Many developing countries have based their policy for small-scale fisheries development on the establishment of fishermen's cooperative societies. Some such programmes have been successful but many have failed.
It is not the purpose of this guide to consider in detail the merits of fisheries cooperatives or the reasons for failure. However, any planning team concerned with integrated small-scale fisheries development at the village or community level may encounter situations where government policy is firmly based on and committed to the establishment of cooperatives. It may even find that such cooperative societies already exist in the locations selected for the development of CFCs. The consideration arises as to how they can be linked in with the CFC/FDU complex.
The first question that might be asked is, “Can a CFC/FDU complex be built around a cooperative society? ” and the answer is “Yes”. A second question could be, “Can a cooperative society exist alongside the CFC/FDU complex?” and the answer is again “Yes”. As indicated earlier a well established CFC may consist of a wide variety of enterprises, services and facilities, some
owned and operated by individuals, others by fishermen's organizations such as cooperatives, some by the private sector and perhaps some by the government.
It follows that while it might own and/or operate a whole CFC, a cooperative society could control just one or a few components in the CFC, without dictating the policies and operations of all the others. For example, where a cooperative society owns and operates the ice plant and the fish store, it may have no control over the local health clinic operated by the government, the boatyard owned by a private businessman, and the netloft maintained by the community council (see Figure 3).
Failures in the operation of fisheries cooperative societies in many developing countries have often been the result of planning from above without regard to local wishes, local interests and traditional practices. Often this stems from the misconception that, since fishermen's cooperative societies worked well in one particular place, they will work equally well everywhere else.
The present Chapter introduces an approach to fishermen's cooperatives which may help planners and initiators in the establishment and operation of such societies and prevent some of the maladies and failures.
A cooperative is any group of people who have voluntarily agreed to cooperate, i.e., to put their resources together and to work together towards the achievement of a common economic and/or social goal in a joint, financially viable, enterprise.
A cooperative must be run in a democratic way by its members although its day-to-day management can be vested in the hands of skilled non-member managers, supervised by a democratically elected body of members. In a cooperative each member works, has one share and one vote.
A fishermen's cooperative can aim at very limited goals, such as reduction in production costs, or increase of their returns. Others may set their sights at more comprehensive objectives, like the improvement of the standard and quality of life in their communities, for which purpose they may decide to assume multiple functions. A comprehensive list of possible functions at a fishermen's cooperative is given in Figure 17.
A group of fishermen can organize for the single purpose of jointly buying fuel for their engines. In due time their cooperation may develop and cover joint purchase of fishing gear, fish marketing and other functions, however, any attempt to force them or to impose on a fishermen's cooperative a function which is not felt by its members as needed and benefitting them will be counter-productive.
Figure 17
POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF A FISHERMEN'S COOPERATIVE
The goals and functions of a fishermen's cooperative should not be prescribed by anybody except by the members themselves.
The gist of this approach consists in enabling a cooperative to assume almost any form, size and degree of cooperation selected by its members. Even the very name cooperative can be substituted by another (e.g., society, associations, etc.) where it may be associated with a negative experience in the past.
The selection of the goals and functions should also be approached open mindedly and flexibly in each separate case. There are seven main domains in which fishermen can cooperate: (1) in the field of production (capture); (2) in the field of fish processing and storing; (3) in the field of marketing; (4) in the field of services and supply; (5) in the field of consumption and social services; (6) in the field of management of fishing grounds and quotas; and (7) in the field of credit and other financial schemes (Figure 17).
A fishing cooperative that deals with only the first domain would be a group of fishermen who jointly own a boat and jointly fish but then divide their catch according to a predetermined method and each takes care of the marketing and/or processing of his own share of the catch. The expenses involved with the fishing boat and all fishing gear (which also could be privately owned by the members and become a factor in the catch sharing) can be financed from a share of the catch apportioned to the operation of the boat.
A cooperative that deals only with fish processing and marketing might own a fish processing plant or smoking kilns, a fish store, a transport vehicle and rent a fish vending stall in the market of a neighbouring town. Such a cooperative may purchase the catches of its members at a certain predetermined price, if necessary process the catch, market it at the best possible price and divide the profits, after deduction of expenses, among its members in proportion to the value of the catch they have delivered to the cooperative.
