Rome, 17–26 January 1983
by
J.A. Gulland
Marine Resources Service
FAO Fisheries Department
Rome, Italy
Abstract
The purpose of the Consultation is reviewed, noting the needs for controlling the amount of fishing, and the fact that many of the controls actually implemented have not succeeded in improving the performance. The improved opportunities for effective management provided by the new Law of the Sea are also noted.
All management schemes must be based on a clear understanding of the objectives to be pursued and of the priorities between these objectives when, as will often be the case, there are several objectives that cannot be achieved simultaneously. There may, however, since national policies and objectives can change, be advantages in having this understanding implicit, rather than spelt out in a permanent form.
Objectives against which the performance of a management scheme can be judged include maintaining the biological production of the stock - though not necessarily taking exactly the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), improving the efficiency and economic performance of the fishery, achieving equity and a socially desirable distribution of benefits between the different groups concerned, and keeping down the costs of research, administration, etc. directly involved in the management process. The impact on these different objectives on one or other approach to the control of the amount of fishing is discussed.
by
Iain MacSween
Scottish Fish Producers Organization
Edinburgh 4, Scotland
Abstract
The marketing of fish is an integral part of the activity of fishing. As such any management measures introduced have implications for the marketing of the species in question.
There are two basic categories of objectives of management - biological and economic. The biological objective is based on the idea of maximising physical yield, although this is a rather simplistic objective and one that is difficult to attain and measure. The economic objective comes into conflict with the biological one when it is argued that the emphasis should be on the economic yield, not the physical yield. But if maximum sustainable yield is too simplistic, then economic yield can be criticised as too complex given the inter-relationship between costs and prices.
The actual objectives, therefore, inevitably involve some compromise, particularly internationally when added complications arise. This compromise tends to lean towards biological yield and in particular to the introduction of catch quotas.
Given that catch quotas are to be introduced they can affect either the size, the condition, and the total amount of fish caught.
The marketing of fish tends to have been ignored by managers and as it is part of an inter-related process it must be taken into account when designing management measures. But there may be conflict between the needs of management and the needs of the market. Measures introduced may disrupt the flow of supply to the market throughout the year; they may also dictate the size and quality of the fish and these may not correspond with the standards of the market. Thus the product being delivered to the market can be affected by the management measures introduced.
In practice it has to be recognized that there are limits upon the volume a market can absorb. Achieving maximum physical yield could, therefore, cause serious marketing problems. Whilst over-supplying a market can cause problems, so can prohibiting fishing until a spawning stock biomass sufficient to sustain maximum yield is achieved.
The actual management measures introduced over the past few years within the European Community have tended towards those regulating the size of fish caught, the seasons and areas in which they can be caught and the total amount that may be caught.
Closures by areas or seasons generally cause no marketing problems and contribute towards stock conservation. This is particularly true if alternative supplies of the same species are available elsewhere, although closed areas can disrupt the supplies of other species contained within that area.
Regulations involving minimum mesh sizes tend to harmonize with the requirements of the market. Such measures generally result in the larger sizes being landed although it may on occasions lead to a shortage of some smaller fish.
Restrictive licensing has rarely been used and in the context of over-capacity has had no real impact on the market.
A much more common method has been restriction by per-man or per-vessel quotas. This can lead to cases of shortages or gluts and a deterioration of quality if there is not adequate on-board storage capacity. Fishermen will also try to land the very best quality fish and discard the remainder. In addition to undoing the benefits of conservation measures such practices deprive the market of the full range of selections.
by
David B. Thomson
Farmhouse, Baberton
Edinburgh EH 14, Scotland
Abstract
This paper deals with the attitudes and responses of fishermen and fishing communities to fishery regulation measures. Any means used by Government to control, limit or direct fish-capture activities must necessarily affect the fisherman. His cooperation is essential to the success of the legislation. His attitude and reaction largely determine how workable any regulation will be in practice.
Fishermen tend to be individualistic and independent beings. This fact should not blind us to the enormous amount of cooperation that goes on within the industry, particularly within each port or community. To an outsider fishermen's behaviour may appear to be perverse or eccentric at times but it is little different in essence from that of any group or society whose livelihood, way of life, or existence is under threat.
The reaction of fishermen is viewed from the background of his profession and way of life. It is examined in two main areas: observation or infringement of regulations, and general communication with Government on the subject of fisheries management.
The specific purpose of management measures is then discussed and the situation facing fishery managers summarized. Some aspects of well-developed fisheries in industrialized countries are treated separately from fisheries in developing parts of the world as their situations are quite different and may merit different management goals and measures.
Ways of improving fisheries management and avoiding pitfalls are suggested in the concluding section. The importance of fostering good relations with fishermen and of involving them in the decision-making process is emphasized.
by
James R. McGoodwin
University of Colorado
Boulder, USA
Abstract
This paper reviews a variety of indigenous and/or traditional mechanisms of self-regulation employed in unmanaged fisheries. The paper discusses the following categories of self-regulatory mechanisms: unregulated, unmanaged fisheries; passive mechanisms of self-regulation; and active mechanisms of self-regulation. An unmanaged fishery is defined as a fishery not regulated by the central authority of a government-controlled managerial regime. Passive self-regulation is viewed from the aspect of certain socio-cultural systems that can have an effect on the regulation of fisheries.
Active mechanisms of self-regulation are examined from a historical perspective to determine whether primitive, pre-colonial, pre-industrial humanity lived in a state of harmony, balance and/or equilibrium with nature. Observations are also made concerning societies that do regulate their fisheries. This aspect forms the main part of the paper because of its relevance to the recognition that small-scale traditional fishermen, in terms of numbers, production of fish, and efficiency in fishing techniques contribute the major problem for effective management of fisheries. As a result, self-regulatory mechanisms are discussed with a regard for their possible relevance and efficiency in future policies for the management and development of small-scale fishermen and fisheries.
by
J.F. Caddy
Marine Resources Service
FAO Fisheries Department
Rome, Italy
Abstract
Questions of the feasibility, advantages and disadvantages of controlling the fishing effort and mortality exerted on a stock by methods other than by direct control of catch and fishing effort, or by economic manipulation, are addressed. These indirect methods are generally simpler to formulate and enforce than by direct means but suffer specific disadvantages.
