Ivar E. Strand, Jr. and Virgil J. Norton
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742 USA
ABSTRACT
Landings taxes are compared with other forms of fisheries management. The major advantages of the landings tax are in minimizing production costs, directing effort effectively and maintaining “freedom” to compete. The major disadvantage is in management costs. Payments for the natural productivity of the resource accrue to the government instead of either the fishermen or sellers of fishing equipment. Policy makers are urged at least to consider landings taxes as a management alternative.
RÉSUMÉ
Les taxes au débarquement sont comparées à d'autres formes de gestion des pêches. Les principaux avantages des taxes au débarquement sont une réduction au minimum des coûts de production, une orientation efficace de l'effort et la maintenance de la libre compétition. Le principal désavantage réside dans les coûts de gestion. Des payements sur la productivité naturelle des ressources reviennent au gouvernement au lieu que ce soit aux pêcheurs ou aux vendeurs d'équipement de pêche. Les plannificateurs sont encouragés à au moins considérer les taxes au débarquement comme une méthode alternative de gestion.
INTRODUCTION
There has been considerable thought and literature devoted to the analysis of the best method or technique to manage marine fisheries (e.g. Christy 1973; Davis et al. 1975; McConnell and Norton 1979). The authors agree that landings rights (i.e., stock certificates) and landings taxes1 are economically rational as compared with traditional approaches to fishery management. Comparisons of these two rational approaches have only recently surfaced (e.g., Scott 1979; Crutchfield 1979; Stokes 1979).
Critical evaluation of the two is extremely important because the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA) forbids the use of taxes to manage marine fisheries [16 U.S.C. 1854 (d)]. Fees or taxes can be levied only to recuperate administrative costs. They cannot be levied explicitly to manage the stock. This is different from many industries that must pay to extract federally regulated resources. The oil industry, for example, must pay fees for rights to simply explore for oil, much less exploit it. Western cattlemen pay grazing fees for access to federal land and farmers pay for irrigation water.
The purpose of this paper is to further the analysis of landings taxes and to offer guidance regarding possible amendments to the FCMA to allow for the use of taxes for management purposes. The procedure followed is to review the background in which this issue arises and then compare landings taxes with two types of management techniques: closed access based on time, area and operating units (e.g., vessels)2; and closed access based on landings rights. The conclusions, based on identification of certain desirable aspects of landings taxes, is that taxes should not be prohibited under the FCMA.
BACKGROUND
Rebuilding3 fish stocks requires some form of regulation to remove or redirect effort in the short-run to provide greater landings in the future. Seasonal closures, quotas, mesh size restrictions, landings rights, and landings taxes are among the alternative techniques which can be used in fishery management to rebuild stocks.
Regardless of the specific technique, imposition of regulations will create upward pressure on consumer prices in the short-run. Initially, landings must be reduced to increase stocks and this event alone will increase consumer prices in the short-run. After the initial decrease in landings, some modest increase in landings should be expected as stocks improve. Therefore, prices should fall in the longer run as landings improve. Since the major thrust of FCMA is to rebuild or maintain stocks and landings control is the only way to achieve that overriding purpose, consumers will have to pay the same prices regardless of the technique used to control landings.
Thus, the primary consideration should be on the effect of the various techniques on the producers. Regulations also impose costs on producers in that any regulation is a form of tax and will result in higher costs per weight landed. Increasing mesh size, for example, will reduce the amount of fish caught per tow and, since towing costs remain approximately the same, the cost per kilogram harvested must rise. Quotas will force the fishermen to operate with excess capacity and, thus, require average costs to be higher than minimum. Limited entry such as the Canadian Salmon Fleet Control Program (Pearse and Wilen 1979) or landings rights raise costs as new entrants must buy existing permits and existing permit holders incur the opportunity costs of not selling their permits. It should be recognized that all of the above methods indirectly raise output costs by increasing input costs or reducing output. In contrast, landings taxes raise costs directly and allow the fishermen to identify accurately the cost of fish landed.
Since all of the methods impose increased producer costs and can achieve the overall goal of rebuilding stocks, appropriate criteria must be established to evaluate alternative techniques. Possible criteria4 are: 1) minimizing producer costs, 2) distributing benefits, 3) redirecting fishing effort, 4) maintaining a competitive fishery, and 5) minimizing management costs. Although there are other criteria, these appear to cover the major issues faced by fishery managers.
The remainder of the paper examines the relationship of alternative techniques with respect to the criteria. Although much of the discussion can be found in previous literature, an extension is made by explicitly considering imperfect capital markets and by using a wide range of evaluation criteria.
MINIMIZATION OF PRODUCTION COSTS
Minimization of production costs is important from two perspectives: society and the producer. It is desirable from a social standpoint because resources not employed in fisheries can be used to produce other products. That is, the lower fishing costs, the more production inputs available for production of other goods. From the producer's standpoint, lower costs will mean higher profits. Entreprenuers who minimize costs work for their own gain but as it turns out, also in the best interests of society.
Closed Access Based on Time, Area or Gear
Management of time, area or gear are combined into one group because all three types of management have a common economic element. Seasonal closures, area restrictions and vessel limitations5 are all directed to restraining an input that fishermen use. However, time, space or vessels are only a portion of the fishermen's inputs. Restraint of one input prohibits the fishermen from choosing the best combination of inputs and leads them to alter other input use to offset restrictions imposed by management. Increasing restrictions on these or other inputs is the common reaction of management to the fishermen's behavior. Complaints by fishermen arise because they feel excessively regulated. More importantly, production costs are not minimized because fishermen are prohibited from combining inputs in the best way (i.e., to minimize cost).
For example, the major problem with seasonal and/or geographic restrictions is that the vessel owners incur the same fixed costs of operation (e.g., insurance) even though they land less fish. Thus, cost per fish will rise even in the shortrun. Eventually, vessel owners will redesign their vessels and gear for greater speed and capacity so that a larger catch can be taken during the open season, negating the resource rebuilding effort. Therefore, seasonal and geographic restrictions have to be extended to protect the resource. This has been evidenced in those fisheries where such restrictions have applied. The result is the creation of excess capacity not only in the harvesting sector but also in the processing sector which has to receive a glut of landings followed by a season of no landings.
Restricting the number of vessels allowed to harvest a species (limited entry) has been used to limit landings. This approach can bring rapid results in the short-run although, without additional restrictions, it can result in offsetting adjustments by participating vessel owners. As the stock of fish is increased, cost/fish should fall and profits per vessel tend to rise. This creates an incentive for those in the fishery to add equipment and labor to harvest still more fish. Such actions can substantially reduce the speed with which stocks are rebuilt, and may eliminate many of the benefits of entry restriction (see Pearse and Wilen 1979). This problem is not diminished by allowing the sale of vessel permits.
A further complication can result if the demand for the resource rises, generating additional incentives to add inputs in an attempt to increase landings. This will cause the total catch to rise and the efforts of the rebuilding program to be diminished. It may force managers to place further restrictions on the fishermen or to enter into buyback programs.
Closed Access Based on Landing Rights
Discussion of access limits based on landing rights will, for the purposes of this paper, be confined to a stock certificate program where individuals own transferable rights to a fixed percentage of an allowable overall quota. Overall quotas without ownership rights are equivalent to seasonal closure (because the fishery is closed once the quota is reached) and thus have the same problems as access closure based on time.
A stock certificate program can minimize harvest costs (Scott 1979). The owner of the quota will know the level of production that will be allowed during the year. Given the output level, factors of production can be organized so that costs are minimum. There is no incentive to add capacity or other factors to enter into a race to obtain the resource because no additional harvest can be obtained. New and more efficient equipment can enter the fishery if the owner can produce at lower costs. Individuals capable of combining inputs in the most efficient manner and at the lowest cost will tend to become owners of the certificates. Therefore, a stock certificate program will provide incentives for minimum harvest cost in most instances. As the program is established, the value of the certificate will reach the opportunity value of allowable catch. This will act to limit effort and catch in a manner similar to a tax.
