AID AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT: SOME PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS

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Introduction:

Section 1: 'ILLEGITIMATE CIVILIANS'

Whether in the Cold War era or the post-9/11 era, the international community has a poor record in accessing and protecting civilians in geographical areas where rebels are strong, particularly in circumstances where these rebels have some kind of stigma internationally as well as within a country. Even in the 1990s, when the international community stepped up its **efforts to challenge the 'sovereignty' of abusive governments and to ne**gotiate access to rebel-held areas, there were important examples of neglecting the assistance and protection needs of those in areas of rebel strength (for example, in Angola and Uganda). Over several decades, there have been damaging silences on human rights issues, particularly in relation to such populations; moreover, aid agencies have sometimes misrepresented the situation.[i] A **process of 'picking sides' has tended to obscure the suffering of these civilians. Agendas like 'statebuilding', 'peacebuilding', 'stabilisation', 'counter-terrorism', 'coherence' and 'integrated missions' can easily feed into this suffering unless there is a constant attempt to highlight and meet emergency and protection needs in areas where rebels are strong.** 'Global wars (whether against Communism during the Cold War or terrorism more recently) tend to delegitimise particular groups of rebels and thereby to create additional impunity for those abusive civilians in areas containing rebels.

A common occurrence – whether during the Cold War, in the 1990s, or since 9/11 - has been for aid to be positioned on the edge of a zone that has a strong rebel presence and that the government wishes to depopulate.[ii] Simply providing aid in this way without drawing attention to human rights abuses tends to legitimise this underlying abusive process. It may also help to fund it. Particularly in the 1990s, cross-border operations offered one way of engaging with rebel groups, although these operations (like negotiated access more generally) seem to have fallen out of favour. Engaging with these rebel groups is important for civilian protection and for meeting humanitarian needs, even when rebels have been guilty of abuses and even when they have been labeled (whether nationally, internationally **or both) as 'terrorist'. Opportunities to engage with rebels will usually be present, but are** likely to be particularly noteworthy in circumstances where rebels are pursuing some kind of political power and legitimacy.[iii]

A concentration on the food emergency rather than underlying security issues has characterised international responses to crises in such places as Sudan (1980s, to some extent the 1990s, and since 9/11), Ethiopia (in the 1980s and even today), Uganda (notably from 1996), Sierra Leone (1990s), Angola (1998-2002), Rwanda (1994), DRC (from 1994), and, particularly in the early stages, Bosnia (1990s).[iv]

It has become fashionable to state that long-term food security and peacebuilding depend on functioning states. In many ways this is true, but the question of *how to get to* a well-functioning state is a thorny one. In practice, peacebulding and statebuilding have often been regarded as one and the same thing, and this is problematic.[v] **'Supporting states' has often** taken the form of budget suppor**t and also sometimes of 'integrated missions' that involve some degree of identifying and combating the 'spoilers' of a particular peace process.** However, this mode of operation risks reinforcing abusive states and contributing to (and obscuring) the suffe**ring of civilians who are associated with these 'spoilers' or with armed** actors that are deemed to be illegitimate.[vi] Spurred in part by the Arab Spring and criticism of support for repressive states, the European Union has been reconsidering budget support and looking to move towards more political conditionality.[vii] There is a growing emphasis **within the UK's Department for International Development on the need to nurture an**

accountable state rather than simply supporting a state deemed to be benevolent. It is true, also, that a number of states – for example, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia - have shown some improvements in elements of their internal governance since the worst of their domestic humanitarian emergencies. Even so, once a country has been labeled as having 'good governance' and has been heavily favoured by donor money, it becomes relatively easy to dismiss the very considerable abuses that they may be engaging in, whether internally or externally. Examples include abuses by Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC, Uganda in Sudan, Ethiopia in relation to the Ogaden region, and so on. The dangers of an international bias towards abusive governments are still very much with us. The common view that rebels are motivated by 'greed' and not 'grievance' is particularly unhelpful here.[viii] Whilst in theory 'the international community' can make a judgment on the abusive/enlightened nature of a particular state on the basis of some kind of objective criteria or judgment, in practice a number of biases and self-interested concerns have come into the picture. Whether during the Cold War or in the post-Cold War era, a number of states have received a large degree of immunity from criticism or sanction, whether because they favour neoliberal market reforms, because they are being held up as rare examples of the 'success of international aid', because they are considered as allies in the 'war on terror', because their concerns with 'security' are validated by some previous experience of oppression or genocide, or because of some other rationale or combination of rationales. These dynamics have often created 'windows of impunity' (sometimes of limited duration, but devastating nonetheless) for abusive actors of various kinds.

With some significant exceptions, the United Nations system has a tendency to produce rather bland and de-politicised analysis of protracted crises that gives credence to government statements stressing their concern to protect and assist civilians. In this context, it is worth giving some specific examples where this discourse has been damagingly misleading. Due to space restrictions, the examples are limited; other governments that have enjoyed a significant degree of impunity for abuses against civilians include Turkey,[ix] Israel,[x] Pakistan[xi] and Afghanistan.[xii]

During Ethiopia's 1983-85 famine, international agencies highlighted the role of drought but largely ignored the government policies of sponsoring raids (by militias and the army) on rural areas where rebel support was strong as well as ignoring the government policy of blocking relief to these areas. Tellingly, the region of Tigray, with around one third of Ethiopia's famine-affected population, received around one twentieth of the total relief food.[xiii] In 1994, the Ogaden National Liberation Front rebelled against a radically transformed Ethiopian government. After fighting intensified from 2007, the Ethiopian government has confined aid agencies to the edge of the war zone, allowing the government to conduct reprisals "behind closed doors". These reprisals have included forced displacement and a commercial blockade against the Ogadeni population, which is mostly Muslim and ethnic Somali.[xiv]

In the 1980s, the Sudanese government, seen as an important pro-Western 'buffer' between Gaddafi's Libya and 'Communist' Ethiopia, enjoyed significant immunity from criticism or sanction during the Cold War. Information on *why* people had been displaced from the south was rarely presented, and government-sponsored militia attacks were often presented as 'tribal violence'. Meanwhile, relief to the south was neglected, and major international donors and UN agencies largely left efforts at relieving rebel-held areas to the ICRC. Revealingly, even an attempt to channel relief to civilians in *government-held* towns in the south fell foul of government retaliation when the UN's special representative Winston Prattley was expelled from Sudan for talking with the rebel SPLA as part of the negotiations around this initiative.