Several categories of methods are reviewed: firstly, seasonal closures of all or part of the fishing zone, with the purpose of reducing fishing effort to some preset level. Unless access is controlled, closed seasons usually grow to occupy much of the year as fleet efficiency and size increase. Closures of fixed duration may be necessary in the case of some stocks where spawning concentrations or migrations cause periods of high vulnerability. Closures of fisheries for market or socio-economic reasons may also occur and have important impacts on effective effort. Impacts of permanent closures of part of the stock area (marine parks and other refugia) are more difficult to evaluate. Selective closures of coastal belts (e.g. to large trawlers) are being evaluated in various areas of the world, largely to avoid social conflicts, but have uncertain impacts in absence of other measures that directly control exploitation rate.
The other major class of indirect methods are size limits, regulations on mesh size, gear design and by-catch regulations. These various approaches act to modify the mortality experienced by segments of the fish population, but experience with international fisheries regulated solely by these methods suggest that, without any control, they are unlikely to be fully effective, are easily circumvented, and require close attention to enforcement. Problems of conflict of regulations in mixed-species fisheries will need addressing in using these indirect approaches.
by
Bernard E. Skud
NOAA
Northeast Fisheries Center
Rhode Island
USA
Abstract
The paper reviews studies, undertaken over the last thirty years, regarding the manipulation of stationary fishing gear, specifically hook-spacing of longline gear and duration of set for pots. The studies indicate the complexity of estimating CPUE for these fisheries. Subtle changes can have a profound influence on the utility of this statistic as an index of abundance. The studies also emphasize the need for a continual evaluation of changes in the gear or the method of fishing to provide reliable indices of abundance for a given fishery. The degree of refinement needed for estimates of CPUE should be evaluated in terms of management goals and the practicality of collecting the data necessary for the specified refinements. The studies demonstrate that adjustments to the gear or method of fishing can have economic advantages for the fisherman in determining the optimum operation in a particular fishery. Direct financial gain may be realized through manipulation of the gear that improves the catch rate or, indirectly, through reductions in the cost of fishing.
In both the pelagic and demersal longline fisheries discussed in this report, the fishermen were aware of the advantages of wider hook-spacing much before its significance was appreciated by biologists. In pot fisheries, there generally is little evidence to show that fishermen are retrieving their gear at the optimum rate, suggesting either that the potential advantages are not realized or that weather conditions, market demand or other factors indicate the methods of operation.
by
R. Jones
Marine Laboratory
Aberdeen, Scotland
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the principles of mesh regulation, its role in fisheries management and difficulties encountered in its implementation.
The theoretical basis of mesh regulation is based on the concept of an “optimum harvesting strategy”, i.e. the fact that, for many commercially important fish species, recruitment is unrelated to spawning stock size over a wide range of stock sizes. This makes it possible to conceive of an optimum exploitation pattern for exploiting each year class throughout its life, irrespective of its absolute magnitude. Within this context, theoretical considerations are concerned with the probable age at which a fish is likely to be captured. If, for example, fish are caught when they are very young, the catch will typically consist of large numbers of very small individuals. This will provide a numerically very large catch but not necessarily a large weight of fish. Conversely, if fish are not caught until they are very old, the catch will tend to consist of a relatively small number of relatively large fish. Again the aggregate weight of catch may not necessarily be large. The theoretical approach is to determine the best average age or size at which to capture so as to maximise the sustainable yield in weight per year class entering the fishery.
There are various ways of achieving this, and one of these is by regulating the age (or size) of first capture directly. This may be done by regulating the mesh size, in a demersal drag-net fishery, or the hook size as in a hook and line fishery. One object of mesh regulations therefore is to influence the sustainable yield in the long-term. Other objectives are to protect juvenile fish from capture, and to try to ensure that sufficient fish survive to maturity. This may be especially important for stocks which are exploited at so high a level that there is a danger of recruitment failure due to diminished stock size.
There are a number of difficulties with mesh regulations, one of which is that it is not usually possible to demonstrate that an actual change in mesh size has had the expected effect on catches. This is because natural fluctuations in stock size (and catch) tend to be much larger than the expected effects of the changes in mesh size that have been implemented in practice. This does not necessarily mean that mesh regulations have no effect. It does mean, however, that the effects of mesh regulations cannot be demonstrated, in practice. Because of this, and because the short-term effect of a mesh increase is likely to be a reduction in catch, it may be difficult to convince industry that such restrictive measures are really necessary. Other difficulties include:
How to persuade industry to accept regulatory measures if different sectors of the industry are likely to be affected to different extents (for example, fisheries for fish meal frequently require smaller-meshed nets than fisheries for fish for human consumption).
How to determine the best mesh size for a multispecies fishery such as a demersal trawl fishery.
How to ensure enforcement in situations where it may be possible to corrupt the enforcement officers.
How to prevent evasion of regulations as might be done, for example, by fitting one codend inside another as to reduce the effective mesh size when in use.
How to compromise between the spirit and the letter of the law; for example, to comply with the intention of a regulation, it may be appropriate to require the average mesh size to be of a certain size, but for legal purposes it may be necessary to require that no meshes are below a certain size.
In conclusion, it must be accepted that there are a number of difficulties associated with mesh regulations, but equally, it should be pointed out that none of them need be insuperable.
by
| David B. Thomson Farmhouse, Baberton Edinburgh, Scotland | M. Ben-Yami Fisheries Technology Division Haifa, Israel |
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the broad aspects of fishing gear selectivity inasfar as it relates to fisheries management and to the measurement of fishing effort. It is not intended to provide a detailed or scientific analysis of selectivity, rather to give sufficient information for discussion of aspects of fishing gear performance that are of interest to fishery managers.
Selectivity is understood here as the capacity of any method or gear type to capture certain fractions or sections of the fish population whether grouped by species, age, size or behaviour, and to exclude others.
Too often gear selectivity has been viewed only in the very narrow sense of mesh selectivity in the cod-end of trawl nets. This paper takes a much broader view and treats mesh size as a rather minor aspect of total gear selectivity.
