To be able to assess the efficiency of the forest revenue system, it is worthwhile looking at the modes of collection with respect to the various forest products (i.e. timber, poles, charcoal, firewood, etc.).
In terms of cost effectiveness, the timber royalties are probably very cost-efficient. The DFO's and field staff collecting timber royalties are government employees earning civil service salaries. In a district, the total monthly salaries of a DFO and field staff involved in collecting these royalties may not exceed Ush 500,000, but the total amount collected is usually much more than this.
Regarding the evasion of charges, this is possible where the field officers collude with the sawmillers to under-declare the volumes cut and where logs are stolen from the forest. Although this is not very common, it has been reported in some stations. In most cases, these temptations are brought about by factors such as poor remuneration for staff, delays in paying salaries and the non-payment of allowances. Illegally harvested timber is normally transported without the necessary documentation and is transported at night or disguised in some form in order to escape arrest. Attempts have been made to minimise this by patrolling with a task force, which verifies the documentation of timber in transit and at timber sheds and stock markets. Timber without proper documentation is impounded and auctioned. The success of these patrols is shown by the collection of Ush 137,898,936 during the 1999/2000 financial year (an increase on the pervious year’s figure of Ush 36,827,180). This accounted for 12.4% of total revenue collection. Certainly, the expenses incurred by members of the task force (e.g. allowances, fuel, etc.) are less than 30% of the total amount collected.
The new system of making advance deposits to the District Forest Office will also minimise the evasion of charges if it is implemented honestly. One of the current weaknesses of timber royalty collection is monitoring in the forest. Even with the rigorous patrols of the task force, a lot of illegally obtained timber still finds its way to the market, implying that monitoring and control at the source is still weak. Two of the reasons for this are inadequate staffing in the field and the lack of transport. In addition, even the few existing staff are not motivated and not particularly concerned about what goes on inside the forest. Therefore, their collusion in illegal activities cannot be ruled out.
Irregular monitoring by Forestry Department headquarters staff is also a contributing factor to the evasion of charges. There is no proper system at headquarters to check the amounts collected against what might be expected. Field visits are irregular due to difficulties with transport and the lack of money for allowances. Therefore, field staff are not very worried about colluding with the private-sector, because they know that audits by headquarters staff are very infrequent.
The current systems to document timber production and royalty collection also include some measures that reduce the scope for revenue losses. Advance payment ensures that legal producers will not get into arrears with their royalty payments. The declaration of production to the URA before timber is stamped also ensures the timely payment of VAT.
Timber royalty collection has been dealt with in detail because it is the only system of forest revenue collection that is complex and it accounts for nearly 60% of total revenue collection. For the other types of forest products (e.g. charcoal, firewood, poles, etc.) the system of revenue collection is relatively simple. The producer simply visits the DFO's office to pay for the quantity taken or to obtain a licence to deal in the products for a specified period of time. In some cases, the Forest Ranger in charge collects the revenue and later submits this to the DFO. However, as with the timber royalties, charges can be evaded through collusion and stealing.
On the whole, the forest revenue system could be improved by implementing a number of measures:
Level of charges. In the past, forest products were viewed as a service by government for the welfare of the people and, as such, forest charges were very low. Charges should be revised to reflect realistic market prices.
Staff motivation. The people responsible for revenue collection should be well-motivated and harsh punishments should be prescribed for illegal acts.
Mobility. Field staff have to have transport in order to be able to collect revenue. In particular, effective patrols in and around forest reserves require transport.
Supervision. In addition to local supervision by the DFO, there must be regular supervision by headquarters staff.
Forest practices. The loss of revenue through careless tendencies (e.g. abandoning short logs, abandoning of less valuable species and the use of destructive logging techniques) should be minimised by carrying out technical audits and by intensifying supervision. Failures in any of these areas should be met with severe punishments (e.g. the cancellation of a licence)
Bonuses. Revenue could also be increased by introducing a bonus system for those who excel in the collection of revenue. This would require the setting of targets which, if exceeded, would qualify the staff member for a bonus award.
The ITTO definition of sustainable forest management is:
“Sustainable forest management is the process of managing forests to
achieve one or more clearly specified objectives of management with regard to
the production of a continuous flow of desired forest products and services,
without undue reduction of its inherent values and future productivity and
without undesirable effects on the physical and social environment.”