The expulsion of Prattley drew little protest from the major donors, such as the United States and the European Community. Nor was any penalty imposed from within the UN itself.[xv]

It might be tempting to assume that these failings in international assistance were a Cold War phenomenon; but many of these failings extended into the 1990s and the post-9/11 era. It is true that in the 1990s there was a much more concerted attempt to channel relief to the south under Operation Lifeline Sudan. However, during this operation the international community soft-pedaled on massive violence in the Nuba Mountains whilst relief to southern Sudan was prioritised (relief that was organized with the [sporadic] agreement of the Sudan government). After falling out of favour with Western governments in the 1990s, the Sudanese government of Omer el Beshir benefited from a degree of renewed immunity (notably over Darfur) in the context of Khartoum's post-9/11 cooperation in the 'war on terror'.[xvi]

The case of Sierra Leone also shows how damaging pro-government biases cannot be dismissed as a Cold War phenomenon. In the early years of Sierra Leone's civil war, the military government (1992-1996) benefited from a degree of international favour as a result, in part, of its adherence to policies of strict financial orthodoxy and its success in bringing down inflation in the middle of a civil war (a success that owed something to the 'self-funding' nature of counterinsurgency, including widespread abuse of civilians and illegal mining by government soldiers).[xvii] During the first phase of Sierra Leone's civil war (from 1991 until democratic government was temporarily installed in 1996), a major contributor to violence against civilians were abuses by government soldiers, some of them posing as rebels. There were occasional mentions of soldiers' attacks on civilian targets in UN reports, usually internal reports.[xviii] But more typical was a 1995 report setting out WFP's aid strategy[xix] and attributing all the attacks in Sierra Leone to the rebels. UNDP 'situation reports' and UN Inter-Agency Missions routinely used the language of 'rebel attacks'.[xx] An 'institutionalised optimism' in relation to an ostensibly reforming military government helped to create a political space in which soldiers' abuses could thrive. It was also significant in impeding relief and obscuring its inadequacies.[xxi]

Angola also showed how a pro-government bias could damage civilians – again well into the post-Cold War era. From 1988, international humanitarian assistance was directed overwhelmingly to the government side while sanctions were placed on the rebel group, UNITA. In one careful study, Christine Messiant observed: "For over three years (from the end of 1998 to the beginning of 2002), hundreds of thousands of Angolans were unable to request or receive assistance: more than 3 million were estimated to be beyond reach in 1999, with an additional million at the time of the [April 2002] ceasefire."[xxii]

In the late 1990s and extending well into the twenty-first century, Uganda and Rwanda's destructive interventions in the DRC drew relatively little criticism internationally (most glaringly from the US and United Kingdom governments). Uganda and Rwanda's exploitation of natural resources in the DRC did not meet with an international response that was anything like as strong or determined as those designed to rein in rebel groups like UNITA in Angola or the RUF in Sierra Leone.[xxiii] Meanwhile, the Ugandan and Rwandan governments were praised for an economic performance that actually reflected, in part, their exploitation of DRC resources.[xxiv] Whilst the Rwandan government claimed to be confronting *interahamwe* groups linked to the 1994 genocide, such confrontations were actually rather scarce; by contrast, the economic benefits from Rwanda's interventions were substantial. Perhaps significantly, Rwanda and Uganda were among the select 'coalition of the willing' that signed up to the planned invasion of Iraq. Rwanda and Uganda have also been hailed – for example, by the UK government – as rare examples of developmental government in Africa. Combined with a

significant investment of foreign aid in these countries, this habit of praise – as Chris Dolan and Zoe Marriage have shown in different ways – has made it difficult to turn round and criticise these governments.[xxv] Even in 2012, a UN investigation accusing Rwandan President Paul Kagame of supporting rebel forces in the DRC was being held back, apparently as a result of pressure from Rwanda's allies including the US.[xxvi]

International favour for the post-1994 government in Rwanda fed into a meager international response to crisis in the remaining Hutu refugee camps in eastern former Zaire and those fleeing west in early 1997, when death rates reportedly reached 300 per 10,000 people per day. At this time, there were concerted military attacks on refugee camps by armed elements of the Banyamulenge – of Tutsi origin but long-established in the Congo - in alliance with the Rwandan government.[xxvii] The massacres that followed killed about 232,000 Rwandan refugees, according to Emizet's calculations.[xxviii] Hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees were denied humanitarian assistance. Where aid was provided, it appears sometimes to have been used by the forces of rebel leader Laurent Kabila to get refugees to assemble, after which aid agency access would be cut off and killings would be carried out.[xxix] Emizet's verdict is a damning one: "There was little in the way of public protest in the West, and the silence that greeted the massacre of refugees was overwhelming."[xxx] Part of the reason seems to have been that the Rwandan government, collaborating with Kabila at this time, enjoyed a privileged moral status as victims of 1994 genocide.

For its part, the government of Uganda has enjoyed remarkably muted international criticism – and remarkably limited repercussions – given that it has been involved in a series of invasions and in sustained internal repression. A highly abusive counterinsurgency in northern Uganda (including the forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians into camps) was generally accepted by international agencies as an effort a 'protecting' civilians against the rebel Lord's Resistance Army.[xxxi]

If discrimination against civilians in areas of rebel strength thus survived the Cold War, the 'war on terror' added new intensity to this problem. Somalia illustrates this. The famine that occurred in Somalia in 2011 (with refugees spilling into Kenya and Ethiopia) was widely blamed internationally on a, drought and b, the al Shabaab rebels in Somalia. Al Shabaab has indeed contributed to famine in various ways. However, al Shabaab's antipathy towards Western-led interventions (including Western-led relief operations) has not arisen out of nothing but rather reflects, in large part, a backlash against the US/Ethiopian interference in Somalia and the ousting of a government that was in many ways both popular and successful. At the beginning of 2010, the World Food Programme (WFP) suspended aid to south-central Somalia, citing insecurity. But the UN agency had also been under strong pressure from the US government, a major donor, not to provide relief that could find its way into the hands of 'terrorists'.[xxxii] Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus notes that relief efforts aimed at areas of rebel strength were effectively criminalised under US law as the US government sought to ensure that no relief would reach terrorist groups.[xxxiii]

In Sri Lanka, the Colombo government's ruthless assault on LTTE rebels and many Tamil civilians from 2008 was opposed rather weakly and ineffectively by Western governments that had themselves deemed the LTTE to be terrorists. The growing influence of China and other non-Western powers also limited 'leverage' in relation to Colombo. An in South-South development assistance has brought important opportunities, as noted at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in late 2011. But there

are grave dangers in developmental efforts that sideline political rights and political grievances, perhaps storing up conflict for the future.

In Sri Lanka, many aid workers felt that that a prioritisation of delivery over advocacy had ultimately had very adverse affects for the protection of target populations, and had actually done little to enhance staff security or even the ability to deliver relief goods and services. In fact, the amount of 'humanitarian space' in which aid agencies could operate was perceived as having shrunk alongside a series of concessions to the Sri Lankan government, which was seen – rather on the model of the playground bully - as having been emboldened by each successive concession. Today's trade-off, even when it appears to be a sensible one, may create a worse situation (and a smaller humanitarian space) tomorrow – because of the signals sent.

The humanitarian arms of major donor bilateral organisations and governments frequently compete with other arms of government, which may put commercial or geopolitical aims ahead of humanitarian goals. Insofar as aid agencies (including within the UN system) are prepared to highlight neglected emergency needs and official obstruction, this can strengthen the arguments and the persuasiveness of those with more humanitarian mandates and agendas. Many of those consulted in Sri Lanka in 2009 stressed a lack of openness within the UN system and a rather weak advocacy effort in relation to the civilians in the north. One representative of a major donor made this significant comment:

> We need from our UN partners transparency, admitting there are obstacles and problems. The system as presented on paper is not the reality. It's not helpful if these elements remain hidden – the protection environment, problems of distribution.[xxxiv]

Advocacy has often been constrained in the interests of providing relief, and in Sri Lanka aid agencies were compelled to sign contracts that prohibited speaking out on protection issues and even on the adequacy or inadequacy of the services they are providing. The access secured amidst quietude on human rights abuses and humanitarian needs proved actually to be very limited, with most agencies being confined to government-held areas at the height of the crisis in 2009. Institutional incentives have also been a problem. One senior WFP staff member in Sri Lanka said, "There's a huge problem with our financing practices. We're funded through a percentage of the tonnage we deliver. You keep the sub-office open through a certain amount of tonnage - whether it's purchased internationally, locally, or comes in kind."

