V. ACCESS TO BASIC FOODS

1. Trends in food basket and its cost
2. Overall poverty situation
3. Composition of households in the region
4. Mechanisms for disaster prevention and relief
5. The international community and emergency aid
6. Impact on internal and external migration
7. National policies on food security

1. Trends in food basket and its cost

It would appear that since Hurricane Mitch, the monthly cost of the food basket, as well as the expanded food basket and the basic basket¹⁷, have not fluctuated a great deal. This is essentially because the exchange-parity and price-adjustment processes do not reflect difficulties in gaining access to the baskets.

When one looks at trends in the various countries, the consumer price indexes of Honduras and Nicaragua reflect significant rises in the CPI of foods, which rose 25 percent and 21 percent, respectively, between 1997 and 1999. In terms of the food basket and the basic basket, however, the trends are a little less pronounced. This is due to the dollarization effect applied to the baskets. The movements of countries' domestic currencies against the dollar do not match the movements of the income level of the population in local currencies.

Table 18. Cost of food, basic-food and basic baskets (December 1997- December 1999)

Country	Year	CPI %		Monthly Cost of Baskets US$
		General	Foods	Food	Basic Food	Basic
Belize	1997	110.6	111.2	N/a	N/a	N/a
	1998	109.7	110.1	N/a	N/a	N/a
	1999	108.4	108.3	N/a	N/a	N/a
	1999/97	0.98	0.97	N/a	N/a	N/a
Guatemala	1997	827.0	940.7	124.5	184.3	336.4
	1998	911.3	1 028.7	114.0	169.5	308.0
	1999	927.6	1 005.6	99.5	147.8	269.0
	1999/97	1.12	1.07	0.80	0.80	0.80
El Salvador	1997	148.8	159.5	142.7	N/a	285.6
	1998	155.0	170.4	140.6	N/a	281.2
	1999	153.5	161.5	135.6	N/a	271.3
	1999/97	1.03	1.01	0.95	N/a	0.95
Honduras	1997	75.2	77.0	114.0	124.5	151.8
	1998	85.5	85.9	123.1	134.6	164.1
	1999	95.4	96.2	129.4	141.5	172.5
	1999/97	1.27	1.25	1.14	1.14	1.14
Nicaragua	1997	135.2	136.0	22.40	89.62	140.28
	1998	152.9	155.4	22.44	89.76	141.04
	1999	170.0	163.9	21.19	84.78	137.57
	1999/97	1.26	1.21	1.16	1.16	1.21

N/a= Not Available; Source: Institutes of Statistics and Censuses, Reports of Central Banks

As Table 18 illustrates, there are marked differences between basket prices in the different countries. If we look at the food basket, for example, El Salvador has the highest cost for the 11 products that it contains. The same is true of the basic basket. And yet, Nicaragua has a considerably lower cost than in all the other countries in the region, with regard to its food and basic baskets. For the food basket, Nicaragua's cost is as much as four and five times lower than elsewhere, while for the basic basket, it is between 96 percent and 125 percent cheaper.

The reason for these lower costs is that Nicaragua is the poorest in terms of income per capita (less than US$500 per month) and also has the lowest prices in the region. The domestic prices of basic grains and garden vegetables are very low, and these items are often acquired by purchasers from neighbouring countries.

If we look at how far the average monthly income of workers in various countries can cover the cost of the basic basket, we see that a Guatemalan worker earning the average national income in 1997 (US$271.3) could meet only 81 percent of the cost (US$336.4). With an end-1998 income of US$265 per month, however, he could cover 86 percent of the basket. In 1999 his income (US$257.6) would enable him to cover 95 percent: a clear improvement. Over the same period, however, the income of an agricultural worker would cover only 32 percent, 34 percent and 37 percent of the same basket, respectively. Thus, incomes in the rural sector allow workers to purchase only the food basket, while wage earners in the urban sector are able to cover the cost of the basic basket 1.5 times (see Table 19 and Annex 13).

For workers in El Salvador, the average national wage is not enough to cover the food basket, and far less the basic basket. In 1997, the average monthly income of US$97.4 would not cover the food basket, which cost US$142.7. The level of coverage for the food basket was thus only 68 percent and, in the case of the basic basket, 34 percent. Over the next few years, there was a slight improvement, with coverage levels for the food basket rising to 74 percent, and coverage of the basic basket, to 37 percent. In 1999, the year immediately after Hurricane Mitch, the situation improved a little further, to levels of 77 percent and 39 percent, respectively. In the rural sector, the situation is much more dramatic, as there was a freeze in farm wages, at the minimum wage of US$81 per month. As a result, agricultural workers could afford 58 percent coverage of the food basket and 29 percent of the basic basket (see Tables 18 and 19 and Annex 13). Note that a large part of the Salvadorian population receives an extra income of 28 percent deriving from family remittances sent home from the United States. Those remittances totalled US$1 600 million in 1999, making remittances the country's prime source of foreign-exchange income.