A fishermen's cooperative that deals with supplies may only deal with one particular item, e.g. fuel, or may take care of the whole range of fishing gear and equipment, become a wholesale buyer and hence be able to obtain the equipment at a lower price and sell it at cost (plus expenses) to its members.
A fishermen's cooperative that deals with only aspects of consumption and social services may be the result of fishermen joining forces to build themselves a tea house or a little supermarket where they and their families can buy basic necessities and some other consumer products at cost, plus expenses.
Where a community or a group of communities have an exclusive access to a fish resource, it can be a fishermen's cooperative that is vested with the responsibility of allocating fishing grounds or
fish quotas to fishermen and thus protect the resource from overfishing and prevent hostile competition.
A fishermen's cooperative may be established to serve as a channel through which credit for working and investment capital can reach individual fishermen. Such a cooperative may be essential where the individual fishermen-members are unable to provide the bank (or another financing institution) with the required collaterals and guaranties. Other activities in the same field may consist of establishing and operating various funds (e.g., mutual insurance for fishing boats, health and life insurance, pension fund, etc.), and savings schemes (see also the Chapter on credit schemes and fishermen funds).
Depending on the specific local circumstances a cooperative can be involved in any one of the above domains or combine some, most or even all of them. It may, for example, operate a whole community fishery centre, i.e., all its components, or only one or some of them. Some examples are given in the table (Figure 18).
The size of a cooperative should not be prescribed by law, though one would expect it to have at least four to six members. There are successful fishermen's cooperatives in the world with memberships ranging from 6 to many thousands. The smaller ones, generally, would be involved in production while the bigger ones in marketing and supply. The actual size of a cooperative should only be dictated by its operational, commercial, and social and cultural feasibility. The last is particularly important because a cooperative would never function properly if the membership and the management are not socially compatible or if the functions of the cooperative are in an irreconcilable conflict with local customs and traditions. If, for example, the fishing village is composed of or includes two or three traditionally hostile or competing clans or family groups, then it may be better if they organize each in a separate cooperative, except where hopes are justified that the framework of one fishermen's cooperative will bring them peacefully together.
In some countries there are umbrella cooperative organizations (or cooperative unions), sometimes called cooperatives, although their membership is not made up of individual fishermen but of smaller cooperatives. The reason for cooperatives joining forces together in such umbrella organizations can be both for commercial convenience (to become bigger and hence more powerful buyers or sellers) or for political reasons (to create strong lobbies and pressure groups and more efficiently represent fishermen's views and interests). In a larger country a whole cooperative hierarchy may develop, i.e. primary cooperatives at village level, primary federations at provincial level and central federations at national level. Umbrella organizations may facilitate lobbying for and promotion of government and bank financing to the cooperatives and their membership. Additionally, the umbrella organizations are useful in persuading the government and various financial institutions to invest in infrastructure facilities (ports, markets, processing plants, boatyards, fish stores, etc.) and in their subsequent operation.
Figura 18 - POSSIBLE OWNERSHIP PATTERNS IN COMMUNITY FISHERY CENTRES
| Key Elements | Alternates | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Private enterprise | Single, privately-owned modules | Sets of modules privately-owned | All CFC services company-woned Trading station | |
| Cooperative | Sets of cooperative-owned modules | All CFC services one cooperative | CFC run by a large cooperative society outside the community | |
| Government | CFC as independent state-owned enterprise | CFC as branch of state company | CFC temporarily administered by government service | |
| Community enterprise | Single modules owned by the community | Sets of modules owned by the community | All CFC services community-owned | |
There have been cases of governments establishing and using umbrella organizations of fishermen (and other) cooperatives with the aim of pursuing the government policies and keeping the individual cooperatives under bureaucratic control. Such practice, more often than not, has proved counter-productive.
There are many reasons and their analysis deserves a separate treatment, but the most obvious and persistant appear to be:
wrong identification and planning and hence no apparent benefits to and lack of interest on the side of the membership;
unqualified and uninspired business management and leadership;
corruption and larceny.
Firstly, we should admit that some situations and some people do not lend themselves at the present time to cooperative organization and that attempts to set up cooperatives where this is the case are doomed.