Pakistan also showed how discrimination against civilians in rebel-held areas remains a powerful phenomenon. One study of Pakistan noted: "Although the Pakistan army operations against militants in South Waziristan had started as early as 2004, and triggered significant displacement, th humanitarian community mostly did not investigate needs in PKP and the FATA until 2008."[xxxv]

Section 2: needs assessment

Over a prolonged period, the assessment of needs has often been conflated with an assessment of the numbers that can 'realistically' be helped, notably the 'numbers in need and reachable'. This has contributed to a great deal of suffering. Crucially, it has tended to prevent reported constraints – such as logistics, security or 'donor fatigue' – from ever being properly challenged or addressed.[xxxvi] When it has been difficult to bring the aid response into

line with needs, there appears to be a temptation to bring the needs into line with the favoured response. This temptation needs to be resisted.

In Sudan in 1988, at close to the peak of a famine in the south that killed perhaps half a million people, with NGOs seeking major financial support from the European Community, an EC-funded official expressed his view that the numbers of "unacceptably malnourished that we are able to reach is limited to small groups, possibly totaling several hundred only.[xxxvii] Tellingly, even relief for those displaced into Khartoum and its shanty towns was neglected, with one joint donors' report (April 1988) noting: "Only the newly arrived [in Khartoum] are in extreme need and are currently being helped by several NGOs… Difficulties in reaching or in targeting needy people for food distribution limits scope for such actions.[xxxviii] At this time, major donors did not want to incur the political risks of confronting the Khartoum government's very partial assessment of where relief was a, needed and b, possible.

Crucially, a security constraint is likely to be affected by perceptions of bias in relief operations (including any manipulation of relief for military purposes). In Sudan in the late 1980s, designated 'relief' trains were used to transport military supplies to government garrison towns in the south. Rebel attacks on these trains were labeled a 'security constraint' affecting relief operations, but owed something to government manipulation of the trains (about which international donors remained silent for a crucial period).[xxxix] A particular security situation may come to seem natural and inevitable and the policies within it 'unobjectionable'. But those policies may themselves profoundly shape the security situation.[xl]

In Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s, inadequate relief was often blamed on security obstacles. While these obstacles were considerable, they were again not always immutable as they were made to appear. For example, while the Sierra Leonean government and UN organisations tended to attribute attacks on aid convoys to the rebels, many of these attacks were actually carried out by government soldiers (and often by the same soldiers that were supposed to be protecting the convoys). Lorry drivers repeatedly requested that convoys be accompanied by ECOMOG troops (from the West African peacekeeping force), but these requests were ignored. As in many other crises (including in Sudan), challenging security 'constraints' would have required an investigation and discussion of many facets of the emergency – including the abuses by government forces and the emergence of economic interests in continued conflict - that major donors (notably within the UN system) seemed anxious to ignore or to dismiss.

In November 1994, a plan to feed 500,000 displaced people in Sierra Leone was finalised. Yet WFP/UNHCR's own figures indicated that there were some 800,000 internally displaced (1994b, 5). In the event, there were some 1.5 million internally displaced by June 1995.[xli] The plan to help only 500,000 apparently took account of "the limited NGO food distribution capacity".[xlii] The recommended quantities of food aid for 1995-96 also took account of the "limited geographic coverage and access", reflecting "security constraints".[xliii] In other words, UN agencies were not assessing the needs but the needs that could 'realistically' be met - a crucial difference.[xliv] In fact, only the 'security constraint' was allowing WFP to claim anything resembling a response to need. WFP's 1996 evaluation report said low commitments were "compensated through the fact that, due to the security situation in Sierra Leone, WFP was not able to deliver food up-country according to plans."[xlv] The low level of the ration also exacerbated people's vulnerability to interruptions in delivery.[xlvi] As the crisis in Sierra Leone escalated, the number of people receiving relief actually dropped dramatically - from 300,000 in December 1994 to only about 130,000 in February 1995.[xlvii]

Needs assessment (and the related assessment of constraints) has also been unreliable in Central Africa. Once the mass repatriation of Rwandans from Zaire began in late 1996 (encouraged by the US government), both the US and Rwanda were keen to declare the refugee crisis over and an international presence unnecessary.[xlviii] The US government said **there was just one cluster of people who were 'in good shape' and who, moreover, could** be assumed to be Hutu militiamen and members of the old Rwandan army implicated in genocide. But US aerial photos showed there were still about 500,000 displaced people - refugees plus a number of internally displaced - in various clusters in eastern Zaire. In effect, Stockton reported, some 400,000 refugees and an unknown number of internally **displaced Zaireans were effectively "air-brushed from history".**[xlix] US officials later admitted to Congress that some 400-500,000 Rwandan refugees had been left in Congo in late 1996.[l] Moreover, only about six per cent of the Rwanda refugees in Congo were members of Hutu militias or the old Rwandan army.[li]

An International Rescue Committee survey, published in January 2008, concluded that 5.4 million people had died in the DRC since 1998 as a result of conflict and humanitarian crisis.[lii] Developmental interventions were no more immune to stealing and attack that emergency operations, and provision of seeds and tools was unlikely to effect major rehabilitation in a context of widespread violence. Emergency aid was sometimes said by **aid workers to be 'fueling conflict' (often citing the very particular situation in Goma).** There **were also widespread statements that emergency aid might 'fuel dependency'. In** these circumstances, essential life-saving activities were to a large extent neglected. Stockton reports that the 2001 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) sought resources to assist only 1.4 million beneficiaries with food aid while reporting 16 million people in need.[liii] Even the mapping of humanitarian needs was poor.[liv]

In this situation, WFP cited high operating costs, donor fatigue and insecurity as the biggest constraint to its relief operations. Acknowledging the formidable and expensive logistics challenges in the DRC, Stockton also noted the achievements of WFP in other testing environments like Sudan and Afghanistan. In an important statement, he observed:

> There remains the unavoidable observation that if in the first place plans are not advanced to make good the humanitarian food deficit, other potential constraints, such as fatigued donors or insecurity will never be put to the test. Such problems may be logically cited as explanations for failure only if they can be shown to have stymied an otherwise realistic plan for meeting the humanitarian gap. It appears that such a plan was not produced for the DRC during the height of the emergency.[lv]

In 2000-2, donors covered between 17 and 38 per cent of the funding requested for the DRC.[lvi] There was no ICRC-style dissemination programme to encourage greater acceptance of humanitarian relief.

In Afghanistan after 2001, with the exceptions of ICRC and MSF, the international community **did not try to negotiate for access to Taliban areas; this was despite a mandate from the UN's** Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that calls for such negotiations.[lvii] The antipathy of the Taliban to many aid actors has clearly been linked with perceptions that the international humanitarian effort has been lining up to support the government (and often fuelling corruption).[lviii] Meanwhile, needs in Taliban areas have had a tendency to fall off the map.