In Honduras, the situation is similar to that of El Salvador, since the average monthly wage of the population covers neither the food basket nor the basic basket. Taking the year 1999 as a reference for the post-Mitch situation, the national average was US$86.7 per month, while the cost of the food basket was US$129.4 per month and the basic basket US$172.5 per month, so that the coverage was 67 percent for the first and 50 percent for the second. In the agricultural sector, in the same year, coverage was 61 percent and 46 percent, respectively, for both baskets.

According to official figures, in Nicaragua, the income levels of the employed population, in both sectors, are well able to cover the food basket. And yet, the lowest-income sectors and the high proportion of the population that is either unemployed or underemployed suggests that this relationship is distorted. In 1999, GDP per capita was US$488 per annum, and the methods used to measure poverty by other state sectors indicate that coverage of incomes in the food basket and the basic basket is the opposite of that found in the other countries, since national indicators in Nicaragua give the agriculture sector a coverage of two food baskets and, in contrast, scarcely 32 percent for the basic basket, in 1999. It is the same for the national average, which is reported to cover times the food basket 2.2 times, and the basic basket to only 35 percent.

If we consider the unemployed population, at the regional level, and the capacity of the unemployed to cover the food basket, we see that 30 percent of this population has access to the food basket and has serious difficulties in purchasing the basic basket. With a 50 percent regional average poverty level, the income levels of this population are considerably below those in the formal sectors of the economy, although they do serve as a reference point for gaining some sense of the living conditions of the people affected by Hurricane Mitch.

The number of people who would not be in a position to purchase the basic basket for the region is estimated to be around 15 million (50 percent of the total regional population) They are mostly farm labourers and/or agricultural workers and, to a lesser degree, people from outlying districts of regional capitals, at high risk of food insecurity. In this context, the exception is Belize, where living conditions are a little better than those of other population segments elsewhere in Central America.

Table 19. Employment & per-capita wage, per sector of activity 1997/99

Country	Year	Total		Rural		Urban
		Workers	Average	Workers	US$	Workers	US$
		(1 000s)	US$	(1 000s)	per capita	(1 000s)	per capita
Belize		N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Guatemala	1997*	681.6	271.3	212.8	106.9	468.8	435.7
	1998*	709.9	265.0	204.0	104.7	505.9	425.3
	1999*	1513.5	257.6	984.3	98.9	529.2	416.3
El Salvador	1997	3201.7	97.4	883.7	81.0	2318.0	132.0
	1998	3298.5	104.2	903.8	81.0	2394.7	144.0
	1999	3474.0	104.7	1005.4	81.0	2468.6	144.0
Honduras	1997	1955.0	67.2	799.7	63.5	1155.3	70.8
	1998	2040.9	76.2	817.1	71.7	1223.8	80.7
	1999	2131.3	86.7	834.9	79.3	1296.4	94.1
Nicaragua	1997	1369.9	49.4	574.5	44.5	795.4	79.2
	1998	1441.8	46.7	609.2	43.4	832.6	56.7
	1999	1544.2	47.6	655.3	44.3	888.9	55.7
Average	1997	7208.2	121.3	2470.7	74.0	4737.5	179.4
	1998	7491.1	123.0	2534.1	75.2	4957.0	176.7
	1999	8663.0	124.2	3479.9	75.9	5183.1	177.5

* Affiliated to Social Security; N/a= Not Available; Source: Agriculture Ministries.

It should be noted that most of the regional population employed in the agricultural sector does not enjoy the benefits of social security. When they do enjoy those benefits, the level of income is so low that the relationship between coverage and their basic needs is not as it should be. Indeed, there is even a tendency for the few material goods involved to be undercapitalized, in order to provide for these needs, as well as for other basic services.

Chart 13. Dollar cost of food basket vs. average rural and urban incomes in each country

Honduras

Guatemala

Nicaragua

El Salvador

2. Overall poverty situation

a. General description

The countries affected by Hurricane Mitch face one of the most difficult situations that can be encountered in the areas of poverty and food insecurity. Essentially because of structural problems, poverty has become a short-term condition for population sectors with the lowest incomes and the lowest production capacity, who must confront the problem of survival every day. As the economies of each affected country become globalized, the profitability of production for domestic consumption comes up against the profitability of exports. Within this context, there is little chance of investment in food production or adequate social investment.

Added to the above, there are the high levels of poverty, which - notwithstanding the official figures - affects two-thirds of the region's population and, within that population, almost all indigenous communities, who live in a constant state of poverty and social exclusion. In statistical terms, this means that they are a vulnerable population group, at high risk of food insecurity.

Normally, it is rural communities that live under such conditions. These population groups are generally classified as producers of basic grains, having areas of land of less than two hectares. Typically, they supplement their incomes by offering their labour or through low-cost handicraft activities. In some cases, they also receive income in the form of remittances sent from abroad by their relatives - most of whom have emigrated to the United States. The other important sector of the population is made up of those who live in outlying city districts or in marginal inner-city districts. The people in these areas are mostly informal workers with very low income levels and very little chance of finding stable employment.

There are very few jobs available to these people, because their cultural and educational level is very low. In fact, the average length of school enrolment in the region is 3.7 years of primary school. Furthermore, until very recently, they also had to endure the armed conflict that devastated most countries in the region, with the sole exception of Belize.