In Uganda, the major factors in the forest revenue system that are likely to have an impact on sustainable forest management are the legal and policy framework, revenue sharing and control and supervision.
Much of the forest revenue system in Uganda is regulated by Section 30 of the 1961 Forest Act (Cap 246) which, amongst other things, gives the Minister the powers to do the following:
to prescribe fees to be paid for a license issued for forest produce;
to prescribe fees to be paid for the cutting or removal of forest produce; and
to prescribe the manner in which the Commissioner or any other person specified by such rules may sell or dispose of forest produce.
Section 31(1) of the same Act gives powers to the local authorities to make rules applicable to the local forest reserves controlled by them.
It is one of the objectives of the current Forestry Policy to promote the development of viable and efficient forest-based industries, so as to fully utilise forest products, reduce excessive waste and satisfy domestic and export demand for competitively priced quality products. However, the law has not been updated to reflect this and much of the 1961 Forest Act is still in force today. Problems with the current legal and policy framework include: the low level of royalties and penalties; inadequate provision for private-sector development; and the lack of resources for the Forestry Department.
Low levels of penalties and royalties. The Act includes rules and regulations for sustainable forest management and prescribes penalties for contravention of the Act, but those penalties are now so ridiculously low that they are no deterrent to illegal activities. For example, for cutting more than the allowable cut, the fine is Ush 2,500 or imprisonment for 6 months, regardless of the quantity of roundwood cut. From 1964 to 1971 this fine was equivalent to US$ 375, but now it is only equal to about US$ 1.40. Thus, this fine is very easy to pay and it encourages people to over-cut the forest.
Another problem is the pricing policy. The Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) for Class I hardwoods taken from forest reserves is 1,960 m3 of roundwood, which is equivalent to 163 m3 of roundwood each month. This AAC is based on an agreed number of sawmillers and pitsawyers working in a forest reserve and the average volume of roundwood that each is able to take in a month. The timber royalty for Class I hardwoods was Ush 34,000/m3 or approximately US$ 18.80/m3, before the recent revision to the royalties. At a 30 percent recovery rate, the output of sawnwood from 163 m3 of roundwood is 49 m3 and the current market price of sawnwood from Class 1 hardwoods is approximately US$ 482/m3. Therefore, the 49 m3 of sawnwood would sell for US $23,618 after paying a royalty of US$ 3,065. Even after offsetting the expense of producing the sawnwood, the profit margin is still so big that a sawmiller would have a strong incentive to make more money by cutting more than the AAC. The new timber royalties may have reduced this problem, but it remains to be seen how effective it will be at reducing the incentive to harvest more than is allowed.
In conclusion, the low royalties on forest products and very low penalties for illegal acts do little to discourage the over-exploitation of forest resources and lead to unsustainable forest management. The effects of this have been: a decline in forest resources in the tropical high forest, where about 280,000 ha is now degraded; a reduction in the area of other woodlands, where there has been a lot of clearance; and a reduction in the area of government forest reserves, where there is now only 740,000 ha of the original 1.1 million ha.
Private-sector development. Much of the current forestry policy and legislation focuses on protected areas and forest reserves and only engages the private-sector in an advisory role. This may have led to some forest degradation on private and public lands and the loss of revenues. Unlike other sectors of the economy, there has been no privatisation of forest reserves so far. In addition, another gap in the current forestry policy is that there is no provision for subsidies in the sector. Grants are not even available to support forest extension (as they are in agriculture).
Resource constraints. According to the Forestry Policy, the management of gazetted forest reserves is entirely the responsibility of the Forestry Department. However, the remittance of most of the revenues collected from the sector to the Treasury and the ever declining budgetary allocation to the sector from the Treasury prevents the Forestry Department from executing the routine and development activities of the sector. The authorised AiA is far less than what is required for all of the planned activities throughout the country, with the result that many activities are not executed, illegal activities have increased and the forest is degraded and revenue is lost. The decline in the budgetary allocation for the forestry sector may be partly due to the relatively low contribution from the sector to the Treasury, but the management of forest reserves by poorly paid and demotivated government staff has resulted in a cycle of increased illegal activities, degradation of forests and the corruption of some demoralised staff.