A forthcoming paper on Somalia (by Lautze et al.) shows how assessment of needs continues today to be distorted by assessments of feasibility and constraints. The paper notes:

> 'Feasibility' is one criteria by which the UN evaluates proposals to be included in their appeals. Such appeals, therefore, do not necessarily reflect the breadth and depth of total requirements but rather what is possible within the limits of perceived agency capabilities. This has the effect of keeping request levels in appeals for international humanitarian assistance within a certain range over time.[lix]

Where the needs are downplayed, the obstacles to relief and protection are unlikely to be fully recognised or addressed. The potential for 'underplaying needs' is all the greater if we consider that there has generally been a lack of accepted criteria by which to judge where and when a 'humanitarian crisis' has emerged.[lx] One 2003 study noted that in the previous 5-6 years malnutrition rates over 15 per cent in Red Sea State, Sudan, and over 20 per cent in Mandera, Kenya, had not been characterized as a famine.[lxi]

Section 3: Timing the phasing out of emergency relief

Emergency rations should be phased out only in circumstances where target populations can be proven to be self-reliant. Particularly in wartime, there has often been a premature assumption of self-sufficiency even in circumstances where normal coping strategies are severely constrained. This sometimes reflects budget considerations rather than an objective assessment of needs.

In the 1990s, many donors and aid agencies stressed that relief should be more 'developmental'. As Joanna Macrae and Adele Harmer noted,

> There was a concern to ensure that the instruments of international engagement avoided creating dependency, and contributed to revitalizing people's livelihoods: in other words, how relief might be more developmental and sustainable. Much of this work was driven by multi-mandated UN agencies and NGOs.[lxii]

This was linked to a common assumption that emergencies were a temporary interruption to the process of development.[lxiii] The fear was often expressed that prolonged emergency assistance could promote 'dependency'; correspondingly, the aim was often to phase out emergency relief as soon as possible. A number of problems with this perspective have become clear, however.

First, it is not at all clear that emergency relief creates dependency. Harrell-Bond's work shows that many of the characteristics attributed to refugees in camp situations (listlessness, 'dependency' on relief) arise more from the restrictions imposed by the camp environment than from any debilitating effects of the relief itself.[lxiv] Gaim Kibreab also did important work debunking the 'dependency' myth in the context of Somalia.[lxv] De Waal showed that during the drought of 1984-85 in Darfur most people did not rely on relief for their survival and also that they would have been foolish to do so.

A second problem is that the assumption that the emergency phase is temporary is very questionable. Conflicts can be surprisingly stable and in many ways they represent the emergence of an alternative system of profit, power and protection.[lxvi] In Sudan, a civil war that pitted southern rebels against the government lasted from 1955 to 1972 and then resumed from 1983 to 2005 – effectively a 50-year war 'interrupted' by a decade of peace. Angola's war lasted, with brief respites, from 1975 to 2002, while Sri Lanka's endured

(again with respites) from 1983 to 2009 and Guatemala's spanned the 36 years from 1960 to 1996.

A third problem is that emergency aid may be very limited – or even withdrawn - in **circumstances where development and 'normal coping strategies' remain severely** constrained – not least by conflict. This leaves people vulnerable to increased malnutrition, morbidity and mortality. Apparent respites in fighting have often proved the prelude to renewed humanitarian crisis. 2011 saw a rapid decline in the humanitarian situation in Somalia and outright famine in many areas. But according to the 2012 Consolidated Appeals Process document for Somalia, **"Until June 2011, [food assistance] cluster** members were drastically cutting rations to beneficiaries because of severe funding **shortfalls."**[lxvii] Even in the immediate aftermath of a war, the possibilities for rapidly rebuilding livelihoods may also be very limited. In some circumstances, overoptimistic assessments of development (and the possibilities for development in the middle of a war) have played a role in *legitimising* ration reductions that are done on other grounds. Even the provision of relatively rudimentary assistance like seeds and tools may sometimes be **taken as evidence that a 'developmental' phase has been reached and that the relevant** population *must* be in a reasonable condition.[lxviii]

Duffield has stressed that situations that in the 1980s were regarded as warranting a relief intervention were by the 1990s coming to be seen as an opportunity for rehabilitation and development.[lxix] In southern Sudan in the 1990s, for example, rations were being cut even as malnutrition rose.[lxx] Coping strategies that had proven value in time of natural disaster – such as labour migration, dependence on wild foods and fish, and exchange of cattle for grain – were proving difficult or impossible to implement in wartime, underlining the need for emergency relief and the limitations of the often-**expressed need to promote 'self-reliance'.**[lxxi] **A study of humanitarian interventions in Sudan at that time noted, "… the fact that the** relatively simple task of delivering humanitarian aid has proven so difficult in the Sudanese context suggests that achieving more complex, developmental objectives is likely to be **extremely problematic."**[lxxii]

A fourth problem with shifting as quickly as possible from the emergency to the **'developmental' phase is that international efforts at 'development' ha**ve often been weak. Promising innovations include a variety of market interventions including cash and coupon **distributions; these can stimulate local markets and maximise local people's ability to choose** what food or seeds or other commodities to acquire; they can also be used in combination with efforts to boost supply. But developmental efforts have often been underfunded and unimaginative. A report on relief to Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya during drought in 2004-2006 showed that livelihood support (for example, provision of water sources, fodder relief, veterinary programmes, livestock purchase) continued to be weak in comparison to food aid. There has often been an emphasis on distribution of seeds and tools – even in circumstances where many people are not relying on smallholder farming.[lxxiii] Yet cash and roads, for example, have sometimes been much more urgently needed than seeds and tools.[lxxiv] One **study found, "In general, the impacts of conventional seed relief programmes have been** rather less than might be assumed, particularly in chronic emergency contexts where seed aid **is distributed on a repeated basis."**[lxxv] Moreover, efforts to assess the impact of these developmental initiatives (including their impact on conflict) have frequently been weak.[lxxvi]

Sierra Leone's decade-long war illustrates many of the problems with shifting from 'relief' to **'development'. Although the severity of the conflict there tended to increase between 1991** (when the war began) and 1996 (when democratic government was temporarily installed), the level of the ration for displaced people in Sierra Leone was actually reduced - from 350

grams of cereal per person per day in 1992, to 300 in 1993, and again to 200 in 1994 and 1995. WFP was facing a major funding crisis in the region, with the catastrophes in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda taking attention and resources away; donors were supplying only a fraction of what they had pledged.[lxxvii] Global shipments of cereal food aid plummeted from about 15 million tons in 1992/3 to about 5 million tons four years later.[lxxviii] Refugees in neighbouring Guinea were also suffering. An MSF report concluded: "There has been sustained pressure to reduce quantities of food aid since 1992. Every year since 1992, there has been an increase in the number of refugees, but there has been a yearly decrease in the amount of food aid distributed."[lxxix] Relief to Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia appears to have been phased out prematurely on the assumption that they had become 'self-sufficient'. Many returned to conditions of considerable danger in Sierra Leone as a result.

Alongside these ration reductions, there was an emphasis on the coping strategies of the Sierra Leoneans and a simultaneous emphasis on the importance of avoiding dependency.[lxxx] Ration reductions, it was said, would actually boost these coping strategies.[lxxxi] Yet some of the economic strategies adopted - like begging, prostitution, selling vital assets and leaving one's land – are hardly everybody's idea of 'coping'.[lxxxii] Moreover, the much-talked-about 'coping strategies' were never examined in detail by missions assessing food needs.[lxxxiii]

Section 4: Aid, exploitation and livelihoods: What *kind* of development?

