Appendices

Appendix I: Country Background
Appendix II: Key Elements of the PPP Development Approach
Appendix III: Institutional Arrangements
Appendix IV: Group Formation, Membership, and Structure
Appendix V: Credit and Savings Component
Appendix VI: Issues Discussed with PPP-Groups
Appendix VII: PPP Groups Visited
Appendix VIII: Individuals Interviewed

Appendix I: Country Background

Ghanaian Fact Sheet

Ghana is located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, bordering Togo, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso. Ideologically, coastal savanna in the south quickly gives way to moist forest and then rain forest, with interior savanna dominating the northern half of the country.

The population of Ghana as of 1988 was estimated to be 14 million, growing at 3.5 percent per year. Over two thirds of the population live in rural areas, less than 40 percent of which have access to safe drinking water. Life expectancy in Ghana is 50 years for men and 54 years for women, and infant mortality under five years of age is almost 15 percent. The Akan, Ashanti, Ewe, Ga, and Mossi-Dagomba are the largest ethnic groups in Ghana, and 42 percent of the population is Christian, 38 percent animist, and 12 percent Muslim.

In 1982, agriculture (including livestock, forestry, and fishing) accounted for 65 percent of employment and over 57 percent of Ghana's gross domestic product (GDP). By 1987, agriculture's percentage of GDP had dropped to just over 50 percent. While industry remains a small part of the economy compared to agriculture, it has grown from less than 7 percent of GDP in 1982 to almost 16 percent in 1987. Cocoa, gold, and timber dominate Ghanaian exports, accounting for 88 percent of total exports in 1987.

Post-Independence Economic and Political History

Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African colony to gain independence, which occurred in 1957. Unfortunately, Ghana's political history has been especially unstable, with nine different civilian or military governments between 1957 and 1982. Over the same period, the Ghanaian economy deteriorated significantly. In the early 1960s, Ghana had close to the highest per capita income in Africa. By 1982, however, it ranked twenty-first out of forty-four African countries.

The 1970s and the early 1980s were a period of accelerated decline in Ghana, both politically and economically. Over this period, Ghana experienced three successful military coups, numerous coup attempts, and less than five years of civilian rule.

Looking at Ghana's macroeconomic indicators, there was little reason to question the proposition that Ghana had become a hopeless case. Per capita income, which had been approximately 640 cedis in 1971, had declined by the end of 1981 to approximately 460 cedis in constant (1975) terms. Every organization in the country, ranging from the government to the private sector to voluntary organizations in the rural areas such as the churches, had essentially ground to a halt because of the lack of resources. It was estimated that two million Ghanaians had simply left the country because of a lack of economic opportunity. Ghana had completed the transition from a prospering middle-income developing country with great hopes at independence to a nation suffering from Fourth World poverty.⁴

⁴ Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991, Berkeley, 1993, p. 27.

Two external events added to the economic and political crisis of the early 1980s. In January 1983, Nigeria expelled close to a million Ghanaians, whose return to Ghana increased the population by 10 percent in a matter of weeks. Further, in 1982 and 1983, Ghana experienced a severe drought as well as bush fires that destroyed up to 50 percent of Ghana's vegetation cover and 35 percent of its crops. Domestic economic and political mismanagement, combined with external shocks, made the early 1980s one of the most desperate periods in Ghana's history as an independent nation.

The beginning of Ghana's economic and (ironically) political recovery can be traced back to Right Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings's second coup on December 31, 1981. While the first years of his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government faced several attempted coups, the PNDC has survived to hold district assembly elections in 1988 and 1989, as well as a national election in 1992 that returned Rawlings to power as a civilian president. On the economic front, although the Ghanaian economy continued to decline during the first two years of PNDC rule, by 1984 the economy had begun to recover.

This improvement was largely caused by the introduction of a four-year economic recovery programme (ERP) in 1983. Based on IMF and World Bank recommendations, the ERP's main objectives included: reducing inflation through conservative fiscal, monetary, and trade policies; increasing the supply of foreign exchange and allocating it to priority sectors; restructuring Ghana's economic institutions; restoring production incentives; reconstructing infrastructure to promote production and transportation of goods; and increasing the supply of essential consumer goods.

A year after its initiation, the ERP began to show results, with GDP growing at an average rate of 4.7 percent between 1984 and 1988. Successive economic recovery and structural adjustment programs have been implemented since the first ERP, and the economy has exhibited continued healthy growth into the early 1990s.

Appendix II: Key Elements of the PPP Development Approach⁵

⁵ FAO, Participation in Practice, pp. 5-7.

· Promotion of women in development: PPP projects actively promote women's membership in PPP groups and participation in PPP group activities.

· Self-formation of small, homogeneous self-help groups: groups of 8 to 15 members are to be formed by the villagers themselves. These groups are to be run democratically, with regular elections of group leaders. Organizing villagers into groups is intended to facilitate their access to credit, extension, and other services.

· Government or NGOs as implementing agencies: government agencies or NGOs have responsibility for implementing PPP projects.

· Field and national level coordinating committees: committees consisting of beneficiaries, project staff and administrators, and representatives of government, NGOs, and FAO are intended to maximize the efficient use of resources and promote better understanding of the PPP development approach.

· National project coordinators trained by FAO: project coordinators are to be country nationals selected by the implementing agency and trained by FAO.

· Group promoters to assist in group development: group promoters are selected and trained to assist in group formation and development and in linking PPP groups to government and NGO services.

· Group income-generating activities: PPP group income-generating activities are intended to build up and diversify the economic base of group members.

· Group credit for income-generating activities: FAO covers the banks risk of loan default with a guaranteed-cum-risk fund. Loans to PPP groups are intended to be used to facilitate the development of group income-generating activities.

· Group savings mobilization: group savings are promoted to serve as additional credit, cover loan defaults, and build up the members capital base.

· Organizational and production training of group members: high priority is given to improving the organizational and production skills of PPP group members. Training is provided by project staff as well as government and NGO officials and covers project planning, recordkeeping, food-storage, animal rearing, and soil conservation.

· Participatory monitoring and on-going evaluation: group members are to participate fully in action research connected to the project, and in monitoring and evaluation of project activities.