It must be recognized that in a multiple species fishery, the stock certificate approach, if allocations are based on species, can become cumbersome and complex for both the fishermen and the resource managers. Certain of the above advantages may be diminished as a result.
Closed Access Based on Taxes
A landing rights tax will also act to minimize production costs. The tax in effect lowers the price of the fish to the fishermen but allows the vessel owners to operate freely to minimize costs (Gould 1972). New and more efficient capital will enter if these owners can produce at lower costs per kilogram. This will cause an exit of the less efficient capital because owners will be unable to realize profits. Therefore, new and efficient technology will be introduced or the operator will exit from the industry.
As Scott pointed out, the tax rate that will cause landing to be at the level to rebuild stocks is not easy to determine. Most likely, some trial and error period will be needed to establish the desirable tax level.
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS
Stocks of fish have productivity, both in terms of providing greater catch per unit effort but also in terms of propogating future fish stocks. If someone is not paid for these productivities, they will be used too heavily and stocks will fall. The payments are referred to as resource rents and are associated with how landings deplete the resource stock. They can be perceived as benefits derived from resource use. They are similar to land rent. Attention must be given to how various management techniques distribute these benefits within the society.
Closed Access Based on Time, Area or Gear
Seasonal, spatial, and vessel limitations may increase stock size but the benefits are not likely to be captured directly by fishery participants. The rent will be spent to replace existing vessels with ones that have greater capacity or on inputs such as gasoline. The benefits are wasted on new capital or inputs that are not really essential for the level of landings that exists. Thus, the rent is spent on excess capacity or excess oil purchases, most of which are owned by individuals outside of the fishery. Since fuel is such a large portion of vessels' operating costs, it is likely that many of the benefits will accrue to the oil companies or OPEC countries.
Closed Access Based on Landing Rights
Benefits can be distributed in a number of ways using a landing rights system. If rights are auctioned by the government, then the benefits will go to the government in the form of payments for the rights to fish. On the other hand, the normal case of allocating rights based on a grandfather system causes the initial grantee of the rights to obtain the resource rents. They receive the benefits through excess profits (above normal returns) received by fishing or through payments for the sale of the right if not fishing. The government conceivably could capture some of the rent in the form of a transfer tax, paid if the initial grantee sells the landing rights. This tax could be avoided by fishermen by not selling the rights and collecting the excess profits through fishing operations.
Closed Access Based on Taxes
Taxes represent the resource rent and when collected will accrue in general tax funds. This form of benefit distribution awards payments to the general public. The distribution could be defended on the basis of common ownership of national resources. Just as oil companies are required to pay for extraction of oil and gas from federal lands, fishermen could be charged for the extraction of fish.
The initial distribution of the benefits does not imply that the benefits stay within the general public. It is often a practice to earmark tax funds so that they can be redistributed to the industries that have paid them. This could be done so as to finance programs such as enhancement, management or market development.
EFFECTIVE REDIRECTION OF FISHING EFFORT
One program that requires special attention is the creation of incentives or “seed money” for fishermen so that they will harvest species either underutilized or currently utilized by foreign nations. The underlying belief is that numerous markets exist for U.S. fishery resources but that they must be proven or developed before producers will accept the risk of full-scale production. The incentives are, therefore, payments to individuals to accept the extra costs in the development stage. At the same time, these fisheries offer a productive channel for the excess capital in traditional fisheries. Moving excess capital to underutilized or foreign landed species would serve to mitigate any dislocation effects of more stringent management of traditional fisheries.
Closed Access Based on Time, Area or Gear
Redirecting effort with seasonal and spatial closures offers only negative incentives to fish for underutilized species. By restricting areas and periods of time fished, management eliminates some of the opportunities for vessels. This can, in certain instances, cause vessels to move to alternative underutilized species. However, if the economic incentives (e.g., profit) are not present to harvest the underutilized species, the vessels will remain idle during the closures and possible productivity will be lost.
“Seed money” could be taken from general public funds, to fund development of a market that would offer the proper incentives to the fishermen. This requires Congress allocating general monies to development, a situation that may or may not occur.
The same problem arises with redirecting effort by vessel restriction that arose with seasonal and spatial closures: the lack of positive incentives to redirect effort. Opportunities are restricted and create negative incentives, but there is no guarantee the market for underutilized species exists.
Closed Access Based on Landing Rights
The effect of establishing landing rights or redirecting effort is more complex. For those excluded from fishing, there are only negative incentives to harvest underutilized species. This creates the same problem as with seasonal or spatial closures. However, those individuals that obtain the landing rights will generally obtain6 additional profits as the rights will become valuable. They may use these profits to develop the markets for underutilized species, for which there is presently no market. This is an uncertain and perhaps unlikely event.
If the government prefers to auction rights to individuals, then the government will obtain revenues which they can directly apply to market or technological development for underutilized or foreign-caught species.
Closed Access Based on Taxes
Taxes can also directly provide funds for creating market incentives for underutilized species. Taxes paid for the right to land fish can be applied to “support” prices for other species. By varying support prices and tax rates, management can redirect effort among species effectively, providing the information on price response is available. If not, a period of trial and error would be required. In this way, taxes are earmarked for market development purposes and would be more palatable to Congress as it would appear that money was internally transferred at no-cost to the general public.
MAINTAINING COMPETITIVE MARKETS
In a world where all markets are not operating perfectly, more complex situations arise. Fishermen often argue that large corporations or processors will monopolize the industry if landings rights are used as the technique to rebuild the stocks. Maintaining an industry structure that allows freedom of entry and exit appears to be very important to independent fishermen. At the same time, lowering barriers to entry may be socially desirable so that production is not artificially restricted.
It is difficult to determine generally what effect access closure based on time, area or gear will have on market structure. The effect would be specific to the case at hand, and generally deduction is not fruitful.
There may be substantial truth to these independent fishermen's claims provided that imperfect capital markets exist and there are large payments necessary to purchase landings rights.7 In this case, a large corporation or processor may be able to use previous earnings (the opportunity cost of which might be the lending rate, say 8%) to pay for the rights to fish. A small fisherman, on the other hand, might have to enter capital markets, most likely the bank, to get the money to bid for the rights. The bank will charge more than 8%, say 15%, to loan the money to the fisherman. Clearly, if both are equally efficient at fishing, the corporation will be able to outbid the fisherman for the rights. It can also be shown that the fisherman could be more efficient and still be outbid.
The taxing system avoids this problem by allowing payments to fish to be paid after the fish is landed and on a long-term basis. In this manner, the imperfect capital market is avoided (except for capital investment) and the most efficient producer will be the one that can pay the taxes and still operate with a normal return. Indications are that the most efficient producers are usually independent owner-operators8 and that there are social gains from having them in the fisheries. Taxes, therefore, are preferable to landings rights when imperfect capital markets exist (usually) and when large initial payments are necessary to purchase landing rights.
MINIMIZATION OF MANAGEMENT COSTS
One of the social costs incurred because of regulation is the cost of management, measured in administration, data collection, research, enforcement and violation costs. The first two relate to the costs of operating a management agency and providing information for decisions. The third is related to costs of enforcement activities, such as for Coast Guard vessels, whereas the last represents costs to individuals from violators of the law.
Table 1. Comparison of management techniques in achieving management goals in regulating commercial fishery.
| Technique used to close access | Management goal | ||||
| Minimizing production costs | Distributing benefits | Redirecting effort effectively | Maintaining competition | Minimizing management costs | |
| Time, space or gear limitations | - | To input suppliers | - | ? | 0 |
| Landing rights | + | To fishermen or government | - | - | 0 |
| Taxes | + | To government | + | + | - |
There are few generalizations that can be made concerning how management costs differ as the result of management technique. The most important, as noted by Scott (1979), is that the taxing scheme will require more information (and costs) than a landing rights system. This is only true, however, if the landing rights are auctioned rather than granted on the basis of prior use or other criteria. In the instance where rights are granted on the basis of criteria, information on the grantees will have to be gathered and processed.