There is an urgent need to look more carefully at the relationship between aid (whether emergency or relief aid) and exploitation. There has often been an assumption that emergency food aid undermines livelihoods while development aid supports them. But emergency food relief, if vigorously channeled to those most in need, can sometimes combat exploitation and support livelihoods. And development, if poorly handled, can feed into exploitation and undermine livelihoods. Rather than simply promoting 'development' (whether in wartime or a post-war context), agencies and donors need to investigate more systematically what kinds of already-existing 'development' (perhaps exploitative, violent or both) have fed into conflict and what kinds of conflict may be promoted by current or proposed 'developmental' interventions.

Whether in the context of an armed conflict or not, there has often been intense conflict over natural resources, with some groups being relatively well connected to government and some groups being poorly connected. Whether looking at 'resilience', 'early recovery' or the 'relief to development continuum', a technical analysis that highlights the various 'coping strategies' of 'a community' is likely to miss these political dimensions and may actually play into the hands of those who are using their political or military 'muscle' to gain a disproportionate share of these resources. Indeed, violent and exploitative processes processes have often been carried out in the name of 'development'.[lxxxiv]

Again, Sudan is a case in point. Much of the development that took place there in the 1970s and 1980s took the form of a rapid expansion of semi-mechanised farming (with finance from the World Bank and the newly oil-rich Middle East).[lxxxv] This expansion eroded the livelihoods of many Arab cattle herders in the west (often known as 'Baggara') as well as to other groups like the Nuba (living in the Nuba Mountains in the centre of the country). Apart from the forcible expropriation of land in Sudan, another part of the violence of development were the monopolistic profits for Arab traders bringing cattle out of the south, a trade that increasingly attracted attacks from southern Sudanese. Exploitative arrangements had fuelled resistance, which in turn provided increased opportunities (and a degree of perceived legitimacy) for heightened exploitation, further fuelling resistance. Partly through inducing man-made famine as crops were stolen and destroyed and livestock were raided, the militia strategy offered the

prospect of depopulating oil-rich lands and decimating the Dinka, seen as the principal supporters of the rebel SPLA. It also offered to relieve some of the frustrations of Arab pastoralist groups damaged by earlier processes of 'development'.

If development was dysfunctional, this situation could not be remedied by cutting relief. One careful 1997 study of Sudan noted,

> … reducing relief aid, without a parallel expansion in genuine development opportunities, serves to increase further the vulnerability of displaced populations, while benefiting other powerful economic and political interests. It is therefore unsurprising that merchants, local authorities and the national government are at the forefront of continuum thinking in Sudan.[lxxxvi]

Rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains were being systematically deprived of relief, and reduced rations more generally were helping to propel people into exploitative labour on commercial farms. Some of the 'developmental' efforts in camps for the displaced were also helping the government with its strategy of forcibly depopulating certain areas and improving its military position.[lxxxvii]

Conflict may lead to a loss of judicial control over exploitation,[lxxxviii] and people can sometimes be helped to resist exploitation when they are helped to stake a successful claim to land. As for emergency food relief, when it is vigorously and successfully targeted at those who are most in need, this effort can actually challenge and undermine processes of exploitation and related processes of violence. Amrita Rangasami's analysis of 'desperation' sales and purchases during a famine suggests that, if more food aid and livelihoods support can be successfully channelled to those who need it, then price movements driving famine can be mitigated. Reducing 'desperation' sales and purchases means pushing through food relief to people who still have some assets and who are still in their home areas. This, it should be noted, is a very different task from simply targeting the poorest. Indeed, targeting the absolutely poor (once they have lost all their assets and perhaps even the ability to work) may be play into the hands of those who benefit from desperation sales and purchases. In Sudan in the late 1980s army officers and traders involved in profiting from desperation purchases of grain and desperation sales of livestock succeeded in limiting relief distributions that could have undermined these profits. On those occasions when food relief did get through, grain prices tended to fall sharply.[lxxxix]

Significantly, during the late 1980s famine, asset loss was sometimes seen as a sign of progress. Oxfam was lobbying the European Community for a substantial relief response in early 1987, and Oxfam's country representative in Sudan noted:

> to make good a claimed food deficit when people still have livestock could cause dependency. In his view, pastoralism was, in any case, non-viable and in decline all over the region… It is important to note that USAID, UNICEF and EEC have all recently expressed similar views concerning pastoralism in the South, that it is on the way out and in twenty years would have disappeared anyway.[xc]

Such views have a pedigree. Remarking on the Sahel famine in the 1970s, the French anthropologist and sociologist Jean Copans noted, "The FAO experts seem on the whole pleased at the disappearance of the cattle of Sahelian nomads. They see these people as not producing enough meat for the market."[xci]

Anti-pastoralist prejudice remains quite widespread in many countries. In Ethiopia today, the ruling party (the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) has explicitly stated that it does not value the way of life of indigenous communities in the Lower Omo (where a major dam for electricity and irrigation is planned), declaring its intention to make pastoralism moribund in southern Ethiopia.[xcii]

Development has often been urged and lauded. But what exactly is the vision of progress? In Ireland in the 1940s, the dominant vision was of a rural transformation from agriculture (with smallholders and tenants) to larger farms producing livestock for the growing market in industrializing England. Within this particular 'developmental' framework, famine was not so much a problem as a solution, since it speeded the decline of the peasantry (through mortality, outmigration and the surrender of land). In the Soviet Union, in the 1930s the developmental vision centred on collectivization and industrialization (to which the 'Kulaks' of the Ukraine were seen as a major obstacle). Again, famine played a part in weakening this class. In the Ethiopian famine of 1983-85, relief had a 'developmental' aspect that was pernicious. Relief operations were manipulated to encourage population shifts away from rural Tigray and Eritrea towards government towns and towards so-called 'protected' villages in those provinces and towards provinces further south, where workers were needed on state farms. This resettlement was accompanied by high mortality.[xciii] In recent years in Amhara region, northern Ethiopia, the donor-funded Productive Safety Net Programme (receiving some 107 million US dollars annually at the national level) has been used by local authorities to further a programme of resettlement, with the result that the benefits of the PSNP have been reserved for the more affluent while those labeled as 'dependent' have often been forced, in effect, to resettle.[xciv] Bishop and Hilhorst say similar experiences have also been noted in other parts of Ethiopia.[xcv]

Section 5: Aid as a magical solution

Emergency and developmental interventions can affect the dynamics of conflict, sometimes in helpful ways. However, international actors have frequently put too much faith in aid as a source of conflict reduction and too little effort into diplomatic solutions addressing more 'top down' dynamics.[xcvi] Moreover, even where no claim has been made that aid will address violence, aid has very often been a substitute for action on other fronts, and relief can be used to legitimise conflict. Agencies need to make sure their own behaviour does not encourage this. This means, first, highlighting unmet needs for protection and, second, being very careful about any claim of 'protection by presence' or any claim that aid is otherwise contributing to peace.

Macrae and Harmer have noted:

> During the 1990s, aid actors examined the ways in which relief and development assistance could be better linked. While framed initially around aid programming in response to natural disasters, these ideas were steadily adapted to the demands of conflict-related crises. This shift assumed that aid (particularly development aid) could be used to prevent conflict, by addressing grievances and reducing economic instability. It was also premised on the notion that conflict-related crises were essentially transitory: short interruptions to an otherwise progressive, state-led process of development.[xcvii]

Particularly after 9/11, linking relief to development discourse increasingly gave way to linking aid and security.[xcviii] Aid was increasingly presented as something that could contribute to peacebuilding in the context of a 'war on terror' (for example in Afghanistan).