· Group self-reliance: PPP groups are urged to increase their self-reliance in preparation of withdrawal of GPs and FAO assistance. Self-reliance is promoted through training, savings mobilization, and consolidation of PPP groups in self-governing inter-group associations intended to serve their wider interests.

· PPP development approach replication: with the completion of PPP pilot projects, the PPP development approach is intended to be replicated on a larger scale.

Appendix III: Institutional Arrangements

History of Institutional Arrangements

Six institutions participated in the implementation of PPP-Ghana. These were FAO, the government of Ghana, the Christian Council of Ghana, the National Catholic Secretariat, the Presbyterian Church of Ghana and the Catholic Diocese of Sunyani. At different times during the life of the project, these institutions played different roles with different responsibilities. Early in the project, these roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined and responsibility was not delegated as close to the grass roots as possible. This created an environment were, in the end, it was FAO that continued to make many project decisions. PPP-Ghana was consistently considered an “FAO project,” never the project of the government of Ghana or the local NGOs.

Initial development of the PPP development approach and project design for PPP-Ghana was conducted by FAO staff and consultants based on the recommendations of WCARRD. Once these had been finalized, discussions began with the government of Ghana to determine if it would be interested in such a project, ending with the signing of the Phase I Plan of Operations in January 1982. This Plan of Operations called for local NGOs to be the institutions responsible for the local implementation of the project.

During a FAO consultant's mission to Ghana in April and May of 1982, the National Catholic Secretariat (NCS) and the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG) were identified as the two NGOs to implement the project. While NGOs were included in the institutional arrangements of the project in order to provide local knowledge and resources, both the NCS and the CCG were located in Accra. Further, they did not have direct local experience, but instead coordinated the work of local NGOs. Finally, they were brought in after many important decisions regarding project design had already been made, limiting their ability to shape PPP-Ghana to make it more appropriate to conditions in Ghana in general and in the AAs in particular.

The Phase I Revised Plan of Operations states, “The coordination of the project shall be under the supervision of a joint Task Force of the Government, the implementing NGOs and FAO.” This Task Force was created in May 1982. The government of Ghana was represented on the Task Force by a “PPP Liaison-Officer” from the Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives. This ministry was renamed a number of times during the life of the project and is currently titled the Ministry of Local Government (MLG). FAO was represented by the National and Regional Institutions Officer from FAO's Regional Office for Africa (FAO/RAFR) in Accra. The NCS and the CCG had their own representatives on the Task Force. Although the Task Force and its successor the Project Review Committee (PRC) were intended as coordinating institutions, they played only a limited role in the implementation of PPP-Ghana.

During the first 18 months of Phase I, the Task Force selected the two action areas where the project would be implemented, revised certain aspects of the original Plan of Operations, selected a national project coordinator (NPC), selected and trained project staff, and developed a system for financing the project during Ghana's difficult economic situation of the early 1980s. While the Task Force was intended to be the coordinating institution, it was the NPC that managed the project activities in the action areas throughout the first half of Phase I, with only limited support or supervision from the Task Force or the other institutions involved.

In an effort to improve project management, responsibility for implementing the project was transferred to two NGOs that had staff in the action areas. These were the Catholic Diocese of Sunyani (CDS) in Wenchi and the Presbyterian Church of Ghana (PCG) in Begoro. Although these NGOs had local staff, in both cases their headquarters (and subsequently most decision making) were located outside of the action areas. The transfer of responsibility to the new local NGOs was a gradual process, ending in the signing of a letter of agreement between FAO and the PCG and the CDS at the beginning of the second phase. This meant that throughout Phase I, before the PCG and CDS began working with the project, there was very limited institutional support and supervision of project staff, and even during subsequent phases institutional support remained limited. While the NGOs increased their involvement during the second and transition phases, they remained located outside of the action areas and some project staff continued to live outside of the AA.

Role of Local NGOs in PPP-Ghana

While the local NGOs played an increasingly important role in the implementation of PPP-Ghana, a number of factors constrained their efforts. One was the fact that for both NGOs, this was the first time they had managed a FAO project and were therefore very concerned with accounting for all project funds (not including loans). This concern led them to keep control of the project at their headquarters instead of in the action areas. Also, FAO maintained considerable control over funding and decision making, limiting the ability of the local NGOs to take full responsibility for the project.

During Phase II and the Transition Phase, the PCG and the CDS managed the daily implementation of the project in their respective action areas. Throughout this period, however, both NGOs continued to feel they were implementing a FAO project, not their own. This was mostly caused by their being brought into the project after it had already begun, but also because many important decisions regarding the project were still being made by FAO in Accra and Rome.

In addition, project funding continued to be channeled through FAO/Rome, leading at times during Phase II and the Transition Phase to month-long delays in funding that brought project activities to a halt and lowered staff moral. This situation was exacerbated by the introduction of a new centralized computer financial management system at FAO/Rome during Phase II. FAO officials report severe problems with the system; so much so that FAO administration officers often did not how much money existed in the PPP-Ghana project account. These problems led to delays in project funding and forced FAO officials to maintain tight financial control of the project. Even during Phase III, when FAO was no longer involved in the project, and the local NGOs had complete responsibility its implementation, PPP-Ghana was still considered separate from the local NGO's other development activities.

Another factor effecting each NGO's implementation of PPP-Ghana was its particular institutional structure. The Catholic Diocese of Sunyani appears to have had a more centralized management structure. This may have limited the ability of project staff to respond to local conditions in Wenchi AA and reduced the participation of local individuals and groups. The Presbyterian Church of Ghana, on the other hand, was more loosely structured which allowed both greater freedom to project staff to adapt the project to local conditions and greater room for local participation.

Role of the Government of Ghana in PPP-Ghana

The government of Ghana's involvement in the project declined early in the project's life. While the government of Ghana had a formal role in project implementation, through the Ministry of Local Government's representative on the Task Force and later the PRC, its involvement in project implementation was restricted by the central role of the two local NGOs. With limited responsibilities within the project's formal institutional arrangement, national, regional, and local government officials became increasingly distanced from the project.