The Government of Uganda is the main recipient of forest revenue collected from the forest reserves, followed by the local government at the LC 5 level. In most districts, the 40 percent of revenue that is retained at the district level is rarely passed onto lower levels (LC 3), but remains at the LC 5 level. The equitable sharing of forest revenue with the lower levels is rarely considered, so local government at the LC 3 level and the District Forest Offices do not benefit directly and have limited control over the forest revenue that is collected.
Although the parishes or sub-counties adjacent to the forest reserves do not benefit from forest revenue collection, they bear most of the costs and responsibility for forest protection. The absence of benefit sharing leads to the desire by local government at the lower levels to levy additional taxes on timber and their reluctance to participate in the protection of forest reserves.
Furthermore, many districts are opposed to any sharing of revenue with the central government. They want to retain all of the forest revenue collected and, where this feeling is strong, the support of these local governments is minimal. The protection of forest reserves requires the support of local government, so there is a need for the Forestry Department to come to an amicable arrangement with local government about revenue sharing, so that their co‑operation can be obtained to support sustainable forest management.
Out of the 60 percent of forest revenue that is remitted to the central government, a certain fraction is paid back to the Forestry Department as AiA on a monthly basis. This mainly covers recurrent expenditure. On average, every DFO receives Ush 200,000 (US$ 117) per month, which is grossly inadequate to cover the costs of forest protection activities and operating expenses. This situation leads to the severe demotivation of Forestry Department field staff. Even more important is the pay and conditions offered to Forestry Department staff, which are very poor. Given the poor pay and terms and conditions of employment, it is almost inevitable that some staff will seek to improve their lot through corrupt practices. However, this situation may improve shortly, as the Forestry Department is currently undergoing re-structuring and it is expected that the new organisation will include fewer staff than at present, but with significantly improved terms and conditions.
Finally, it is the prerogative of the Treasury Department in the Ministry of Finance to determine which items on the Forestry Department work-plan are financed and the ceiling for the Forestry Department budget. This depends on their assessment of national priorities at the time and has, for a long time, undermined the prioritisation of activities by the Forestry Department (particularly forestry development programmes).
For example, the forest plantations that were planted in the 1960’s and 1970’s have not been regenerated after clear‑felling, due to a lack of funds. The National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) states in its State of the Environment Report for Uganda 1988 (page 81):
“It has been predicted that if massive afforestation is not immediately
undertaken, the country will face sawnwood production deficits by the year 2010
at the current level of harvesting.
This will have major implication on both the economy to import timber to
satisfy domestic need and the environment (through reduction of both the
products and services accruing from the forests).”
Such a scenario is an example of the unsustainability of current forest management. However, it is expected that the proposed National Forestry Authority will have greater autonomy. The Authority will encourage minimal government involvement in the sector, the out-sourcing of activities and privatisation, to boost productivity and support the drive towards sustainable forest management.
Under the current systems for monitoring and controlling forestry practices and revenue collection, supervision is inadequate. Few staff from the Forestry Department Headquarters travel to the field. The absence of field visits from the top management of the Forestry Department has led to field staff becoming increasingly alienated towards good forestry practice and has led to low productivity and low levels of forest revenue collection. To achieve sustainable forest management and improved forest revenue collection, regulatory and advisory services (such as monitoring, standard setting, inspection and technical assistance) are necessary.
There are no specific mechanisms in the forest revenue system to promote sustainable forest management. Performance bonds and improvement grants are not available. Consequently, investors in forest plantations have invested very little in their projects and are not working to a high technical level. Indeed, groups of local people, if properly supported, could probably grow trees on leased land inside the forest reserves or on their own land that would meet higher standards than the current investors are achieving. Technical and financial support systems are required to encourage this. There is also a need to provide systems to minimise and control the degradation of forests. These should be based on appropriate incentives and disincentives to encourage better management of the existing forest resource and the expansion of the resource onto agricultural land and other suitable land.
The following recommendations are suggested to enhance the impact of the forest revenue system on sustainable forest management:
forest charges should be set with reference to the existing economic situation, so that real market values are charged;
similarly, penalties for forest offences should be more of a deterrent (i.e. the fines should be high enough to make illegal operations unattractive);
there should be a complete reform of the sector, to allow the participation of other stakeholders outside the Forestry Department;
grants and other subsidies should be used to provide incentives for good forest management and extension by the private-sector;
AiA should be increased so that the priorities of the sector are adequately funded;
forestry policy should be revised to address the protection of forests on public and private land;
the ban on public-sector recruitment should be lifted to allow the recruitment of field staff required for the effective policing of the forest reserves and improved revenue collection; and
in order to maintain the minimum amount of forest required for sustainable forest management, land-use policies must be defined and clarified to stop tendencies such as the de‑gazetting of forest reserves for industrial development.