Furthermore, the arrival of peace did not bring investment programmes, access to credit facilities, technical-assistance programmes, etc., for the reconstruction of family production units or, even less, for the relocation of entire populations, who had to emigrate to neighbouring countries in order to survive.

The number of people living in extreme poverty rose from 13.9 million people¹⁸ in 1990 to 14.5 million in 1998, as shown in Table 20. The countries most affected, in relative terms, were Nicaragua and Honduras, which account for 50 percent of all those living in extreme poverty, out of a total of around 22 million people living in poverty in the region as a whole.

Table 20. Basic poverty indicators

Country	Population 1000s inhabitants	Level of extreme poverty		Per-capita GDP	External debt*
		Inhabitants 1000's	%	US$	Million US$
Belize	249.8	N/a	N/a	2725	338.0
Guatemala	11389.3	5580.6	49.0	1533	4565
El Salvador	6276.1	3031.3	48.3	1716	3630
Honduras	6597.1	3298.6	50.0	722	5002
Nicaragua	5113.4	2572.0	50.3	452	5968
Total	29625.7	14482.5	49%	1204	19503

* In 1998; Source: Central American Institutes of Statistics, Central Banks, UNDP.

Nicaragua has the highest proportion of people living in extreme poverty, relative to its total population, with 50.3 percent. Honduras has the next-highest proportion (50 percent); Guatemala lies in third place, with 49 percent, and El Salvador has the lowest relative proportion of people living in extreme poverty. These relative differences between the different countries are not, however, significant. Indeed, in the region as a whole, 49 percent of people live in extreme poverty.

One reason for the increased poverty in these countries is the high level of external debt, which, for all countries, totalled US$19 500 million, or 54 percent of total annual regional GDP, in 1998. In the case of Honduras and Nicaragua, however, external debt represents 1.5 times and 2.5 times their annual productive capacity, respectively. Based on the regional exports of the countries affected, this debt is equal to 2.3 times joint exports, and in the case of Nicaragua, almost 10 times its export capacity.

Although per-capita GDP may be useful for evaluating poverty, it does not accurately reflect the real lives of the people. In this case, it reflects a concentration of wealth within minority nuclei, in which manifestations of opulence stand out amid widespread manifestations of marginalization: people without basic health services, education, drinking water or sanitation, and with their communications and transport systems in an appalling condition.

In 1998, the per-capita incomes of the countries under consideration were as follows: Belize, US$2 669; Guatemala, US$1 640; El Salvador, US$1 850; Honduras, US$740; and Nicaragua, US$370. The two latter countries are, by the way, the poorest in the region. And yet, the level of poverty is similar in all the countries of the region, even though it is more pronounced in countries with a higher per-capita income.

The SICA report¹⁹ gives the following figures for the level of social investment in the countries affected, two years before Hurricane Mitch. As a percentage of GDP, the respective levels were: Nicaragua, 10.7 percent; El Salvador, 7.7 percent; Honduras, 7.2 percent; and in Guatemala, 4.2 percent.

Table 21. Selected poverty indicators

Country	Drinking-water coverage		Housing deficit	UNDP HDI			Schooling (years of study)
	Urban	Rural	(thousands)	1998	1999	2000
Belize	N/a	N/a	N/a	63	83	58	N/a
Guatemala	96	68	1390.0	111	117	120	3.2
El Salvador	92	25	550.0	114	107	104	4.1
Honduras	89	53	700.0	119	114	113	4.3
Nicaragua	89	35	380.0	126	121	116	3.8
Total	92	45	3020.0				3.7

Source: HDI - UNDP, SICA.

In the case of the earthquakes in El Salvador in January and 2000, the number of homes destroyed is estimated to have been around 150 000, with a further 150 000 having sustained damage. This further increased the shortages among the Salvadorian people.

With regard to the Human Development Index (HDI), which is prepared annually by UNDP, studies referring to the period 1998-2000 (which in fact refer to 1996-1998) indicate the following: Belize has climbed from 63 to 58 on the index scale; Guatemala has fallen 111 to 120; Honduras has risen from 119 to 113, despite a number of setbacks, including Hurricane Mitch; and El Salvador and Nicaragua have been better behaved, each slipping by 10 places, from 114 to 104 and from 126 to 116 respectively, over the three years in question.

The country with the highest school enrolment rates is Honduras, with an average of 4.3 years of study across the population. El Salvador has a slightly lower average (4.1 years), while Guatemala and Nicaragua have averages of 3.2 and 3.8 for respectively.