It is not clear that there will generally be large management cost differences directly attributable to the management technique. Readers are referred to McConnell and Norton (1979) for a discussion of some particular situations that arise in fisheries.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Table 1 contains a summary of the previous arguments. Along the top of the table are the various objectives or goals of management. The various techniques are represented along the left-hand side of the table. A plus (+) represents a technique that is likely to satisfy the objective, a zero implies that the technique may or may not satisfy the goal and a minus (-) implies the technique is not likely to achieve the goal. Entries in the column labeled “Distribution Benefits” show the likely recipient of fisheries benefits.
Table 1 vividly demonstrates that a taxing scheme has clear advantages over other forms of management methods. Both in providing funds for fisheries development and allowing for a competitive harvesting market, the taxing method is superior. It is at least as capable at minimizing production costs as landings rights. The two areas where it may be inferior are in 1) not directly distributing resource benefits to fishermen and 2) possibly being more costly to manage.
It is clear that the advantages and disadvantages of the different techniques require analysis on a case by case basis. One must know the costs involved in each management technique for the fishery involved. Historical case studies (see Stokes 1979) would be useful in predicting these costs. Estimating costs would require common sense adjustments as it is impossible to find two identical fisheries. The political climate also would have to be assessed. There would be no use in wasting time and resources on programs that have no likelihood of being implemented. One must be careful not to discard taxation too quickly on political grounds, however, as there are state programs where taxes are used.
One must also recognize that analysis on an individual basis does not detract from the central conclusion: taxation may have superior attributes in managing fisheries and should not be prohibited under FCMA. This is not to say that it is the best technique in every instance. In fact, in some instances a laissez-faire management role may be superior. It is, however, meant to imply that outright prohibition of taxes as now contained in the FCMA is not rational public policy. Moreover, it appears desirable for future legislation to include a taxation possibility, a provision that would at least allow decisions to be made on a case by case basis.
LITERATURE CITED
Christy, F.T. 1973 Alternative arrangements for marine fisheries: an overview. Washington, D.C., Resources for the Future, Inc. 91p.
Crutchfield, J.A. 1979 Economic and social implications of the main policy alternatives for controlling fishing effort. J. Fish. Res. Board Can., 36:742–752.
Davis, J., N.B. Theberge, M.N. Strand, N.P. Bockstael and J. Gates. 1975 Alternative management schemes for the surf clam fishery. SRAMSOE No. 103, Virginia Institute of Marine Science, Gloucester Point, Va.
Gould, J.R. 1972 Externalities, factor proportions and the level of free access resources. Economica, 39:383–402.
McConnell, K.E. and V.J. Norton. 1979 An evaluation of limited entry and alternative approaches to fisheries management. In Proceedings of workshop on limited entry, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Pearse, P.H. and J.E. Wilen. 1979 Impact of Canada's Pacific salmon fleet control program. J. Fish. Res. Board Can., 36:764–769.
Scott, A. 1979 Development of economic theory on fisheries regulation. J. Fish. Res. Board Can., 36:725–741.
Stokes, R.L. 1979 Limitation of fishing effort; an economic analysis of options. Marine Policy Rev., 3:289–301.
R. H. Stroud, G. C. Radonski and R. G. Martin
Sport Fishing Institute, 608 13th Street N. W., Suite 801, Washington, D.C. 20005, USA
ABSTRACT
Historically, allocation of fishery resources reveals a decided lack of sophistication. From man's earliest existence to the signing of the Magna Carta at Runnymede in 1214 A.D., and its Forest Charter derivative in 1217, fish and game resources allocation was a function of brute force. Thereafter, the method of allocation of fishery resources changed only in form, not in principle. In recent times political strength has been substituted for physical strength. Although more subtle, the users having the greatest amount of political power determine the allocation. This circumstance culminated in the establishment of the present widely-prevalent 370-km extended marine fishery conservation zones in the late 1970's. In America, the latter development in 1976, carried with it statutory requirements to manage fish stocks under optimum-yield (OY) regimes and to accord coequal consideration to domestic recreational and commercial fishery needs. Optimum-yield management brought forth new factors to be reconciled in resource allocation—economic, sociological, and ecological, as well as biological. These new considerations require the development of research methodology incorporating multi-disciplinary efforts to generate and quantify needed new data. However, in as much as OY is not precisely quantifiable in our present stage of scientific ignorance about marine angling parameters, it is predicted that OY will probably long remain a concept having widely variable connotations before it evolves into a mathematical model.
RÉSUMÉ
Historiquement, l'allocation des ressources de la pêche révéle un net manque de sophistication. Depuis la première existence de l'homme jusqu'à la signature de la Magna Carta à Runnymede en 1214 P.C., et en 1217 de sa dérivée, la “Forest Charter”, l'allocation des ressources de la pêche et de la chasse était fonction de la force brutale. Par la suite la méthode d'allocation des ressources de la pêche changea seulement de par sa forme, non dans ses principes. Plus récemment la force politique a été substituée à la force physique. Bien que cela soit de manière plus subtile, ce sont les utilisateurs ayant le plus de pouvoir politique qui déterminent l'allocation. Cet état de fait culmina à la fin des années '70 par l'établissement des zones de pêche maritime étendues à 370-km, prévalant largement dans le présent. En Amérique, le dernier développement en 1976, amena avec lui des obligations statutaires de gérer les stocks de poissons sous le régime des captures optimales (C.O.), et d'accorder une considération équivalente aux besoins de la pêche familiale, de loisir et commerciale. La gestion en “captures optimales” a apporté quatre nouveaux facteurs devant être réconciliés dans l'allocation des ressources—facteur économique, sociologique, et écologique, de même que biologique. Ces nouvelles considérations nécéssitent le développement d'une méthodologie de recherche incorporant des efforts multidisciplinaires pour générer et quantifier de nouvelles données nécéssaires. Toutefois, d'autant plus que les C.O. ne sont précisément pas quantifiables dans notre stade actuel d'ignorance scientifique à propos des paramètres de la pêche à la ligne en mer, il est prévisible que les C.O. resteront probablement longtemps un concept à connotations largement variables, avant qu'elles évoluent vers un modèle mathématique.
INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly the first approach to best-use allocations of fishery resources was taken by the ancestors of modern man on the basis of brute force. We assume that those prehistoric beings who were the strongest and most aggressive merely usurped the fishery resources to the extent both of their needs and their capabilities to repel competitors.
Something of this general nature probably served well enough during many millenia as a means of resource allocation to users amidst the sparse human populations then occurring. Such a mechanism is consonant with the comparatively recent Darwinian theory of “survival of the fittest”.
Under the feudal system of the 11th and 12th centuries A.D., the royal house in London, supported by surrounding baronies, dominated the social order of England. Use of the fish and wildlife resources of the great English forest tracts of the time was reserved to the Norman kings and princes and those favored nobles to whom resource-use allocations were assigned by royal grant. This feudal circumstance represented a mere refinement of the assumed prehistoric condition wherein resources were allocated by the strongest individuals to themselves.
The Forest Charter
Fish and game continued to be regarded as royal property until, in 1215, a general uprising of the English barons forced King John to sign the Magna Carta at Runnymede. By means of this revolutionary “bill of rights,” the barons sought to remedy a broad range of grievances accrued under the Norman kings, including many severe abuses in the administration of the forests.
Two years later (1217), the brief Forest Articles were taken from the Great Charter and expanded into a separate companion document, called “The Charter of the Forest”. In the process, the barons secured some fishing and hunting rights for themselves. These new rights did not extend to the common people, who continued to poach at their peril.
