The basic characteristics of Lake Idi Amin are the following:
the waters of the lake are shared by Zaire and Uganda. Zaire possesses 1,630 km2; or 73% of the total area. It is important to note that the Ugandan part of the lake is no deeper than 40 meters, while the deeper and productive waters are found in that part belonging to Zaire.
the lake lies within two national parks: Zaire's Virunga National Park and Uganda's Queen Elizabeth National Park;
overall potential yield for Lake Idi Amin is estimated at 15,000–16,000 tons. per year. In 1989 both a Zairian and Uganda study reached the same conclusion: that the lakes fishery resources are being exploited to maximum capacity with only a slightly increased yield possible, under specific conditions, i.e. if the deep waters belonging to Zaire could be exploited.
The characteristics call for the adoption of specific management measures for Lake Idi Amin in order to achieve national resource exploitation and harmony between the development of the fisheries and the development of the national parks.
Similarity of conditions in the fisheries of the two countries bordering the lake (level of resource exploitation, fishing and processing techniques and especially, inclusion within a national park) should facilitate development of collaboration between Zaire and Uganda and the adoption of joint management measures. A 1978 Convention authorises fishermen from the two countries to fish the entire lake. This initial collaboration should gradually be reinforced by the following steps:
instigation of periodic meetings within the framework of Regional Fisheries Project RAF/87/099, regular meetings can be arranged between national authorities responsible for the development of the fisheries and the national parks in order to discuss problems common to both countries;
creation of a permanent committee composed of the above mentioned authorities;
adoption of a standardized method of data collection and exchange of information making it easier to follow the global evolution of the lake fisheries accurately. This is very important when we consider that fisheries resources are probably over exploited at the present time;
a scientific research program could be carried out by a joint study of the lake as a whole. The conclusions of such a study would serve as the scientific basis for true development and management planning for Lake Idi Amin fisheries. The need for such research was underlined by the two studies previously mentioned and it should be assigned high priority (a project for realizing this research is proposed in Appendix 3 of this report);
management measures and limiting fishing effort: the resource study can be of use in the adoption of balanced fishery management measures. The most important of these would be the coordinated limitation of fishing effort, because it is obvious that a policy to reduce effort, adopted unilaterally, would prove ineffective; and
adoption of joint regulations: the long-term objective must be a joint regulation of all fishing activity on the lake. This is possible if we consider that the two fisheries are similar and that the two countries have a mutual interest in the lake.
In 1979, the COPEVI (Virunga Fishermen's Co-operative) signed a new convention with the IZCN which gave it a monopoly, for an undetermined time, over fishing on lake Idi Amin. The COPEVI mandate can however be revoked by presidential order.
There remains a fundamental ambiguity however, in the name COPEVI. The COPEVI is in fact not a cooperative but a private company obliged under the terms of the convention with IZCN to provide certain services to its fishermen (who are not members but rather, sub-contractors and consequently pay fees rather than dues to COPEVI).
The core of the problem is the services COPEVI is expected to provide to fishermen. The necessary infrastructures are there: equipment and supply storage depot, wood-metal workshop, fuel pump, salting and marketing equipment. Most of these are in good condition. For many years, however, COPEVI has provided none of these services to the fishermen due to its financial crisis.
As a result of COPEVI's paralysis, the situation deteriorated and development of the fisheries came to a halt. There was no standardization of equipment. Fuel and spare parts for outboard motors are in short supply. Illegal mesh sizes are being used and, most seriously, fishermen are being exploited by private merchants, (at Vitshumbi, a litre of gasoline currently sells for 620 Zaire/litre, although the official rate for the region is 305 Zaire/litre). Given this situation, most fishermen are very hostile to COPEVI, and this conflict jeopardizes development of the lake fisheries.
In 1988, some changes were made within COPEVI. This mission's comments about the new management are the following:
the decision to test the profitability of deep-water fishing is admirable, with the intention to begin to exploit new resources; but the ultimate profitability of this activity is doubtful. Moreover, the new COPEVI management apparently does not have the technical experience necessary to undertake semi-industrial fishing, involving the use of sophisticated gear, little known on the lake, and which would require new training for fishermen in its use and maintenance;
the dioceses intend to supervise management a posteriori, but COPEVI management needs continual, day-to-day assistance with management; and
it is bad that all the funds received have been completely spent on fish production and marketing, while services to fishermen have been completely neglected.
COPEVI management explained to the mission that priority had been given to production and marketing because the amount of the funds were small, and that other activities will receive attention once the company shows a profit.