It is important to remember that during the difficult political and economic situation in the early 1980s, the MLG had only limited institutional resources outside of Accra. Once the decision had been made to implement a PPP pilot project in Ghana, NGOs (and especially church based NGOs) were virtually the only institutions still functioning in the AAs. Therefore, it was a necessary decision to implement the project through NGOs in the early 1980s. As the economic and political situation improved throughout the 1980s, the MLG and the Ministry of Agriculture increased their representation in the AAs. Since they did not have an active role in project implementation, however, they did not become more involved in the project at the regional and local levels.

The severe budgetary constraints of the government of Ghana during this period also limited its ability to support the project. Throughout the project, the government resources made available to the project were typically limited to existing government personnel and offices. The government did support the project by facilitating its dealings with various government agencies and officials not involved in project implementation.

The degree of government participation in the project varied from the national to local levels and between the two action areas. At the national level, government involvement in the project was largely limited to its role on first the Task Force and later the PRC. At the regional level, government officials in the MLG and Ministry of Agriculture had even less involvement in the project, and by the summer of 1993, few could be found that knew anything about PPP-Ghana.

The degree on involvement of government officials at the local level depended upon the efforts of project staff to create linkages. Typically, these linkages were stronger in Begoro than in Wenchi. One typical example from the study's field research was the District Agricultural Extension Officer in Wenchi who had been working in the district for four years but had never heard of PPP-Ghana. An example from Begoro AA was the Deputy Agricultural Extension Officer who stated that “They (PPP-Ghana project staff) are helping the farmers, we are helping the farmers, so we work hand in hand.” Due to a high rate of staff turnover within the government line agencies, however, it was difficult for PPP-Ghana to develop long term relationships with district and regional government agencies in either AA.

Role of FAO in PPP-Ghana

FAO's headquarters in Rome (FAO/Rome) was deeply involved in the implementation of PPP-Ghana throughout the first three phases. Although it was intended that the local NGOs and the MLG would play key roles in project implementation, the often confused institutional arrangements and FAO's responsibility to the donors caused FAO to become the institution that had the final decision on most important issues. This caused decision making and funding to be centralized in Rome, instead of decentralized to the two AAs.

FAO/Rome monitored the project through consultant and FAO staff technical backstopping missions. Consultants would typically visit Ghana for three of four weeks, often spending less than a week in each action area. Further, consultant would usually only visit the project once, therefore there was no continuity between successive consultant missions. While many project reports and evaluations were written, it appears that basic problems remained unresolved for extended periods of time.

FAO/Rome's involvement in the project through technical backstopping missions was largest during the project's first phase. With the signing of the letter of agreement between FAO and the two implementing NGOs at the beginning of Phase II, FAO/Rome's involvement began to decline but still remained high throughout the phase. By the beginning of the Transition Phase, constraints on the FAO's Regular Programme budget and FAO staff travel restrictions considerably limited technical backstopping of the project. With the beginning of Phase III, FAO involvement in the project ended.

The involvement of FAO's Regional Office for Africa (FAO/RAFR) in project implementation, on the other hand, was limited. Two associate professional officers (APOs) worked on the project at different times during the first phase. While these APOs dedicated a significant amount of time to PPP-Ghana, they had little authority and therefore were largely ineffective in correcting project problems. The National and Regional Institutions Officer from FAO/RAFR, who was a member of the Task Force and PRC, attempted to assist PPP-Ghana as much as possible but was unable to dedicate significant amounts of time to the project because of his regional responsibilities. Therefore, although the FAO's Regional Office for Africa is located in Ghana, it was unable to provide extensive support to PPP-Ghana.

FAO's involvement in the project declined after the end of the second phase. During the Transition Phase, it was limited to efforts to locate funding for the project's third phase and two consultant missions. With the beginning of Phase III, FAO's involvement in PPP-Ghana ended. Phase III is currently being implemented solely by the PCG and CDS with direct funding from two Dutch donor NGOs.

PPP-Ghana Project Staff

For the first half of Phase I, a national project coordinator (NPC) based in Accra managed project activities in both AAs. A team of four GPs was stationed in Wenchi AA and a team of three in Begoro AA to begin the process of group formation and development. Midway through the first phase, the project switched from the system of a single national project coordinator to project coordinators assigned to each action area. This was in response to the inability of a single NPC to coordinate project activities in both AAs. In March 1986, a new project coordinator was appointed in the Wenchi AA, and the NPC became the project coordinator for the Begoro action area. Two of the seven GPs resigned before the end of Phase I, one in Wenchi AA in early 1985, and one in Begoro AA in early 1986. Therefore, by the end of Phase I, only two GPs remained in Begoro and three in Wenchi.

At the start of Phase II, the entire project staff in Begoro AA was replaced. The Presbyterian Church of Ghana hired a new PC and six new GPs to restart the project's work in Begoro. One GP resigned in the middle of Phase II and was replaced by a farmer representative. Another GP and the farmer representative resigned at the end of Phase II, but the PC and the remaining four GPs continued to work throughout the second and transition phases and into Phase III.

In Wenchi AA, the PC and three GPs from Phase I continued with the project in Phase II, and three new GPs were recruited. In 1989, two GPs resigned and left Ghana and were replaced by farmer representatives. At the end of Phase II, three of the remaining GPs and one of the farmer representatives left the project while the PC, one GP, and one farmer representative continued to work until the end of the Transition Phase. With the beginning of Phase III in January 1993, the remaining farmer representative became a GP and five new GPs and a new PC were hired.

While it was difficult to determine the exact reasons for the high rate of staff turnover, contributing factors include low staff moral caused by late payment of salaries and inconsistent project support for staff activities, new job opportunities in the private sector, opportunities to work abroad and personal reasons. The high rate of project staff turnover obviously had a serious impact on the continuity of project activities. Also, since Phase I project staff were hired by the Task Force and not the implementing NGOs, they were not integrated into the NGO's staff. The ability of the PCG to hire its own project staff at the beginning of the second phase was probably an important factor in the greater success in Begoro AA compared to Wenchi AA.

PPP-Ghana project staff received pre-service and on-going training throughout the life of the project. This included orientation workshops at the beginning of Phases I and II as well as specialized workshops during each phase. Topics of staff training included the PPP development approach, PPP group formation, extension skills, agroforestry, financial and group enterprise management, group savings promotion, and PMOE.