From all the above, it is evident that the level of sustainability achieved now in forest management is dependent on donor funding. The government only provides money for recurrent expenditure (e.g. staff salaries, allowances and administration costs etc.), supplemented with AiA. Of the total government expenditure on forestry, 22 percent is used for salaries, 19 percent is used for allowances, 18 percent is spent on administration costs and the rest is spent on paying for utilities.
In the current financial year (2000-01), the government budget for forest operations is Ush 877,763,000 (approximately US$ 487,646), compared to donor funding of Ush 1,241,116,000 (US$ 1,930,624). This money is used for forestry projects implemented by the Forestry Department, such as: the Tree Seed Project; the National Biomass Study; the Peri Urban Plantations Project; and capacity building. This money is shared between over 50 District Forest Offices, so that each district receives between Ush 20,000 and Ush 300,000 from the government each month, to cover all operational expenses, such as: transport; fuel; stationery; office supplies; etc. Vital management activities (such as: protection from fires and illegal activities; new planting; tending operations; stock surveys; management inventories; tending of permanent sample plots; forest boundary demarcation; forest management planning; awareness campaigns; and forest extension services) are all not catered for at all in government funding. Salary levels are very low and there are no measures to motivate staff (e.g. bonuses or extra allowances). In addition, there is no provision for subsidies or grants to motivate companies and individuals operating in the forestry sector.
All of the expenditure on development activities is donor-funded, with the exception of the taxes that should be paid on imported goods and the salaries of local staff attached to projects. This grossly inadequate level of government funding leads to the low level of achievement in terms of sustainable forest management. Forest degradation has been increasing and it is only through these projects that the Forestry Department has managed to regain some control over the forest estate and to plan some sustainable forest management activities.
It appears that the priorities of government have led to the inadequate resources devoted to forestry and the critical problem of financing in the Forestry Department. The revenue collected by government (from all sources) is not sufficient to cover all of the programmes in the various ministries and departments of government. The government has core programmes, such as: Universal Primary Education (UPE); Defence; Poverty Alleviation; and Health etc., which are given higher priority during budgetary allocations. The result of this is that departments such as the Forestry Department are seriously marginalised. This is probably due to a combination of factors, such as low revenue collection in the forestry sector and the lack of understanding amongst legislators about the environmental importance of forestry.
One of the solutions to the problems mentioned above could be to improve revenue collection, so that the contribution from the forestry sector to the Treasury becomes significant. If legislators view the sector as an important source of government revenue then the budget allocations to the Forestry Department will definitely be increased.
Secondly, the Forestry Department should become autonomous, so that it has the authority to use the revenue it collects. If this is done, expenditure will be allocated according to the priorities of the Forestry Department and important activities for sustainable forest management will rank high in that list of priorities. An alternative to this would be to increase the flexibility of the AiA, so that funds can be switched around when circumstances make this necessary. Currently, it is not permitted to move AiA funds across activities and this often doesn’t make any sense. For example, in the 2000-01 budget for AiA, the budget for water is Ush 118,000,000 and the budget for electricity is only Ush 3,716,000, but the use of water is far more limited than the use of electricity.
Finally, another important measure would be to create awareness amongst the legislators about the environmental benefits of forestry. This might help them to appreciate these benefits and protect the Forestry Department from drastic budgetary cuts.
There are a number of related Acts and policies that affect sustainable forest management and these are discussed below.
Under the Wildlife Statue of 1966, 321,000 ha of forest were transferred to the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). The UWA simply resorted to clear-felling the forest plantations within the boundaries of these areas (many of which were valuable research and seed areas) in the hope that they would convert to natural forest. They did not know that many of these areas were established on grassland not natural forest and that it might have been better to carefully thin them to protect and enhance the natural regeneration of indigenous species.