Linked to the emerging security agenda was a pressure to re-engage with so-called 'failed states' and increase development spending there (for example, by World Bank and EU) in situations of (often enduring) conflict.[xcix]

Unrealistic expectations attached to aid appear to have served a function in allowing key international actors to avoid politically sensitive decisions (like putting pressure on governments with whom they have some alignment, or pursuing some kind of political settlement with 'pariah' rebels (such as those labeled internationally as terrorists). In the case of Israel/Palestine, Le More shows who aid was posited as a way of building a nascent Palestinian state after the 1994 Oslo agreement; however, in the absence of concerted international pressure to rein in the active undermining of this state by Israel, the aid strategy did not work.[c] In Afghanistan, the idea of winning a conflict by means of aid seems to have served as an alternative to other means of ending conflict (notably, negotiating with the Taliban). But it has proven extremely difficult to 'win hearts and minds' with aid, which has often been seen as reinforcing government corruption.[ci]

In the case of the DRC in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Stockton showed how 'developmental relief' was sometimes credited with almost miraculous powers in terms of its ability to reduce mortality, foster development in the midst of conflict, and even promote peace. Mirroring the habitual optimism in Sierra Leone, Stockton reported in 2003 that "movement in the peace process is invariably anticipated, although real progress is almost never observed."[cii] Meanwhile, the UN's peacekeeping mission, MONUC, was not being given the mandate or the resources necessary to protect civilians.[ciii]

If these are some of the expectations that have been attached to aid, is there reason to believe that aid can contribute to conflict mitigation?

In certain respects, a 'political economy' approach to understanding contemporary conflicts (an approach I have favoured, incidentally) would seem to suggest that (emergency relief or development) aid – whether fostering food security or, more broadly, promoting development – can play an important role in conflict prevention and even conflict resolution. In particular, political economy approaches tend to suggest that (especially in weak states) there is an important 'bottom up' element in conflict and that war is not simply a question of leaders ordering their followers into battle as 'an extension of politics by other means'.[civ] Part of such a 'bottom-up' analysis will be an investigation into the diverse reasons why diverse non-elite groups become actively involved in violence, including short-term goals like economic accumulation, the pursuit of material goods, security and respect.

If we view conflict from this perspective, then aid operations that meet people's basic needs (notably, the need for food) would seem to hold out the prospect of removing a powerful incentive for violence. Insofar as grievances are important in generating conflict,[cv] then addressing food security might be expected to remove a significant contributor to conflict. In protracted crises, nurturing beneficial food systems within a particular country might be expected to be *particularly* beneficial since it offers the promise of breaking a vicious circle in which war produces food insecurity which in turns feeds into more war.

In line with these *a priori* expectations, there is indeed some evidence that food insecurity has fed into conflict in many countries, both as an initial cause and as an exacerbating factor once armed conflict is under way. A link between food security and conflict is suggested, for example, in a significant quantitative paper by Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa, who note: "… poor health and nutritional status seems to play a key role in inducing armed conflicts in

poor countries"[cvi] Assuming that aid can boost health and nutritional status, it might therefore be expected to help prevent armed conflict.

Some country evidence supports the view that food security is an important factor in conflict creation or mitigation. For example, the precarious livelihoods of Baggara cattle herders in western Sudan created an environment in which many of these herders were willing to be recruited into militias that then undermined food security in the south. One factor was the neglect of these groups in relief operations mounted during the 1984-5 drought in western Sudan.[cvii] Later, the precarious livelihoods of camel-herding groups in Darfur fed into *their* willingness to be recruited into *janjaweed* militias that undermined the food security of large numbers in Darfur.[cviii] It is important to note that the humanitarian needs of Arab pastoralist groups in Darfur, many of them actually suffering as a result of conflict and not involved in the attacks, have again been largely neglected.[cix]

Relief operations have sometimes succeeded in contributing to conflict resolution or mitigation (for example, when armed groups benefiting from aid come under pressure to conform to humanitarian principles). Examples include aid to the Nuba Mountains,[cx] and the **gradual adoption by Sudan's rebel SPLA of humanitarian principles in the context of relief** operations for the south in the 1990s.[cxi] In Liberia in the late 1990s, aid agencies worked together to try to ensure they were not played off against each other. Cooperation between aid agencies helped to put civilian protection on the agenda, feeding into a peace process in combination with diplomatic and legal pressures.[cxii]

There is also evidence that aid (emergency or developmental) can make conflict worse, **suggesting that 'getting aid right' is relevant to conflict mitigation. A number of mechanisms** can be identified here.

First, long-term aid may prop up unrepresentative governments, stoking grievances that may spill over into armed conflict. This was a notable phenomenon during the Cold War. The list of the six largest sub-Saharan African recipients of US bilateral assistance in 1962-88 is sobering one. Sudan, Zaire, Kenya, Somalia, Liberia and Ethiopia - it reads like a roll-call of recent political emergencies. One could add Rwanda to this list, where one-party rule in the 1970s and 1980s was to a large extent sustained by foreign aid.

Second, particular patterns of aid distribution may reinforce grievances and fuel conflict. For example, refugee communities can be a significant *source* of conflict, particularly where their conditions are poor.[cxiii] A number of abusive actors linked to the counterinsurgency are likely to be reinforced by aid flows, and the resulting grievances may be a boost to rebel groups.[cxiv] **Since Sierra Leone's rebellion was fuelled in part by resentment at elites and insiders (especially in Freetown) who siphoned off aid and Sierra Leone's own resources in** peacetime,[cxv] it was likely to be further inflamed when emergency aid did not reach the poorest. Some aid workers reported that aid scams (and associated cover-ups) were serving as another reason to join the RUF. Areas of rebel strength were particularly neglected in international relief operations. Kand**eh noted, "…those fleeing organised banditry were forced** to choose between either becoming brigands themselves or joining the teeming ranks of the **destitute, starving and dying."**[cxvi] Some local people linked inadequate aid with the decision to join the government army. The common practice of ceasing distributions at harvest time, while it fitted with the fashionable ideology that there should be a speedy shift from relief to **'development', appears to have encouraged a number of attacks.** A Catholic Relief Services report linked renewed attacks in Kenema, Kailahun and Pujehun districts in December-January 1993 and January 1994 with the arrival of the harvest and the simultaneous phasing out of relief.[cxvii]

Third, aid may produce – or reinforce – vested interests in continued conflict. In Somalia over a long period, aid groups have obtained aid resources in return for protection of various kinds, including protection of aid deliveries[cxviii] and protection of civilians.[cxix] Where a conflict gives rise to large flows of international aid (as in Vietnam and Afghanistan), any successful counterinsurgency would risk drying up that flow of aid.[cxx]

Aid may also serve as an incentive for rebellion if rebels are reasonably sure of receiving substantial assistance, as was arguably the case in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Tsunami.[cxxi]

In Sierra Leone, many citizens suspected that elites were inactive in bringing the war to a close in part because of the flourishing 'war economy' in Freetown in particular, where looted goods were flooding in and where rents had been artificially elevated by people fleeing rural areas and by the influx of aid organisations.[cxxii] One priest went so far as to state:

> The aid business is a way of life. It's an income. It's keeping the country going... There's a division of things in the NPRC: 'We'll make use of the diamonds. You live off the aid in Freetown.' There's a vested interest in keeping the chaos going, and attracting the aid.