During Phase I, staff training proved insufficient to avoid problems regarding group formation and management of the project's credit and savings component. Later in the project, training appears to have improved, but many new skills acquired by project staff were not put into practice. This was largely because of the domination the project's savings and credit component.

Appendix IV: Group Formation, Membership, and Structure

Process of Group Formation

According to the Phase I Plan of Operation, the project's group promoters were responsible for facilitating the process of group formation. Each GP was assigned a cluster of villages where he or she would promote group formation. With clusters and target villages identified, GPs were to introduce the project and the PPP development approach through discussions with village leaders and meetings with the entire community. Afterwards, GPs were to identify eligible families through “target group identification surveys.”

With this done, GPs were to conduct “intensive household surveys” to help eligible families “assess their economic and social conditions and potentials as a first step in the process of group formation.” Then, community members would “identify common productive activities and interests as the basis for the self-formation of small, homogeneous 'trust' groups of 8 to 15 members.”

While surveys of the action areas were conducted during initial GP training, insufficient information was gathered to help in the identification of project beneficiaries. The more detailed baseline socio-economic surveys of both action areas were not completed until after the Phase I mid-term evaluation. Further, the baseline surveys were conducted by university consultants, not GPs, and typically were not used by project staff in group formation. Early in Phase I, GPs often formed PPP groups by announcing that any group of 8 to 15 individuals that formed a group would receive credit and inputs. Later in Phase II, group promoters began to encourage group formation based on the benefits of group income-generating activities and group savings.

Table A-2. Group Formation and Membership (Mid-term and Terminal Evaluations).

Report Date		Groups	Membership	Male Members	Female Members
Begoro AA
	February 1985	53	612	N/A	N/A
	December 1986	121	1,459	1,101	358
	August 1988	120	1,500	960	540
	January 1990	126	1,588	992	596
Wenchi AA
	February 1985	100	1,400	N/A	N/A
	December 1986	89	1,330	N/A	N/A
	August 1988	123	1,835	1,287	548
	January 1990	123	1,835	1,287	548

History of Group Formation and Membership

A review of semi-annual project reports, shown in Table A-1, provides an initial estimate of the pattern of group formation and membership. A similar review of Phase I and II mid-term and terminal evaluations, shown in Table A-2, reveals a slightly different pattern of PPP group formation and membership.

Unfortunately, inconsistencies between these two sources and with information gathered during the study's field research raise questions about the accuracy of the data provided in the semi-annual reports and mid-term and terminal evaluations. These inaccuracies appear to arise from poorly understood reporting procedures and inconsistent data-collection methods. In addition, these project reports rarely differentiated among active, dormant, and failed groups. Finally, the reports often excluded groups that were formed but never received loans or only existed for short periods. These problems make it difficult to assess the precise number of groups and their membership that existed at any particular time. However, by comparing the data from these various sources, it was possible to determine the history of group formation presented in the project background section of this report.

Table A-1. Group Formation and Membership (Semi-Annual Reports).

Report Date		Groups	Membership	Male Members	Female Members
Begoro AA
	November 1983	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	February 1985	N/A	612	N/N	N/A
	August 1985	76	1,152	N/A	N/A
	February 1986	95	854	N/A	N/A
	August 1986	121	1,459	1,101	358
	February 1987	121	1,459	1,101	358
	August 1987	58	781	499	282
	August 1988	107	1,355	840	495
	August 1989	126	1,518	960	558
	August 1990	126	1,548	970	578
	February 1992	96	1,250	850	400
Wenchi AA
	November 1983	5	N/A	N/A	N/A
	February 1985	N/A	1,747	N/A	N/A
	August 1985	111	1,670	N/A	N/A
	February 1986	30	464	355	79
	August 1986	96	1,440	1,285	155
	February 1987	90	1,345	1,183	172
	August 1987	123	1,835	1,287	548
	August 1988	123	1,835	1,287	548
	August 1989	123	1,835	1,287	548
	August 1990	123	1,835	1,287	548
	February 1992	70	N/A	N/A	N/A

PPP Group Structure

The PPP development approach calls for groups to have between 8 and 15 members, with an average of 10. Almost all groups in both action areas fell within this range. At the end of Phase II, the average group size was 12.6 in Begoro AA and 14.9 in Wenchi AA. While local cultural differences may have played a role, the average membership of nearly 15 in Wenchi seems to be connected to the group formation process where many groups were formed with the maximum 15 members in order to obtain the largest amount of credit and inputs possible.

Membership in PPP groups seems to have been fairly stable during their existence. While a few groups had specific bylaws or membership fees for new members, most groups allowed new members to join if the group felt their past behavior indicated they would work well in the group. While some group members resigned from their groups or moved to other areas, no groups reported removing members.

When asked during field research what members had in common prior to joining their PPP group, most responded that they are all farmers. In other cases, PPP group members replied that they were all members of the same church, all of the same ethnic group, or all members of the same extended family.

For many PPP groups, however, a common occupation appeared to be the only characteristic with which the group could be defined as homogeneous. Groups in both action areas were formed with members from different ethnic groups and members living in different villages. In addition, many PPP groups were not made up of only the “poorest of the poor” or even exclusively of the marginally poor. Although most PPP group members could be classified as poor, others were local businessmen and members of local royal families. The failure to exclude members based on income level may arise from the Ghanaian's dislike for being labeled “poor” and their desire to be inclusive in group membership. The lack of homogeneous membership in many PPP groups likely contributed to their eventual failure.

Most PPP groups in both action areas had an executive committee consisting of a chairman, secretary, and treasurer, with some groups having a porter to organize meetings and group work. Almost always, group leadership was selected by members, most often by voting after nominations and group discussion. Group members stated that the characteristics most often looked for when selecting leaders was honesty, hard work, and dedication to their community. For the most part, group leadership was not changed unless they left the community or committed a serious offense against the group. An example is the Ahomahomasu inter-group association in Begoro AA that removed its chairman for failing to repay his loan.

A sample PPP group constitution written by project staff stated that the chairman was expected to preside over all meetings, be the spokesman for the group and “steer the affairs of the group and meetings in a peaceful and amiable manner.” The secretary was to keep minutes of group meetings and records of group activities. Finally, the treasurer was the “custodian of the group's finances.”