Of the total population of Central America, 48 percent live in urban areas. It is expected that, due to the impact of migration from rural areas to the cities, that percentage might reach 64 percent by the year 2020. This will mean that there will be 32 million people (almost the present population) will be living in metropolitan areas.²⁰

This migration essentially represents a response to the concentration of jobs in urban areas. In rural areas, meanwhile, poverty is increasing at an alarming rate. Indeed, for all countries in the region, poverty indicators are increasing in rural areas. In the case of Guatemala, the rate has reached an overall level of 66 percent. Moreover, in the country's northern regions, where most of the indigenous people live, the percentage is 80 percent. In El Salvador, the national indicator of rural poverty stands at 62 percent of rural households. In Honduras, rural poverty affects 75 percent of the population, 65 percent of whom are extremely poor, with indigenous ethnic groups and Afro-Antillan groups the hardest hit. Afro-Antillan groups live in the most extreme poverty, for two reasons: the effects of the lethal yellowing of the coconut palm and the impact of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).

In Nicaragua, rural poverty makes up 75 percent of the total. The largest concentrations of rural poor live in the Atlantic and North-Central regions of the country. In Belize, poverty is also concentrated in rural areas, which account for 43 percent of the total. Hardest hit are indigenous Maya (70 percent), indigenous eastern groups (42 percent) and Mestizos (35 percent).

Of course, most of those living in extreme poverty are affected by food insecurity, especially within those communities (the majority) that depend on dry agriculture and stable rainfall, and whose production focuses on basic grains and, to a lesser degree, on fruits (largely for their own consumption).

The damage inflicted by Hurricane Mitch on urban areas, and especially outlying urban areas, exacerbated the poverty. The institutional response capacity was very limited, and the resources that were promised, especially in the case of Honduras, did not cover the majority of the population, who had to survive under conditions of chronic overcrowding, together with their relatives, in homes that were too small to accommodate a large number of people. There was also the further complication of problems involving children and elderly people, who suffer permanently from the diseases commonly associated with this type of situation.

In many areas (both urban and rural), however, the humanitarian assistance received by most of the affected populations has proven to be the only form of income and the only way to improve their living standards. The assistance provided thus becomes a way to meet long-standing needs. As a result, among the poorest population groups in all the countries affected, disasters have become a way for people to improve their lives a little in the middle of tragedy. For a short while, at least, they have access to health services, medicines, clothes, shelter, food and even a little diversion, only to have to return once more to the struggle of their daily lives, with all the associated limitations.

Every Mitch-type event highlights the desperate reality of poverty in the region regional and demonstrates the need for investment in social and productive sectors to provide a medium-term response to the urgent needs of this vast number of people and prevent the consequences of violence and social unrest that were such a tragic constant in people's lives during the 1980s.

b. Plans and programmes

In general, the countries concerned have, since Hurricane Mitch, felt the need to strengthen their national capacities to initiate a poverty-reduction programme. However, this need cannot be met by these countries on an individual basis, since their national budgetary resources are not enough to have a real impact on this scourge, which continues to grow with every passing day.

Following the hurricane, consultative forums were organized jointly with the international community and multilateral support organizations, with the aim of soliciting assistance for the countries in the region affected by the hurricane, at annual meetings in Estocolmo 2000 and, recently, Madrid 2001.

The countries have jointly formulated projects in the areas of health, education, agriculture, forestry, the environment and infrastructure. Among other projects, emphasis has been placed on management of resources in shared basins, with a view to preventing disasters and addressing them through concerted action in other project components, such as health, education, gender equity, production, financial and economic matters and vulnerability.

In addition to making plans for the reconstruction of lost infrastructures and production capacities, the affected countries have also been preparing draft strategies for the reduction of poverty, which contain very specific objectives, but which require major investment in the region, of around US$ 2 000 million per annum over four years.

The plans formulated to combat poverty in each country may be summarized as follows:

Guatemala: The Social Plan presented by the Government focuses on three main goals:

• Sustained economic growth, based on clear, consistent rules;
• Creation of paid employment based on productivity;
• Investment in human capital, to ensure that the people have access to basic social services such as health and education.

El Salvador: The National Plan for Reconstruction²¹, is structured around five concentric security circles, designed to reduce vulnerability:

• Social organization of responses before, during and after disasters;
• Equal access to health and shelter, with an adequate infrastructure, as basic elements of people's security and productivity;
• More equitable opportunities for economic integration, through promotion of microenterprises and small enterprises and promotion of their capacity for market participation;
• An environment that is preserved and used within a spirit of respect for the requirements of today and tomorrow;
• Strengthened formal and informal government institutions.

Honduras: Through the Master Plan for National Reconstruction and Transformation, five key goals have been identified, based on rapid and sustained economic growth:

• To reduce the effects of the impact of Hurricane Mitch on the living conditions of the most vulnerable population groups;
• To improve the quality of, and access to basic social services;
• To increase opportunities to create jobs for low-income families;
• To promote and protect natural resources and the environment;
• To expand and improve the participation of low-income population groups in dealing with factors that exacerbate and perpetuate poverty.

Nicaragua: In announcing its Reinforced Strategy for Poverty Reduction, the Government identified three main strategic goals:

• Equitable and broad-based growth, with high generation of quality jobs and emphasis on developing the rural economy;
• A high level of investment in the human capital of poor population sectors;
• Strengthening of social-welfare systems.