Mark Bradbury (1995, 12), in his extremely informative report for CARE, observed: "There is some speculation that humanitarian relief may be being used to maintain people in camps to keep them away from depopulated areas where mining is taking place." When it came to the chiefs, whilst many played key roles in the civil defence, some sources charged that any vocal opposition to the war was sometimes tempered by benefits flowing to chiefs serving as intermediaries between aid agencies and the displaced.

Fourth, aid may attract violence. One 1997 study of Sudan noted: "In some parts of the Southern Sector, OLS [Operation Lifeline Sudan] projects invite attack."[cxxiii] There is no reason to assume that developmental impacts are immune from attracting violence.[cxxiv]

Fifth, aid may disguise violence. It may do so by suggesting that the humanitarian problem is being addressed by the international community. It may also help to give a misleading impression of normality in certain parts of a country (notably the capital).

In Sierra Leone, with aid helping to maintain Freetown as an enclave economy, journalists, officials, and Freetown residents more generally were further insulated from the suffering upcountry. One priest remarked angrily: "The EC is providing the electricity and roads. They're making the government look good. It's a sham. And then the government forces are just beating up on everyone."

However, there are also important reasons to be skeptical about the ability of aid to mitigate conflict.

First, other resources may be much more valuable than aid.[cxxv] Given the value of some of the resources being fought over, it is not plausible that stopping aid is going to bring conflict to a close.

Second, *political* grievances have often been an important cause of conflict, and economic development or rehabilitation does not in itself address grievances such as lack of political representation or lack of devolution.[cxxvi] In Sri Lanka, poverty and hunger appear to be relatively minor contributors to the recruitment of LTTE suicide bombers, compared (for example) with the experience of violence at the hands of Sri Lankan government forces.[cxxvii] When it comes to rehabilitation, if we accept that war is pursued in part for its material benefits, an international effort at rehabilitation that does not resolve underlying political

inequalities may serve as an incentive for further violence, as appears to have been the case with the rehabilitation of southern Sudan after the Sudan's first civil war.[cxxviii]

A third reason to be skeptical on aid as a route to conflict resolution is the difficulty in using aid to 'win hearts and minds' in wartime. In general, the idea that development can resolve conflict (and especially development as route to successful counterinsurgency) risks legitimising some unwinnable conflicts within the context of the 'war on terror' in particular.

Fourth, the manipulation of conflict in 'top down' processes remains an important cause of civil and regional wars. Correspondingly, war retains a powerful 'top down' element and conflict resolution often comes from putting strong diplomatic pressure on political leaders. It is true that the local causes of violence are often numerous and varied (as today in South Sudan). But weak states are often not as weak as they look – witness, for example, the extreme political longevity of Beshir in Sudan, a man who has survived at the top despite (and to some extent because of) a wide variety of civil wars.[cxxix] As one study noted in 1997, reducing conflict in Sudan was "a matter for political actors, including the foreign ministries of donor governments, rather than humanitarian actors."[cxxx]

A fifth reason for caution on aid's ability to resolve conflict is that aid agencies' protection work has its limits. Sometimes agencies have been careful not to claim too much in terms of 'protection'.[cxxxi] But where there is some kind of 'protection gap' or a population that is being victimized 'in the shadow of just wars'[cxxxii] (MSF) (for example, because it is associated with some more-or-less demonized rebel group), there does appear to be a strong temptation for aid agencies to claim that they are providing protection – eg 'protection by presence'[cxxxiii] – that they are actually unable to provide. In an important paper, Pantuliano and O'Callaghan noted that the international humanitarian community's claims of providing 'protection by presence' seem to have had an effect in reducing political pressure on Khartoum whilst at the same time only very limited protection on the ground had been provided. Inhibiting factors here included a desire to keep aid workers (especially international aid workers) away from the most dangerous areas, the frequent use of relatively inexperienced field officers, a reluctance to work alongside government actors (with ICRC being an exception) and, most importantly, the willingness of the Sudanese government to sponsor widespread attacks on civilians despite the large-scale presence of aid workers in the area. Pantuliano and O'Callaghan noted that in Darfur, "There is a general perception that some organisations have been re-fashioning their traditional assistance programmes in protection language because they have detected that protection is a new funding fashion.[cxxxiv] Somewhat similarly, Dubois noted: "When people need protection most – at the point of attack – our security restrictions virtually eliminate the possibility of our presence."[cxxxv] And further: "What does the public perceive when we humanitarians boldly market ourselves as protectors? We know full well: That the world is doing all it can to make sure people in places like Darfur are safe."[cxxxvi] Agencies in Darfur have provided firewood to minimise the risks of rape during the journey to collect it. This has been an important practical measure, and anything that helps is not to be denigrated. At the same time, the very heavy emphasis on firewood as a key – sometimes it seems like *the* key - protective measure in Darfur perhaps speaks of the scarcity of other practical protection measures. It is almost as if firewood has taken on magical properties as a humanitarian solution for a protection problem.

Section 6:

Rather than thinking of food security as something that is provided to "the weakest and most vulnerable", it is important to think about the food security (and other elements of welfare) of those who are involved in *perpetrating* violence. This includes those within formal military

organizations and those (like a variety of Arab groups in western Sudan) who may be recruited into informal militias.[cxxxvii] **Where a process of 'development' (perhaps including** democratisation and/or demobilisation) damages the interests of such groups, there may be a violent backlash. This possibility needs to be built into the design of policy.

A problem group cannot be wished out of existence simply by demobilizing it. Planned or actual demobilisations in Rwanda (1993-94) and Iraq (2003) proved highly destabilizing. **Sometimes a rush to proceed with 'development' may lead to policy initiatives that** undermine security and hence the prospects of real development. After a democratic government was established in Sierra Leone in 1996, the International Monetary Fund pushed for reduced spending on the security sector on the assumption that this would release more funds for development. Accordingly, 1997 saw cuts in the size of the rations of the Sierra Leonean army as well as the departure of (expensive) mercenary outfit Executive Outcomes. Unfortunately, in the absence of a UN peacekeeping presence, these measures paved the way for a military coup in May 1997 by disgruntled junior officers, who joined with the rebel RUF to form a highly abusive government.[cxxxviii] This reignited the civil war, with extremely adverse **consequences for 'development'.**

Various groups may be involved in actively and even intentionally undermining food security for various reasons. Some of these people may have problems with their own food security (and other aspects of welfare). In general, food security within military organisations – formal and informal – has important links to violence.

From the beginning of Sierra Leone's civil war, poor conditions (including poor access to food) within the army had helped to undermine military discipline, even promoting significant elements of collaboration with the RUF rebels. One man who was held hostage by the West Side Boys, a breakaway faction from the national army, told me:

> … **even within th**e army, they feel they are not treated fairly, not receiving sacks of **rice, and feel they are being used or bullied… When they find themselves in the bush,** they inflict the same injustice on those under them that they are complaining **about… They're finding** worth, attention and respect, and they think one way is by **bullying those under them…**

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[i] See, for example, Shawcross on the ICRC and the Nazi holocaust; see also Terry on MSF interventions in Burma/Myanmar.