Besides their role in the executive committee, group leaders also served as a receiving mechanism for training provided by the project. Group leaders were then expected to share what they learned with the other members of their group. GPs also relied on group leaders as “contact persons” and often commented that the quality of a group's leadership was commonly the deciding factor in a group's success or failure.

Although PPP group bylaws were not always written at the time of group formation, they were often established in response to problems that arose during the group's existence. The most common bylaws covered attendance at group meetings and group work, with some groups having provisions for fines and eventual removal for repeat offenders. Other common bylaws covered membership or monthly dues, loan repayment, new members and regularity of group meetings. In many cases, however, bylaws were not strictly enforced.

In general, when PPP groups kept records, they were limited to minutes of group meetings. In some cases, groups kept records of group activities and production plans. Most members reported that group records were helpful in reminding them of decisions they had made and monitoring progress towards objectives set by the group. For example, one group in Begoro AA stated that their records “serve as guidance for our activities. We go back to the records to see how our old activities were done, before starting a new activity. If something is placed in the record, it must be put into action.”

While record keeping helped some groups plan their activities and solve their problems, many groups never developed effective means of planning and problem solving. FAO tried to remedy this problem by providing training on record keeping and sponsoring a National Workshop on Participatory Monitoring and On-going Evaluation (PMOE). The workshop took place in June 1986 and was attended by project staff and participants. A manual for PMOE with standard forms to be completed by group members, GPs, and PCs was developed in an effort to regularize record keeping and data collection in the action areas. It is clear, however, that these forms were seldom used by group members, GPs, or PCs. In the end, an effective system of PMOE and group record keeping was never established in the action areas.

Appendix V: Credit and Savings Component

The credit and savings component of PPP-Ghana has been the most documented aspect of the project. Four evaluations exclusively addressed the issue, a letter of agreement was negotiated and signed between FAO and the Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB), and every project semi-annual report and mid-term and final evaluation detailed its current status. The great attention paid to the credit and savings component stems from the problems it caused during project implementation. While the savings and credit component was intended to be a mechanism for making available the necessary resources for group income-generating activities and promote greater group self-reliance, in practice, it became the single largest cause of PPP group failure.

Credit Supply

PPP-Ghana intended its credit supply component to provide loans to PPP group members to allow them to undertake group income-generating activities. The project selected the Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) as the local lending agency to manage loan delivery and recovery. To cover any loses incurred by the GCB from PPP group loan default, the FAO intended to set up a guarantee-cum-risk fund (GCRF). Initially, the GCB was expected to lend funds equivalent to five times the value of the GCRF, with the understanding that this amount would increase once the credit worthiness of PPP groups (in the form of “group liability”) had been established. The GCB was to charge market rates and manage all aspects of loan delivery and recovery.

With the guaranteed-cum-risk fund and involvement of a local lending agency, FAO hoped to avoid past problems experienced with revolving fund loan schemes. In these projects, as soon as the revolving fund was exhausted, credit supply ended. By having credit supplied by the GCB backed by the GCRF, FAO hoped that the project would demonstrate to the GCB the profitability of lending to PPP groups so that credit supply would continue after the project ended.

Unfortunately, there were problems with implementing the GCRF. The letter of agreement regarding the GCRF was not signed with the Ghana Commercial Bank until 1987, and the GCRF was not established until 1989. Because of this, all of the loans made by the GCB during the project were made without the guarantee-cum-risk fund to back the loans. FAO officials speculate that this was possible because the GCB was not managed as a “real” commercial bank, but rather as a government controlled institution more concerned with political than financial considerations. The difference in understanding over the purpose of the loans to PPP groups caused difficulties between FAO and GCB throughout the life of the project.

In addition, the GCB had a different understanding than FAO officials and project staff of how the credit supply component would be implemented. According to district and national GCB officials, the GCB never felt it was lending its own money, rather that it was lending “FAO money.” The GCB also considered loan disbursement and recovery to be the job of the group promoters, and when local GCB officials did not actively pursue loan recovery, the GPs had to take on this responsibility. Project staff stated that for periods of more than a year during the second phase, between 75 and 90 percent of GP's work was consumed by credit supply and repayment activities alone. In the end, the GCB provided some administrative services to the credit component of PPP-Ghana, but all other aspects of loan delivery and recovery were carried out by project staff.

The high degree of involvement of project staff in managing the money of the credit component led in a limited number of cases to financial misappropriation. This is especially (and almost exclusively) the case in Wenchi AA. During field research, many members of PPP groups as well as former project staff gave examples of GP's mishandling project credit. This mishandling included GPs forming “ghost groups” (either groups that did not exist at all or groups made of GPs and their families and friends to channel loans for purposes unrelated to the PPP development approach), adding “ghost names” to existing groups and collecting their loans, and failing to deliver loan repayments made by PPP groups to the GCB. In both AAs, project staff and group members also claimed that GCB officials were involved in these misappropriations.

Indirect evidence of the creation of “ghost groups” is given by the high percentage of PPP groups formed in Wenchi town. The inhabitants of Wenchi town can not be classified as rural, and many people interviewed claimed that these groups were formed by friends or relatives of GPs in order to receive loans (that they never intended to repay). Of the 27 Phase II PPP groups formed in Koase cluster, 14 (52 percent) were formed in Wenchi town. In Badu cluster, of the 26 Phase II groups, 11 (42 percent) were formed in Wenchi town. The other four clusters had at most one group each in Wenchi town. While some of the loans made to “ghost groups” may have been repaid and may have had some pro-development impact, they certainly did not work toward achieving the project's stated goals.

It was not the purpose of this study to collect information on financial misappropriation Additionally, none of the assertions by group members and former project staff can be claimed as proof that particular project staff and GCB officials were involved in financial misappropriation. However, it is certain that the widespread belief by group members that project staff were not honest in their handling of project credit contributed to group failure.

The way PPP-Ghana supplied credit to the PPP groups also caused problems. According to project documents, after a group had been formed, it was to produce a “group production plan indicating their technical and financial needs” with the assistance of GPs, government line agencies, and local financial institutions. This plan needed to be approved by a “technical committee” of the local PIC before the project would make available the necessary inputs, credit, and training.

