2.1 Private Producers
2.2 Cooperatives
2.3 Subsistence Producers
2.4 Selection of Target Groups
The selection of target groups for extension programmes often results in a highly emotional debate. Selection is generally determined by government policy, although government policy does not always represent the attitudes and philosophies of all individuals in society.
Selection of target groups may precipitate debates which range from ideological/philosophical posturings to pragmatic assessments of a nation's capability of providing extension services dictated by a particular philosophy. Extension services represent a large investment with returns occurring over the long-term. Rarely are returns immediate in nature. Budgetary resources may not permit the level of investment which a sense of moral obligation to strive for social justice may require.
Who will be the beneficiaries of the aquacultural extension system? Target groups can be identified and categorized in several ways. In many countries policy debates are common on whether to carry out extension with the purpose of maintaining low consumer prices, or helping rural producers to achieve higher standards of living through higher prices for their commodities.
Aquaculture projects often specify goals of enhancing rural incomes, nutrition, and overall food security for smallholders (Ben-Yami, 1987). At the other end of the spectrum the need for foreign exchange (which can be obtained by export of high-value commodities such as salmon and shrimp) has resulted in capital-intensive aquaculture systems for large-scale commercial producers (Bailey, 1988).
A second policy issue revolves around emphasis on private producers or cooperatives. Often the argument is phrased as a decision to work primarily with large- or small-scale farmers. This decision is closely related to national philosophies on economic development strategies.
Some countries identify private producers as the targets for extension activities. Private producers are defined in this document as farmers who work for themselves, receive benefits from their management and control of the aquaculture enterprise, and assume the consequences of any wrong decision. Private producers can be small-scale farmers working individually, or large-scale commercialized farmers. The common denominators are the private ownership and management control of the farm pond(s).
Private producers have strong incentives to adopt those technologies which will benefit them the most, and from which a tangible reward can be obtained for their efforts. The challenge to extension, in general, is to demonstrate effectively to farmers the benefits of any proposed technology, and to ensure adequate feedback from farmers as to its on-farm feasibility.
Private producers can be difficult to work with if farms are small, isolated, and difficult to reach. In these cases extension agents may invest enormous amounts of energy, fuel, and effort to visit remote areas with relatively little time to work directly with the farmer. Ambitious programmes, which call for working and attending to large numbers of such farmers, may place unrealistic demands on both the energy of extension agents and transportation resources of many countries. Some countries have developed ingenious methods of handling these types of situations; for example, see the case studies for Rwanda (Section 4.4.2) and Zaïre (4.4.3).
On the other hand many large producers provide a different set of problems for extension programmes. For example, large producers may be more educated than extension agents and consider them poorly trained, and some purposely try to avoid extension agents if they fear that the agent may communicate their production secrets to other farmers.
Despite these difficulties, the trend in aquaculture extension has been to move away from emphasis on group and cooperative efforts to services for private producers. Efforts to encourage community and group aquaculture projects have generally met with little success.
Many development efforts of international assistance agencies have been oriented towards cooperative groups. In this approach individuals are not favoured with special privileges, and extension resources are used efficiently by working with a group of people rather than one person at a time.
The investment required in both capital and labour to construct fish ponds has been the basis for encouraging cooperative or group efforts in aquaculture. For example, instead of 10 small ponds constructed at high cost per water surface area, one large pond could be constructed at a much lower cost and would supply the same number of people with fish. Moreover, one large pond requires only one good site, while 10 small ponds require 10 good sites. Individual subsistence farmers may have insufficent land to set aside part for a fish pond, but the government may be willing to provide land to a group of farmers for an aquaculture project.
However, grouping farmers is not always easy. For example, cooperative efforts in Panama appeared to be hindered by the organizational complexity related to socio-economic inequality, existing cattle ranching operations, and divisions between members and non-members (Lovshin et al., 1986). But younger, married, and relatively well-informed men with large households were especially attracted to group fish culture projects.