[ii] Examples include: Ethiopia in the 1980s (eg Africa Watch) and also in the 2000s (eg Binet on Ogaden); Sudan in the 1980s (eg Keen, 1994); Uganda in the 1990s and early 2000s (Dolan), Sri Lanka in 2008-9 (Keen, 2009); and Pakistan from 2008 (Whittall).

[iii] See, for example, LeRiche, n.d., and LeRiche, 2012; see also Slim; Crombe with Hofman.

[iv] See, for example, Africa Watch; Keen, 1994; Duffield, 1994; Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda; Woodward.

[v] They have often, for example, been run together by the UK's Department for International Development in recent years.

[vi] See, particularly, Duffield, 2001, 2007.

[vii] See, for example, Faust et al..

[viii] Collier, 2007, 2009; Keen, 2012.

[ix] In the early 1990s, the Turkish army was involved in large-scale forcible displacement of Kurds in southeastern Turkey (Human Rights Watch, 1994). Turkey was seen as a key strategic ally by the US government in particular, and international protests were muted.

[x] See, for example, Le More; Said.

[xi] See, for example, Whittall.

[xii] See, for example, Wilder; Gordon; Forsberg.

[xiii] Africa Watch; Vaux.

[xiv] Allie, 12; Binet.

[xv] Keen, 1994; Bonner.

[xvi] Keen, 1994; Silverstein; see also Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen.

[xvii] Keen, 2005.

xviii See, for example, WFP/UNHCR, 1994a, p. 3.
xix WFP, 1995, p. 7.
xx See, for example, UNDP, 1995; UN Inter-Agency Mission, 1995, 3.
xxi Keen, 2005.
xxii Messiant, p. 119.
xxiii Cooper.
xxiv Keen, 2008; Cooper; Panel of Experts, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
xxv Dolan; Marriage.
xxvi Jones and Smith.
xxvii Pottier.
xxviii Emizet.
xxix Emizet.
xxx Emizet.
xxxi See, notably, Dolan; Human Rights Watch, 2005.
xxxii Menkhaus; Bradbury, 2010.
xxxiii Menkhaus.
xxxiv Keen, 2009.
xxxv Pechayre, p. 5.
xxxvi Compare Schaffer.
xxxvii RRC/EC 1988.
xxxviii Interdonor memo, 1988.
xxxix Keen, 1994.
xl Compare Foucault; Schaffer; Keen, 1994.
xli WFP, 1995, p. 1.
xlii WFP/UNHCR, 1994b, p. 5.
xliii WFP/UNHCR, 1994b, pp. 13-14.
xliv Compare also relief to Sudan (Keen, 1994).
xlv WFP, 1996, vol. 1, p. 28.
xlvi WFP, 1996, vol. 1, p. xii.
xlvii WFP, 1995, annex II
xlviii Pottier; Stockton, 1998.
xlix Stockton, 1998.
l Emizet.
li Emizet.
lii International Rescue Committee.
liii Stockton, 2003, p. 21.
liv Stockton, 2003.
lv Stockton, 2003.
lvi Stockton, 2003, p. 50.
lvii Donini.
lviii Wilder; Gordon; Forsberg; Crombe with Hofman.
lix Lautze et al.
lx See, notably, Darcy and Hofmann.
lxi Darcy and Hofmann, p. 15.
lxii Macrae and Harmer, p. 2.
lxiii Macrae and Harmer.
lxiv Harrell-Bond.
lxv Kibreab.
lxvi Keen, 1998.
lxvii OCHA, Somalia CAP 2012, p. 14.
lxviii Personal communication, Simon Levine.
lxix Duffield, 2001; see also Bradbury, 1998; Karim et al..
lxx Macrae et al, 1997.
lxxi Macrae et al., 1997; de Waal, 1989; Keen, 1994.
lxxii Macrae et al., p. 239.
lxxiii Christoplos et al.
lxxiv Levine and Chastre.
lxxv Sperling and Longley
lxxvi Christoplos et al..
lxxvii Keen, 2005.
lxxviii ODI, 2000.
lxxix MSF,1995, p. 21.
lxxx WFP/UNHCR, 1994a, p. 13.
lxxxi WFP, 1996, vol. 1, p. xiv.
lxxxii WFP, 1996, vol. 2, p. 7a; UNHCR/SCF.
lxxxiii WFP, 1996.
lxxxiv See, for example, Rampton on Sri Lanka, Macrae et al. on Sudan, Johnson on Sudan, Keen (1994) on Sudan and Keen (2005) on Sierra Leone.
lxxxv See discussion and references in Keen, 1994.
lxxxvi Macrae et al., p. 230.

[lxxxvii] Macrae et al.; Keen, 1994.
[lxxxviii] Levine and Adoko; see also Forsberg on Afghanistan.
[lxxxix] Keen, 1994.
[xc] Oxfam-UK, 1987.
[xci] Copans, 1983.
[xcii] Human Rights Watch, 2012.
[xciii] De Waal, 1997; see also Vaux.
[xciv] Bishop and Hilhorst.
[xcv] Bishop and Hilhorst.
[xcvi] See, for example, Le More on Israel/Palestine; Stockton, 2003, on the DRC; Wilder on Afghanistan; Pantuliano and O'Callaghan on Sudan.
[xcvii] Macrae and Harmer, p. 2.
[xcviii] Macrae and Harmer.
[xcix] See, for example, Macrae and Harmer.
[c] Le More.
[ci] Wilder; Gordon; Forsberg.
[cii] Stockton, 2003, p. 24.
[ciii] Stockton, 2003.
[civ] See, for example, Keen, 1998; Kaldor; Duffield, 2001.
[cv] See, for example, Stewart.
[cvi] Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa, p. 513.
[cvii] Keen, 1991; Keen, 1994.
[cviii] Young et al..
[cix] Flint; Pantuliano and O'Callaghan.
[cx] Pantuliano.
[cxi] LeRiche, n.d.; LeRiche, 2012.
[cxii] Atkinson and Leader.
[cxiii] Zolberg et al.; Marsden.
[cxiv] Forsberg; Wilder; Gordon.
[cxv] For example, pre-war resentment of chiefs was sometimes compounded by their preferential access to international aid (see, for example, WFP, 1996, vol. 1, p. 15).
[cxvi] Kandeh, p. 397
[cxvii] Catholic Relief Services, 1995, p. 37.
[cxviii] Maren.
[cxix] Narbeth and McLean.
[cxx] Keen, 2012.
[cxxi] Mamphilly.
[cxxii] Keen, 2005.
[cxxiii] Macrae et al., p. 238.
[cxxiv] Stockton (2003) on DRC.
[cxxv] Shearer; Stockton, 1998.
[cxxvi] Goodhand; Keen, 2009.
[cxxvii] Somasundaram.
[cxxviii] Keen, 1994.
[cxxix] De Waal, 2007.
[cxxx] Macrae et al., 240.
[cxxxi] See, for example, Crawford et al..
[cxxxii] Weissman (ed.).
[cxxxiii] Dubois; see also O'Callaghan and Pantuliano on Darfur, and Keen (2009) on Sri Lanka.
[cxxxiv] Pantuliano and O'Callaghan, p. 18.
[cxxxv] ((need page number)).
[cxxxvi] Dubois, p. 7.
[cxxxvii] Young et al.
[cxxxviii] See discussion in Keen, 2005.