Some suggestions are made as to the usefulness and feasibility of management measures based on limitations of fishing gear size type or specification. It is hoped that they, and the general information contained, will be of some help to those involved in the formulation of fisheries legislation.
by
J.A. Gulland
Marine Resources Service
FAO Fisheries Department
Rome, Italy
Abstract
The problems of controlling the true amount of fishing (fishing mortality) on a stock of fish by means of a catch quota are discussed. Although catch quotas have been the most widely used method in industrial fisheries, and some of the key phrases in the Law of the Sea Convention refer to setting of an allowable catch, catch quotas are not necessarily the most useful approach under the condition of the new Law of the Sea. They were used in international commissions (ICNAF, IWC) largely because they solved the difficulty of comparing the effective fishing power of different national fleets, while facilitating the allocation of shares between countries.
The problems of using a catch quota are that there has to be up-to-data information on changes in stock abundance, which can require extensive and expensive research; that attainment of a catch quota may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient condition that the stock is being managed so as to achieve economic and social objectives; and that catch quotas can be difficult to enforce and can affect the quality of the statistical data essential for stock assessment and other inputs to management.
by
J.G. Pope
MAFF Fisheries Laboratory
Lowestoft
UK
Abstract
Limiting fishing mortality by catch quotas (total allowable catches or TACs) requires the input of scientific advice if it is to be successful. In some regions, aspects of this advice are fairly routine, while other aspects are in clear need of development. In other regions, almost everything remains to be developed if this method of managing fisheries is to be adopted. This paper seeks to review briefly the scientific methods used and their limitations. It seeks to indicate where new technique is needed and where more dialogue is required between scientists, administrators and fishermen.
by
Bjørn S. Brochmann
Director of Planning
Ministry of Fisheries
Oslo, Norway
Abstract
The paper first examines, with particular reference to Norwegian experiences, why vessel licensing schemes are introduced and often maintained even after the introduction of catch quotas. Whilst the original reasons for introducing licensing frequently have only limited validity, they are often maintained because situations would worsen without them, especially when there is excessive capacity in relation to catch quotas. Moreover, the geographical distribution of licences can be an instrument to assist regions which are particularly dependent upon fish catching and processing. Licensing arrangements also facilitate the enlistment of fishermen's support for quota-relation. The author argues that, whilst it is possible to replace quota systems by licensing arrangements, experience demonstrates that such a policy is inadvisable and has many disadvantages as a means of keeping catches within desirable limits. The paper concludes that licensing systems nevertheless can be very important instruments of policy, especially as means of restricting over-capitalization. Consideration should be given to the treatment of licences as a commodity to buy and to sell; under such conditions, the author argues, most of the disadvantages presently connected with licensing schemes might be avoided.
by
Theodore Panayotou
Faculty of Economics
Kesetsart University
Bangkok 9, Thailand
Abstract
This is the preliminary report of a small Workshop held in Rome, 6–9 December 1982. The Workshop was called to examine the concept of territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) and the possible use of such rights in the management of small-scale fisheries. The possibility of using TURFs for fisheries management derives from the recent increase in knowledge about traditional territorial systems that continue to exist in a large number of areas throughout the world. The Workshop was exploratory in nature. This preliminary report recounts the highlights of the discussions on the definition of TURFs and on the evaluation of their use with regard to criteria of efficiency and equity. A final report is being prepared and will include contributions by the participants elaborating various issues raised at the Workshop.
by
Fernand J. Doucet
Toledo
Ontario, Canada
Abstract
The paper outlines the problems in managing fisheries caused by open-access conditions to the fisheries resource. Historical examples of private property rights assigned to certain fisheries in Canada are given for comparison with common property rights. The author describes the difficulties experienced with control over fishing effort through limits on numbers of vessels because of the inability by fisheries managers to effectively prevent technological innovation from occurring. Innovation is basic in fisheries because of the competitive aspect that exists within any common property resource. Instead, the paper suggests that the assignment of quantities of fish to individual fishing enterprises will remove the competitive aspect that frustrates normative approaches to controlling fishing effort.
Conditions for the assignment of quantities of fish to fishing enterprises (quasi-property rights) are listed.
The paper describes the Canadian experience in this approach for the Canadian Atlantic offshore wetfish-trawler fishery.
by
Bjørn S. Brochmann
Director of Planning
Ministry of Fisheries
Oslo, Norway
Abstract
The paper concentrates upon financial measures designed to improve the net economic benefits from fisheries. The author argues that priority should be given to the maximization of such benefits as, in the long run, an unprofitable industry cannot be responsible for food supply or social welfare. The paper contrasts classical economic theory with experience and practice in relation to a number of hypothetical situations, e.g. one nation exploiting a single fish stock, a single stock fished by two nations. It also reviews Norwegian experience in attempting, through fiscal and other measures, to keep the catch within national quotas. The author makes three main conclusions. First, licence schemes must be maintained mainly to restrict investments in new vessels and overall participation in the fishery, thus counteracting the expansive effects of state-income support. Secondly, taxes on fishing are not necessary to get rid of excess capacity; it is sufficient to withdraw the support scheme. Thirdly, if for political reasons it is not possible to follow the advice of economic theory, i.e. impose a tax on fishing, the opposite should be avoided as in the long run such action will have severely detrimental difficult economic and biological effects. He concludes that it is extremely difficult to combine financial support to a specific sector with the seeking of increased efficiency in that sector.
by
J.F. Caddy
Marine Resources Service
FAO Fisheries Department
Rome, Italy
Abstract
Most existing theory of fisheries rest on the “steady state” axiom, whereby a given level of return is expected to be sustainable from some given level of human intervention in the resource system, and this body of theory is essential to an understanding of the main factors governing yields from fishing. Unfortunately, its uncritical use may obscure a realization that: (i) oceanographic and ecological interactions change the carrying capacity of the environment more or less drastically from time to time, for many resources and hence also the sustainable yield; (ii) the train of events during fisheries development, even for resources in more stable environments, rarely involves a steady application of fishing effort from year to year, but typically occurs in a series of pulses of investment in vessels and plant, usually separated by fairly extended intervals of time. Each wave of new investment is typically followed soon afterwards by a period of over-capitalization and excess effort, when the MSY level is often soon exceeded. The duration of this initial phase appears to have declined over the last few decades, however, as the alternatives for fleet diversion to other resources have declined, and the practice of offering subsidies has become more common, the duration of the second phase of over-exploitation (or at least over-capitalization) seems to have increased. Following a period of low returns, and consequent fleet diversion or lack of replacement, effort may eventually decline leading to increased returns, and in all probability a new cycle of rapid investment with the same consequences.