As mentioned above, these plans require a massive investment programme, estimated at around US$2 000 million per country within a time span of four years. This will require international aid, in the provision of financial resources and technical assistance and creation of mechanisms for follow-up and evaluation of how the resources to be allocated to the various development areas will be prioritized and directed. It will also be necessary to determine the funds and the national staff that will be involved in these actions.

Hurricane Mitch had the effect of destabilizing the economies of Honduras and Nicaragua and both countries have therefore asked the international community to cancel their External Debt Their requests were made through the IMF, under the terms of the HIPC initiative. Both countries are eligible under the initiative, and it is therefore very possible that they will be granted cancellation of around 80 percent of their present debt over the medium-term.

For their part, non-governmental organizations in all affected countries have plans and programmes of their own. In most cases those plans and programmes do not dovetail with government plans, which were discussed at international forums, in an effort to determine the best way to confront the crises caused by natural disasters and seek out the necessary assistance. In the specific case of Hurricane Mitch, such organizations have been used as intermediary channels. As it turned out, if the international community was full of good intentions, those intentions have not translated into concrete actions, for various reasons, ranging from questions as to how the funds should be spent, to identification of the beneficiaries, a process conducted jointly with state authorities. Moreover, promised funding for rehabilitation actions did not arrive in the amounts requested.

Lastly it is often very noticeable that whenever a disaster affects a region in this hemisphere, and is then superseded by another, similar, or more devastating event on another continent, the tendency of the international community has been to defer or relegate the importance of the first event, as has been the case with Hurricane Mitch. Naturally, this has had the effect of limiting effective reconstruction, especially in the most vulnerable sectors, including food production.

3. Composition of households in the region

Demographic conditions are very similar throughout the region and, with the exception of Nicaragua, which has the highest rate of population growth, the other countries demonstrate a trend toward a reduction in their population growth. Households overall are composed of families of between 4.5 and 6 members, with numbers trending to be higher in rural families. Women are heads of household in between 35 and 42 percent of homes in the countries affected by Hurricane Mitch. In most households, 85 percent of occupants are under 40 years of age.

Most households (75 percent) have homes made of wood, with a zinc roof and, especially in rural areas, a floor of earth or filler material, covered with a thin layer of cement. Many urban homes are built from adobe bricks and cement, and there are still a number of houses made with the traditional taquezal ("pocket") building technique.²²

4. Mechanisms for disaster prevention and relief

a. Follow-up and evaluation of the affected population

Two years after Hurricane Mitch tore through Central America, the memories of regional institutions and regional populations provide testimony to a tragedy that virtually exhausted the capacities of the region. Actions to follow-up and evaluate the effects of Hurricane Mitch on the population, both from the view of State institutions and of non-governmental organizations and civil society, have simply drifted into oblivion. Other disasters have occurred since Mitch, and priorities have been shifted to other sectors.

In fact, it has not always possible to gather information about these events, with a view to determining how the condition of the affected population was changed by Hurricane Mitch. One of the main reasons for this is that agreements made with the international community of donors and international financial entities were not honoured within the specified time periods. Furthermore, the recommendations of the United Nations System concerning measures to deal with vulnerability in the region were not taken into account.

In Central America, under agreements reached by national Presidents at the 20^th Summit, held after Mitch, prior to the Estocolmo Conference of May 1999, it was agreed to adopt the Strategic Framework for the Reduction of Vulnerability and Disaster Relief in Central America, which contains measures regarding damage prevention and relief, as well as the preparation for, and management of emergencies. This Framework of Actions sought to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters over the immediate five-year period 2000 - 2004, and stipulated, through the Central American Security Committee, the adoption of mechanisms for joint action. Due to operational limitations, however, it has not been possible to guarantee that mandates and expressions of good intentions be converted into concrete action.

b. Mechanisms for prevention and relief

All countries in the region have created new organizations as institutional responses to these issues. The institutions in question, and their functions, are as follows:

Belize: Belize has a national office for the management of emergencies, which implements its actions through the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), acting in a direct line from the Office of the Prime Minister. NEMO is endowed with a coordination office, which in turn functions through a number of Committees, which administer each sectoral action and effectively implement its guidelines at the district, municipal and local levels. The national plan was revised in 1997 and functions on a permanent basis.

Guatemala: Guatemala has created the National Office for the Coordination of Disaster Relief (CONRED), which has been duly supported by a Law and a Regulation since 1996. It consists, in the first instance, of a National Council, comprising the main state ministerial organizations involved in this type of action, as well as members of civil society. Its administrative actions are in turn implemented through an Executive Secretariat, which is endowed with technical coordination teams at the regional, departmental, municipal and local levels.

El Salvador: The El Salvador National Emergency Committee (COEN) has, in the past, been solely responsible for dealing with emergencies. Presently, however, the Committee's prevention and relief activities are the subject of discussion, aimed at strengthening National Emergency and Civil Defence laws that have existed since 1976. This discussion process was initiated by NGOs specializing in disasters. These NGOs have been forming a response that parallels the response of civil society, but contrasts with the operative and functional nature of the institutional response to disasters. COEN operates at the regional, departmental and municipal levels.