In practice, for most of the project's life, these steps were not followed. Most groups did not develop group production plans, and the PICs in both AAs were either nonexistent or nonfunctioning. For the most part, any group of people that came together and called themselves a PPP group and requested credit, received it. Only later in Phase II of the project is there any indication of groups being denied credit because they did not meet project requirements, and these were very blatant cases of groups being formed by a few individuals to gain access to credit for non-PPP related purposes.

Very few PPP groups used the loans they received from the project exclusively for group income-generating activities. A high percentage used their loans exclusively for individual activities, and many reported dividing their loan between individual and group activities. Since the most common activity for both individuals and groups was small-scale farming, the majority of loans were intended to be invested in agriculture. A number of factors, however, caused loans to be diverted to other uses.

To be productively invested in the major agricultural season, funds need to be available between February and April in order to hire labor or tractor services for land clearing and for purchasing improved seed and chemical fertilizers. The loans provided by the project, however, were disbursed between March and August. Even though loans were too late to be productively invested in the major season, most groups accepted the loans when they arrived because of their general lack of funds. Further, many farmers stated that the size of the loans was too small to be productively invested, even if they were received on time.

Contributing to the problems of the credit and savings component, loans often arrived during the annual “hungry season,” from May until July, when many small-scale farmers are running low on staple foods and their price in the market is reaching its maximum. Therefore, many loans were consumed instead of invested in order to help these farmers make it through the “hungry season.”

Loans were expected to be repaid at the end of the year, with a full year's interest. Many farmers felt this was an unfair practice since they had received the loan halfway through the year. Further, in November and December prices for maize in the markets are reaching their minimum, so in order to pay back loans on time, farmers would be forced to sell their produce at its lowest prices. All of the factors above, combined with a view by many small-scale farmers that these loans were from “FAO” or the government and therefore were “gifts,” contributed to a low rate of loan repayment.

Once repayment became a problem, project staff employed various strategies to increase the rate of loan repayment. Among them were having arrest warrants issued, involving the police in loan collection and focusing PPP group and IA activities to motivating members to repay their loans. While these tactics increased loan recovery, they damaged the more important aspects of the project, such as group self-reliance and sustainability.

The aspect of the credit component that sealed its fate was the GCB's policy that 70 percent of all loans to PPP groups in the AAs must be recovered before new loans would be provided. Because of this policy, no new loans were issued to PPP groups after 1988. This policy penalized repaying and defaulting groups alike, and it motivated many groups to invest or consume their loan repayments instead of delivering them to the bank.

Loans were provided by the project on four occasions. In Wenchi AA, loans were made available to PPP groups in 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1988. In Begoro AA, because new staff was hired at the beginning of Phase II and new groups had to be formed, no loans were disbursed to PPP groups in 1987. These loans and their rates of repayment as of May 1990 are summarized in Table A-3.

By February 1992, the amount recovered in Begoro AA had increased to 11,196,390 cedis (64 percent repayment). In Wenchi AA, 21,115,334 cedis had been recovered by February 1992 (79 percent repayment). It must be noted that these rates of loan recovery were achieved only after intensive efforts by project staff for years after loan repayment was originally due. Loan repayment rates even a year after loans were due were far lower.

Table A-3. Summary of PPP Loans as of May 1990, (cedis).

AA/Year		Loans Granted	Total Debt	Amount Repaid	Unpaid Balance	Percent Repaid
Begoro AA		14,097,000	17,592,450	10,473,620	7,118,830	60%
	1984	1,137,000	1,279,125	773,480	505,645	60%
	1986	705,000	810,750	364,250	446,500	45%
	1988	12,255,000	15,502,575	9,335,890	6,166,685	60%
Wenchi AA		21,165,540	26,681,345	17,389,505	9,291,840	65%
	1984	1,497,000	1,659,175	1,345,240	313,935	81%
	1986	4,482,500	5,500,000	4,663,856	836,144	85%
	1987	7,388,140	9,657,700	7,437,114	2,220,586	77%
	1988	7,798,000	9,864,470	3,943,295	5,921,175	40%

Early in the project, most groups were formed for the sole purpose of receiving credit. Once this became clear, FAO decided that the project should place more emphasis on group IGAs. In many cases, however, this was implemented at the project level by creating a new requirement for PPP groups to receive its next loan. Similarly, when FAO realized that PPP groups were not saving, they decided a greater emphasis on group saving was necessary. Once again this was implemented as a new requirement for loans.

In both instances, these requirements created an increase in the desired activities, but as soon as project loans ended, these activities came to an end also. This is because group IGAs and savings were often viewed by project participants as requirements for loans, not activities with value of their own. Other factors contributed to PPP group's focus on loans, including government policy, high inflation, and a traditional view of government loans as “free money.” Ultimately, because of these factors, PPP-Ghana proved unable to a great extent to change the project's early focus on credit.

Savings Promotion

While savings were an important part of original project documents, few, if any, PPP groups had formal savings during Phase I. When FAO officials and project staff realized the lack of saving, considerable effort was made to promote saving during the second and transition phases. Savings performance indicators were included in the Phase II Plan of Operation and opening a savings account at the GCB and regular savings was often made a requirement for new loans. Unfortunately, When no new loans were forthcoming after 1988, most groups stopped their formal savings activities. Also, while project staff in Wenchi promoted saving through the local Catholic credit union, BACCSOD, there was no indication from PPP group members or project staff that PPP groups took advantage of this avenue for saving and credit during the first, second, and transition phases. Many PPP groups met by the researcher reported that their GCB savings accounts had sat idle since the late 1980s, indicating that most PPP group were interested in saving only as a means to receive credit.

Some groups, exclusively in Begoro AA, were able to continue formal savings, although on a limited scale. Most of these groups, however, saved informally at the village level, as well as investing in productive activities such as livestock raising. Many farmers noted that the return on money invested in the village was greater than the interest on savings in the bank. Unfortunately, the credit portion of the project far outweighed the project's efforts to promote saving.