Some of the factors underlying this sequence of events are outlined, and it is concluded that the most effective interventions occur in the early stages of development, with the phased introduction of new vessels. This timing is preferable to having to face the very difficult, costly and not always effective allocation and management problems that are the consequences of over-capitalization. Only with attention to the systems' nature of fisheries, and the devising of appropriate systems of feedback of information, will a matching of fleet capacity to yield potential be possible.
by
Hjartan Hoydal
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
Copenhagen, Denmark
Abstract
This paper deals specifically with the ICES advisory process in regard to fish stock management and with the scientific problems involved, and will not describe the more general scientific discussion within ICES of a number of marine disciplines that may in various ways have a bearing on the management of fisheries. A general outline of the role of ICES providing scientific advice is given by Tambs-Lyche (1980).
An attempt is made to describe the procedures for establishing the basic scientific descriptions of stocks and fisheries, the way these descriptions have been converted to actual management advice and, finally, recent attempts to improve the usefulness of the advice to managers.
by
M.J. Holden
Directorate General for Fisheries
Commission of the European Communities
Brussels, Belgium
Abstract
In January 1977, the Member States of the EEC extended their fishery limits to 200 miles, and at the same time the EEC took over responsibilities for management of fish stocks in these waters. The procedures for setting management measures within the EEC start with the scientific advice from ICES concerning the state of the stocks, and the catches associated with different policies, particularly with different levels of fishing mortalities including current levels and Fmax.
This advice is then used in determining the total allowable catches from each stock (TACs). Five situations occur:
Autonomous stocks in EEC waters, fished only by EEC
Autonomous stocks in EEC waters, fished also by other countries (usually in exchange for EEC access to other stocks)
Joint stocks, occurring in the waters of EEZ and other States
Autonomous stocks of third countries
Stocks outside exclusive fishery limits
In all, except the first case, this involves negotiation, possibly lengthy, with other countries.
The next stage is to allocate national shares in these TACs; this is done mainly on the basis of historic catches, but consideration is also given to the needs of fishing communities in the poorer parts of the Community, and of countries whose fleets have been displaced from the EEZs of third countries. Agreements on these shares have been reached for all the major species except herring.
Considerable progress has thus been made in establishing a quota-based management system, but problems remain. These include the need for long-range forecasts, perhaps with a degree of stochasticity, herring and the current poor level of effective enforcement.
by
P.J. Derham
Chief Inspector of Fisheries
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Great Westminster House
Horseferry Road
London SWIP 2AE, UK
Abstract
The paper examines, against a background of experiences in the North Atlantic in general and European waters in particular, the range of practical problems encountered in the operational implementation of the TAC concept. It deals extensively with the special problems of data acquisition, including such aspects as the assessment of quotas in terms of live weight caught, the use and validity of log-book information, practices for inspections at sea and on-board catch assessment, and considerations regarding mixed fisheries.
The South-West of England mackerel fishery is described in detail as an illustration of the problems of domestic quota management. The paper concludes that quota management is, above all, an exercise in data acquisition. The problems associated with this requirement and the associated high cost of manpower and operational resources lend weight to the argument that quota systems are in many respects unenforceable.
by
Bruce Rettig
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Oregon State University
Corvallis, Oregon, USA
Abstract
Licence limitation in the fisheries of the United States and Canada has been a major issue in the management of fisheries for the last twenty years. It is an extremely controversial issue in many parts of the two countries concerned and has been the subject of periodic reviews by academics, fisheries administrators and fishermen. The paper outlines the basic factors in fisheries that resulted in the adoption of a limitation in the number of fishing licences issued.
Because of the differences in form of the various licence limitation schemes in practice as a result of varied objectives, examples are given of experiences with different fisheries in many of the States and Provinces of the USA and Canada. The paper examines recent trends and emerging issues from current practices in licence limitation. An evaluation of the successes and failures of the various schemes is made on the basis of the effectiveness of the various programmes in terms of resource conservation, economic efficiency, equity, administrative feasibility and political acceptability.
The author concludes that limited entry schemes will contribute to the achievement of certain objectives only through sacrifice with respect to others. Thus, as in many cases the consequences of such schemes are gains by some groups and losses or smaller gains to others, careful attention to overall equity is required. The integral involvement of fishermen in the design of management measures will therefore greatly enhance the possibility of achieving key objectives. A cooperative approach, including all those involved, is recommended.
by
William D. Chappell
Operational Law Enforcement Division
US Coast Guard Headquarters
Washington D.C., USA
Abstract
Current United States fishery management is a direct result of the 200 nautical mile limit legislation passed in 1976. Previous management regimes had proved ineffective for management of most coastal fisheries in the United States. Fisheries management is conducted by regional councils set up by the law. They must consider biological, technological, economic, social and political factors in management. Measures are generally divided into quota or effort restrictions with permits or licences used to identify authorized fishing vessels. Effort restrictions are discussed. They include: permits, reports and record-keeping, gear reporting and marking, closures, seasons, gear restrictions, size/sex restrictions, prohibited species and facilitation of enforcement. These effort restrictions are described as they apply to the foreign and domestic fisheries. Effort restriction enforcement by different resources or modes are discussed and costs compared. Their relative effectiveness in performing the law enforcement tasks of surveillance, detention, identification, classification and apprehension are described. Specific problems in enforcing effort restrictions and some solutions are described, with emphasis on ease of enforcement. Effort restrictions can be effective management measures so long as the benefits received justify the costs of enforcement.
by
L.N. Schowengerdt, Jr.
Operational Law Enforcement
US Coast Guard (Gole)
Washington, D.C.
USA
Abstract
This paper discusses enforcement of fishery quota regulations as applied to foreign fishing operations within the United States fishery conservation zone (200 nautical miles). The discussion focuses on the detection of quota violations by the US Coast Guard. More specifically, the report provides methods of estimating catch on board to determine the accuracy of fishing logs, and therefore the accuracy of reported catch - an essential element of effective quota regulation.
by
Clement V. Tillion
North Pacific Fishery Management Council
Anchorage, Alaska 9951
USA
Abstract
The paper discusses the reasons that necessitated the imposing of limits on the numbers of fishing licences issued in Alaska. A comparison is made between fishing and other common property resources such as oil and range land for cotton. Reference is made to the impact of Canada's salmon licence limitation share on the west coast and the beneficial impact of the scheme on fishermen, their access to financial institutions, and the technological advantage gained by Canadian fishermen with better vessels and younger fishermen over American salmon fishermen.