Honduras: Honduras has created the Permanent Emergency Committee (COPECO), which is the national entity for the coordination of emergency and disaster management. COPECO answers to the National Emergency Commission (CNE), which is coordinated by the President of the Republic, albeit with a limited functional mandate, since much of the responsibilities in this regard are assumed by the Joint Operations Command of the Armed Forces. As a result, disaster-relief coordination is organized according to military regions, and this system feeds down, in turn, to the municipal and local levels. UNDP and the Honduran Government concluded that it would be advisable to draft a Programme to Strengthen Capacities for Risk Management and Relief of Natural Disasters in Honduras. This programme is closely linked with civil society, and with National and Municipal Governments.

Nicaragua: Legislation was recently passed (June 2000) to introduce the National System for Disaster Prevention and Relief, headed by the President of the Republic and run by a permanent Executive Secretariat. According to the United Nations Representative in Nicaragua, this is perhaps the best-structured disaster-response system in the region. It is administered by a National Emergency Committee, comprising all the State Agencies concerned (those national entities involved with this theme). It also functions through regional, departmental and municipal Committees.

c. Population at risk of food insecurity due to natural disasters

As mentioned above, the Central American region is vulnerable to the ravages of hurricanes, with a margin of probability of 36 percent on the coasts of Nicaragua and Honduras (which are located at 20° North and 84° West) and with less risk for the remaining countries in the area.²³ Of all the countries in the region, El Salvador runs the least risk of suffering the ravages of a cyclonic event.

The number of people in the region that are at risk of suffering such events is approximately 7.4 million (equivalent to 25 percent of the regional population). Honduras and Nicaragua have the highest proportions of at-risk people, relative to their respective populations. In the case of El Salvador and Guatemala, the levels of population at risk are 19.1 percent and 17.6 percent respectively, as shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Population at risk of food insecurity due to natural disasters

Country	Total pop.* thousands	Population at Risk (millions of inhabitants)
		Hurric.	%	Drought	%*	Earth-quake	%
Belize	249.8	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Guatemala	11389.3	2.0	17.6	6.9	60.6	6.5	57.0
El Salvador	6276.1	1.2	19.1	2.8	44.9	3.0	47.6
Honduras	6597.1	2.9	44.0	3.4	51.8	4.0	60.6
Nicaragua	5113.4	1.3	25.4	2.3	44.7	1.4	27.4
Total	29625.7	7.4	25.0	15.4	52.5	14.9	50.3

* 1998; Source: OXFAM and Consultant estimates

With the El Niño cycle about to be completed, the vulnerability of countries in the region that have a large number of people living along the Pacific Coast will be exposed once more. This is especially true of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. It is therefore likely that an alert may have to be sounded for this phenomenon during this year and next.

As far as earthquakes are concerned, the region is an area of high seismic activity, due to the fact that five major tectonic plates coincide there: the Coco, Pacific, North American, Caribbean and Rivera plates.

Two earthquakes of catastrophic dimensions struck El Salvador in January and February, as this report was being prepared. The earthquakes affected 184 000 families, leaving 155 000 homes destroyed and around 1.5 million people in a condition of food vulnerability.²⁴ Consequently, the emergency rations provided by WFP were not enough to deal with the effects of two earthquakes that struck one month apart.

Of particular interest in this context is that the damage was greater in rural communities, where the homes of local farm workers, who grow basic grains, were damaged or destroyed. These farmers also lost part of their grain production, which was buried by the earthquakes. The ability of these farmers, and of the State, to reconstruct and rehabilitate material assets is extremely limited. It seems that a food-insecurity alert may be needed, because the people are selling their few capital goods and sowing seeds for the planting cycle that begins in April, with the preparation of the land ahead of the May rains.

If these people are not provided with a consequential, nation-wide programme, El Salvador may, in the medium term, be presented with a high risk of hunger in communities where it will not be possible to plant due to the lack of resources with which to work the land. This is especially the case if one considers that the few resources that are being provided are being spent on the partial reconstruction of homes.

5. The international community and emergency aid

Emergency aid from the international community functioned effectively for all the countries and areas where Hurricane Mitch inflicted the heaviest damage. WFP provided emergency and urgent support for around 1 250 000 people between the period immediately after the tragedy (October 1998) and May of the following year. That aid consisted of maize, legumes, canned fish and vegetable oil.

Agencies that provided humanitarian food aid, as well as equipment for farming and the reconstruction of infrastructure, included organizations such as CARE, CRF, the League of Red Cross Societies, IICA, OIRSA, USAID, the European Union and European countries, Japan's JICA, and a number of international multilateral financial cooperation organizations with a regional presence (IDB, WB, IMF, IFAD, to mention some of the more prominent agencies). Much of the food aid was provided under the "food for work" model, both by WFP and by other international organizations, such as IDA, in close collaboration with other cooperation organizations having a major regional presence.

Mention should be made of the contributions made by organizations such as the European Union, which provided the region with US$15 million, two-thirds of which was distributed to Honduras and Nicaragua, and the rest among the other two most heavily affected countries. In the same way, the United States Department of Agriculture provided aid in the form of 180 000 tonnes of wheat, 50 000 tonnes of maize and an aid programme of US$40 million in other products, supplying the food aid through the Food for Peace programme.