Appendix VI: Issues Discussed with PPP-Groups

I. Group Formation

A. Group Location:

1. Name of the group?
2. Name of the village?
3. Name of the village cluster?

1. When was the group formed?
2. Why did the group members decide to form the group?
3. Does the group meet regularly?
4. How often does the group meet?
5. When was the last group meeting?

1. How many members are currently in the group?
2. How many of the members are women?
3. Have members left the group or new members joined? Why?
4. Has the group ever had to remove a member? Why and How?
5. Are there bylaws or requirements for a new member to join the group?
6. What did the group members have in common before joining the group?
7. What are the benefits from being a group member?
8. What are the drawbacks from being a group member?

1. Does the group have bylaws?
2. If so, what are they and what subjects do they cover?
3. Have the bylaws been changed or new ones added? Why and how?
4. Do group members follow the bylaws?
5. If bylaws are not followed, what sanctions or penalties exist?
6. Has a group member ever been penalized or sanctioned?
7. How are important decisions made by the group?
8. How does the group resolve disagreements?
9. What group organizational training has the group received?

1. How do women participate in group discussions?
2. How do women participate in group decision making?
3. How are the problems faced by female members different from male members?
4. How are the goals of female members different from those of the male members?
5. How does the group help to resolve women's issues?

1. Does the group keep records?
2. If so, what do they cover?
3. Who keeps the group records?
4. Are the records understandable to all group members?
5. How do the group members have access to the records?
6. Are the records discussed in meetings?
7. How does the group use its records?
8. Do the records help solve group problems or improve group activities?
9. Does the group have a production plan for its group income-generating activity?

1. What leadership positions or committees exist in the group?
2. What are the responsibilities of the leaders?
3. Which of these positions are held by women?
4. Has the group leadership changed over time? Why?
5. How are group leaders chosen or selected?
6. How frequently are group leaders chosen or selected?
7. What personal qualities do members look for when choosing its leaders?
8. Has a group leader ever been removed? Why and how?
9. What would cause the group to change its current leadership?
10. What special training have the leaders received?

A. Group Income-Generating Activities:

1. Is the group currently engaged in a group activity?
2. If not, when was the last group activity?
3. What is the group's current group activity?
4. What group activities has the group engaged in the past?
5. Where did the group get the idea for this activity?
6. How do women participate in this activity?
7. How much time do group members dedicate to the group activity?

1. What planning did the group do before starting its group activity?
2. What training did group members receive before starting its group activity?

1. How have the group members benefited from their group activity (quantify)?
2. When did group members first receive benefits from their group activity?
3. How have the benefits or losses from the group activity been distributed among group members?
4. Is this distribution different for women than men?
5. Do these benefits depend upon continued PPP/Ghana support?
6. How does the group market its product?
7. What are the costs of the group activity (quantify)?

1. Before joining the group, what individual activities did group members engage in?
2. After joining the group, have group members started new individual activities?
3. Have group members changed their previous individual activities because of group membership?
4. Have these individual activities been improved because of project support?
5. If so, what are the benefits from these improvements (quantify)?
6. Since joining the group, have members reduced or expanded their individual activities?
7. What training have group members received to improve their individual activities?

1. What social/community activities has the group initiated?
2. Where did the group get the idea for these activities?
3. Does the group participate in community initiated projects?

A. Group Credit:

1. Has the group received a loan?
2. How big was the loan and when was it received?
3. Was the loan used for group or individual activities?
4. Was the amount and timing of the loan appropriate? Why or why not?
5. Was the loan fully repaid on time? Why or why not?
6. How has the lack of credit effected the group?

1. Does the group have group savings?
2. Are the group savings held in cash or kind?
3. Are the group savings held in the bank, or in the village?
4. How much savings does the group have?
5. How much and how frequently does the group save?
6. How does the group use its savings?
7. How do individual members save?

A. Enabling Linkages:

1. What NGOs or government agencies work in the village?
2. What services do they provide or what projects are they involved in?
3. Has the group received training or support from these NGOs or government agencies?
4. If so, what kind of assistance and how often?
5. Can the group make contact with these NGOs or government agencies on their own?

1. Does the group know of any other PPP groups?
2. How often does the group have contact with other PPP groups?
3. Is the group a member of an inter-group association?
4. What activities is the inter-group association engaged in?
5. How does the group benefit from being a member of the inter-group association?

1. Does the group have contact with the local authorities?
2. If so, on what issues and with what results?

1. Has the group been approached by non-members for help in forming a group?
2. If so, with what result?
3. What is the group's relationship with the rest of the village?
4. Does the group know of any new groups that were formed without project support?

A. Group Constraints:

1. What are the main factors limiting the success of the group?
2. What plans or actions has the group taken to resolve these limiting factors?
3. What factors help make a group succeed?
4. What factors cause a group to fail?

1. What activities does the group have planned for the future?
2. What would the group like to achieve in the next five years?
3. What goals does the group have?
4. If this were the last visit by the group promoter, would the group continue to function?

Appendix VII: PPP Groups Visited

I. Wenchi Action Area (total of 83 groups visited)

A. Tromeso Cluster:

1. Bepotrim Group No. 1
2. Bepotrim Group No. 2
3. Tromeso II
4. Agyei Yawkrom
5. Tromeso III
6. Tromeso I
7. Atekyem
8. Amangoase
9. Nsuansa
10. Ehiamenkyene
11. Amoakrom Group No. 1
12. Amoakrom Group No. 2
13. Nyame Bekyere I
14. Nyame Bekyere II
15. Nyame Bekyere BBW

1. Anantase Bakers Association
2. Akrobi Vegetable Growers
3. Akrobi Maize Growers
4. Akrobi Woman's Group
5. Wenchi I (Nyame Bekyere)
6. Buasufie
7. Buasu
8. Nkonsia Group No. 1
9. Nkonsia Group No. 2
10. Droboso Group No. 1
11. Droboso Group No. 2
12. Asuano
13. Koase Marketing
14. Koase I
15. Subingya III
16. Mframaso
17. Ayaayo Ebenezer
18. Domfe Memorial
19. Saw Saw
20. Nkyiribi

1. Akete Cassava Growers
2. Mansie A
3. Mansie B
4. Nchiraa I
5. Nchiraa II
6. Nchiraa Maize Farmers
7. Nchiraa Piggery Breeders
8. Nwoase Maize Farmers Association