Clear-felling leads to a tangle of weeds and competing species, which take decades to develop into a natural forest. This felling, which was done without a harvesting plan, deprived the sector of the important seed sources and the revenue that could have been obtained from the wood. In addition, it stopped the research on sustainable forest management in these areas. On the whole, the transfer of control of these areas to the UWA led to the loss of valuable forest resources and did not meet their stated objectives very well.
The framework for decentralisation in the 1997 Local Government Act included the devolution of powers from central government to the districts and lower-level councils. This included the transfer of powers over management of a number of natural resources, such as water, fisheries and forestry.
The management of all forest reserves was decentralised at first, but management of the major forest reserves (areas over 5,000 ha – known as Central Forest Reserves) was soon brought back under central government control. This policy was reversed because it was felt that the districts lacked the technical expertise and the financial resources needed for effective and sustainable forest management. In addition, there was a fear that the districts might disregard the biological and environmental status of these forests (e.g. AACs) and over-exploit the forests in order to cover their budget deficits.
Uncontrolled harvesting has already been noted in the local forest reserves that remained under the control of local government. For example, uncontrolled felling for charcoal and timber production, uncontrolled grazing and the conversion of forest areas to agricultural land have been reported. In view of this, the degradation of most of the local forest reserves in Uganda seems highly likely.
The reasons for these problems are that none of the districts have adequate mechanisms for managing forest resources and none of them are aware of the need for reinvestment in order to ensure sustainable forest management. In addition, none of them have recruited forest officers to plan the management of these local forest reserves.
If local governments are concerned about sustainable forest management, they have the powers to make bye-laws (under various Acts and the Constitution) and they could introduce a bye‑law to regulate forest harvesting.
The 1998 Land Act gives the responsibility of managing land resources to the districts and empowers them to manage all land-related issues in their respective areas. This Act has important implications for the management of forest areas on public land outside the forest reserves. These areas have had almost no formal management and many have been converted to other land uses, particularly agriculture. It is not clear if the districts will also assume the responsibility managing these forests or leave them to fate.
The 1998 Land Act also gives the authority to people to claim ownership of land that they have used or lived on 13 years or more. This could become a threat to sustainable forest management, if a user claims ownership of forest reserve land that they have used for more than 13 years. In particular, this is a problem in forest reserves where the boundaries have not been clearly marked. There is the danger that private ownership of land will lead to more forest fragmentation, which could be a hindrance to obtaining large blocks of land for commercial forest plantation development. Private land ownership may also cause people without land to move into forest areas. Finally, the private ownership of land could lead to the depletion of forests on private land, if private land owners are not made aware of the importance of their forests and helped to improve their farming methods.
On the other hand, private land ownership could encourage investment in forest plantations by individuals that have the necessary resources and interest. However, under the prevailing economic conditions at the moment, there is a great need for immediate income generation, which is likely to encourage more expansion of agriculture.
The current policy on urbanisation and industrialisation is seen as threat to sustainable forest management due to the pressure this generates for the conversion of forest land. Many urban and peri-urban plantations are threatened with clearance. For example, the increasing demand for industrial land has caused the loss of 1,000 ha of forest in Namanve Forest Reserve (on the Kampala-Jinja highway) and another loss of 8,744 ha in Wabisi-Wajala Forest Reserve. There are also numerous smaller areas of peri-urban plantations that have been cleared by some urban authorities.
The Public Service Reform and Restructuring Exercise has led to the depletion of human resources in the forestry sector and there is now a staff requirement gap of 154 Forest Rangers, 284 Forest Guards and 25 Forest Officers. This has led to very weak protection of the forest estate, a lack of extension services, and illegal activities.
To date, the Government’s overall financial support to the forestry sector has been minimal. The reasons for this have already been discussed at length above. However, the sector does enjoy enormous political support. The appointment of a Minister of State for Environment signifies the importance that the government attaches to the sector.
Support is also shown by the fact that Uganda participates in the regional and international level intergovernmental meetings on sustainable forest management. At the regional level, Uganda is a signatory to the East African Co‑operation Treaty and is a member of IGAD and COMESA. Uganda is also a party to the following international conventions: the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES); the Ramsar Convention; and the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. These are all opportunities to pursue forestry policy development through regional and international cooperation.
Given the limited resources that Uganda can commit to the forestry sector, significant benefits have been realised and effectiveness has been increased through regional and international initiatives. The high level of political support for forestry in the Government has been recognised by donors and accounts for the large number of donor-funded projects that the Forestry Department is currently implementing.