Conservation of fisheries resources is given as the first objective for Alaska and that this objective requires restraint on fishing practices. An example of how the benefits of such restraint can be frustrated by environmental factors is given. The paper advises that conservation is not an objective by itself, since such a single purpose will fail socially. Objectives for management must recognize and include the needs of fishermen and the communities in which they live.
Examples are given of the disadvantage small fishing communities with small fishing vessels will face from large highly-efficient fishing vessels catching quotas in shorter and shorter periods.
by
Tadashi Yamamoto
College of Economics
Nihon University
Tokyo, Japan
Abstract
During the feudal era in Japan, all coastal villages were classified for revenue purposes into either agricultural or fishing villages. Certificates were issued to fishing villages entitling people in the village to fish the resources in the sea off their village. Additionally, people from other areas were sometimes granted special fishing privileges in return for financial or other contribution made to the Government. In 1901, a fisheries law was established embodying the traditional “rights” system of feudal times, while establishing new rights for sea areas beyond the jurisdiction of the local lords. Disputes arose over the fairness of allocating rights to new sea areas between different fishing villages.
After World War II, all fishing rights granted by the old fisheries law were cancelled as part of steps to democratize the socio-economic structure in Japan. A new fisheries law was established in 1949 whereby Regional Fishery Coordinating Committees, with representation by fishermen, determine how the resources and fishing areas are to be utilized. Attention is given to the protection of coastal fishermen who were considered to be socially and economically disadvantaged.
The present system in Japan protects coastal fishermen and their fishing grounds from outside interference. This is accomplished by issuing three types of fishing rights to the fishermen for specific areas, namely: (i) common fishing rights for the capture of littoral resources; (ii) set-net fishing rights for large-scale set-nets; (iii) demarcated rights for mariculture. In general, the fishing right system has worked effectively and the major problems which have arisen - the effect and costs of government-launched re-stocking programmes, and the growth of sport fishing - are of relatively recent origin and relate the questions not foreseen when the system was first introduced.
by
Y. Asada
Fisheries Agency
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Tokyo, Japan
Abstract
Fishery regulations in Japan derive from the “Old Fisheries Law” of 1901. This law recognized and legalized traditional institutions and practices. In 1949 a new law replaced the “Old Fisheries Law” and this in turn was amended substantially in 1962.
From the legal view-point, fisheries are divided into three categories: “Fishing Rights Fisheries”, “Licence Fisheries” and “Other Fisheries”. Licence Fisheries produce 60 percent of catches and this proportion has gradually increased over many years. Coastal Fisheries are controlled by the Fishing Rights system. “Common Fishing Rights” are those that enable fishermen to exploit a certain area of water in order to harvest shellfish and seaweeds and to operate small types of fixed gear and small mobile gears such as beach seines set from non-motorized craft. “Set Net Fishing Rights” are granted for gears fixed in water shallower than 27 m. “Demarcated Fishing Rights” enable holders to engage within a given coastal area. Fishing Rights are monopolistic rights to engage in certain fisheries in certain areas of public-waters. They are thus property rights and, in legal transactions, most of the same provisions concerning land apply to them.
The major fisheries are controlled by licences. A fishing licence legally exempts an individual from general prohibitions declared for the purpose of conservation or the maintenance of order in the exploitation of fishing grounds. There are two categories: licences granted by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and licences granted by Prefectural Governors. The former licences are required to engage in fisheries for which national control is considered necessary because of the large size of the vessels engaged, the wide area of fishing operation, the existence of international fishery agreements, and the nature of the fishing grounds, etc. Seventeen fisheries come under these licences. Prefectural Governors issue licences to vessels engaged in fisheries next in importance to the above group. The number of vessels to be licensed in each fishery is determined in consultation with Fisheries Coordination Committees by size-class of vessels, fishing area and periods of operation. Licences are subject to restrictions in respect to areas fished, closed seasons, vessel tonnage, equipment and power, minimum size of fish caught and other things.
All Japanese fisheries are controlled as a unit. Almost all are limited in the number of vessels that may take part. In recent years there have been few fisheries where the number of licences issued has increased, but there has been a rise in the size of vessels and the quality of their equipment. Since fishing effort is controlled by the limitation on the number of licences, in several instances their number has been reduced when exploitation seemed too high. In some cases vessels have been transferred to other fisheries; in others those forced out have been compensated by those remaining. But since renewal is nearly assured, the licence acquires value and investments and loans are made taking the licence as security. There is no fee charged for the licences. It would have been better if one were, and the income used to compensate those who are forced out.
A “tonngae supplement system” is used to reduce the effects of increase in fishing power resulting from the use of larger and more efficient vessels within the licensing system. To replace a vessel with another of larger size, the equivalent extra tonnage must be retired by purchase of a licence or some other means.
The system used in Japan arose in response to conditions in that country and is regarded as successful. Other countries considering licence limitations should consider their special problems to judge whether such a system is appropriate.
by
Shahrom bin Abdul Majid
Department of Fisheries
Ministry of Agriculture
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur
Abstract
The inshore fisheries of Peninsular Malaysia are intensively exploited on the east coast and over-exploited on the west coast. Fishing effort and investment need to be reduced, particularly on the west coast, in order to make harvest more economically efficient in terms of manpower and capital and to conserve the resources.
Malaysia has adopted a Fisheries Licensing Policy addressed to, inter alia:
The elimination of the competition and the ensuing conflict between traditional fishermen and mini-trawler fishermen in inshore waters.
The prevention of over-exploitation of the fishery resources in the inshore waters.
The re-structuring of the ownership pattern of fishing units in accord with the New Economic Policy.
One of the main strategies employed is allocation of fishing grounds through zones, so that areas close to shore are reserved for the smaller vessels. Another main strategy is the regulation of fishing effort through a licence limitation to control excess capacity taking into account socio-economic and political aspects.
