where control over the industry at the production, transformation and marketing level was maintained, and from **Turkey,** where, in an effort to protect local producers, crushers were obliged to purchase certain amounts of oilseeds from domestic origins.

15. With regard to public stockholding, several countries continued to maintain stocks of vegetable oils for food security purposes and/or in order to stabilize domestic markets (in particular prices) through government purchases and sales. Where such stock policies were newly introduced (**Indonesia, Morocco,** and **Lithuania**), governments tended to encourage greater private sector participation in the administration and financing of the various operations. Also in **China**, where the central government continued to provide loans and subsidies for holding stocks of public interest, the new policy was to reduce public outlays while increasing the involvement of private companies.

Consumption policies

16. Several countries continued to support consumption of oilseed based products, particularly of oils and fats destined for human consumption. Main objectives were to keep costs of living down (developing countries) and/or to raise consumption from domestic, often relatively high-cost, sources (developed countries). Examples include the **EU** for butter, olive oil and rapeseed for industrial uses, the **USA** for butter, and **Switzerland** for oil from rapeseed and soybean as well as butter. In several developing countries, retail prices for vegetable oils were either set or controlled closely by the government. In countries where prices were allowed to move freely, consumers were most often exposed to steep rises in vegetable oil prices during the period under review. To check such price escalation, in **India, Indonesia** and **Pakistan**, government controlled agencies and public retail outlets were directed to sell vegetable oils and fats (procured on the national or international market) at prices below prevailing market levels. In the **Russian Federation**, the value-added tax on vegetable oils and butter was lowered. In **Bulgaria** prices were liberalized for most food products, but refined sunflower oil prices remained among the nine still

under some form of control by the government. In some countries, intervention in domestic markets and support of retail prices were accompanied by trade policy measures, such as reduction of import duties or export restrictions.

17. Some governments adopted measures which led to a reduction in consumer protection and/or consumer price increases. Such measures included: the reduction or termination of price control over vegetable oils and fats, the phasing out of subsidies provided to processors and traders, and/or reduced provision of subsidized food through public distribution systems. Countries affected include **Senegal, Venezuela, Egypt, Morocco** and **Syria**.

International trade policies and food aid

Measures affecting exports

18. Compared to previous years, during 1995-1996, the impact of export incentive schemes on trade was less pronounced during the period under review. The two main reasons for this were (a) during 1995-1996, competition between exporting countries was reduced by a steady expansion in global import demand which, combined with a relatively tight supply situation, led to firm prices for oilseed-based products, and (b) several governments reduced or terminated their contribution to export promotion programmes, either in response to budgetary constraints, or as a result of the URA. WTO member countries committed themselves to gradually reduce the volume of subsidised exports as well as corresponding government outlays.

19. The various export programmes operated by the **USA** (the Export Enhancement Program or EEP, the Cottonseed and Sunflowerseed Oil Assistance Programs, COAP/SOAP, and the Dairy Export Incentives Program, DEIP) remained virtually unused since 1995 as far as oils and fats are concerned, because market conditions did not warrant the application of export subsidies. Under the new farm legislation introduced in 1996, EEP and DEIP were reauthorized. Sunflower and cottonseed oil will no longer enjoy specific funding, but will be admitted under the EEP. Funding for EEP was made subject to specific limits, which range well below the level of government outlays recorded in recent years as well as the maximum levels permitted under the country’s URA commitment regarding outlays for export subsidization. The provision of export incentives through export credit guarantees (GSM-102) will continue, though subject to newly introduced funding limitations. Outlays under the Market Promotion Program have also been cut.

20. In **Canada**, the termination of the WGTA in 1995 eliminated the transport subsidy enjoyed by grain and oilseed exporters. As a compensation, the government introduced export credit guarantee programmes **-** a form of support which is not affected by the URA. In the **EU**, exports continued to be subsidized at an unchanged level for butter, and at a slightly lower rate for olive oil (see Table 2). **Poland** continued to subsidise its exports of rapeseed, while, in **Hungary**, support to sunflower oil and butter exports was discontinued.