Establishment of Common Rights
Thus it was that common folk fleeing the tyranny of the Old World settled in the New World and established common rights of ownership to the fish and game resources. Most of the charters of the 13 original colonies of America granted the settlers the privilege to fish and hunt freely on lands of the colony held in common and not deeded to private ownership.
No further developments significantly affecting the distribution or allocation of the fishery resources occurred until the latter half of the 19th century. The next allocation milestone could not be attained until after completion of the exploration, settlement, and organization into a series of distinct political entities of the western regions of the emerging new American nation.
DESIGNATION OF INLAND GAME FISHES
Toward the end of the 19th century the western region of America became politically organized, first into territories then into state entities. Then commenced, at varying times, a consideration of resource matters. Among the related actions were the legislative designations of certain groups of inland fishes as game or sport fishes.
Allocation by Legislation
The assemblage of game or sport fishes invariably included the catchable larger species of the family Centrarchidae—so-called black basses, several smaller sunfishes and crappies; family Esocidae—pikes; family Ictaluridae—cat-fishes and bullheads; family Percidae—walleyes and perch (except in Great Lakes waters and in the Mississippi River and its major tributaries); and family Salmonidae—trouts and salmons (except in the Columbia River and Sacramento River drainages). By these specific legal designations, or equivalent legal actions that outlawed their commercial harvest or capture by nets, such fishes were effectively allocated exclusively to anglers (some temporary local exceptions occurred in a few states).
The earliest such allocation in the new territories and states occurred in Wisconsin in 1853, a decade before the American Civil War. Between the Civil War and the end of the 19th century, 15 states and territories allocated all or selected game fishes to angling use. In the opening years of the 20th century, prior to World War I, 12 additional states took similar actions. During the time between World War I and II, 21 more states undertook corresponding reservations of their game fishes. Similar actions have been taken since World War II by 8 states, thereby affecting the remaining states and most of the previously excepted species (see Table 1 for details).
The Black Bass Act
The next major milestone with respect to fishery allocation was the enactment in 1926 of the U.S. Federal Act for the “Regulation of Interstate Transportation of Black Bass and Other Fish” (the Black Bass Act), which controlled the movement of black basses (Micropterus sp.) in interstate commerce. The effect was to eliminate the commercial sale of black basses, thereby reserving these species exclusively for angling purposes.
Table 1. Legislative allocation of inland fishes to angling use, either by designation as game fishes or by outlawing their commercial sale or their harvest by nets.a
| Time period | States (territory) acting | Number of states |
| 1776–1862 | Wisconsin | 1 |
| 1863–1899 | Idaho, b Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, (Montana), Nebraska, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, c West Virginia, Wyoming | 15 |
| 1900–1918 | Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, d Oregon, e South Carolina, Virginia, f Washington, b | 12 |
| 1919–1942 | Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, g Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, h Tennessee, i Texas, j Virginia, k Washington k | 21 |
| 1943–1980 | Alaska, California, Florida, l Hawaii, Idaho, Ohio, m Vermont, n Washington n | 8 |
a Information supplied in oral communication (telephone survey) by the chief fishery administrative officers of the respective states.
b Resident trout only.
c All species except only walleyes in Lake Champlain.
d Black bass, crappies, and sunfishes.
e Black bass, catfish, resident trout.
f Except for black bass in Back Bay.
g Steelhead rainbow trout.
h Sunfishes (Lepomis sp.), yellow perch (Perca flavescens), walleyes.
i Netting and sale of crappies (Pomoxis sp.) from Reelfoot Lake permitted intermittently.
j As early as 1899 in a few counties.
k Black bass.
l Netting and sale of sunfishes and crappies permitted 1950–1952, and in Lake Okeechobee only commencing in 1977 (continuing).
m Walleyes and northern pike (Esox lucius).
n Walleyes.
This act resulted from organized political action on the part of American sport fishermen, constituting a total allocation of the black basses, among America's premier game fish, to recreational fishing (angling) use.
It is interesting to note that in 1980 a bill is pending before the U.S. Congress to amend the Black Bass Act so as also to embrace the steel-head rainbow trout (Salmo gairdneri). Again, the proposal is a response by an elected legislator to irresistible organized pressure from his political constituency.
Passage of the Black Bass Act signaled a nationwide recognition in America that the principal game fishes of inland waters should be allocated to the exclusive use of recreational or sport fishermen (i.e., anglers). This conclusion was reached as the result of a general perception that such allocation constituted the best use of the fishery resources in the limited bodies of water represented by most natural lakes and ponds as well as most streams. Such a conclusion was largely a function of an intuitive or common sense appreciation of the greater socio-economic values involved in angling use. Scientific studies verifying the correctness of such conclusions were not available until many years later. The conclusion also took into account the self-evident fact that biological productivity was inadequate to serve simultaneously the legitimate needs of both sport and commercial users. It was, in short, the unheralded harbinger of optimum yield several decades later.
Decisive Political Factor
In the decades leading up to the passage of the Black Bass Act, as already noted, a majority of states had moved to designate various inland fish species as game fish, and virtually all had done so by the 1960s (Table 1). These actions reflected the overwhelming political power of the angling constituency in most circumstances. They also reflected the biological limitations of most waters as well as broad public acceptance of the self-evident superior socio-economic value of selected species of fishes as objects of sport fishing.
There were notable exceptions to this fast-moving and widespread phenomenon. The exceptions centered around the very large bodies of water, where major commercial fisheries had developed some years before the passage of the Black Bass Act. Indeed, these commercial developments had been a major stimulus to the effective organization of sport fishermen that led to the act's passage. The commercial fisheries were especially important both in the Great Lakes and in the “Great Rivers” of America.
Even in these latter waters the commercial exploitation of black bass was outlawed. Some other species commonly pursued by and reserved to anglers in smaller bodies of water throughout America were allowed to be taken in those very large bodies of water. Until the middle of the 20th century, neither commercial fishing nor angling power had yet developed sufficiently on those waters to generate a level of competition for the fishery resources which necessitated resource allocation decisions. Since then, however, the fishing power of both groups has grown to levels sufficient to cause more or less serious overfishing problems. Consequently, highly charged confrontations between competing user groups are common occurrences, compelling authorities to commence making allocation decisions among user groups.
In the Great Lakes until the late 1960s commercial fishing predominated. Thereafter, populations of many of the most valuable commercially sought species collapsed precipitously, primarily as a result of decades of unregulated commercial fishing, proliferation of exotic species—sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) and alewife (Alosa pseudoharengus)—and burgeoning pollution. Following intensified management efforts by the riparian states, featuring the introduction of coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) and chinook salmon (O. tshawytscha), recreational fishing increased dramatically.
In the 1970s Great Lakes angling became a multi-million-dollar business. All 8 Great Lakes states have, as a result, established regulations restricting or prohibiting the commercial catch of the high-valued salmonid species (including lake trout, Salvelinus namaycush, and steelhead trout) desired by recreational fishermen (Comptroller General of the United States 1977).
DESIGNATION OF MARINE GAME FISHES
Following in the footsteps of their inland counterparts, certain well-organized groups of saltwater anglers succeeded in persuading a few state legislatures on opposite coasts of America to outlaw commercial fishing for certain marine species having special significance to sport fishermen.
Pacific Coastal Actions
The first such allocations to exclusive sport fishing use seem to have occurred in California. Until 1957, substantial commercial fisheries occurred in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and San Francisco Bay. One by one, due to an apparent decline in the resources and a longstanding conflict between sport and commercial interests, the commercial fisheries of the Delta-Bay area were legislated out of existence. Commercial fishing in the Delta was closed permanently to white sturgeon (Acipenser transmontanus) in 1917, to striped bass (Morone saxatilis) in 1935, and to white catfish (Ictalurus catus), chinook salmon, coho salmon, and American shad (Alosa sapidissima) in 1957. Of these species, striped bass, American shad, and white catfish, all transplants from the East Coast, today support the bulk of all sport fishing in the Delta-Bay area (Skinner 1972).
