Lake Idi Amin has a surface area of 2,240 km2. It is 90 km long and 40 km wide. Maximum depth is 117 m whith an average depth of 33 m.
The Zaire-Uganda border crosses the lake. 73% of the total area, including those deep waters considered less productive, belong to Zaire.
Lake Idi Amin is quite poor in relation to species of fish; all the species found there are also found in Lake Mobutu. However, fossilized remains of the species Lates, Synodontis, and Hydrocynus have been found in the lake bed, leading Hulot1 to hypothesize that at one time, the fauna of the Nile and Congo basins were similar. The first separation of the two basins did in fact take place when Lake Kivu flowed into Lake Idi Amin and Lake Idi Amin flowed into Lake Mobutu.
At a later time, total or partial sterilization of Lakes Kivu and Idi Amin occurred. Subsequently, either volcanic activity or drought caused these lakes to be recolonized by fish especially resistant to poor conditions of oxygenation (Protopterus); fish whose of limological characteristics favour protection of their progeny (Cichlidae); and river fish (Barbus, Labeo).
The most important commercial species are:
“tilapias” (70% of catch);
Bagrus (15% of catch);
Protopterus (9% of catch);
Barbus (2% of catch);
Clarias (1% of catch).
In 1988, Mr. Vakily made an estimate of the potential yield of Lake Idi Amin on the basis of two models.
According to the morpho-edaphic index created by Henderson and Welcomme, potential annual yield for all of Lake Idi Amin would be 15,000 tons.
The second model (derived by Schlesinger and Regier) used, included a variable representing the average annual air temperature. Potential yield in this case would be 16,000 t.
There was intensive beach seine fishing in the hatcheries until April 1989, the deadline set by the Department of the Environment for the destruction of this type of seine. It appears, however, that seining still continues but at a reduced level.
Illegal fishing activities such as these threaten to greatly reduce the potential yield estimated by the two models mentioned, and place the fishery resources themselves in jeopardy.
In 1988, yield for Lake Idi Amin was estimated at 10,700 t/year. In view of the lack of reliable statistics, annual catches could prove to be higher than these estimates.
In 1989, two studies carried out separately by Zaire and Uganda1 reached the same conclusion, which was that the lake's fish resources were being exploited at maximum capacity, and that only under specific conditions could a small increase be made, by exploiting the deep waters belonging to Zaire.
Because resource conservation is imperative, a policy aimed at maintaining the current catch level has become necessary. The development of semi-industrial fishing should be considered only after an in depth study of lake resources has been completed.
Lake Idi Amin is located within the national parks: the Virunga National Park on the Zairian side and Queen Elizabeth National Park on the Ugandan side. In Zaire, the lake waters are considered an integral part of the park, while in Uganda, they are separate entities.
When the Albert National Park was created in 1925, Zairians residing along the shore were evacuated to the interior, while Ugandan fishermen continued to fish on their side of the lake. In 1943 however, in light of a shortage of fish in Zaire, it was decided that the fisheries on the Zairian side should be re-opened.
Shortly thereafter these fishermen formed a single cooperative organization, the COPILE, and its fishing “ceiling” was set at 3,000 tons/year. COPILE's mandate was for 30 years. In 1979, when the period ended, a new convention was produced and the company's name became COPEVI (Cooperative of the Fishermen of Vitshumbi). COPEVI fishermen are therefore sub-contractors rather than COPEVI members. The terms of this convention gave the COPEVI a monopoly over fishing on the lake. Although COPEVI's mandate has no pre-set expiry date, the IZCN/COPEVI convention states that it may be revoked by presidential decree.
The Virunga National Park and the lake fisheries form a single homogenous entity for the following reasons:
inter-relationships of environmental elements: the flora and fauna of the park are closely linked to the fish population; imbalance of one element automatically affects the others; and
integration of fishermen's communities in the park: the existence of a national park provides special stability for the fishing villages, which are perfectly integrated with the park environment.
As a result, life in these communities within the park must be carefully regulated in order to avoid problems and situations incompatible with the existence of a national park. In keeping with this premise, it is obvious that there should be only one company responsible for fishery related activities (supplies and sale of equipment, processing materials and equipment, fuel, marketing). In this way, competition between numerous private enterprises and disruption of the order and regulation necessary in a national park, can be avoided. This company has the right to manage all fishery activities and the obligation to manage them well. It should also maintain harmony between the various institutions present in the park: IZCN (the Zairian Institute for Nature Conservation); DAFECN and the fishermen.
The Convention signed in 1979 by IZCN and COPEVI reflects the principles advanced in the preceding paragraph. By awarding the monopoly of fishing activity to COPEVI (Art. 13-A “No other company, no public or private service, shall be established in this enclave”) this Convention assigns a series of responsibilities to COPEVI: Statistics (Art. 8), security and surveillance (Art. 13-C), infractions (Art. 9 "The management of COPEVI will be held responsible for any infraction committed, including those committed by fishermen, etc) and services to fishermen, responsibilities which arise from COPEVI's monopoly over all the fishery and collateral activities.