21. Among developing countries, **Malaysia** continued its efforts to raise the country’s market share in global palm oil trade by providing credit facilities to or entering into long-term purchase agreements with major importers, and by pursuing joint ventures to develop palm oil consumption abroad. Furthermore, the export duty on processed palm oil was suspended during 1995-1996. **Argentina** continued to apply its system of taxes and rebates to stimulate exports. In **Brazil**, the taxation of exports of oilseeds and oilseed-based products, through the ICMS (Impuesto sobre Circulacao de Mercadorias e Servicos) was discontinued, which raised the competitiveness of soybean exports vis-à-vis shipments of soybean oil and meal. **China** reduced export subsidization of oilseeds and oilseed products, which led to changes in the overall pattern of shipments, as oilseeds and meals were less affected than oils.

22. Measures to limit exports of oilseeds and derived products continued to be used by several net importing developing countries including **Indonesia**, **China**, **Myanmar**, **Nigeria**, and **Pakistan**. The main objective behind such measures was to ensure adequate domestic supplies and/or to control rises in

domestic prices. These consumer oriented policies included the taxation of exports and export bans. However, given the potential negative effects of such measures on local producers and crushers, some governments preferred using temporary forms of export control or variable taxes, so as to be able to respond swiftly to changes in the internal supply and demand situation.

23. In the **Russian Federation, Hungary** and **India**, exports of certain products were liberalized, in particular with regard to export permit requirements. This stimulated export-oriented production and raised foreign exchange earnings. In a number of other countries, however, restrictions - in particular export quotas and licensing requirements - were maintained or even strengthened in an effort to raise domestic supplies of oils and fats.

Measures affecting imports

24. Since 1995, a number of developing countries reduced or removed tariffs and related duties affecting imports of oilseed-based products, either in a permanent or temporary manner, in order to facilitate meeting local demand for oilseed products, where its growth was outpacing that of local supply, and/or to combat price surges resulting from supply shortages. In some countries, vegetable oil supplies fell short of demand and crushers operated below full capacity, unrestricted importation of oilseed was permitted. However, in some cases, where policies would negatively affect local oilseed producers, imports were made conditional upon the absorption of domestic production at government determined minimum prices.

25. Other measures which have contributed to opening up import markets included the gradual reduction or lifting of quantitative import restrictions, import monopolies, licensing requirements and similar non-tariff measures. Countries concerned include **Morocco**, the **Russian Federation**, **Indonesia** and **India**. Besides complying with overall market liberalization policies, these measures were also taken to ensure that domestic consumption needs would be met. In **Indonesia**, oilmeal imports were liberalized with a view to stimulate the livestock production.

26. There were, however, other countries where existing import barriers were strengthened or new ones introduced. Generally, such steps were taken to support production policy measures which tended to push domestic prices above world market levels. To control imports, governments resorted to: increased import tariffs, levies or other surcharges; import bans; discretionary licensing; allocation of quotas and special tariff concessions to state enterprises; and quantitative import restrictions.

27. During the period under review, import policies started to come under the influence of the URA. Under the agreement, minimum import opportunities were offered, non-tariff barriers were converted into ordinary customs duties, and tariffs were bound with, in many cases, reductions to be applied over time. The ongoing tariffication process and the binding of tariffs seem to have improved market transparency.

Food aid

28. Available food aid statistics show that, in 1994-1995, the amount of fats and oils supplied on concessional terms ranged well below the average level recorded in the four preceding years (see Table 3). The **USA** continued to account for about 60% of total concessional trade, and the **EU** together with **Canada** for a further 35%. In 1995, the share of shipments to low-income food deficit countries (LIFDCs) in the world total of concessional trade was 71%, slightly below the 1990-1994 average of 74%. Overall, during 1994-1995, developing countries (or the LIFDC group) obtained only 1,6% (or 2.6%) of their oils and fats imports as food aid, compared to about 4.4% (or 7.3%) in the eighties.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

29. The above review shows that a number of changes have occurred or are underway in the field of production policies. Traditional price support schemes were discontinued or modified in a number of countries. The overall tendency was to reform price support schemes with a view to increase the

producers' responsiveness to market signals, and to decrease governments' influence on price formation; this went hand in hand (particularly in developed countries) with a shift towards more production neutral forms of support, such as direct income payments. These developments, together with continued efforts to reduce production incentives resulting from support payment, have resulted in halting policy induced expansion of relatively high-cost production in certain regions.

30. Government intervention in markets and other measures to improve domestic market stability continued to be applied in many countries where imbalances between supply and demand developed, principally to alleviate the negative effects of such situations on consumers. However, it appears that governments started using these instruments in a more targeted and focused manner, with a view not to impede global reforms to liberalize markets.