In Oregon in 1969 the state legislature adopted a bill that classified the steelhead rainbow trout as a game fish in all waters of the state, while permitting an incidental catch of steelhead in the commercial salmon fishery in the Columbia River and Territorial Sea waters of Oregon. A further proviso required that the said incidental catch be reduced below 10% of the commercial salmon catch (Stroud 1969).
Atlantic Coastal Actions
On the East Coast, the first designation of a marine species as a game fish evidently occurred by action of the Florida state legislature in 1957, when it so classified the snook (Centropomus undecimalis). After several abortive efforts in earlier years, the instrumental bill passed both houses of the Florida legislature in 1957 almost without opposition. The Governor expressed an active desire to sign it rather than let it become law without signing. The Act represented the climax of a persistent long-term drive by organized sportsmen, outdoor writers, and many conservation-minded legislators.
ESTABLISHMENT OF FISHING RIGHTS THROUGH TREATY
Historically, the U.S. Congress reserved by treaty the rights of American Indians to engage in fishing. Interestingly, the treaty guaranteed to the Indian a federal constitutional right which he already possessed and exercised, and placed him, under that Constitution, in a superior position (Martin 1979).
Indian Fishing Rights
The treaty reserved to the tribes the exclusive right of fishing by the tribes within the area and boundary waters of their reservations, and off the reservation at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations without restraint by nonIndian citizens. The Indians' rights assured their subsistence and held special significance to their religious and cultural mores.
Despite the exclusive rights reserved by the U.S. treaty power to Indians, industrial development and state regulation have resulted in presumed interference with and prevention of those rights. Loss of income and inhibition of cultural practices of the American Indian are also attributed to those same factors.
The special and superior rights created by the Indian treaties serve as an example of how certain citizens of a state may gain the “exclusive right to fish” at the expense or loss of that right by others under the federal treaty power.
Landmark Rights Decision
Early in 1974, Judge George H. Boldt, U.S. District Court in Tacoma, Washington, issued a 203-page landmark decision concerning fishing rights of certain Treaty Indian tribes in the State of Washington. The opinion severely restricted the Washington State Game Commission's authority to regulate the taking of steelhead trout. The opinion also relates to the harvest of other anadromous and saltwater fish by Washington Treaty Indians, in part as follows:
The State's regulation of off-reservation fishing by Treaty Indians is restricted only to the need for conservation, limited to those measures which are reasonable and necessary to the perpetuation of a particular run or species of fish.
All State game fish laws and regulations pertaining to fishing rights on anadromous fish were held to be unlawful as applied to Treaty Indians.
Treaty Indian fishermen have the opportunity to fish for unrestricted numbers of fish on their reservation. They may also take unrestricted numbers of fish off their reservation for ceremonial and personal use. The remainder of harvestable numbers of fish shall be divided equally between Indians and non-Indians.
The decision further stated that the State Game Commission has no authority to impose restrictions on Indians without a showing that a steelhead run is in jeopardy. The decision also opened the way for Indians to commercially sell steelhead within the state.
State Management Authority Clarified
Another important decision was rendered in 1976 with respect to an Indian treaty case involving Indian fishing for steelhead trout on the Puyallup River, Washington. In an appeal of the lower court decision before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington the rights of the Puyallup Indian Tribe to commercially harvest steelhead rainbow trout were clearly spelled out in 1976 (No. 43736 En Banc.).
For example (among other findings):
…The jurisdictional scope of the State's powers to enforce fish resource conservation regulations is unaffected by the boundaries of an Indian reservation. When required to meaningfully control the conservation of a species of fish, both on-reservation and offreservation areas may be regulated by the State.
…There is no requirement, under the Treaty of Medicine Creek, that the Department of Game create regulations permitting an Indian net fishery for steel-head trout.
…The right of Indians under the Treaty of Medicine Creek to fish “in common with” others merely means that fishing conservation regulations must accord equal treatment to both Indian and non-Indian fishermen.
The Washington State Supreme Court clearly repudiated in its findings the controversial Boldt construction of the treaty phrase, “in common with”. The Court also upheld a Pierce County Superior Court finding (1975) that the Indians were entitled to catch 45% of the remaining half of the natural steelhead run, after allowing half the natural run to escape for perpetuation of the species, and that treaty fishing rights did not extend to the hatchery run of steelheads.
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the on-reservation catch of steelhead trout for Indian subsistence or ceremonial purposes must be considered part of the tribal share, and that share shall not exceed 50% of the harvestable portions of the steelhead spawning runs. The decision also upheld the State's rights to regulate the on-reservation fishery if necessary to preserve fish runs.
Treaty Rights Override State Authority
A U.S. District Court in Michigan found in 1979 that the Bay Mills Indian Community and Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, as political successors to the Indians who were party to the Treaty of Ghent and the Treaty of 1836, have present-day rights to fish commercially and for subsistence in the waters of the Great Lakes, as ceded by the Treaty of 1836. The Court also found that the fishing rights in question are communal property of the Tribes subject to tribal regulation under their constitutions and codes.
Of particular importance are the following declarations by the Court (among many others):
…Because the right of the plaintiff tribes to fish in ceded waters of the Great Lakes is protected by treaties of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians with the United States, that right is reserved and protected under the supreme law of the land. It does not depend on state law.… To the extent that any laws or regulations of Michigan are inconsistent with the treaty rights of the Michigan Indians, such laws and regulations are void ab initio and of no force and effect as to the plaintiff tribes and their members.
…Regulation of treaty-right fishing by the plaintiff tribes preempts any state authority to regulate any fishing activities of tribal members. The state lacks authority to enforce its police power regulations against members of the plaintiff tribes.
International Treaties
Many international fishery treaties have been negotiated by many fishing nations, particularly with respect to marine fisheries. The purpose is to establish regimes to provide for sustained-yield management of the fishery resources and the rational or equitable allocation of harvestable surpluses among the several user entities involved. This almost always has revolved around the commercial fisheries. Examples affecting recreational fisheries are of rare occurrence.
Atlantic Tunas
The International Commission of Atlantic Tunas and Tuna-like Fishes (ICCAT) resulted from a 17-nation conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1966, with the Convention coming into force in 1968. The purpose is to conserve the tuna resources, among them the northern bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus), and to allocate the harvestable surplus among the fishing nations involved.
The Commission has adopted regulations protecting juvenile tunas from harvest and limiting catches of small, intermediate, and large tunas. Implementing regulations within U.S. waters are designed to allocate various fractions of the U.S. harvest quota among various user groups—recreational fishermen, purse seiners, harpooners, keg-line fishermen.
Atlantic Salmon
The International Commission for the North-west Atlantic Fisheries banned high-seas fishing for Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) in 1969. The ban proved ineffective because Denmark refused to abide by it, even though it had been adopted by a strong majority vote.
As 1971 closed, the U.S. adopted legislation authorizing the embargoing of fish imports from nations whose fishing operations diminish the effectiveness of international fishery conservation programs. This action was directly responsive to the growing protests of American Atlantic salmon conservationists and anglers who had, through existing international machinery, for several years to no avail patiently attempted to achieve a workable conservation agreement to protect the Atlantic salmon resources.
Early in 1972, the U.S. State Department succeeded in reaching agreement with Denmark under which the high-seas fishery by Danish flag vessels off West Greenland would gradually phase out over a 4-year period, 1972 through 1975. In addition, the inshore salmon catch by local Greenland fishermen would be stabilized at an annual maximum of 100 tons. The agreement, though lacking the total ban sought by many interests, served the interests of those countries which undertake heavy expenditures to protect the salmon runs in the streams of origin and of Denmark in the local Greenland fishery.