1. Ayorya I (Biakoye Group)
2. Ayorya II (Asomdwee Group)
3. Branamfie
4. Branam Woman's Group
5. Amponsakrom I
6. Amponsakrom II (Abongo Farms)
7. Awisa II
8. Awisa III
9. Awisa IV
10. Wurumpo I
11. Wurumpo II
12. Christ Agro Society
13. New Longoro Piggery Group
14. New Longoro (Adwuma Den Ye)
15. Subinso No. 1 I
16. Subinso No. 1 II

1. Drobokrom I
2. Kolongo
3. Adamu II
4. Kwame Mensah Group No. 1
5. Kwame Mensah Group No. 2
6. Bepoayase I (Maize Group)
7. Bepoayase II (Pepper Group)
8. Asuafu
9. Badu I (Maize Group)
10. Addokrom
11. Abanfua
12. Tainso I
13. Abekwae

1. Papakyeaye
2. Yawbraso I
3. Yawbraso II
4. Kwaekesim
5. Soronoase
6. Attakrom
7. Kukuramoa
8. Nsawkaw II
9. Nsawkaw D.Y.L.G.
10. Muramuraso
11. Anakya

A. Abooho Cluster:

1. Besea Adwuma Ye Group
2. Armstrong
3. Abodobi Cassava Farmers
4. Abodobi Maize Growers
5. Hope Farmers Association
6. Abooho Gari Processing Group

1. Anidaso Group
2. All Young Shall Grow
3. Adwen Daho
4. Dobi Farmers
5. Kroye Farmers

1. Kobededa No. 2
2. Onyame Bekyere
3. Bepoase Gari Processing Group

1. Biakoye Group
2. Presbyterian Women Fellowship
3. Dwem Prem Gya
4. Biakoye Woman's Group
5. Love All Farmers
6. Nyamebekyere

1. Nkabom Tomato Group

1. Dominase Resettlement Group No. 1
2. Dominase Resettlement Group No. 2
3. Ebeykyie Group
4. Mmoden Group

1. Believers Group
2. Somuyie
3. Suffer To Gain

Appendix VIII: Individuals Interviewed

Accra

1. Mr. Michael Mensah, Senior Planning Officer, Ministry of Local Government.

2. Dr. John Dadson, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ghana-Legon.

3. Dr. Ellen Bortei-Doku, Research Fellow, Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research.

4. Ms. Comfort Ntiamoa-Mensah, Development Officer, Presbyterian Church of Ghana.

5. Rev. Dr. David Kpobi, Secretary, Inter-church and Ecumenical Relations, Presbyterian Church of Ghana.

6. Mr. Antoinne Fayossewo, National and Regional Institutional Officer, FAO Regional Office for Africa.

7. Ms. Victoria Abanbwa, Ministry of Local Government.

8. Mr. J. A. Annorbah-Sarpei, Former National Project Coordinator, PPP-Ghana.

1. Dr. Asante, Regional Director, Ministry of Agriculture.

2. Mr. Geoffrey Paddie Padditey, Economic Planning Officer, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.

1. Mr. George Maison, Deputy Ministry of Agriculture, Brong Ahafo Region.

2. Fr. R. Mensah-Abrampah, Vicar General, Catholic Diocese of Sunyani.

3. Mr. A. Adomako, Agriculture Programmes Coordinator, Catholic Diocese of Sunyani

4. Mr. T. Asare-Barffour, Regional Coordinator, Global 2000

1. Mr. Kissiedu-Ayi, Project Coordinator, PPP-Ghana, Begoro AA.

2. Mr. Adjei-Dampare, Group Promoter, PPP-Ghana, Begoro AA.

3. Mr. Agyakwa, Group Promoter, PPP-Ghana, Begoro AA.

4. Mr. Anno-Oware, Group Promoter, PPP-Ghana, Begoro AA.

5. Mr. Kwaku-Dua, Group Promoter, PPP-Ghana, Begoro AA.

6. Mr. E.A. Yeboah, Branch Manager, GCB, Begoro Branch Office.

7. Rev. Dako-Mamphy, Presbyterian Church in Begoro.

8. Mr. Samuel Amfo, District Secretary, Begoro District Assembly.

9. Mr. Asamoeh Obey Nyarko, Deputy District Extension Officer, Ministry of Agriculture.

10. Mr. Alex A. Boahene, former District Officer, Department of Community Development.

1. Mr. K. Dapaah-Dacosta, Former Project Coordinator, PPP-Ghana, Wenchi AA.

2. Mr. Alex Apier, Project Coordinator, PPRD.

3. Mr. S.S. Mumuni, Group Promoter, PPRD.

4. Mr. Michael Owusu, Group Promoter, PPRD.

5. Ms. Gladys Asare, Group Promoter, PPRD.

6. Mr. George Aful, Group Promoter, PPRD.

7. Ms. Joyce Anso, Group Promoter, PPRD.

8. Mr. Peter Asenso, Group Promoter, PPRD.

9. Mr. Clement Assibey, Project Manager, Subinso Agric Project.

10. Mr. Owusu-Asari, District Agriculture Extension Officer.

11. Mr. R.K. Manu, Acting Branch Manager, GCB, Wenchi Branch Office.

12. Mr. Peter Gyrko, Manager, BACCSOD (Catholic Credit Union).

***

This study, conducted in collaboration with the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, examines the post-project impact of an FAO People's Participation Programme (PPP) project implemented in central Ghana from 1982 to 1992. The project represented FAO's first full-scale attempt to test the new participatory, small-group approach in Africa. The study was conducted in the summer of 1993, about one year after the project's formal termination and about two years after the cessation of FAO-supported field activities.

The main aim of the study was to determine the extent to which self-help groups organized under the FAO project were able to sustain their activities and continue to develop in the absence of FAO support. The study findings are somewhat encouraging, but they also highlight many of the problems faced by FAO and project field staff in modifying and adapting their methods to fit the unique socio-economic situation that existed in Ghana at that time. Many of the difficult lessons learned by FAO in the implementation of the Ghana PPP project were later used in improving application of PPP methodologies in other countries in both Africa and Asia.

ISBN 92-5-103698-5