In addition, the organizations of the United Nations System channelled all kinds of aid to those sectors that were most vulnerable to, and affected by the disaster, contributing, during the assistance phase, to the preparation of prevention and relief actions in all the countries concerned, particularly PAHO, with its aid programmes for the health sector, and UNICEF, with its assistance to affected communities and to national institutions working with children and families.

On a regional basis, FAO, together with WFP, made major efforts to seek contributions from the international community. Those contributions totalled US$58.4 million, and were intended to supply of food aid to 1 125 000 people, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, over a period of six months. FAO also contributed by launching Technical Cooperation Programmes (TCPs) in each of those countries. Those programmes were linked to the immediate productive recovery of small food producers.

Furthermore, meetings of the Donor Community Consultative Group were also held, in Washington (December 1998), Estocolmo (May 1999) and Madrid (March 2001), with a view to drafting a framework for cooperation with the region. During these meetings, donors made commitments for over US$2 800 million. Most of this money has not, however, been provided to the affected countries.

With regard to emergency assistance for the health emergency in the farming sector, both IICA and OIRSA made major contributions to the affected countries, for amounts of around US$300 000 and US$250 000 respectively. Those funds were used to purchase vaccines and chemicals, as well as for surveillance and data-collection actions aimed at monitoring potential outbreaks of plague and disease in the livestock sector.

It should be mentioned that in the Central American region, efforts are being made to strengthen CEPREDENAC, as the satellite organization of SICA, bringing together the national entities working in each country to help reduce the impact of natural disasters.

CEPREDENAC receives support from the following organizations:

• Germany's GTZ, which promotes local structures in matters of preparation, relief and prevention. GTZ also runs a programme to strengthen organizations responsible for implementing emergency operations in each country;
• Sweden's ASDI, which is focusing its attention on early-warning systems designed to reduce risk, strengthening CEPREDENAC;
• Norway's NORAD, which is focusing its attention on preparatory measures to be taken to counter seismic risk, with CEPREDENAC as its counterpart;
• IDB and the World Bank, which are also focusing their efforts on helping to strengthen the National Committees of CEPREDENAC in each country;
• UNESCO, which is providing support for the strengthening of capacities to reduce the impact of natural disasters, with CEPREDENAC as its counterpart.

Most of the funding provided by these institutions had run out by the time this report was being prepared. Additional resources are now being provided, however, with a view to funding integration and coordination activities, in light of the weaknesses identified in the following areas:

• Development of maps and risk scenarios, by type of risk;
• Standardization of regional information;
• Risk management;
• Planning of actions to deal with emergencies and reconstruction.

It must be said that efforts to address food vulnerability, within CEPREDENAC and within its counterparts in each country, are not reflected in the content of their respective programmes. Indeed, incorporation of this key social variable has not yet been addressed at the regional level.

6. Impact on internal and external migration

National institutions in the Central American region do not keep domestic records that might make it possible to determine the extent of migration from rural areas to the cities. Urban populations continue to increase, however, and SICA estimates indicate that if the relationship between rural and urban areas continues in this manner, the region will be transformed into a predominately urban region, with conditions very similar to those of Venezuela (the difference being that Central America does not have Venezuela's oil wealth).

Furthermore, it is well known - and migration records confirm this - that a significant proportion of migrants (the vast majority) head for the United States. As a result, these immigrants have become, in the case of El Salvador, the leading national resource in terms of foreign exchange income and support of the family economy and the national economy.

In 1999, total family remittances from abroad were as follows: El Salvador, US$1 600 million; Guatemala, US$700 million; Honduras, US$400 million; and Nicaragua, US$800 million.²⁵ This means that the region receives US$3 500 million per annum, equivalent to US$118 per annum per person. These remittances help somewhat to lighten the burden of many families in Central America, although in many cases, they conceal investments from other people in the countries.

7. National policies on food security

National food-security policies have been advocated by regional Agriculture Ministries as an essential component of efforts to manage natural disasters and improve the living standards of the population. In practice, however, it has not proven possible to communicate this message effectively. Nor has it proven possible to convince people of the support that should be given, at an institutional level, to build an administrative structure to implement actions that make it possible to conduct assessments and set up the various follow-up and evaluation mechanisms.

Authorities in the various countries do discuss this issue, and they are concerned about the living conditions of vulnerable population groups. In most cases, however, this idea is used more to refer to the supply of food to at-risk groups than it is to determine appropriate policy measures to resolve the food insecurity of the aforementioned groups. It also seems that the authorities have lost sight of the steps that need to be taken, and that ideas are often focused on mechanisms for combating poverty, as the essential precondition for efforts to combat food insecurity.

Some countries have drafted policy documents that require complementary technical-assistance programmes - since, in most cases, they focus on nutritional aspects - while avoiding factors such as the availability of foods, the stability of food supply, the conditions needed to ensure access and the best way to consume the food, bearing in mind the appropriate biological utilization.