REGULATORY ALLOCATION
Each of the 50 American states has an agency of government charged with responsibility for conserving and managing the inland fishery resources and each of the coastal states has a similar agency responsible for their marine fishery resources (usually separate, some few are combined with the inland agencies). These agencies are variously empowered with delegated authority of the state legislatures to formulate and enforce fishery regulations having the force of law.
The state and federal legislative actions, prohibiting commercial fishing for various species and classifying various fishes as game fishes, were substantially completed with respect to American inland waters by 1980. A few further such actions, however, are pending. A bill has been introduced into the Congress to amend the Black Bass Act to extend its provisions to include the steelhead trout. Another newly-introduced bill would extend its provisions, similarly, to Great Lakes salmonids.
Limiting Use of Nets
A measure is pending before the Texas state legislature to outlaw commercial netting for red drum or “redfish” (Sciaenops ocellata) and spotted seatrout (Cynoscion nebulosus) within Texas territorial waters. The measure would also designate these much-angled species as game fish, thereby allocating them to sport fishing use. We believe that this proposed action, which seems likely to prevail, will prove to be the forerunner of similar legislative allocations to sport fishing of recreationally significant marine species in many other coastal states.
In 1972 Canada began applying drastic federal restrictions to the licensing of commercial net-fishing for Atlantic salmon. The purpose was to close out such activity for several years as a conservation measure to help rebuild depleted stocks. Sport fishing, amounting to only about 2% of the Canadian catch, was exempted.
Several decades of laissez-faire commercial gill-netting for walleyes (Stizostedion vitreum) had contributed significantly to the decline of both the commercial and sport fisheries for walleyes in western Lake Erie (Regier et al. 1969). Commencing in 1971, the Ohio Division of Wildlife imposed a 5-year moratorium on commercial fishing for walleyes in Lake Erie as a conservation measure while permitting continued sport fishing. By mid-September 1972 a state angling survey revealed that sport fishing success had improved dramatically over that prior to 1970, reflecting a strong resurgence in the abundance of walleyes in Lake Erie.
Size and Catch Limits
The Mississippi Marine Conservation Commission acted in 1978 to regulate the harvest of spotted seatrout (“speckled trout”), red drum (“redfish”), and striped mullet (Mugil cephalus). In announcing the ordinance, the Commission's Director said it was designed to protect the saltwater sport fishes and terminate a conflict between commercial and sport fishermen (Leard 1978).
Under the ordinance, a sport fisherman's daily catch may not include more than 50 seatrout and red drum combined, and not more than a 3-day maximum catch may be possessed at any time. The ordinance also makes it illegal for sport fishermen to sell any saltwater fish caught in Mississippi waters. Neither commercial nor sport fishermen may have more than two redfish in excess of 914 mm in length in a day's catch. Fishermen may not sell redfish less than 355 mm long, speckled trout less than 305 mm long, or mullet less than 254 mm long that are caught in state waters.
Restrictions on Terminal Gear
Trout are frequently allocated among recreational users on the basis of regulations formulated in response to desires of special interest groups. The regulations are generally applied to require the exclusive use of artificial flies (vs. live bait or other artificial lures). Findings from several years of study on Michigan waters demonstrated that “flies-only” regulations are totally ineffective as a tool for enhancing populations of eastern brook trout (Salvelinus fontinalis) as previously claimed by fly-fishing advocates (Shetter and Alexander 1966).
The principal effect of the regulations proved to be a greater rate of catch for the fewer anglers who fished under the regulations. (It is noteworthy that the Michigan study findings were corroborated in a corresponding study in Wisconsin: Hunt 1970). Although these findings were available to the Michigan Conservation Commissio as early as 1962, “flies-only” regulations were extended on selected trout streams to accommodate overriding social considerations (Stroud 1963).
These and other studies elsewhere have corroborated repeatedly that the application of regulations restricting terminal gear for trout fishing to use only of flies or of artificial lures, or of a combination, causes a noticeable decrease in trout fishing activity. The extent of this decrease has been shown in various studies to range up to 70% or more.
Thus, the terminal gear restriction regulation has come into recognition as a means of allocating certain trout resources among special-interest angling groups.
ALLOCATION TO COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
In the modern industrial commercial world, there is an indirect allocation of fishery resources to so-called progress. Sometimes an allocation is made unwittingly, out of ecological ignorance. Sometimes an allocation is made inadvertently, out of careless administrative planning. Sometimes an allocation is made deliberately, either out of arrogance or out of deliberate cost-benefit decision making.
A mechanism exists for mitigating anticipated losses owing to water resource developments in America. It is the federal Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661-667e). The construction agencies are required to consider the impacts of their water development projects on fish and wildlife resources, as projected by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and to undertake appropriate mitigation. The success of this procedure is being evaluated currently by the Sport Fishing Institute (Prosser et al. 1979).
THE FCMA AND OPTIMUM YIELD MANAGEMENT
One of the most far-reaching fishery developments in modern times was the extension of many national marine fishery jurisdictions seaward to distances of 200 nautical miles (approximately 370 km) offshore. This trend found expression in America through enactment of the federal Public Law 94-265 (90 Stat. 331), the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA). Under this new act, a series of Regional Fishery Management Councils have been established to deal, respectively, with the fisheries of New England, the Mid-Atlantic (New York to Virginia), the South Atlantic (North Carolina to Florida), the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific, the North Pacific (Alaska), and the Western Pacific (Hawaiian archipelago) coastal regions seaward of the Territorial Seas. The Councils are charged to develop Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) for the various stocks of fish found in the 370-km zone. The revolutionary aspect of the FCMA is that the fishery plans are required to be drawn up on the basis of optimum-yield determinations.
As early as 1950, many inland fishery managers were stressing the social and economic aspects of recreational fishing on a basis of parity with biological factors as the consciously stated objectives of fish management—in effect, optimum yield (OY). It was largely in the ocean fisheries, where principal concern at mid-century was to maximize catches (hopefully, thereby, profitability) in commercial fishing enterprises, that the principle of maximum sustained yield (MSY) was nourished to the exclusion of most other considerations. A corollary concept was that of “full utilization,” conceived in narrow terms of use of fish exclusively as human food, directly or indirectly, with all other possible uses (i.e., ecological, recreational, scientific, esthetic) ignored or rejected.
Precursors of Optimum Yield Management
In most freshwaters of the U.S., until recently except the Great Lakes, the chief goal of aquatic production has for many decades been primarily to serve recreational fishery needs. Tolerance or encouragement of commercial fishing has prevailed largely in those circumstances where it was perceived to benefit or at least not harm or conflict with recreational fishing.
Intensive year-round studies, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, of anglers' harvests, game fish populations, fish food organisms, age and growth of fishes, and limnology of Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reservoirs generated significant new insights into the dynamics of reservoir biology. These studies, in 1944–45, generated a revolutionary new concept of year-round fishing—essentially, spring fishing—for warmwater game fishes (Eschmeyer 1945).
Year-round fishing was first applied in 1944 to Norris Reservoir, Tennessee, without prejudice to maintenance of fish populations but with subsequent doubling of fishing opportunity and fish harvest. In 1945, all of the TVA's remaining reservoirs were opened similarly. As a largely intuitive corollary to year-round fishing, in the context of then-prevailing fishing pressures, size limits were also discarded simultaneously. Nearly three decades later, the bass fishing was shown to have held up well under continuous year-round fishing with respect both to rate of catch and to average size harvested (Chance et al. 1975).
By 1959, based largely on local confirmation of the TVA findings, the traditional closed season had been discarded for bass in 34 states and for panfishes in 45 states (Stroud and Martin 1968). In addition to liberalization of fishing regulations, conceived originally by TVA researchers, the existing concept of controlling food-competitive (non-game) fishes to encourage game fish production was strenghtened at TVA, especially by the research findings of Tarzwell (1942). Commercial fishing for non-game fishes was encouraged as a result of the latter findings.