In following these strategies, several major issues and problems have arisen. The success of fishery management measures depends to a large extent upon the acceptance of the need and value of the measures by those who will be affected and by politicians. Since allocation decisions are political, fishery administrators must have full support at the political level.
This means that there must be full comprehension of the unique common property characteristics and the necessity for government intervention. It is also necessary that the proposed measures be backed by sound scientific facts and socio-economic information in order to ensure credibility.
An additional requirement is the need for coordination of all relevant government agencies in order to ensure that policies and actions are not counter-productive. This includes, for example, involving those agencies that can help in re-allocating excess fishermen by creating alternative employment opportunities, providing training for new skills, and initiating special land schemes for fishermen.
There is an urgent need to look into compensation for the fishermen to be re-allocated or excluded from the fishery sector. This requires surveys of the economic profiles of the fishermen.
Licence fees need to be reviewed and high licence fees specifically related to the catching power of the vessels should be imposed.
And, finally, there is an urgent need to develop the capability of the management and research personnel.
by
R. Bain
Fisheries Division
Department of Primary Industry
Canberra, Australia
Abstract
The declared Australian Fishery Zone (AFZ), within the 200-mile limit, is one of the largest such zones in the world. However, the biological productivity in many parts is low, and with a small domestic market catches are small (0.2 percent of total world production). Responsibility for management of the resources is shared between the individual States (out to 3 miles), and the Australian Commonwealth Government (from 3 to 200 miles). The objectives are to conserve the stocks and to make optimum use of the resources.
The paper discusses the general approach to management and the experience in some of the major fisheries. This includes some purely national fisheries (Western Australia rock lobster, shrimp (prawn) in the Gulf of Carpentaria and in Spencer Gulf, the mixed species trawl fishery in the south-east and the south-eastern abalone fishery), as well as the southern bluetun tuna (which is also fished by Japan and New Zealand beyond the AFZ) and some fisheries by foreign fleets within the AFZ.
The most important measure has been some form of licence limitation. This has involved problems of who should get licences and of their transfer. Currently, in some fisheries, licences have a very high transfer value, though this can vary with the success of the fishery, and the value of a licence in the northern prawn fishery has dropped well below the peak of 150,000 Australian Dollars. There can also be substantial annual licence fees, e.g. A$7,000 in the Spencer Gulf prawn fishery, which can go a long way towards covering the cost of management.
Discussions are being held between Australia, Japan and New Zealand concerning the southern bluefin tuna, which the Australian fishermen catch during its first few years of life in coastal waters before moving into the open ocean, where it is caught by Japanese longliners. These discussions are likely to lead to some form of control of the amount of fishing. Because of differences in national law and custom, this is more likely to be in the terms of some type of national catch quotas rather than effort controls.
In conformity of the Law of the Sea Convention, Australia allows access, under conditions, by foreign vessels to resources surplus to Australian harvesting capacity. In doing this, one objective has been to increase the degree of Australian capacity. Access has been granted for a number of resources under joint ventures and other arrangements. These operations have tended to confirm the small size of Australian resources and, at present, the only significant operations are for southern bluefin tuna, for squid in the south-east, and pair trawl and gill-net fishing on the north-west shelf.
by
G. Duncan Waugh
Fisheries Research Center
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract
The paper describes the recent history of the fisheries around New Zealand and the step being taken to manage them. Until recently, the only fisheries were domestic ones restricted to a few of the more highly-priced species in the near-shore access. The activities of foreign trawlers and squid-jigging vessels, which started in 1969, drew attention to the substantial under-exploited resources, and there has been a steady increase in the participation of New Zealand interests in the offshore fisheries, especially for export.
The New Zealand EEZ is very large - almost 1.2 million square nautical miles - much of it relatively deep continental shelf, down to 1,500 metres. Accurate estimates of the resources have been difficult to obtain, especially for some of the deep-water species such as orange roughy. Determination of annual catch quotas has therefore been based on a conservative approach.
The general policy has been to encourage the development of local involvement in the deep-sea fisheries, e.g. through joint venture or cooperative venture agreements, while minimizing conflict with established local fisheries, and the risk of over-exploitation of the resource. Thus foreign fishing has banned within the territorial sea, and also as far as trawling and lining are concerned, in some other near-shore areas of special interest to local vessels.
The problem raised by differences in vulnerability, distribution and market price of various species are discussed. The paper also reviews some of the administrative machinery involved, e.g. in collection of statistics and in the determination of appropriate management measures.
by
Fisheries Management Division
Southeast Regional Office
National Marine Fisheries Service
9450 Koger Boulevard
St. Petersburg, Florida
USA
Abstract
The shrimp fishery of the Gulf of Mexico faces several problems, including: conflict among user groups as to area and size at which shrimp are to be harvested; discard of shrimp through wasteful practice of culling; the continuing decline in quality and quantity of estuarine and associated inland habitats; and conflict with other fisheries.
In order to deal with these problems, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC) has prepared a shrimp management plan. One of the management strategies was to reduce growth over-fishing through the closure of selected fishing areas. Some basic conclusions are evident from studies of the two years of experience with closures.
It appears that, because shrimp are an annual crop and their abundance is determined primarily by environmental conditions, the impact of the closure can range from beneficial to non-detectable. During years of good recruitment, such as 1981, the seasonal closure provided excellent gains both in terms of number of pounds landed and value of the harvest. In years of low recruitment, such as 1982, benefits derived from the closure seem to be reduced. With several years of data, it may be possible to model the closure and predict those years in which benefits are expected.
by
Julio A. Baisre, Armando Pérez, Maria H. Obregon and Raul Cruz
Centro de Investigaciones Pesqueras
La Habana, Cuba
Abstract
Regulation of fishing effort in three of the most important Cuban shelf fisheries is discussed in connection with the results of the research work, the nature of the resources and their exploitation state.
It is shown that shrimp fisheries, the species having a short life span, need a very dynamic regulation system. In small shrimp areas, keeping a buffer biomass is an imperative step in their management because of their high dependence on environmental and human actions. Shrimp fisheries regulations must also take into account not only total yearly effort regulation but also spatial and season regulation, considering both size and species composition.
Lane snapper set-net fisheries must be regulated based on a catch quota in “windows”, in order to allow some fishing activity during the season of highest yields and the use of selective devices assuring a proper scapement of undersized fishes.