31. As to consumption policies, some governments continued to support or stimulate consumption by subsidizing retail prices (developed countries), while others introduced measures to check price escalation so as to keep costs of living down and/or to raise per caput intake of oils and fats, although some developing countries ceased consumption support.

32. Regarding international trade, policies in WTO member countries started to be influenced by the URA. The agreement initiated a process which is expected to lead to increased market transparency, reduced barriers to trade, and improved export competition and import access for agricultural commodities, including oilseed-based products. Eventually, these policy reforms should bring domestic prices more into line with variations in world market prices, hence strengthening the transmission of price signals between producers (or exporters) and consumers (or importers). At this stage, evaluating the full impact of UR related policy changes on international trade in oilseeds, oils and oilmeals appears to be premature, considering that the implementation period envisaged for the policy reforms is 6-10 years.

33. Overall, it appears that in the period under review some progress was made, under the influence of the URA with respect to reducing potentially market distorting, direct government interference in the production, marketing and international trade of oilseed-based products. However, despite some improvements in market access, international trade in oilseeds, oils and oilmeals in 1995-96 was still affected by tariff and non tariff-measures, and by producer and export subsidies granted by some countries. As a result, some exporting developing countries continued to see their competitive position in international markets impaired. Furthermore, in some countries, producers and consumers were negatively affected by reduced funding for public support programmes, while further decreases in the level of concessional trade contributed to lower consumption levels of oils and fats in some LIFDCs.

34. In view of the above findings, and in general accordance with the Guidelines[1] and the various objectives laid down therein the Group may wish, *inter alia,* to:

- (with regard to overall objectives)
  underline that the main objective of international cooperation and national policies should be to secure a balanced expansion of production, consumption and trade, within the context of progressive liberalization of domestic markets and international trade.

- (with regard to production policies)
  encourage governments to refrain from using production support measures which have a direct, potentially distorting, effect on markets. Policies should be designed in such a way as to allow producers to respond better to global market signals.

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1 Please note that, in view of the forthcoming review of the Guidelines and the likely revision of some of them in order to better reflect the ongoing re-orientation of policies, in particular in response to the UR Agreement on Agriculture, the Secretariat refrained from making specific reference to individual Guidelines.

- (with regard to trade policies)
  recommend that governments strive towards increased market transparency, improved access to markets, and fairer competition in oilseeds, oils and oilmeal markets. In doing so, governments should give special attention to products exported by developing (and, in particular, least developed) countries. All members of the WTO should follow the UR provisions referring to trade policies, in particular with regard to the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff barriers.

- (with regard to food aid)
  remind international aid-giving agencies and bilateral donors that, wherever required and in line with the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal as well as the relevant provisions of the UR Final Act, adequate volumes of food aid in the form of oils and fats should be made available to developing countries, particularly LIFDCs, at favourable conditions. Where feasible, the participation of developing exporting countries in providing food aid in commodities within the sector through triangular transactions or similar schemes should be increased.

- (with regard to consumption)
  remind governments of the importance to support consumption of oils and fats when per caput intake of these foodstuffs is low, so as to improve nutritional standards.

- (with regard to international assistance to developed and least developed countries)
  invite governments to pay special attention to the interests of least developed countries that depend on production and trade of oilseeds, oils or oilmeals, or that have a particular production and processing potential within the sector.

Table 1: Available information on prices at which production of certain oilseeds, oils and fats is supported in selected countries

	1994	1995	1996	1995	1996
	National currency/ton			US$/ton	
COPRA					
India	23 500	25 000	25 000	771	706
GROUNDNUTS (unshelled)					
India	8 600	9 000	9 200	278	260
Turkey	a/				
USA c/	748	747	672	747	672
USA d/	145	145	145	145	145
Zimbabwe e/	1 560	a/			
OLIVE OIL					
EU	3 178	3 838	3 838	5 020	4 867
RAPESEED					
India	8 100	8 300	8 600	256	243
Morocco	4 100	4 100	a/	480	
Switzerland	1 650	1 650	na	1 396	
USA	192	192	192	192	192
SOYBEANS					
Brazil f/	136	136	148	148	147
Colombia	293 200	na	na		
India (black)	5 700	6 000	6 200	185	175
Mexico	856	a/			
Morocco	3 700	3 700	a/	433	
Pakistan	6 875	b/			
Rep. of Korea (grade 2)	1 365 000	1 365 000	1 433 000	1 770	1 781
South Africa	839	na	na		
Switzerland	1 650	1 650	na	1 396	
Turkey	a/				
USA	181	181	183	181	183
Zimbabwe	1 800	a/			
SUNFLOWERSEED					
Egypt	900	1 050	1 050	310	310
India	9 000	9 500	9 600	293	271
Morocco	4 400	4 400	a/	515	
Pakistan	7 875	7 875	9 625	249	267
South Africa	878	na	na		
Switzerland	1 650	1 650	na	1 396	
Turkey	a/				
USA	192	192	192	192	192
Zimbabwe	1 472	1 600	1 800	185	181
BUTTER					
EU	2 763	3 235	3 282	4 232	4 162
USA (Grade A)	1 433	1 433	1 433	1 433	1 433