One serious oversight of this Convention is the absence of a Committee to oversee the activities of the COPEVI. In our opinion, a monitoring Committee should have been created, composed of IZCN, DAFECN, and fishermen's representatives. The Committee would examine the management of COPEVI and impose sanctions in the event that COPEVI failed to meet its institutional responsibilities.
COPEVI functioned as intended until 1970, when its economic decline and eventual paralysis in 1984 led to the liberalization of fishing activities on the lake.
At first, this liberalization was the cause of considerable development of the sector, increased yields, more fishermen and boats and greater efficiency in the marketing sector.
This situation, nonetheless, degenerated into a sort of anarchy which seriously affected the park:
the number of fishery-related institutions increased from three to five: COPEVI, independent fishermen (non-COPEVI fishermen), the Fishery Committee (created by the MPR Party), IZCN and DAFECN;
there were conflicts among these institutions;
the number of illegal fishermen increased;
the number of people residing within the park increased, unchecked;
new markets were created and those residing just outside the park gained unlimited access to the park interior;
illegal fishing sites were established;
use of fishing gears harmful to the ecosystem increased (beach seines were used in hatcheries, and many belonged to the COPEVI, which was responsible for monitoring such illegal fishing activity);
certain fish species probably became overexploited.
In March 1989, the Department of the Environment intervened and adopted a series of management measures:
the maximum number of canoes authorized to fish on the lake was set at 700;
entry into the park was regulated;
illegal residents were expelled;
the status of “resident” was defined;
beach seines were destroyed;
hatcheries were marked off and fishing units found within them were expelled;
mesh size (surface gill nets: 6 cm knot-to-knot; bottom-set gillnets: 7 cm knot-to-knot) was increased by 2 cm.
These measures were necessary to re-establish order within the park and eliminate the primary causes of mismanagement of fishery resources. They may be considered the first step toward effective management of the lake fisheries. However, reorganization of COPEVI remains the principal problem. It is vital that it reassumes its role, which is to provide and guarantee services for the welfare of the fishermen.
COPEVI already possesses the infrastructure necessary to provide fishermen's services:
a storage warehouse for equipment and supplies;
carpentry and metal-working shops;
fuel pumps and tanks (25,000 litres cap.);
36 cement brine tanks for salting and preserving;
racks for drying salted fish and storage space;
refrigeration capacity;
a refrigeration truck for transporting fresh fish.
Infrastructures and equipment are generally in good condition. COPEVI has, however, failed for many years to provide any services to fishermen because of its financial crisis. This failure is the main reason for (the problems currently observed) constraints now found in the Lake Idi Amin fisheries which are:
lack of standardization of equipment;
sale of nets by several different merchants and availability of nets of prohibited mesh size;
scarcity of spare parts for outboard engines;
scarcity of fuel; and
exploitation of fishermen by private businessmen (merchants).
This situation has created much conflict between COPEVI and the fishermen, seriously hindering development of the lakes' fisheries. In 1988, the following changes were made within COPEVI:
new management was established;
the status and structure of the company was revised;
control of COPEVI management was given to respected local authorities (the Dioceses of Butembo-Beni and Goma);
CEBEMO (a Dutch Catholic NGO) provided funds for two projects which should help COPEVI to recover somewhat financially. The first funds were used in a way which even COPEVI has defined as wasteful. The rest (20,000,000 Belgian francs) were used for the following:
purchase of three purse seines and diesel engines for demersal fishing; the profitability of which remains uncertain; moreover, purse-seining is an unfamiliar technique on the lake and purse-seines fishermen will had to be trained and receive technical supervision; and
purchase of equipment for marketing fresh fish.
In the present conflict, fishermen are reluctant to sell their catch to COPEVI. The profitability of COPEVI activities therefore depends upon purseseining; the success of which is doubtful.
It seems unlikely that COPEVI will make enough profit to provide services to fishermen. The DAFECN should therefore quickly take measures necessary to solve this problem, and improve the current situation, so detrimental to fishery development on Lake Idi Amin.
The plank canoe is the only type of boat used for fishing. Out of 780 canoes surveyed, about 200 are equipped with outboard engines (6–8 hp). Most have only primitive sails.
Fishing activities are conducted in waters up to 40 metres deep, with the highest concentration in waters of less than 20 meters deep.
Fishing effort is poorly distributed; fishermen tend to operate in the same zones.
Gillnets (both surface and demersal) are the fishing gear most frequently used. Each boat uses an average of 100 nets. The nets are mounted sideways, with cords top and bottom. Pieces of cork are used as floats and rocks as sinkers. Because corks and rocks must be removed before the nets are cleaned and stored, they are reattached to the cords before each use. The positioning of gillnets depends upon the spot chosen by fishermen. In shallow water the nets float on the surface. In offshore areas, in water deeper than 20 metres, nets are often anchored to the bottom. These may remain in position for up to one week1.