It is also shown how spiny lobster yields have been improved by the lengthening of the closed season and a legal minimum size with strict enforcement of both.
In each of the above cases a complete set of regulatory measures is needed to ensure the proper deployment of fishing effort and better fishing performance.
by
M. Bar Ilan
Fisheries Department
Ministry of Agriculture
Tel-Aviv, Israel
Abstract
The first steps towards the regulation of fishing effort and the assignment of fishing rights on Israel's Lake Kinnereth can be traced as far back as 1300 B.C. The paper describes the resource limits of the lake and how conflicts can occur in the allocation of the resource between groups of fishermen. These conflicts arise from increases in the number of nets and intensity of use of fishing areas, improvements in gear and the impact of price on larger species. All of these classical examples occur within a restricted fishing licence system. The paper describes how fishing licences are presently restricted, the mechanisms used, the criteria for selection of additional licences, and the key role of the Advisory Committee. It notes that re-stocking activities are an integral part of the overall management schemes. It concludes that the licensing of fishermen and gear must be seen as only one part of the complex task of management which, to succeed, must give consideration not only to biological and technical factors but also to economic and social factors.
by
A. Ben-Tuvia
Department of Zoology
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
Abstract
Investigations of the Bardawil Lagoon in the years 1969–1979 were concerned mostly with problems of fisheries biology and management. Since the physical conditions of the Lagoon have decisive influence on the species composition and size of stock of commercial fishes, it was necessary periodically to dredge the artificial openings connecting the Lagoon with the open sea. In years of high salinities, 60 to 100 percent in the central section of the Lagoon, caused by the silting of the artificial openings, the catch of Sparus aurata, Mugil cephalus and Dicentrarchus labrax was drastically reduced. Knowledge of the life-history and ecology of the three main commercial species was used for the introduction of the necessary regulatory measures for the fishery resources management. Age determinations were based on otoliths readings and analysis of length-frequency distributions. A growth curve has been fitted to the age-length data.
Three kinds of fishing gear were used in the Baldawil Lagoon: (1) A purse seine called locally ‘cionciloa’ which is an adaptation of the net used in the Mediterranean Sea for sardines and anchovies; its use started in 1970; (2) Trammel net under the local name of ‘dabba’ or ‘ambattan’; (3) Beach seine or ‘jaraff’.
The catch by month, fishing gear and species has been recorded but difficulties were encountered in calculations of catch per unit of effort. Because of technical improvements in fishing methods and equipment, the fishing effort increased continuously during the period of study.
The main regulatory measures were directed towards conservation and development of the stock of Sparus aurata, the main commercial fish in the Lagoon. The first step was to increase the mesh size. Thus, after a series of mesh size experiments, the 34 mm (stretched) mesh size was replaced by 70 mm mesh size in all nets. The minimum legal size of 180 mm total length was established for marketing of S. aurata.
In order to prevent over-fishing, limits were set on the number of fishing units and the length of nets employed. Beach seines were progressively withdrawn since they were retaining a large proportion of young S. aurata. A closed fishing season was established for the period November-March, which includes spawning migrations of S. aurata and Dicentrarchus labrax.
Due to the rational management of the fishery resources of the Lagoon, the catch of S. aurata and the total catch increased considerably.
by
R.A. Crouter
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Atlantic Fisheries Service
Scotia-Fundy Region
Canada
Abstract
The paper describes the characteristics of the traditional fisheries for herring in the Bay of Fundy, Nova Scotia, and their development since the mid-1960s. It reviews the background to and the evolution of the quota system first introduced in 1972. It examines some of the major problems experienced in applying quotas, in particular equity considerations. Administrative and enforcement requirements are described. Notwithstanding major educational and information programmes and the creation of advisory committees including fishermen's representatives, experience has demonstrated that observance and integrity can only be brought into such quota systems through co-management by government and fishermen's associations, re-inforced by high penalties for non-observance of the rules of the system.
by
Fernand J. Doucet and Derrick Iles
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Canada
Abstract
The development of the herring fishery in the Bay of Fundy (Canada) is traced from 1870 to the time of a large build-up of purse seiners catching 200,000 metric tons of herring in 1968. Initial management measures were required by 1970, whereby the fleet size of purse seine vessels was frozen, followed by the imposition of a quota for the fleet in 1972. Technological innovations circumscribed the freeze in fleet size resulting in an increase in conflicts between the purse seine fleet and other fishing gears. By 1975 the resource was severely depleted and the fleet in financial difficulties.
The paper describes the initiatives taken by the Government to alleviate the problems within the fishery, first by prohibiting the processing of herring into fish meal, thereby ensuring the use of herring for food purposes resulting in higher value to be paid to fishermen for a limited quota. Innovative measures were applied to distribute the overall quota equitably amongst the fishing vessels, which permitted an even flow of herring to plants through an extended fishing fleet. Over the side sales to foreign processing vessels were an effective instrument for improving the price paid to fishermen. This management system is credited as being an effective method for the re-structuring of the industry, even though difficulties were encountered in maintaining cohesion amongst the fishermen.
by
Frank Grice and Peter Colosi
National Marine Fisheries Service
Northeast Region
Gloucester, Massachusetts
USA
Abstract
As a result of the extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles, the US formulated a management plan to replace the regulatory mechanisms that existed under the International Commission for North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). Many of the ICNAF regulations such as quotas, by-catch limitations, mesh size restrictions were incorporated into the management plan because of the severely depressed state of the resources.
Because of the poor condition in the fish stocks, closures had to be rapidly implemented causing severe dislocation to domestic fishermen. Attempts to alleviate the burden on fishermen resulted in a complication of regulations which are given in the paper. In addition to these regulatory measures, recruitment rapidly increased which compounded by-catch problems and were generally ignored by fishermen.
Management measures were also frustrated by increases in fishing effort by new vessels replacing small, old fishing vessels. Direct control over numbers of fishing vessels was considered not feasible because of the political hostility to such a measure. As a result most of the measures proposed in the original management plan have had to be abandoned with only closures of spawning areas to fishing being accepted by the fishermen.