The deliberate experimental opening of Norris Reservoir to year round fishing in 1944, representing a revolutionary reordering of traditional fishery management, had actually been presaged by an earlier recommendation to remove the closed season on TVA mainstream reservoirs (Eschmeyer and Tarzwell 1941). The Norris Reservoir fishing experiment marked for the first time an integration of ecological information with fisheries management objectives designed to benefit resource users without harm to the resource base. It was, in short, one of the earliest precursors, if not actually the very first, of the currently developing philosophy of optimum yield management of fishery resources.
In the late 1950s, economists joined these early inland protagonists of OY and began to take open issue with the concept of MSY in the marine commercial fisheries. They argued for an economic equivalent that would generate the greatest profitability rather that the greatest catch. They recognized that the latter objective often led to economic adversity. The 1958 United Nations Oceans Convention (Geneva) reflected the increasing influence of economists by incorporating the term “optimum yield” in the convention text as the approprite management objective for the marine fisheries—implicitly, the commercial fisheries, for production from marine fish stocks of “a maximum supply of food.”
Recreational fishery leaders have for several decades been active in promoting the concept of optimum yield, in generalized terms. Their successful efforts climaxed in the organization, under joint auspices of the American Fisheries Society, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce), and the Sport Fishing Institute, of the hallmark “Symposium on Optimum Sustainable Yield As a Concept in Fisheries Management,” held at Honolulu, Hawaii, September 9, 1974 (Roedel 1974).
Optimum Yield Defined
Public Law 94-265 (the FCMA) generally follows the thrust of the 1974 OSY Symposium in defining optimum yield as being the yield which:
will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, with particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
is presented on the basis of MSY from such fishery as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factors.
There is no indication of weighting in the FCMA as between the yield objectives of “food production” and “recreational opportunities,” except as their mix serves to “provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation.” These two specified major national benefits may, therefore, logically be inferred to be coequal benefits under law. To attain these benefits from any fishery, however, it is necessary to determine the optimum yield of that fishery as a modification of MSY by various specified factors.
In the recreational fisheries it is necessary, for achievement of fishing satisfaction, to accommodate the important but elusive element of “quality.” Difficult to quantify at best, the “quality” factor obviously requires accommodation of a variety of angling experiences. The species sought, caught, and/or harvested, the balance between sizes and numbers of fish available for capture and harvest, the situations in which they are caught, even the methods employed, are among the important considerations.
Economic Factors as OY Determinants
Economic consideration is specifically enjoined in Sec. 301(a)(5) of the FCMA from being the sole determinant of conservation and management with respect to utilization of the fishery resources.
With respect to recreational fisheries, this factor is poorly assessed. What are anglers willing to pay for their fishing? How do they value their opportunity to harvest fish on a personal basis. A number of methods are in use to approximate such valuation, none totally satisfactory or practicable. These include:
gross expenditures
travel costs
indemnification for deprivation of opportunity
rental costs
opportunity costs of time devoted to fishing
What new approaches, or useful refinements to the foregoing, can be developed? It's an area of urgent need, but of poor attention.
Social Factors as OY Determinants
We know only crudely, indeed, how many people engage in recreational fishing, to what extent (frequency) they fish, why they fish, what they seek out fishing, how many of what species and sizes of fish they actually catch, how often and at what rate they catch fish of various species, where and when they do it, etc.
What are acceptable marine angling catches in terms of species, sizes, numbers? In this connection, can we learn anything useful from the several decades of preceding parallel experiences in managing the inland fisheries?
At Auburn University (Alabama), in the 1940s, a pioneering effort was made in the U.S. by Dr. Homer Swingle and associates to develop information of this character for inland pond fishing in the mid-South region of America. Their innovative efforts led to the propounding of a series of arithmetic ratios among various components of many experimental fish populations by which fish managers might judge pond “balance” (Swingle 1950). The latter was defined in terms of various criteria contributing to a satisfactory state of fishing, at least a function of:
minimum sizes of various species of fish that would be retained as acceptable sizes by anglers, rather than being voluntarily rejected; and
the frequency of catching those acceptably sized fish.
Thus, for example, 114-g bluegills (Lepomis macrochirus) harvested at the rate of one per hour produced acceptable “quality” of fishing. Here, then, was one of the early attempts to quantify some of the social perceptions of angling that were necessary for fish managers to accommodate. Given this criterion, biological management could be devised so as to satisfy perceived social objectives in angling.
Ecological Factors as OY Determinants
Fishery management planners must take into special account in plan development the vast supplies of many species—e.g., northern anchovies (Engraulis mordax), Atlantic menhaden (Brevoortia tyrannus), Atlantic squids Illex, Loligo sp.), etc.—that provide food for the larger carnivorous (predator) species that both commercial fishermen and anglers often seek. There are corresponding concerns that other life forms (seabirds, marine mammals) be allocated substantial shares of prey fishes—an “ecological reserve”—to sustain them in appropriate abundance. Planners must be equally concerned that adequate safety margins be reflected in OY determinations in order that likely errors in estimations of stock abundance will be sufficiently accommodated to forestall biological disasters from possible overfishing.
Contrary to the traditional “full utilization” perceptions, prey species are not necessarily “wasted” if not caught in the commercial fisheries for direct human consumption or for reduction purposes.
The importance of the ecological factor is highlighted in Sec. 304(e) of the FCMA, where “biological research concerning the interdependence of fisheries or stocks of fish” is mandated. Obviously, Congress intended this factor to weigh importantly in the planning process.
FISHERY ALLOCATIONS UNDER OY MANAGEMENT PLANS
Pending the development of Fishery Management Plans by the Regional Councils for the various important stocks of fish under their jurisdiction, the FCMA authorized the prior institution by the Secretary of Commerce of “Preliminary Fishery Management Plans” (PMPs) in particularly urgent circumstances. The PMPs for selected fisheries failed for the most part to consider, as required by the FCMA, the ecological functions that various stocks of finfish and shellfish serve in the predator-prey systems of many other species of economicallyvaluable predatory finfishes, marine mammals, and seabirds. This deficiency was also inconsistent with the Congressional mandate in Sec. 304(e) of P.L. 94–265 (FCMA) to carry out “biological research concerning the interdependence of fisheries or stocks of fish.”
Predators-Prey Considerations
It has been proposed to the Regional Councils, in arriving at the total allowable catch of a fishery under the OY management requirement, that they adopt the concept of an “ecological reserve” as a coequal partner with economic and social factors. The purpose would be to fully accommodate the prey requirements for sustenance of desirable abundance and variety of predaceous marine life, thereby contributing to optimality of yield from the fisheries and making viable the word “conservation” in the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.