The contents of each country's national policy are as follows:

Belize: Recently, in February of the present year, the Government presented its National Policy on Food Security, which will be administered by the Food and Nutrition Agency, administered by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Cooperatives (Ministro de Agricultura, Pesca y Cooperativas), with the participation of other ministries, NGOs and civil society. The Government presented the following six lines of action:

• Information, Education and Communication in Food Production, Preparation and Nutrition;
• Diversification of food production, food processing, storage and mobilization of credit;
• Care of pregnant and breastfeeding women, school meals and nutrition for the elderly and groups living in extreme poverty;
• Job creation and creation of local capacities;
• Food quality;
• Analysis and reform of national food and nutrition policies.

Guatemala: In the middle of last year, Guatemala's Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAGA: Ministerio de Agricultura y Alimentación) formulated a proposal, which is currently being debated, called the Nutritional Food Security Policy 2000-2004. This policy is part of the Agricultural Policy for the same period. Food-security policy has an operational mechanism, the National Food and Nutritional Security System, which has not been successfully implemented since it was created in 1997, when the country's first Nutritional Policy on Food Security was drafted and approved. Its implementation is the responsibility of MAGA, which approves any actions that may be implemented in this context. It has the following objectives:

• To guarantee production of, sustainable supply of, adequate access to, and creation of favourable nutritional conditions for the consumption of basic, nutritional foods for the urban and rural population, mainly for at-risk groups, such as children, breastfeeding mothers and the elderly;
• To facilitate the development of activities that promote quality of life and/or productive activities designed to improve the economic incomes of the poorest population sectors, thereby increasing their capacity access to food;
• To facilitate food production activities within production systems that are socially, economically and environmentally sustainable, and provide them with support, with a view to improving access to technology, as well as to financial and institutional resources;
• To strengthen food-marketing systems, with a view to achieving maximum stability of supply and prices.

El Salvador: El Salvador has not yet drafted a food-security policy. A Food Security Strategy was formulated recently (1997). Based on four key development areas, this strategy has yet to be debated by the country's new authorities. There is a concern, however, on the part of the authorities, to initiate some form of action. The four key development areas are:

• To promote the increase and diversification of agricultural production among small and medium-size farmers, within a context of economic profitability and environmental sustainability;
• To encourage allotment or garden agriculture in rural areas, with a view to diversifying growers' diets and developing the function of such techniques as temporary sources of income;
• To promote job creation in rural areas, especially by seeking to improve coordination between agricultural production and the food-processing industry, by providing support for development and for the creation of centres of economic activity in the country's mid-sized towns;
• To define the institutional framework and the technical tools needed to facilitate the formulation, funding, execution and evaluation of the policies implemented, while striving to coordinate the public initiative with the private sector and with civil society, at the central and local levels.

Honduras: Up to this point, the State of Honduras has not had a national or institutional policy on food security. As a result, there are major shortcomings in the approach used by the State to deal with problems caused by shortages among the Honduran people - especially vulnerable and food-insecure groups.

Nicaragua: Until the early 1990s, Nicaragua was the region's best organized country in matters of food security, since it had a national programme that addressed all key areas. Thereafter, however, programme activities and institutional support gradually dried up, until the programme finally came to an end, in 1997. There is presently an initiative at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAGFOR: Ministerio Agropecuario y Forestal), designed to initiate actions partially reinstating substantive programme actions. At the same time, the Department of Social Action has been charged by the Office of the President of the Republic with development of a Food Security and Nutrition Policy. The key strategic goals of that policy are the following:

• To promote conditions that help to improve domestic food production, with a view to increasing the available of food among the population;
• To ensure that the people have permanent access to plain and culturally acceptable foods, in order to provide a nutritionally appropriate diet, in terms of quantity and quality;
• To promote changes to habits and healthy dietary patterns;
• To improve indices for micronutrient deficiency and protein and energy malnutrition among children under five;
• To guarantee monitoring of foods with regard to hygiene, health and nutrition;
• To lead and coordinate the efforts both of state institutions, within the scope of their budgetary allocations, and of private institutions, whether national or international, to promote food and nutritional security;
• To provide an education based on the application of healthy practices, a healthy and nutritional diet, recreation and care of the environment.

These programmes have remained well-intentioned documents, and nothing more. Due to changes in Government, they have essentially remained on the shelf, without being transformed into concrete programmes to assist groups at risk or deal with food vulnerability. As with poverty-reduction strategies, launching such programmes requires the strengthening of national capacities, as well as the commitment of governments to allocating the budgetary resources needed to guarantee the sustainability of the proposed actions and goals.

Addressing food insecurity on a regional basis should provide an opportunity for close collaboration and consultation regarding specific actions, such as agreements or contracts, involving production, the horizontal transfer of low-cost technologies, marketing and the management of a consistent supply of standard foods specific to each country. The potential and the productive culture of the region can be addressed, on the one hand, through joint implementation of such actions with small producers and, on the other hand, through the systematic implementation of programmes for the analysis and definition of food vulnerability among population sectors living in extreme poverty and vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters. The objective is to identify more effectively the production systems and alternative sources of income that can help to reduce such vulnerability.