The management plan therefore failed because fishermen failed to support the measures in the plan.
by
R. McInnis
National Marine Fisheries Service
USA
Abstract
Since 1978, the US fisheries for anchovy have been managed under Federal regulations based on the Northern Anchovy Fishery Management Plan. In the management plan, the Pacific Fishery Management Council recommended objectives for managing the fisheries and a combination of harvest quotas, season and area closures to achieve the objectives. The resource is an extremely important prey species for commercial and recreational species and is essential to a small purse-seine fishery and to a large recreational fishery as bait.
Although there are three sub-populations along the Pacific Coast, the central sub-population (extending from San Francisco in the north to Punta Baja, Mexico, in the south) is the major target of both the US and Mexican anchovy fisheries. The regulations discussed in this paper refer only to this sub-population and to the US fishery.
The largest volume of anchovy is caught for reduction into fish meal and oil. Much smaller amounts are caught for use as bait by commercial and recreational fishermen. A small portion of the total harvest is canned for human consumption. A major concern is that of maintaining a sufficient standing stock of anchovy to support large populations of the higher predators which are important to recreational and commercial fishermen.
An important characteristic of the anchovy resource is that the abundance of spawners fluctuates widely over short periods.
The primary management measure is an annual quota or catch, which is based on estimates of the spawning biomass. Areal closures are also used, prohibiting the reduction fishery from operating close to shore. There are also seasonal closures. The closures are used primarily to reduce conflict over fishing space between commercial and recreational fishermen.
During the five years anchovy fishing has been regulated, the quota has been reached only once. The population has been estimated to be at a relatively high level of abundance during this period. Thus the impact of the quotas, so far, has been negligible; but, with apparent declining abundance, the quotas will play an increasingly important role.
The costs of regulating the US anchovy fisheries amount to about US$325,000 per year, of which about $200,000 is used for estimating the spawning biomass. Means are being sought to reduce these costs.
by
Bruce Nicholls
Surf Clam Management Coordinator
National Marine Fisheries Service
Gloucester, Massachusetts
USA
Abstract
The Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Surf Clams and ocean Quahogs was one of the first management programmes to be implemented under the authority of the US Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Magnuson Act).
The surf clam fishery off the mid-central Atlantic States reached its maximum development in the early 1970s. At that point, concern was expressed by the industry about the potential over-capitalization of the stocks. With the passage of the 1976 Act, it became possible to adopt management resources covering the stocks of each of the individual States.
The primary management measures consist of a limit on the number of vessels that can be licensed and an annual quota divided up into a series of quarterly quotas and with restrictions on fishing time. The small number of vessels and processors involved in the fishery facilitated formulation and implementation of the measures.
However, the number of licensed vessels is still excessive. With the need for reduced total quotas, allowable fishing time has been restricted to as few as 24 hours per week (and for one period only 12 hours per week). It was necessary to spread out fishing time to permit the processing operations to continue on an orderly basis. The shortened time, however, has greatly complicated the task of enforcement because of the necessity for ensuring that vessels are fishing only on their designated days.
Measures such as these create a complex management programme designed to prevent the fisherman from taking what he could and would under uncontrolled conditions. This is the fundamental foundation of most fishery management programmes today. The more competent the fishermen, the more advanced the harvesting technique, the greater the impediments managers must design to prevent over-fishing.
The fisherman's response to each impediment is to change his operating strategy or invest in additional or redesigned equipment which enables him to maintain or increase his harvest or market share. Escalating over-capacity is the result. In the present surf clam fishery, capacity exceeds resource potential at maximum foreseeable stock levels by perhaps two orders of magnitude.
Consideration is now being given to the concept of a vessel allocation scheme, under which each vessel would receive a share of the total quota and be free to take when and how he wishes. This could eliminate most of the other management measures that are difficult to enforce. The allocations could be traded, allowing operations to reach whatever level of operation and efficiency they need to be profitable. Administrations could be done entirely from the clock and the government would no longer be the arbiter of economic performance and profitability for the industry.
by
Bernard Einar Skud
National Marine Fisheries Service
Narragansett, Rhode Island
USA
Abstract
The Pacific halibut has been managed by the International Pacific Halibut Commission for half a century. During this time there have been considerable developments in the techniques of management and in the details of the measures applied.
The basic measure has been a closed season of varying length and complexity. The principal objective has been biological, to keep the fishery mortality down and the closing data has in many years been determined by the date at which some pre-set catch limit is reached. There have been other social economic objectives, including avoiding fishing during the bad winter weather. Initially, there was a single season, applying to the whole area, but short additional open seasons applying only to certain areas have been used to ensure a better balance of exploitation between stocks and grounds.
Lacking direct control of fleet size, this grew greatly, with a corresponding shrinkage in the length of the open season. This problem has been tackled in various ways, including a lay-up period between trips, though the Commission never had the legal power to enforce this.
Overall, the IPHC has been successful in biological terms and in re-building the stock from its depleted state in the early 1930s. Its role in improving the economic performance of the fishery has come under more criticism, though it must be stressed that the IPHC was never given the mandate under its Convention to deal with economic matters.
The patterns of the halibut fishery and its management is changing under the new Law of the Sea; even though the IPHC has kept its role, Canadian halibut vessels can no longer fish in US water or vice-versa. This, and other factors, e.g. the introduction of limited entry schemes in other fisheries of the north-east Pacific, will affect the future performance of the Commission.
by
Alejandro Zuleta and Juan R. Serra
Undersecretariats of Fisheries
Teatinos 120
Santiago, Chile
Abstract
Pelagic fisheries account for much the greatest proportion in weight of Chilean catches. Until 1971 catches were mainly anchovy but, after the anchovy crisis, the fleets turned to sardine and jurel and total catches increased, reaching nearly 3 million tons in 1981. This was accompanied by a corresponding increase in the size and efficiency of the fleet.
Concern has been expressed that the sardine and jurel fisheries will follow the pattern of many other fisheries which, after a boom period of very rapid expansion, then collapsed soon after reaching a peak or, after reaching a plateau, entered a period of increasing variability and then declined.
A number of measures have been taken, or are being considered, to deal with this problem. These include the closure of a coastal strip to purse seining, the determination of minimum sizes for sardine and jurel, and the introduction of a catch quota for sardine in the northern zone. The problems of determining and enforcing these measures, and of carrying out the necessary research, including estimation of the abundance of the stock, are discussed.