Table 2. Allocations to marine recreational fishing (MRF) from harvestable surpluses of marine fish stocks occurring in the U.S. 370-km fishery conservation zone as set forth in various fishery management plans.a
| Plan | Recreational fishery involvement | MRF allocation | |||
| Directb | Indirectc | Yes | No | ||
| Hake fisheries of the NW Atlantic (PMP) | X | X | |||
| Mackerel fishery of the NW Atlantic (FMP) | X | 5,000 MT COMM., 9,000 MT MRF X | |||
| Atlantic herring fishery of the NW Atlantic (FMP) | X | X | |||
| Squid fishery of the NW Atlantic Ocean (FMP) | X (bait) | X (pred-prey) | X | ||
| Foreign travel fisheries of the NW Atlantic (PMP) | |||||
| Herring and alewife | X | X | |||
| Other finfish | X | X | |||
| Butterfish of the NW Atlantic Ocean (FMP pending) | X | X | |||
| Atlantic groundfish (cod, haddock, yellowtail flounder) (FMP) | |||||
| Cod | X | X | |||
| Haddock | X | X | |||
| Yellowtail flounder | X | X | |||
| Surf clam and ocean quahog fishery (FMP) | X (harvest method impact on bottom fishes) | ||||
| Atlantic billfishes and sharks (PMP) | X | X | |||
| Shrimp fishery, Gulf of Mexico (FMP) | |||||
| Brown shrimp | X | X | X (4,6 million kg plus 0,5 million for bait) | ||
| White shrimp | X | X | X (4,5 million kg plus 0,5 million for bait) | ||
| Pink shrimp | X | X | X (0,5 million kg) | ||
| Trawl fisheries of Washington, Oregon and California (PMP) | |||||
| Ocean perch | X | X | |||
| Other rockfish | X | X | |||
| Flounders | X | X | |||
| Jack mackerel (draft FMP) | X | X | X | ||
| Commercial and recreational salmon off the coasts of Wash., Ore., and CA | |||||
| Coho | X | X | X (in WA and OR) | ||
| Chinook | X | X (in CA only) | |||
| Northern anchovy fishery (FMP) | X | X | X (bait fishery direct) | ||
| Billfishes, oceanic sharks, wahoo and mahimaki in the Pacific Ocean (PMP pending) | X | X | |||
Marine fisheries biologists of the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) estimated (very wide range of error) that the 1975 central stock of northern anchovies along the Pacific Coast comprised at least 2,1 million tons in U.S. waters and 0,9 million tons in Mexican waters. Based on these estimates the DFG developed a draft plan for anchovy management for official action by the California Fish and Game Commission. An interim annual quota of 215 000 tons was recommended for harvest in the commercial reduction fishery, pending improvement in the population estimates. The contemplated goal, after 3 years, was set at approximately 450 000 tons annually.
The Sport Fishing Institute, in testimony submitted to the Commission during plan consideration, recommended that the state's management plan for northern anchovies do several things not then evident in the draft proposal, viz (Stroud 1976):
develop a rationale for the vital concept of an “ecological reserve,” to provide both for maintenance of a substantial spawning population of anchovies and for the food supply necessary to support an abundance of ecologically-dependent marine life forms (also economically valuable);
allocate to the reduction fishery an amount of anchovies equivalent to no more than 10% of the conservatively-estimated spawning population at abundance levels above 1 million tons, and 0% or no allocation below that population size;
allocate to an “ecological reserve” not less than 90% of the spawning population when greater than 1 million tons, and 100% when less abundant; and
require that the commercial harvest of anchovies be made approximately in proportion to their density distribution over the entire range of the anchovy population.
In 1978, the Pacific Fishery Management Council approved an anchovy FMP reflecting modifications to the earlier proposal of the California DFG. Population estimates several years later were considerably reduced and the OY for the U.S. economic or 370-km zone was set at 64 485 tons for all purposes, with none available for foreign fishing. As stated therein, the objectives of the management plan are to allow a fishery within the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone to harvest the optimum yield efficiently on a continuing basis, to maintain a sufficient level of anchovy biomass to sustain adequate levels of predator fish stocks, birds and mammals, and to avoid conflicts between U.S. recreational and commercial fleets.
Allocations to Commercial and Recreational Users
Thus far, excluding those for the Bering Sea, 15 fishery management plans (including preliminary plans not yet supplanted by approved Council plans) have been drafted, are pending, are approved, or are in force (Table 2). Marine anglers directly utilize 12 of the fish stocks involved in these 15 plans. Marine anglers also utilize the remaining 3 stocks indirectly to greater or lesser extent. Anglers have a high level of interest in at least 14 of the stocks.
A detailed examination of the 15 plans reveals, by comparison, that allocations to recreational fishing from the harvestable surpluses of the stocks involved have been made only in 7 plans, none in the remaining 8 plans. The 7 plans in which allocations to recreational fishing (angling) have been made involve only those species of fish for which some recreational fishery harvest estimates are available.
Future Allocations in Fishery Plans
It seems clear that future allocations of fish stocks to the recreational fisheries are closely dependent upon the generation of reasonably accurate, precise, and reliable statistical data both on the catch and effort in the recreational fisheries and on their socio-economic significance. (See Deuel elsewhere in this proceedings for discussions of methodology.)
Several additional fishery management plans are under active development that will almost certainly contain substantial recreational fishery allocations. These concern the striped bass of the Atlantic coast, the bluefish (Pomatomus saltatrix), the king mackerel (Scomberomorus cavalla), the Spanish mackerel (S. maculatus), and the multi-species complex of snappers (Lutjanidae) and of seabasses and groupers (Serranidae).
LITERATURE CITED
Chance, C.J., A.D. Smith, J. Holbrook II AND R.B. Fitz. 1975 Norris Reservoir: a case history in fish management, pages 399–407 in Stroud, R.H. and H. Clepper, eds., Black bass biology and management. Washington, D.C., Sport Fishing Institute.
Comptroller General of the United States. 1977 The U.S. Great Lakes, commercial fishing industry—past, present, and potential. Rep. to the Congress, CED-77-96. Washington, D.C., U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off.
Eschmeyer, R.W. 1945 The Norris lake fishing experiment. Nashville, Tenn. Dep. Conserv. Bull. 31p.
Eschmeyer, R.W., AND C.M. Tarzwell. 1941 An analysis of fishing on the TVA impoundments during 1939. J. Wildl. Manage., 5(1):15–41.
Hunt, R.L. 1970 A compendium of research on angling regulations for brook trout conducted at Lawrence Creek, Wisconsin. Wis. Dep. Nat. Res., Res. Rep. 54. 37p.
Leard R. 1978 Conservation commission puts bag limits on speckled trout, redfish and mullet. Mar. Briefs, 7(6):2 (June).
Martin, E.P. 1979 The law and the individual angler: the legal right to fish. Mar. Recr. Fish. 4:13–22. Washington, D.C., Sport Fishing Institute.
Prosser, N.S., R.G. Martin AND R.H. Stroud. 1979 Adequacy and accuracy of fish and wildlife impacts assessments at Corps of Engineers Projects, pages 384–390 in G. A. Swanson, ed., The mitigation symposium, Ft. Collins, Colo., Rocky Mt. For. and Range Exp. Stn., U.S. For. Serv.
Regier, H.A., V.C. Applegate, R.A. Ryder, J.V.Manz, R.G. Ferguson, H.D. Van Meter and D.R. Wolfert. 1969 The ecology and management of the walleye in western Lake Erie. Ann Arbor, Mich., Great Lakes Fish. Comm., Tech. Rep. 15. 101p.
Roedel, P.M., (ed.). 1974 Optimum sustainable yield as a concept in fisheries management. Bethesda, Md., Am. Fish. Soc., Spec. Publ. 9.89p.
Shetter, D.S. and G.R. Alexander. 1966 Angling and trout populations on the North Branch of the AuSable River, Crawford and Ostego Counties, Michigan under special and normal regulations, 1958–63. Trans. Am. Fish. Soc., 95(1):85–91.
Skinner, J.E. 1972 Introduction, pages 9–13 in J.E. Skinner, ed. Ecological studies of the Sacramento-San Joaquin estuary, Sacramento, Calif., Calif. Dep. Fish & Game Decennial Rep., 1961–1971.
Stroud, R.H. 1963 Biopolitics in Michigan. SFI Bull., (144): 2–3 (June).
Stroud, R.H. 1969 Oregon game fish. SFI Bull., (206):7 (July).
Stroud, R.H. 1976 California anchovy reduction fishery, SFI Bull., (280):1–2 (Nov.-Dec.).
Stroud, R.H., and R.G. Martin. 1968 Synopsis of the 1967 angling regulations, pages 40–46 in Fish conservation highlights, 1963–1967. Washington, D.C., Sport Fishing Institute.
Swingle, H.S. 1950 Relationships and dynamics of balanced and unbalanced fish populations. Ala. Agric. Exp. Stn. Bull., 274. 73p.
Tarzwell, C.M. 1942 Fish populations in the backwaters of Wheeler reservoir and suggestions for their management. Trans. Am. Fish. Soc., 71:201–214.