n.a Not available
a/ Discontinued
b/ Suspended
c/ Prices for production within marketing quota
d/ Prices for production additional to marketing quota
e/ Prices for shelled groundnuts
f/ Real (=2 750 cruzeiros reais) in 1994

Table 2: Available information on costs incurred by governments for price support schemes involving oilseeds, oils and fats *

	1994	**1995**	**1996**	**1995**	**1996**
European Union	(Million ECU per financial year)			(Million US dollars)	
Oilseeds (per ha aid to producers)	2 561	2 289	2 703 b/	2 994	3 428
Olive oil	1 767	774	1 899 b/	1 012	2 403
- Intervention costs c/	1 767	774	1 899 b/	1 012	2 408
- Export refunds	53	38	44 b/	50	56
Butter and related fats					
- Intervention costs c/	737	588	777 b/	769	985
- Export refunds	251	477	307 b/	624	389
United States	(Million US$ per fiscal year)				
Soybeans and groundnuts					
- Intervention costs c/	-146 a/	197	35 b/	197	35
Dairy products					
- Intervention costs c/	158	4	-98 a/b/	4	-98

* Please note that compared to previous years, the country coverage of this table had to be reduced due to lack of accessible data. However, it is known that in several other countries production support programmes involve considerable public expenditures

a/ Minus indicates a net receipt (excess of repayments or other receipts over gross outlays of funds).

b/ Refers to budget appropriations

c/ Including, depending on the commodity, deficiency payments, credit subsidies and other payments to producers; and aids for storage, domestic disposal and consumption

Table 3: Concessional trade in fats and oils

	1990-92	1993	1994	1995
	average		**in '000 tons**	
Total concessional trade 1/	**611**	**636**	**428**	**327**
of which: vegetable oils	539	492	353	313
butter and other edible fats	72	144	75	14
Supplying countries				
- United States	325	443	254	193
- EU 2/3/	203	105	126	103
- Canada	36	31	22	22
- Norway	8	10	5	3
- Finland	10	3	2	4
- Sweden	14	9	13	3
Recipient countries				
Low-income food deficit countries 4/	**466**	**394**	**331**	**232**
of which: - Albania	35	12	11	7
- Angola	9	8	15	19
- Armenia	-	-	20	9
- Bangladesh	10	10	9	4
- Dominican Republic	11	-	5	4
- Egypt	8	9	9	4
- Ethiopia, PDR	47	-	-	-
- Ethiopia	-	28	26	18
- Eritrea	-	5	12	6
- Georgia	-	-	7	11
- India	64	76	39	34
- Kenya	5	12	8	2
- Liberia	9	11	9	8
- Morocco	51	23	12	-
- Mozambique	17	14	8	10
- Nicaragua	35	6	6	8
- Pakistan	59	75	12	8
- Rwanda	2	10	16	11
- Somalia	8	12	3	2
- Sudan	13	16	18	4
Other countries	**145**	**242**	**97**	**95**
of which: - Peru	34	52	25	45
- Romania	17	-	4	-
- Russian Federation	-	98	20	4
- Uganda	6	21	18	7
- Yugoslavia FR	-	28	8	8

1/ Covers food aid shipments excluding purchases made in recipient countries
2/ EU (12) until 1994 and EU(15) thereafter
3/ Includes concessional trade funded through both Community resources and bilateral aid programmes operated by individual member countries
4/ Includes all food deficit countries with per caput incomes below the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance (i.e. with per caput income of US$ 1465 and below in 1995), which in accordance with the guidelines and criteria agreed by the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, should be given priority in the allocation of food aid
\- Means that data are not available or not applicable, or that figures are below unit value