It would therefore seem that it will be several years at best before the company will be able to provide fishermen with the services they so urgently need. Consequently, the mission's opinion is the following:
given the location of these fisheries within a national park, it is necessary that there be a single company able to provide all fishery-related activities;
when the new convention was signed in 1979, a Committee to oversee COPEVI should have been created which included IZCN, representatives of the fishermen and especially, from the Department of the Environment. Such a Committee should have met periodically to evaluate COPEVI management.
COPEVI's monopoly is a “fait accompli”, which must be accepted; and
the Department of the Environment can deal with the present situation by adopting one of the following three solutions:
passively await a new financial crisis at COPEVI. The mission does not recommend this alternative: bankruptcy is still only a distant possibility and the reorganization of fishermen's services is an immediate, critical need.
rescind the convention with COPEVI. The Department of the Environment would oblige COPEVI to meet once more its commitments towards the fishermen and set a deadline for these activities to begin. If COPEVI failed to meet this deadline, the convention would be rescinded by presidential decree; and
provide technical and financial support to COPEVI:
at the technical level: “CEBEMO” should provide the services of a purse seine technician (technologist). In the present situation, liaison should be established between COPEVI and the FAO project at Kinshasa. The project's technologist should advice and supervise COPEVI and, if possible, organize the initial phase to implement purse seine fishing.
at the financial level: the minimum amount deemed necessary for renewing services to fishermen is estimated at US $ 200,000. The Department of the Environment could solicit a backer (perhaps from the Zairian Development Bank) or an international organization (trough a project) to obtain a loan on behalf of COPEVI. In this case, the backer should make direct periodic examination of COPEVI management a condition of financing.
Choosing one of these options is a political decision. The mission believes however, that it would be extremely difficult for COPEVI to solve its financial problems with income from its production and marketing activities alone. Moreover, the hostility which now exists between the company and the fishermen will be difficult to overcome.
Although fishing in the hatcheries has been less intensive since the Department of the Environment destroyed many beach seines, it continues to occur and is a serious threat to fishery resource conservation. The indifference of IZCN agents to this destruction of resources is tragic. Our views, however, are the following:
even if IZCN agents were to monitor and enforce regulations, this illegal fishing would continue;
the fine levied for fishing in hatcheries (25,000 Z maximum) is too low to curb poaching.
The adoption of the following measures is therefore necessary:
make fishing in protected zones impossible. As proposed by Mr. Vakily in the study previously mentioned, large heavy obstacles should be sunk in the hatcheries, making at least beach seining impossible; and
fines should be substantially increased.
DAFECN has 7 agents working at the lake. Their duties are:
to gather statistical data;
to provide extension services to fishermen;
to control fishery activities.
These agents completely lack the logistic means to accomplish these tasks. They should at least be given the equipment they need to collect statistics. The practice of compiling statistics based on the number of fish caught should be abandoned in favour of a system based on catch weight. Agents should receive training in statistics.
COPEVI's paralysis, IZCN's inertia and the DAFECN's agents lack of equipment have created an institutional vacuum in the lake's fisheries. On the other hand, the need to deal with over-exploitation of stocks and fishing in hatcheries and to implement the management measures prescribed by the Department of Fisheries and to reorganize the statistics data collection system requires strong institutions able to devise and execute a viable lake fishery management program.
Apart from the “COPEVI problem”, the mission considers this institutional reinforcement to be the most urgent and important need of the Lake Idi Amin fisheries.
This project could give substantial support to management of the lake fisheries. At the present time, its role may be defined as follows:
provide advice and supervision for COPEVI fishing activities;
if possible, to organize a mission by the project technologist to help initiate deep-water fishing operations;
to introduce the Chorkor oven in order to reduce the quantity of wood needed for smoking and improve the quality of smoked products;
to provide training for agents working in statistics, extension work and processing at Lake Idi Amin.
The mission's recommendations are the following:
to strengthen bilateral cooperation with Uganda by creating a permanent Committee, organizing periodic meetings, exchanging information and carrying out a bio-economic study to determine which common management measures should be adopted;
to monitor no-fishing zones and hatcheries;
to make beach seining impossible by sinking heavy objects in protected zones;
to make surveillance of fishing activities efficient;
to raise the fines for illegal fishing;
to train DAFECN agents in statistics, extension work and processing at the Kinkolé Center;
to provide adequate equipment for DAFECN agents;
to create a Committee to oversee COPEVI to be composed of representations of IZCN, the fishermen and the Department of the Environment;
with the reservations expressed in the conclusion, to advise and supervise the initiation of COPEVI fishing activities;
to try to obtain the financing COPEVI needs in order to provide services to fishermen again; and
to make direct control of the management of these services by the financing institution the condition of financing.
A draft of a project document on “institutional reinforcement” intended to carry out the preceding recommendations is found in Appendix 1.