Socio-economic homogeneity, and socially esteemed and influential leaders (but not rich) are factors which contribute to the success of group projects. Nevertheless, many cooperative groups have not functioned well. In general cooperatives are short-lived, but there have been exceptions. The basic problem is to provide adequate incentives for farmers to share the workload. Inevitably some individuals work harder than others, and become disgruntled when those who do not work as hard receive the same benefits as they do. In fish production it is especially difficult to determine whether an individual has contributed his or her share of work, or if he or she has harvested more than a fair share. In cases where cooperatives have been successful, there is generally a strong and highly-respected leader who has been able to maintain unity. If this person leaves, however, the cooperative usually fails.
A common debate in development philosophy related to extension is whether to work directly with the poorest people, or to work with wealthier farmers and hope that the technology "trickles down" to lower economic strata. In societies which are highly stratified in economic and social terms, choosing to work only with the wealthier class prevents the technology from reaching the poorer strata. In practice the "trickle down" theory rarely works.
In 1979 the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development declared that "... most development efforts have not yet succeeded in satisfying the aspirations of peoples and their basic requirements consistent with principles of human dignity and international social justice and solidarity, especially in the rural areas of developing countries. Rural development strategies can realize their full potential only through the motivations, active involvement, and organization at the grass-roots level of rural people, with special emphasis on the least advantaged." (FAO, 1981).
Efforts directed towards the "poorest of the poor" meet with enormous obstacles. Many of the world's farmers are landless or tenants. Poverty itself indicates a very low level of resources to work with to provide both food and income for the family.
It is far easier to work with people who have a certain level of resources which at least permits them to provide some amount of surplus production to accumulate capital or other resources. However, if the participants in a project are all extremely wealthy the technology may be perceived as one which is only appropriate for the upper economic strata.
In some cases the expressed target group may be subsistence farmers, while in fact the majority of extension efforts are devoted to larger-scale producers. If donor agencies insist on funding only projects devoted to subsistence producers then there is a strong incentive to state them as the target group whether or not this is based on reality.
The types of extension strategies selected depend to a large degree on the target groups selected. Selection of target groups may be, in some cases, by default and not through a conscious effort, and strategies effective for one group may not work for another.
An effective extension programme designed to service large-scale commercial producers should be managed differently from one designed to work primarily with subsistence producers. This paper will attempt to draw from the experiences of various nations, and identify which extension responsibilities, strategies, methods, and organizational structures have been most effective for different target groups and different government objectives.
Table 1 presents data of respondents to the survey instrument (Annex I) on the types of groups targeted by aquaculture extension programmes in a number of countries and regions. With the exception of the Philippines, Panama, and Uruguay, commercial producers were not the targeted group of aquaculture extension efforts. This may be due largely to reasons expressed by several respondents that private producers actually had more advanced technology than researchers or extension agents. Large companies, particularly shrimp farmers, either hire researchers and have developed their own proprietary technology on private research stations, or fund university or government research. In the Philippines respondents from projects of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), colleges, and universities indicated that extension programmes did not target commercial producers, while the Inland Resources Development Corporation worked primarily with private commercial concerns.
Subsistence producers are most often targeted by aquaculture extension efforts. All countries responding, except Ecuador and Uruguay, targeted subsistence producers. Approximately half of the respondents indicated that cooperatives were targeted, while approximately two-thirds targeted private producers. Four of the countries responding (the Philippines, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay) targeted both private and cooperative producers.
Regardless of the target group, careful selection of individual cooperators is of great importance, especially in the early stages of a programme where there is a need to demonstrate that the production technology is sound. Extension theory classifies personality types according to an individual's propensity to adopt new ideas and technologies. Individuals are classified as (a) innovators, (b) early adopters, (c) late adopters, and (d) laggards.
In this scheme extension theory says that early adopters are the best contact persons for extension personnel. Innovators may be too far ahead of what is practical at a certain point in time, and may be seen as unusual or extreme. Early adopters are, on the other hand, interested in new ideas, but are also respected by neighbours and more likely to be perceived as resembling them. While laggards probably have the greatest need, they generally are the least likely to change and adopt new technologies. Extension theory maintains that the greatest long-term effect will occur if extension activities focus on early adopters. If the likelihood of adopting change is low, extension resources may not be well spent and overall change may be slow.