Secondly, the planning and setting up of a cooperative must always be done through a participatory process. This means that the prospective membership, as well as other people and bodies who may be associated with the successful establishment, financing and operation of the cooperative (e.g. national and local governments, banks, community leaders, tribal elders, etc.), are involved in the identification of the needs, in prescribing the cooperative's functions and line of development, rather than being pushed into accepting activities and frameworks in which they do not believe, or which do not stem from needs felt by the prospective members.
Thirdly, the cooperative must be planned to offer its members clear benefits. Without such social and economic incentive, the cooperative will not work. Cooperatives designed to serve “the nation”, “the revolution”, “the party”, or “the government” but which do not directly benefit their members will not work either.
Fourthly, a cooperative must be operated efficiently and reliably. Where its membership cannot immediately produce skilled and educated managers, governments should supply management personnel. Better off cooperatives may hire qualified technicians, business managers and bookkeepers, as needed. Such management, whether hired or government provided, should remain under the supervision of a board of directors (or whatever name such a body would carry) elected from among the membership by the members' general assembly, who should have the right of selecting, approving and dismissing unsuitable managers.
Fifthly, a strong will of the membership and a strong social pressure combined with a reliable auditing system will play a most important role in preventing theft and corruption.
Laws, by-laws, and regulations applying to fishermen's cooperatives have a three-fold purpose: firstly, to assure the honest and fair management of the cooperative; secondly, to create a legal situation in which government policies can be better pursued, and thirdly, to determine the social character of the cooperative.
There is no assurance. The world is abundant of dishonest individuals in spite of the multitude of laws and punitive systems. However, the law can provide at least an obligatory framework which will make embezzlement and other illicit actions as difficult as possible. It can prescribe that every cooperative should have an internal auditing committee composed of elected members and, in addition, be obliged to submit all its accounts to an external auditor.
It may prescribe that major financial deals and money transfers have to be subscribed by more than one of the directors of the cooperative; that the management has to report to its membership so and so many times a year; what activities have to be approved by the whole of the membership; how exactly the various committees and management should be elected; how a director or a manager or any other functionary can be replaced on the members' initiative, etc. In addition, a cooperative law can prescribe special punishments for those managers, directors, and secretaries of cooperatives who have been found guilty of swindling and corruption. Laws should also regulate the manner in which cooperatives are established, registered and dissolved.
If a regulation says that, for example, a cooperative must sell its catch to a government marketing company at a fixed price, the effect would probably be counter-productive. Members will not join voluntarily the cooperative and a parallel black market is bound to develop. But if the government provides some sort of incentive to only those cooperatives which follow the government's marketing policy then the members will have to weigh these incentives against the inconvenience of, as in the above example, a rigid marketing system and reach their own decision. If the incentives are attractive enough (say access to better vessels, improved fishing gear or social services, etc.) the decision may be along the lines desired by the government.
The very idea of cooperatives stems from the concept of cooperation among workers. This implies that every member of a cooperative should be a working member, and a member in a fishermen's cooperative should be an active fisherman. If this is the policy objective, but not spelt out in the law, a former fisherman who became a fish merchant 20 years ago may easily become a member, a secretary and, with time, even an “owner” of a cooperative. Sometimes, people who have never been fishermen establish “fishermen's cooperatives” to enjoy government support and grants which are thus deflected from the rightful target groups. The law, therefore, must be quite clear in this respect.
On the other hand, the policy objective may be to create a cooperative with an integrated membership bringing together, for example, fishermen and their fishmongering wives and other womenfolk. In any case, the desired character of the membership should be defined accordingly in the law.
Certainly not. The legislation should only provide the legal framework within which each cooperative will be free to determine its own functions and mode of operation. Thus, e.g., the law may require that each cooperative, upon its registration, should present a “charter” or “constitution” approved by its General Assembly specifying its functions and way of their execution. When the cooperative decides on a change or an expansion of its functions, an appropriate amendment to the “constitution” must be approved by the members (the law may require, e.g., that such change needs the approval of an absolute majority, two-thirds, 75 percent, etc.) and added to its registered “charter” or “constitution”. Thus the law should require that each cooperative must have a “constitution” and prescribes how this constitution is registered (legalized), but not what is in the constitution.
