2.1. Developing national EMPRES
2.2. Review of the GREP activities in Africa
2.3. Review of the GREP activities in Asia
2.4. Managing the transition from vaccination to sustainable and verifiable freedom from rinderpest
EMPRES activities during the year have continued to focus on the co-ordination and strategic planning of GREP. The molecular analysis of the virus strains active in the rinderpest epidemics has given a greater understanding of the evolution of outbreaks and has assisted in the planning of the control activities. EMPRES has assisted in many emergency situations resulting from epidemics of transboundary disease. This assistance has been given through Regular Programmes and Trust Fund Technical Co-operation Projects (TCP) to address issues of emergency preparedness in the affected country and the regional significance of the epidemic.
A clear need has been recognised to extend the principles of EMPRES in dealing with the epidemic diseases to regional and national levels. This will be achieved initially by creating clusters of countries in regions where, because of foci of rinderpest, GREP is most active. The national authorities will be approached at ministerial level to introduce the EMPRES approach. A regional EMPRES presence is required to develop, train and co-ordinate the cluster of national units. Priority should be given to improving communications systems by e-mail, both within and without the country. The training will concentrate on establishing the principles and systems required for effective early warning, early reaction and emergency preparedness capacity. The expert consultation emphasised the urgent need for countries to improve their capability in these areas especially as they cease vaccination. It also endorsed the view that a regional EMPRES presence was essential to facilitate this.
World trade in livestock now demands that countries establish effective early warning systems and emergency contingency plans to protect the continuity of their trade and gain a premium for both them and their trading partners.
Six (6) countries in Africa have made an official declaration to OIE of provisional freedom from disease. Four (4) other countries have either stopped vaccination or have indicated that they will do so and make provisional declarations to the OIE soon. However;
· thirteen (13) countries have fallen at least 6 months behind the Blueprint schedule,· twelve (12) of these countries have not yet made provisional declarations of freedom from disease, and
· Tanzania became infected
It is clear that in some countries where rinderpest is present or suspected, civil war is still a major impediment to vaccination and disease surveillance.
Countries are expected to implement active clinical disease searching and epidemiological surveillance before or at the time of stopping vaccination. However, not all of the countries that have stopped vaccination have implemented such surveillance.
Progress towards internationally recognised freedom from rinderpest has been slower than was anticipated a year ago. This is largely due to the lack of internationally co-ordinated regional programmes for south Asia, west Asia and the Arabian Peninsula and the fact that large areas of Asia remain effectively outside of the GREP. A concerted effort by the EMPRES Unit is essential to increase awareness of the GREP and promote adoption of its principles. Ultimately, progress towards recognised and sustained freedom from rinderpest for the Arabian Peninsula will require eradication of the disease from Africa and Asia and regional co-ordination of national programmes.
In the SAREC region, India and Bhutan remain on schedule, according to the Blueprint, on the OIE Pathway. Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh did not make declarations of provisional freedom at the end of 1996, and are now behind schedule. Pakistan remains endemically infected with rinderpest, and so is Afghanistan. Progress is expected to accelerate in the next year with full implementation of EC-funded country and regional projects under the SAREC umbrella.
The situation in the Near and Middle East has improved marginally with all countries free of clinical disease except for some countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Rinderpest infection is persisting in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. However, of the twelve (12) countries expected to make declarations of provisional freedom from disease none have yet done so, and vulnerability to reintroduction of infection is increasing.
The former Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia and China appear to be free from rinderpest but have not made the scheduled declarations of provisional freedom. Effectively they remain outside of the GREP.
The main points in the papers 'Managing the transition from vaccination to sustainable and verifiable freedom from rinderpest' and 'Guidelines on emergency preparedness and contingency planning', to be published as separate documents, were accepted. The following were identified as key considerations in making the decision to cease vaccination;
· the expectation that rinderpest virus is no longer present in the population,· the existence of a disease reporting system that would quickly detect rinderpest if it was introduced into the population,
· effective border controls which would prevent reintroduction of rinderpest,
· preparedness to implement rinderpest surveillance procedures in accordance with the published OIE standards and FAO/IAEA guidelines,
· preparedness to invoke emergency actions to deal with any rinderpest outbreaks.
A proposed reduction in the period of surveillance required to qualify for freedom from infection-either by commencing sero-surveillance one year following the cessation of vaccination, or by sampling larger numbers of herds-was discussed. However, the Expert Consultation concluded that any reduction in the minimum time to qualify for a declaration of freedom from infection would increase the risk of not detecting residual foci of disease and increase overall costs. This suggestion was therefore rejected.