Beach seines have been prohibited by the Department of the Environment. We were informed by the EDF project staff, however, that they are still being used in hatcheries. All beach seines have a mesh size of less than 4.5 cm knot to knot and should consequently be considered illegal.
Longlines used on the lake are 500 to 700 meters long, each with approximately 1,000 hooks.
Fishermen buy most of their equipment from fish merchants. The nets and twine come from Korea (Asia). Quality is generally poor and a net lasts for a period of 6 months to 12 months.
Most “tilapia” is sold fresh to merchants from Goma, Lubero and Butembo. These merchants arrive at the lake in the morning with rented vans, carrying ice blocks to keep the tilapia cold during transport. Protopterus and Clarias are often transported live to market.
Salting and drying is the most common processing method. Salting is done by hand and fish are spread on the ground on straw mats or concrete. Fish is then stored in poorly ventilated areas. There is much room for improvement of this technique overall.
COPEVI has 36 brine tanks which are not being used. At Kyavinyonge, however, the COPEVI does process fish (mainly “tilapia”) using brine. The fish are kept in the tanks for 24 hours and then dried for 48 hours.
Fish is smoked over an open fire. Clarias and Protopterus are especially appreciated by people who live near the park and smoking is reduced (to about 2 hours) to obtain “moto moko” fish (smoked only once). The introduction of “Chorkor” ovens would reduce the amount of wood used for smoking.
There is a great demand for processed fish, most of which is sold on the markets near Lake Idi Amin: a relatively prosperous zone. A considerable part of the lake's production of salted fish is marketed at Kisangani and Kinshasa.
There are three institutions involved in these activities: DAFECN, IZCN and COPEVI.
DAFECN has 7 agents working at the lake, whose duties are as follows:
providing extension services to fishermen;
gathering statistics;
In practice, these agents are not providing these extension services and have received no specific training to enable them to do so.
Mr. Vakily1 has described the limitations of the present system for gathering statistics:
“As it is now organized, data collection presents several disadvantages:
catches are recorded by number of fish rather than by weight, although all types of fishery resource management require that information on catch be recorded by weight. While conversion can if correctly chosen be used for “tilapias” and Baqrus species, they are not appropriate for other species which are caught in very different sizes;
statisticians are unable to verify the declarations made by fishermen;
at the end of the fishing trip, a certain quantity of fish is taken by crew members for their personal consumption (ration). This quantity, as well as the fish given to the Fishery Committee, members of the navy, police and other authorities, never appears in the statistics;
catch statistics and these “contributions” in kind are often collected by the same personnel, inciting fishermen to declare a catch lower than it actually was;
at Vitshumbi, the problems which exist between DAFECN and the Fishery Committee have created a situation in which data is no longer exchanged, but compiled in separate and therefore incomplete reports.”
In order to calculate the degree of error in fishery statistics, several catches were weighed at Vitshumbi. Data thus obtained was compared with the estimate of the weight of the catch based on DAFECN figures and a conversion factor for each species. On average, the conversion of number of fish to weight showed that catches had been underestimated by approximately 30%.
It should however be mentioned that agents have none of the equipment necessary to collect statistics. They need to receive training in an appropriate method of statistics (data) collection and also the use of equipment required for such a task.
control of fishery activities.
This job is incompatible with providing extension services. These two tasks should be separate, with IZCN agents responsible for regulation while Department of the Environment agents take charge of statistics and extension services to fishermen.
Although the IZCN's institutional role is to control (regulate) the hatcheries, IZCN agents appear to be indifferent to the fate of fish resources. IZCN should control fishing activity and sanction illegal acts, but instead they seem to be totally unaware of the problems facing the fishery.
According to the contract concluded with the IZCN, COPEVI is responsible for statistics (Art. 8), security and surveillance (Art. 13) and infringment of the regulation. It is, however, noticeably absent from all aspects of management.
The waters of Lake Idi Amin are shared by Zaire and Uganda. Zaire possesses a surface area of 1,630 km2, or 73% of the lake's total area.
Because in both countries fish are caught and processed in the same way, in lake waters lying within national parks, the basic characteristics of the fisheries are the same. Both fisheries must deal with the same problem: the probable over exploitation of its fishery resources. Reducing fishing effort in only one country would have only a limited effect.
Moreover, overexploitation makes reorganization of the fishery necessary and on a shared lake this can only be accomplished through bilateral agreement upon the management measures to be undertaken.
To date, the only fisheries agreement between the two countries is the one signed in 1978. It provides for free exploitation of the lake by the fishermen of both countries.
This first cooperative measure should be followed by others in the interest of both countries. Regional Project RAF/87/099 is the ideal point of reference for coordinated management of these fisheries resources.