Uganda’s forest resources can contribute to poverty eradication and wealth creation, through woodland management operations and forest-based industrial activities. In addition, although formal management of Uganda’s forests began over 100 years ago, the sector is still faced with many challenges as a result of the country’s turbulent post-independence history and the new developments in policy and legislation. Consequently, the existing 1988 Forest Policy is considered weak and inadequate and the Cabinet has proposed to transform the Forestry Department into a semi-autonomous National Forest Authority (NFA).
The proposed NFA is expected to improve the performance of the Ugandan forestry sector in general and, in particular, to improve the management of Central Forest Reserves. In line with this, a new sectoral forestry policy is being formulated. The aim of this is to protect an adequate level of forest cover, which will be owned by the Government, but will be sustainably managed with the participation of the private‑sector and non-governmental organisations. This should provide the ecological services and goods that will be required by present and future generations of Ugandans and the global community. The creation of the NFA is also expected to lead to the benefits described below.
Reduced government spending or the forestry sector. As mentioned earlier, the revenue collected by the Forestry Department is far below potential revenue, due to insufficient funding and capacity. As a result, the districts are gaining little from the Government’s involvement in the forestry sector and the current arrangement leads to net expenditure on forestry by the central government. Higher revenue collection is expected with the creation of a semi-autonomous NFA and it is expected that the effectiveness of expenditure will be improved by improvements in the prioritisation of expenditure.
More efficient management of the Central Forest Reserves. Forest management in the Central Forest Reserves has been inefficient due to a lack of capacity in the Forestry Department. The NFA is to restore this capacity, so that the desired economic and environmental contributions of forestry to society will be achieved.
Increased investment in the forest sector. In the past, both public and private investment in the forestry sector has been limited. The reasons for this are partly economic and partly legal and institutional. In particular, the Forestry Department seems to lack the capacity to attract private investors. The NFA is expected to be more private-sector orientated and will raise the possibility of attracting small and large-scale investors in forestry by providing better public‑private management agreements and improved support and control.
Better income allocation in the forest sector. In spite of the high level of activity in the forestry sector, revenue collection is limited. The proposed NFA should improve the forest revenue system by implementing a number of the following recommendations:
in Central Forest Reserves, stumpage fees should be flexible in order to adapt to changes within and between markets and the use of auctions has been suggested as a way to charge the true market prices for certain products such as sawlogs;
market-based values should be used to assess the 15% tax (in lieu of VAT) on sawnwood production, so that there is no discrimination against VAT registered sawnwood producers;
the NFA’s income should be based on activities within the Central Forest Reserves and services supplied to and paid for by the private-sector, government institutions and donors, but trees outside the reserves should not be reserved by the NFA and should not be subjected to forest charges;
charges on the export or production of processed forest products should not be a responsibility of the NFA, but should remain the responsibility of another government institution and they should not favour government owned enterprises;
districts should collect the 15% tax on sawnwood production from private farmers and those below the VAT threshold, instead of the current system whereby the revenue to the districts is allocated through the Forestry Department.
the role of districts as forest owners should be reviewed and it is suggested that they should collect revenue from forestry activities in their boundaries through licence fees, the 15% tax on sawnwood production, employment and income taxes, rather than through direct involvement in forest operations (where the private‑sector should become more involved in the management of Local Forest Reserves); and
The 40% gross revenue collection allocation to the districts should be reviewed and revised so that the proposed NFA is not dependent on g overnment funding for their activities and will become financially sustainable.
In conclusion, the forestry sector in Uganda is currently being restructured in order to achieve a higher degree of sustainable forest management. A new sectoral forestry policy is being formulated and the Forest Act and accompanying rules and regulations are also being revised in order to provide an enabling environment for sustainable forest management.
With respect to the forest revenue system, the aspects currently being reviewed and revised include the following:
the extent to which the Forestry Department can levy taxes on reserved tree species on private land and timber from private forests;
the management of forest revenue collection;
the funding of forest management activities; and
the arrangements for revenue sharing.
It is anticipated that this restructuring will allow the forestry sector to grow to reach its full potential. Both the Government of Uganda and local government are expected to gain from these institutional changes and the proposed changes to the forest revenue system.
